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The Hidden Dimensions of Monitoring and Planning in Pakistan 
1. De roep om eenvoudige monitoring systemen voor ontwikkelingsprogramma's is 
misleidend. Eenvoudige informatie over de sociale werkelijkheid (bijv. key 
performance indicators) is vaak alleen aan de hand van complexe informatiesystemen 
te verkrijgen. 
2. De idee dat één en hetzelfde project monitoring systeem meerdere, elkaar vaak 
tegenstrevende categorieën van belanghebbenden van zinvolle informatie kan voorzien, 
berust veelal op een fictie. 
3. Alle problemen met betrekking tot dè beoordeling van doelstellingen en problemen die 
spelen bij projectevaluaties spelen ook bij project monitoring systemen. 
4. Vele problemen tijdens de uitvoering van het ontwikkelingsprogramma van de 
Pakistaanse overheid zijn in essentie budgetair; 'preventieve' monitoring van 
beschikbare budgetruimte en van committeringen kan al veel goed werk verrichten. 
5. Monitoring systemen zijn door de standaardisatie van waarneming niet zo geschikt 
voor de verkenning van de onbedoelde sociaal-economische effecten van projecten en 
programma's. Rapid Appraisal, survey en evaluatie instrumenten zijn daarvoor 
geschikter. 
6. Het vaak door donoren gehanteerde uitgangspunt evaluaties samen met de counterpart 
uit te voeren getuigt van een naïef geloof in harmonie; zeker indien het dient te leiden 
tot verslaglegging onder gezamenlijke verantwoordelijkheid (zie ook IOV 1993, blz. 
16). 
7. De afwezigheid van een sterke geprofessionaliseerde lokale overheid (zowel op 
politiek als op ambtelijk niveau) is een van de grote problemen van overheidsbeleid 
in ontwikkelingslanden als Pakistan. 
8. Donoren zouden bij de analyse van hulpontvangende landen veel meer aandacht 
moeten besteden aan de vraag welke maatschappelijke belangengroepen in de kontekst 
van een pluralistische maatschappij de meeste steun verdienen. 
9. De eis van het Promotiereglement dat ten minste zes stellingen geen betrekking mogen 
hebben op de inhoud van het proefschrift getuigt van een verouderd geloof aan de 
universaliteit van het genie van de promovendus. 
10. Het Internet is dé manier om informatie te sluizen naar ontwikkelingslanden, en een 
goede ontsluiting daarvan zou allerwege moeten worden bevorderd in het kader van 
de Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking. 
11. De Nederlandse overheid heeft een merkwaardige opvatting van het recht op 
eerbiediging van het gezinsleven als bedoeld in artikel 8 van het Europese Verdrag tot 
bescherming van de rechten van de mens. Deze opvatting houdt bijvoorbeeld in dat 
een niet-Nederlandse vrouw met een Nederlands kind en een Nederlandse partner niet 
zonder meer met haar gezin naar Nederland mag meeverhuizen. 
12. Er is meer voor nodig dan het ontploffen van een ondergrondse atoombom, om de 
Nederlandse projecthulp aan Pakistan te doen opschudden. 
Walter Kolkma, 1998 
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& Kashmir. I was seconded as an Associate Expert to a project implemented by a department 
of the United Nations. This project was concerned with strengthening planning and 
monitoring capacities in the Planning and Development Department (P&DD). In the context 
of a computerised management information system, I was able to gain not only first hand 
experiences with monitoring, but also collect and analyse a wealth of statistical data, which 
are now the basis of this study. In 1994, as the project had come to an end, an application 
for a post advertised by the same Ministry of Development Cooperation, led to another 
assignment related to monitoring in Pakistan, now as a Monitoring Economist for the Social 
Action Programme in the North West Frontier Province. From the P&DD in Muzaffarabad 
I went to the P&DD in Peshawar. This gave me an opportunity to deepen my understanding 
of the bureaucracy and also keep an eye on post-project developments in Azad Kashmir. 
Monitoring systems for public sector development programmes, though much pursued in 
the practice of development planning, are not yet fully studied from the perspective of the 
social sciences. There are still some dimensions to be uncovered. Or so I think. I see it as 
my opportunity to contribute something to this field. Although my registration of this study 
with the Sociology Department of the University of Wageningen was to some extent a matter 
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Dusseldorp, Emeritus Professor in the Sociological Aspects of Development Planning in non-
Western Countries, at the University of Wageningen. They did not know me from before my 
request for their help - sent from Pakistan - but have been very interested and supportive 
from the start. Furthermore I like to thank the then Minister for Planning, Raja Zulqarnain, 
and Additional Chief Secretaries Yousef Awan and later Tariq Masood of the P&D 
Department in Muzaffarabad, who supported the idea of using AJK experiences and data as 
the source for this study. I would like to thank the project team, first and foremost Dr Irene 
Wilson, from whom I have learned so much, and who also encouraged me after the project 
and has made useful comments on a first draft. Furthermore Ralph Henderson and Dr 
Roswitha Newels, good and knowledgeable colleagues at the time. Two short missions to the 
project by Roger Longhorn put me on the road to learning the valuable techniques of systems 
design and software programming, for which I am grateful. I would like to especially thank 
also my project counterpart Aamir Ghani Mir, who was my closest contact in AJK and who 
continued to help me with various things until the time this dissertation was finally submitted. 
The list of people who have helped me in one way or another is too long to reflect here, but 
has to name at least Latif Khan, Anwar Saeed Abbasi, Mansour Qadir Dar, Ayub Minnas, 
Khalid Bashir Sheikh, Georg Frerks, M.H. Pervez and Ashraf Hussain (in the AJK period), 
and (in the NWFP period) Muhammad Jehanzeb Khan, Sarmad Khan, Nighat Sethi, Tom 
McCartan, Arif Majid Mohmand, Willo Brock and Martijn Elgersma. My good friend Dr 
Tom Kuhlman, with whom I have had so many interesting discussions and correspondence 
4 
also has to be mentioned, and monitoring specialist Dr Bert van de Putte, who put me on the 
right track in the beginning. 
Last but not least, I would like to apologize to my wife Sue and son Steven for the loss of 
so much quality family time... 
As Pakistan continues to 'stagger through history', now with their nuclear faux-pas, one 
cannot help but being extremely concerned about this nation full of human potential. I would 
like to dedicate this study to all the competent government officers and friendly support staff 
that I have had the privilege to meet in those interesting years in Pakistan. 
WK, July 1998 
5 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED 
ACS Additional Chief Secretary (Development) 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
ADP Annual Development Programme 
AERC Applied Economics Research Centre, University of Karachi 
AG Accountant General 
AGR Agriculture sector 
AJK Azad Jammu and Kashmir 
AKCDC Azad Kashmir Cabinet Development Committee 
AKDWP Azad Kashmir Development Working Party 
AKMIDC Azad Kashmir Mineral and Industry Development Corporation 
ANH Animal Husbandry sector 
APO Annual Plan of Operations 
BHU Basic Health Unit 
BPS Basic Pay Scale 
CDC Cabinet Development Committee 
CDO Central Design Office (Public Works Department) 
CDWP Central Development Working Party (in FPC) 
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency 
CM Chief Minister (of a Province) 
CMA Central Monitoring Agency 
CTA Chief Technical Adviser 
DAM Development Authority Muzaffarabad 
DC Deputy Commissioner 
DDAC District Development Advisory Committee 
DDO Drawing and Disbursing Officer 
DDWP Departmental Development Working Party 
DEO District Education Officer 
DG Director General 
DHO District Health Officer 
DMG District Management Group 
DO District Officer 
DPWO District Population Welfare Officer 
DWP Development Working Party 
ECNEC Economic Committee of the National Economic Council 
EDI Economic Development Institute of the World Bank 
EDU Education sector 
FA Foreign Aid 
FANA Federally Administered Northern Areas 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization 
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
FD Finance Department 
FEC Foreign Exchange Component 
FMO Female Medical Officer 
FOR Forestry sector 
FPC Federal Planning Commission 
FY Financial Year 
FYP Five Year Plan 
6 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNP Gross National Product 
GOAJK Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir 
HEA Health sector 
HT High Tension 
IDA International Development Association (World Bank) 
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development 
IHFDP Integrated Hill Farming Development Project 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IND Industries sector 
IOV Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking te Velde (Inspection Unit) 
IRDP Integrated Rural Development Programme 
IRR Internal Rate of Return 
KANA Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas 
LFA Logical Framework Approach 
LGRD Local Government and Rural Development 
LRD Local Government and Rural Development sector 
LT Low Tension 
M Million 
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation 
MDA Mirpur Development Authority 
MIS Management Information System 
MMO Male Medical Officer 
MNA Member of National Assembly 
MPA Member of Provincial Assembly 
MQM Muhajjir Qaumi Movement 
MSU . Multi-donor Support Unit of the Social Action Programme 
n.a. not available (also: not applicable) 
NEC National Economic Council 
NFC National Finance Commission 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
NHA National Highways Authority 
NPV Net Present Value 
NTRC National Transport and Research Centre 
NWFP North West Frontier Province 
O&M Operation and Maintenance 
ODA Overseas Development Administration (UK) 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OED Operations Evaluation Department (World Bank) 
P&DD Planning and Development Department 
PARD Pakistan Academy for Rural Development 
PAG Performance Audit Guidelines 
PC-1 Planning Commission proforma 1 (project document) 
PC-II Planning Commission proforma 2 (feasibility study document) 
PC-III Planning Commission proforma 3 (project progress report) 
pc-rv Planning Commission proforma 4 (project completion report) 
PC-V Planning Commission proforma 5 (project post-completion report) 
PM Prime Minister 
PMM Performance Measurement and Monitoring 
POW Power sector 
PPER Project Performance Evaluation Report 
PPH Physical Planning and Housing sector 
PPP Pakistan People's Party 
PSDP Public Sector Development Programme 
PWD Public Works Department 
QMR Quarterly Monitoring Report 
QRR Quarterly Review Report 
Qtr Quarter 
R&D Research and Development sector 
R&M Repair and Maintenance 
RCP Rational Comprehensive Planning 
RNE Royal Netherlands Embassy, Islamabad 
Rs Pakistan Rupee (Rs 1 = US$ 0.05 in 1991) 
RsM Rupees in Millions 
SAP Social Action Programme 
SAPP Social Action Programme Project 
SDP Special Development Programme 
SPDC Social Policy and Development Centre 
SWD Social Welfare Department 
TOU Tourism sector 
T&C Transport and Communication sector 
TPR Tri-Partite Review 
uc Union Council 
UN United Nations 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNDTCD United Nations Department of Technical Co-operation for Development 
WAPDA Water and Power Development Authority 
WAT Water sector 
WB World Bank 
XEN Executive Engineer 
8 
CHAPTER 1. THE ROLE OF MONITORING IN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING; 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
1.1 A renewed interest in monitoring 
For most governments of Third World countries, monitoring systems for public sector 
development programmes have been a regular item on the list of their good intentions. 
Throughout the history of their independence, efforts have been undertaken to turn the 
monitoring of development into a serious affair. However, over the past 15 years or so, the 
interest in establishing or improving monitoring systems has had a further boost (Van de Putte 
1991, Valadez & Bamberger 1994; Cracknell 1988). No self-respecting government 
department these days can be seen without a monitoring apparatus. Donor agencies are 
increasingly prepared to fund projects to improve these systems, and stress the need for 
improved monitoring if assistance in other areas is to be granted. In Pakistan, to give just one 
example, foreign aided projects concerned with improving monitoring systems for 
development programmes were ongoing in three of the four provinces, whereas in the other, 
negotiations with a donor were ongoing for a number of years. The author was a member in 
a project team working on a monitoring system in Azad Kashmir; in the Federal Planning 
Commission, projects were also being implemented (see also Frerks et al. 1990). Several 
reasons may be advanced to explain this upsurge of interest. 
A first reason that comes to mind is that a number of applied social sciences have become 
popular, which have had an impact on the perceived importance of information collection for 
decision-making. Public administration, business administration, policy analysis and 
'management science' in general have drawn attention to all conceivable factors contributing 
to the success of organisations, policies or programmes. The observation of the collection and 
exchange of information in many organisations and projects has led to a gradual reification 
of this process into monitoring systems and related management information systems; 
subsequently they became standard prescriptions. Since most decision-makers in developing 
countries have had a professional education and many have followed specific training courses 
in public administration, these ideas have filtered through. 
A second reason for the increased interest in monitoring systems is the even greater growth 
of attention for evaluations in public policy; a trend which blew over mostly from the United 
States. The need for regular data collection through monitoring, as a precursor to evaluation 
rounds, was realised by many evaluation advocates (Poister 1982; Casley & Kumar 1987). 
A third, more mundane, reason is the advent of the personal computer and relational 
database technologies in the 1980s which have given the old tedious paper based monitoring 
systems new analytic potential (Van de Putte 1991), as well as a new aureole of scientific 
rigour. Every organisation wishes to be known - or convince itself - as basing its decisions 
on sophisticated, 'high-tech' methodologies, rather than intractable personal observations and 
perceptions (Palumbo 1987, p.23). Therefore the establishment of such computer based 
systems was quickly pursued. 
A fourth reason is that many governments in Western countries have become more 
concerned about accountability in the use of public funds to their legislatures and electorates 
(Kickert 1993, p.21; Wholey 1997, p. 125; Mawhood 1997). Some of this wave of concern 
may have spilled over to developing countries. Moneys spent increasingly need to be 
demonstrated to have been spent efficiently, also in countries with weak governments and 
democracies. With Third World bureaucracies having grown faster than their economies and 
having become molochs, many bureaucrats and politicians have lost track of what is going 
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on. Monitoring systems (or nowadays also called Performance Measurement Systems) are 
seen as opportunities for reinforcing control. 
A fifth and perhaps most pertinent reason for the increased interest in monitoring is the 
general and growing disappointment with central planning as such. Econometric forecasting 
models have often been proved wrong; most economies have gone their own way. Long- and 
medium-term plans for infrastructural and social development have not been adhered to. 
Regional planning has often failed (Guimaraes 1997, p.282). The model of comprehensive 
planning has gone into crisis (Faber & Seers eds. 1972; Van Gunsteren 1976; Lacey 1989; 
Rondinelli 1993). In the West, the planning of the welfare state has proved to be much more 
volatile than imagined. In most developing countries, the planned 'take-off' (Rostov) has 
either failed to take place, or could not be sustained, such as in Pakistan. In Eastern Europe, 
both economy and society eventually collapsed under socialist totalitarian planning. These 
developments have led to a world-wide reduced trust in the power of the state to steer 
society. 
As one of the consequences, governments are almost everywhere trying to reduce their 
participation in the economy. Privatisation programmes of parts of the government have been 
mounted to reduce the managerial burden of government. In the social domain, many Western 
governments are now trying to cut down on the safety nets created for the unemployed, old 
and disadvantaged, because the costs of welfare entitlements have spiralled out of control. 
Generally, the emphasis has shifted from substantive plans orchestrating the economy and 
society, to institutional reforms and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems to reduce 
malfunctions. As was noted by for instance Dekker (1989, p.394), monitoring and evaluation 
seem to be techniques fitting these times better than the old comprehensive and future 
oriented planning techniques. If the future cannot be predicted and if grand policies to shape 
it fail, then a more promising approach may be to go about policies in a more piecemeal 
manner: to monitor constantly in order to refine them, and evaluate to see if there is need to 
change them altogether. 
Questions for this study 
The interest in monitoring systems in developing countries gives rise to several questions. Can 
monitoring systems be effective instruments for the management of development programmes, 
the achievement of planning goals? Under what conditions can monitoring systems meet the 
rising expectations? What kinds of systems are best suited to the management of development 
programmes? 
The answer to these questions has to start with the recognition that much will depend on 
the quality of information yielded by such systems. The quality and transparency of 
information depends at least in part on the complexity of the subject matter at hand (the 
project or programme), but of course also on the observations that the system enables to be 
made (the report formats) and the rapporteur(s) invited to report. Secondly, the effectiveness 
of monitoring systems depends on the use that can be made of this information; in other 
words the structure for acting on the information. Both these conditions hinge, in turn, on 
the organisation of the planning and monitoring system and its anchoring in the overall 
bureaucratic environment. In many developing countries, the planning system and 
bureaucratic environment as a whole have been heavily influenced by a positivist, rational 
comprehensive planning paradigm that unfolded at the start of their independence (Waterston 
1965; Caiden & Wildavsky 1974; Ingham 1995). The monitoring systems that can be 
observed at present, were often created at the same time, or are minor variations on these 
original systems. An analysis of the structure and problems of monitoring systems in vogue 
in developing countries such as Pakistan therefore has to start with a description of the 
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rational comprehensive planning ideology, and contrast it with other possible systems. Then, 
some implications for the functions and results of monitoring systems can be discussed. 
1.2 Planning paradigms 
There is no one definition of rational comprehensive planning (RCP). The concept as such 
originates probably from the spatial planning discipline (cf. Banfield 1959; Altshuler 1965) 
but has been quickly picked up and labeled by the field of public policy analysis in America. 
As used in this study, RCP coincides with alternative terms from related fields such as 
'structure planning', 'technocratic planning', 'synoptic planning' and even the more economic 
concept of 'central planning'. It is therefore fairly loosely defined here and concerns a 
process of (preparation for) public decision-making which is built on the premise that the 
government assumes main responsibility for the economy and welfare of the people and that 
'scientific' methods and experts are seen as the principal inputs to steer society. The word 
comprehensive refers to the idea that planning (i.e. forecasting and policy/plan making) 
should be applied in all sectors of the economy, and in a coordinated fashion. Faludi's (1974) 
Reader on Planning Theory provides a good starting point for a summary of its essentials: 
1) Rational comprehensive planning follows a means-ends scheme and rational choice on 
the basis of complete information: list all the opportunities for action, identify all the 
consequences from each of the possible actions, select the action which would be 
followed by the preferred set of consequences (p. 140). 
2) The consensus about objectives comes ideally speaking from the politicians - choice 
of means constitutes the task of the planners. The task of planners is, however, also 
to compromise between conflicting objectives (p. 142). 
3) Rational comprehensive planning assumes that it is possible to weigh objectives 
meaningfully (p. 194, p.202) (see also Etzioni 1967, p.227). 
4) RCP presupposes profound knowledge of society (which is seen not as pluralistic or 
atomistic but rather as an organic whole) (p. 113). 
5) RCP presupposes that planners know what is the public interest, and that politicians 
know it (pp. 193-194). 
Friedmann (1987, pp.96-97) has elaborated on the essentials of this "planning paradigm 
of considerable staying power" in which it is possible to "lay out the future in advance with 
something approaching scientific rigor". He traces the rational comprehensive planning view 
back to the rise of positivism in the 19th century, with proto-planners such as Henri de Saint-
Simon, Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill. In the positivist world view, society's problems 
are seen as solvable through the scientific study of the empirical reality and the discovery of 
its historical laws. In the same way that scientific and engineering projects are organised, 
societal projects should also be organised. Positivists do not recognise a fundamental 
difference between natural and social sciences; observation of reality stands at the basis of 
both. 
Another scholar of importance to the establishment of the rational comprehensive planning 
paradigm is deemed Max Weber. In the first decades of the 20th century, this sociologist 
made a now famous distinction between the notions of objective knowledge on the one hand 
and political desires on the other; between factual statements and value statements {ibid., 
p. 105). Bureaucrats (including planners) should, in this view, be committed to the production 
of objective knowledge, in preparation of, or as a result of, decisions taken by politicians on 
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the basis of values and desires. A derivative of this concept of rationality is Weber's concept 
of rationalLsafton, which refers to the social processes through which modern institutions are 
progressively brought into conformity with the principles of rational thought. Such institutions 
(bureaucracies, well-established organisations) would be hierarchically structured, functionally 
specialised and, in the public sector, each institution would pursue one governmental 
objective (e.g. the provision of education). Employees within these institutions would, in 
turn, follow abstract rules of universal application irrespective of their own values and 
interests, and with the purpose of controlling the actions of subordinate subjects so that the 
objectives of the state or organisation might be attained (ibid., p.101)1. In this mechanistic 
but pervasive view, government institutions should endeavour to be, and are supposed to be, 
free of values and interests other than those promoting their 'function' in the most rational 
way, and composed of selfless servants obediently and objectively engineering knowledge and 
rational action. 
Friedmann emphasises that other adherents of the rational comprehensive planning 
paradigm have taken the concept to, what he sees as, its logical conclusion: once broad 
political objectives are established2 and the one and only scientifically correct interpretation 
of reality is determined, rational comprehensive planners see themselves as, in principle, able 
to plan the best of all possible futures, and can themselves become a directive force in the 
general interest. Since rationality implies to a large extent also the impartial weighing of 
abstract objectives and values, the dichotomy between knowledge and values is regarded as 
unreal in the final analysis. Planners, as 'professionals' and 'experts', could then suggest 
plans even in the absence of political decisions and goals. RCP has thus 'technified' political 
choices to the extent that there is a conviction that government is best left to the technocrats 
and that science is to substitute for politics. In this sense, it goes a step further than 
positivistic planning, with its fundamental distinction between governments as goal setters, 
and bureaucracies as neutral implementers. Some rational planners have suggested that if the 
rough and tumble of politics would obstruct the realisation of a goal calculated by the 
planners as superior, then planning must become a force of its own in politics, in order to 
actively engineer a wide consensus in its favour (Tugwell, Perloff, Mannheim, Etzioni, even 
Friedmann himself in an earlier epoch). Surely, the scientific superiority of the work of the 
planning professionals would convince the politicians ultimately - society at large for that 
matter - of the path to follow. Such are the ultimate, usually implicit, claims of the 
approach. They sound surprisingly akin to marxist schemes of thought, or something which 
Karl Popper would call 'historicism' (1945, vol. 1 ch. 2). 
The establishment of Rational Comprehensive Planning 
In developed countries after World War II, and developing countries after their independence 
from colonial rule, the paradigm of state responsibility for the economic welfare of its people 
was rapidly established. Of special importance in this process was the widespread acceptance 
of Keynesian economics which instilled confidence in the ability of public investment and 
1 Some (e.g. De Pater 1984, pp.24-25) have argued that Max Weber should not be seen as a positivist but rather 
as one of the founders of phenomenology (before Husserl). Some have seen in him an anticipator of 
postmodernism (Farganis 1996, p. 110). The reason that he is here classified as contributing to the positivist 
paradigm is his approach towards the separation of facts and values. 
2 Killick (1981, p.32-33), in turn drawing on Tinbergen's work, has drawn attention to the striking uniformity 
in official objectives of economic policy to which practically all governments "from neo-fascist through liberal-
democratic to communist" publicly subscribe: increased national income, improved employment situation, price 
stability; a more equal distribution of income between individuals, and balanced regional economic development. 
12 
deficit financing to bring economies out of periods of depression and into sustained growth 
(Wildavsky 1988, p.65-67; Ingham 1995, p. 197). Also important was the orientation of many 
development economists of socialist and social-democratic persuasion that governments should 
aim to reduce poverty through redistributive taxation and spending (Ingham 1995, p. 197). 
Myrdal has argued in his famous 'Asian Drama' (1968, p.739), that RCP in developing 
countries was favoured by the circumstance that it could be introduced, unlike in the West, 
"at an early stage of development, and that the conditions of these countries also imply that 
this [...] planning should be comprehensive and complete, not partial and piecemeal as in the 
Western countries or rather as comprehensive and complete as their governments can succeed 
in making it". Conducive to the establishment of RCP ideals in developing countries was that 
many bureaucracies were looking for new legitimacy after their association with colonial 
powers. They found this by incorporating the new role of main and impartial promoters of 
development in the public interest, and were given the benefit of the doubt by the new 
politicians, who were, themselves, sometimes inexperienced in policy making and planning. 
Western rational comprehensive planning with its scientific and impartial aureole thus quickly 
met with a positive response even from the middle classes and the military in developing 
countries. 
Rational comprehensive planning ideals in developing countries materialised into National 
Development Planning focusing on capital investment, in particular in infrastructure, 
manufacturing and modern agriculture, since these activities were seen as manipulable by 
scientific methods and capital (Hyden 1983, p.65). National development planning became 
enshrined in new institutions like central and provincial planning agencies and the supervisory 
and coordinating roles assigned to them. It manifested itself in the separation of the national 
budget into capital and recurrent expenditure budgets, each managed by a separate, taskforce-
like, department3. It was furthermore manifest in the heavy reliance on macro-economic 
models, perspective plans, five year plans, and annual plans. And it was also manifest in such 
features as (a) parastatal organisations based on the assumptions that (1) market mechanisms 
may work imperfectly and (2) bureaucratic approaches are sufficient to make a business 
operate successfully; (b) a projectised development approach where projects are seen as 
engineering enterprises (Honadle & Rosengard 1983); (c) the emphasis on regulations and 
procedures for the enforcement of central objectives; (d) the rigid forms to standardise the 
project cycle; and (e) the emphasis on centralist monitoring systems for the supervision of 
line agencies which were seen as in constant need of central control4. 
In 'soft' states with difficulties in utilising fiscal/monetary policy instruments (taxes, 
subsidies, levies, tariffs), the desire for the application of rational comprehensive planning 
is witnessed by the predominance of the physical instruments of policy (licenses, permits, 
capital investment)3. Notably the reliance in policies on a multitude of development projects 
to achieve societal goals has to be mentioned here (Rondinelli 1993, p.5). An important 
3 In this thesis, the distinction between departments and ministries is dropped, mainly because in AJK there are 
no ministries. In a general sense, a department can be a ministry. 
4 See for a comprehensive study of development planning as practiced by developing countries Waterston 1965. 
Agarwala (1983) has pointed out that (comprehensive) development planning was mostly practiced in Asia; in 
Latin America it was less so. In Africa, although development plans were drawn up, not much attention was 
paid to these later on. 
5 This distinction is largely owed to Needham (1982, p.3-5), who also identifies juridical instruments of policy, 
such as building regulations, environmental health laws, pollution control, etc. and organisational instruments, 
such as training schemes, promotion and the giving of advice. The latter two are of much lesser importance in 
developing countries. 
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rationale for the emphasis on projects is their economic rate of return: as long as this can be 
shown to be higher than the opportunity cost of capital, projects would pay for themselves -
a logic which has led to very large project portfolios under implementation in many 
developing countries. The parallels between the project philosophy and the rational planning 
paradigm emerge clearly from this delineation of the basic elements of a project, by Morgan 
(1983, p.330): 
1) disciplined conceptual disaggregation of complex, ill-defined problems into discrete 
tasks for which resources can be mobilized and targeted 
2) specific time boundaries within which projects begin and end according to a funding 
schedule and work plan 
3) pre-programmed activities in which the resources, contracting, procurement, training 
and anticipated outcomes are all planned or 'designed' 
4) applied economic and systems analysis used in the appraisal of a project idea to 
determine whether it is economically viable or rational according to other technical 
criteria 
5) standardized reporting procedures for monitoring, control and evaluation.6 
Decline of RCP 
After a few decades of such experimentation, when, over time, it had become clear that 
economic development was slow after the shackles of colonialism had been thrown off, 
disenchantment with central planning agencies and planning itself dampened the enthusiasm, 
particularly with politicians and the general public (Caiden & Wildavsky 1974, Bryant & 
White 1982; Agarwala 1983; Wallis 1989). The acceptance of too many loans to finance the 
large portfolios of projects had often led to unsustainable levels of indebtedness. Due also to 
the financial and economic crises after the oil shocks in the 1970s, there was increasing 
reliance on short-term budgeting and a disregard for longer-term planning (Lacey 1989, p.6). 
Sheer financial survival became the order of the day. In Pakistan, the disillusionment with 
planning resulted in recurring (and vain) attempts by recent Prime Ministers to abolish the 
once prestigious Federal Planning Commission (cf. the newspaper Dawn, 3 and 4 March 
1992). The recent creation of certain other more political commissions, such as for energy 
and road investments, have reduced the Pakistan Planning Commission's aim for 
comprehensiveness in practice. Relations between politicians and professional planners 
became strained. Planners blamed politicians for obstructing plans, politicians blamed 
planners for bureaucracy and rigidity stifling development. Most planning agencies (at least 
in South Asia) have survived these attacks, a measure of their resilience and entrenchment 
in the state bureaucracy; a triumph of hope over experience. It is asserted by this study that, 
in spite of the general disillusionment, the essential tenets of the comprehensive planning 
approach still prevail at least at the bureaucratic level (cf. Ingham 1995, p. 199 ff). Caiden 
& Wildavsky (1974, p. 152) have claimed that government servants constitute by far the most 
powerful interest group in developing countries as far as public expenditure is concerned. 
Their appropriation of RCP has increased their power greatly. This is perhaps one reason why 
6 According to Morgan this 'project orthodoxy' particularly in developing countries has been at the detriment 
of a more programmatic approach capable of overlapping planning and implementation (ibid., 338). Morgan's 
view of a programmatic approach is similar to an incrementalist style of planning (see below). Rondinelli 
(1993) has posited that the projectised development approach may not be incompatible with such planning, as 
long as the projects remain small and flexible. Van Dusseldorp (1990) has outlined some (admittedly difficult 
to meet) conditions that projects have to meet if they are to have a chance of success. 
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RCP, although in a disguised and scaled down form, is still pursued and recurrent attempts 
are made to enforce it. 
As will be argued by this study, the RCP tenets continue to be of importance particularly 
with respect to the organisation of monitoring systems in it. They pertain to the notions that 
all objectives can be weighed rationally so that there must be an objective basis for 
compromise, that the proper course of the country's economy can be fathomed from the 
'facts' as read by experts in the government bureaucracy, and that the quickest way to 
economic development is through capital investment. 
In an analysis of experiences with development planning in developing countries, Agarwala 
of the World Bank (1983, p.2) has concluded that there is no clear association between a high 
degree of planning effort in these countries and their performance in terms of growth. Also, 
the technical, administrative, and political causes of the failure of comprehensive planning 
in mixed economies are regarded as inherent in the process and as such unlikely to be 
remedied merely by more strenuous efforts to strengthen the planning machinery. This study 
argues that there are serious limitations to any rigid practice of rational comprehensive 
planning, for three main reasons7: 
1) Values cannot be kept out of this type of planning in spite of its scientific pretensions, 
because of its domain which is social. Values cannot be weighed objectively. In the 
last resort, values and not technical and econometric analyses must dominate trade-offs 
and choices between such strategies as growth and distribution, growth and 
environment, modern urban society and traditional cultural value based society, 
capitalism and socialism, centralised and decentralised democracy, a large or a lean 
government. Planning itself cannot logically or scientifically settle such choices. 
2) RCP is about predicting and shaping the future of society as a whole and in this sense 
one is reminded of Popper's logical argument against historicism. It goes as follows: 
The history of mankind is deeply influenced by the growth of scientific knowledge. 
The growth of scientific knowledge cannot be predicted. We cannot know now what 
we will discover tomorrow. Therefore, the future of mankind cannot be predicted 
because scientific discoveries cannot be predicted (Popper 1967, p. 11-12). 
3) Rational comprehensive planning requires a fair amount of control of the economy, 
which in turn requires control of society. Strong national leadership is needed over 
an extended period and any possible societal dissent (including human/labour rights) 
may have to be suppressed in order to achieve the goals of the plan (cf. UNDP 1995, 
p.48 ft). 
Increased confusion in the present times 
The rooting of democracies with assertive ministers and parliamentarians has led to many 
civil-military bureaucracies reluctantly letting go of their monopolies on actual planning and 
to some form of power sharing. This could have led to greater societal consensus regarding 
planning objectives and improvement in the management of the public sector, but, in practice, 
7 Early critics of the rational comprehensive planning model include Lindblom (1959), Banfield (1959), 
Wildavsky (1964, p. 147-152), Etzioni (1968, chapters 6 & 11). Rondinelli (1993, pp. 19-21) has recently given 
an interesting list of ten criticisms of quantitative analysis and systems management which points in the same 
direction. 
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it has not worked that way. Part of the reason is bureaucratic unwillingness to change the old 
administrative decision-making procedures8. The result is increased confusion. 
In Pakistan, the production of a Five Year Plan by the Federal Planning Commission goes 
on almost completely detached from the day to day policy decisions and 'economic packages' 
of the Cabinet. A consultative process of preparation of the Five Year Plan is attempted 
through the creation of many working groups with nominal representation from the more 
serious echelons of society (labour unions are not invited). But little of this usually filters 
through in the final plan. 
Today, many planning agencies also focus on functions that have little to do with the 
original central planning functions, e.g. advocacy functions to attract and service foreign 
donors (Hyd6n 1983). These foreign donors, which can be seen as another category of 
stakeholders apart from bureaucrats and politicians (acting in the 'public interest', in the 
interest of reason, the poor, the environment, the long term?), have also been unable to 
increase the consensus on planning objectives. The recent conversion by the World Bank, 
from a structuralist approach focusing on state-led corrections of market imperfections, to a 
more neo-liberal approach whereby the public sector is itself seen as the problem (and is to 
be reduced), has not helped either. Rondinelli (1993, p.4), amongst others, has claimed that 
the neo-liberal structural adjustment programmes mounted in the 1980s and 1990s "did not 
rely on national comprehensive planning and even the use of projects as lending instruments, 
[but they] were nevertheless based on highly standardized prescriptions and rationalistic 
models. They called almost universally for fiscal austerity, liberalization of trade, strong 
monetary controls, rapid privatisation of state enterprises, and deregulation of industry, often 
without an adequate understanding of the social and political characteristics of the countries 
for which the reforms were prescribed." Meanwhile, the increasing number of aid agencies 
on the scene and their lack of coordination has made planning practice more chaotic. Actual 
planning, in spite of five year plans and a machinery geared to comprehensive planning, has 
become incrementalist. 
Incrementalist policy making and planning 
Incrementalism is a term coined within the planning terminology by Charles Lindblom (1959) 
and stands for a type of planning which 'muddles through' step by step, at best through 
processes of 'successive limited comparisons of alternatives', rather than through laying down 
momentous plans and major policies. This is the planning conducted by (and suitable for, as 
Lindblom argues) pluralistic' societies such as the United States of America and most West 
European countries. More often than the instrumental sounding planning, it is called 'policy 
making' (Lindblom & Woodhouse 1993)10, indicative of the inseparability of values and 
facts in this view. Agreement between political institutions rather than science is the criterion 
for validity of decision-making. Feasibility rather than goals per se is the criterion for the 
choice of policies. When incrementalism is also disjointed - such as in most Western countries 
8 Other reasons will be investigated through the study of the case of Pakistan. As this thesis will argue, the lack 
of a serious role for local government is an important one. 
9 Robertson (1986, p.258) defines a pluralist political system as "one that has several centres of power and 
authority, rather than one in which the state is the sole controller of people's actions". In this study, pluralism 
refers to a situation where many organised societal interest groups are able to exert pressure on public decision-
making. 
1 0 The one time that Lindblom & Woodhouse (1993, p. 15) discuss planning in their book, it is in explicit 
reference to the work done by coordinating bodies, to coordinate existing policies of different kind (such as on 
price, investment, employment and foreign trade policies), not to make them. 
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- then this means that the step-wise planning decisions are not taken centrally, but dispersed, 
at various places, levels, times and by many different decision-makers. Haynes (1974, p.6-7) 
gives a good summary of disjointed incrementalism, which: 
"eschews the comprehensive ideal in favour of a strategy in which only those policies which differ 
marginally from existing policies are considered. [...] The model is incremental, or tending towards 
relatively small changes; remedial, in that decisions are made to move away from ills rather than 
towards goals; serial, in that problems are not solved in one stroke but are successively attacked; 
exploratory, in that goals are continually being redefined or newly discovered; fragmented in that 
problems are attacked by considering a limited number of alternatives; and disjointed, in that there are 
many dispersed decision points. Rather than adjusting means to goals, ends are chosen that are 
appropriate to available means, and progress is achieved through a process of marginal adjustment." 
Lindblom (1979, p.522) complements incrementalism in policy making with partisan 
mutual adjustment which: 
"takes the form of fragmented or greatly decentralised political decision making in which the various 
somewhat autonomous participants mutually affect one another (as they always do) with the result that 
policy making displays certain interesting characteristics. One is that policies are resultants of the 
mutual adjustment; they are better described as happening than as decided upon. Another is that 
policies are influenced by a broad range of participants and interests (compared to those of more 
centralized policy making). Another is that the connection between a policy and good reasons for it 
is obscure, since the many participants will act for different reasons." 
Lindblom & Woodhouse (1993) have emphasised that politics and bureaucracy 
insufficiently represent the variety of stakeholder positions in a pluralistic society, and that 
the involvement of interest groups (business and others) is essential for the model to work". 
Disjointed incrementalism in the West, although still rejected by most planners as a normative 
ideal, has had more support since the 1980s, for instance through such budgeting models as 
described by Wildavsky (1988), and planning models as strategic choice (Friend & Jessop 
1969; Faludi et al. 1981; Friend & Hickling 1987). Instead of aiming for such traditional 
norms as linearity, objectivity, certainty and comprehensiveness, the strategic choice approach 
recommends to learn to work systematically with cyclicity, subjectivity, uncertainty and 
selectivity (Friend & Hickling op.cit., p.21). 
The intellectual roots of disjointed incrementalism (and later developments such as the New 
Public Management, see below) probably go back to Popper's 'piecemeal social engineering' 
(1945) and March & Simon's (1958) 'satisficing behaviour' of organisations and the people 
in it12. Wildavsky's many studies of government and budgetary processes in the United 
States and outside (1964, 1974, 1988) also lean on such conceptions. Etzioni's (1968) 'mixed 
But Lindblom has been concerned also that the influence of business interests in public policy has been 
disproportional, and he has put forward proposals to ameliorate this (Lindblom & Woodhouse 1993, ch.12). 
1 2 See also Perrow's (1986, pp. 124-125) summary of Simon's and Simon & March's organizational model: ... 
"calls for satisficing behavior, sequential and limited search processes that are only mildly innovative; 
specialization of activities and roles so that attention is directed to a 'particular restricted set of values'; 
'attention-directors that channelize behavior'; rules, programs and repertoires of action that limit choice in 
recurring situations and prevent an agonizing process of optimal decision-making at each turn; a restricted range 
of stimuli and situations and that narrow perception; training and indoctrination enabling the individual to "make 
decisions, by himself, as the organization would like him to decide'; and the factoring of goals and tasks into 
programs that are semi-independent of one another so as to reduce interdependencies. Most organizational 
activity takes most of the conditions as given; "only a few elements of the system are adaptive at any one 
time'." 
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scanning' planning alternative is mainly based on it13. In the field of organisational science, 
action theory (Harmon 1981) displays striking similarity with disjointed incrementalism, and 
even its opposites of systems theory (Katz & Kahn 1966) and contingency theory (Pfeffer & 
Salancik 1978; Mintzberg 1979) are based on the incrementalism and unpredictability of 
organisations' actions. 
Disjointed incrementalism and mutual partisan adjustment are therefore part of a wide 
current of new social science insights. That they are also becoming more and more 
predominant practices of many governments in Western countries can for instance be 
witnessed in public decision-making in the Netherlands by the importance of the 
'maatschappelijk middenveld', the societal centre-field of non-governmental, not-for-profit 
organisations in between the public and private sector. In the last ten years or so, privatisation 
initiatives have rendered the 'public management' (rather than the government or 
administration) of the country even more disjointed, whereas public sector reforms such as 
contract management, contracting-out, and decentralisation of tasks to local authorities have 
also contributed to this (cf. Frissen 1989, p.584). Paradoxically, these developments have led 
simultaneously to increased complexity, societal consensus, and governmental efficiency (see 
Corry (1997) for similar experiences in the UK). They have also led to increased interest in 
monitoring systems for private sector provision of public services (Mawhood 1997, p. 135; 
Engbersen et al. 1997). The new approaches have been labeled 'The New Public 
Management' (cf. Hughes 1994; Osborne & Gaebler 1992). 
Disjointed incrementalist planning as an option for developing countries 
That a disjointed incrementalist approach and New Public Management can be more 
appropriate for developing countries has had some recognition by development analysts, 
including Chambers (1974, 1983), Caiden & Wildavsky (1974), Morgan (1983), Uphoff & 
Esman (1984) and, more recently, Sagasti (1988), Esman (1991), Putnam (1992), and 
Rondinelli (1993). Sagasti proposes that short-, medium- and long-term planning should be 
abandoned in favour of an approach which focuses on clusters of issues and problems. The 
old-style, comprehensive development planning system would have to be replaced by a much 
more loosely organised structure on the basis of participation of a wide variety of institutional 
actors (both government and non-government organisations) and allow planners to respond 
more quickly to a changing environment. Each of these actors should pursue his own goals 
rationally, but can also be expected to pursue them strategically, whereas there should be an 
explicit recognition, within the law, that each has his rights and that political compromise is 
legitimate. Gradually, more staff members of the main think tank on development: the World 
Bank, are favouring the abandoning of technocratic approaches and the change to a more 
consultative approach (starting with Agarwala 1983; Cernea 1985 ). Other donor 
organisations such as UNDP are also promoting a kind of development with more attention 
to decentralisation, local government, non-governmental organisations, and people's 
1 3 Many planning theorists, such as Faludi (1974) and Etzioni himself, have argued that mixed scanning is the 
(superior) compromise or middle way between rationalist comprehensive and disjointed incrementalist planning 
systems. This view is not completely shared by this author. Etzioni (op.cit., p.283) himself has recognised the 
difficulty of identifying the 'contextuating' (fundamental) decisions after which the incremental 'bit' decisions 
are to come. Politics and bureaucracies would often be too involved in the status quo to initiate on their own 
the contextuating changes that could jeopardize their existence. Etzioni relies on unattached intellectuals 
('bohemians'), universities, policy-research centres, action groups, and so on, to come up with the new issues. 
That the initiative may come from such arbitrary categories of stakeholders is, however, the essence of 
disjointed incrementalism. 
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participation (Human Development Report 1993 and continued in later year reports). The real 
interest and real impacts of aid agencies in these realms are, however, yet to be seen (cf. 
UNDP 1993, p.68 and 89). 
In many developing countries, the path of privatisation of parts of the public sector has 
similarly been treaded in the 1990s, whereas many of the ideas of the new public 
management are being promoted by such organisations as the World Bank and USAID (see 
for instance the latest issue of the World Development Report: The State in a Changing World 
(World Bank 1997). However, whether the societal centre-field or the private sector is 
sufficiently articulated, competitive and professionalised to take over the servicing of essential 
public needs, remains to be seen. The approach is also vulnerable to new dangers of 
corruption (cf. Turner & Hulme 1997, pp.234-35). At any rate, the new management 
techniques have not spread very fast within bureaucracies so far. Institutional reforms within 
the remaining public sector have met with much resistance, in spite of the adoption of 
structural adjustment programmes in many countries (Paul 1988, p.7). Due inter alia to the 
absence of an organised civil society and weak regulatory frameworks, the potential benefits 
of a more disjointed incrementalist approach to public management have not yet been 
understood14 and a technocratic approach in combination with hierarchical systems and 
decision-making continues to be important (cf. Rondinelli 1993, p.3). 
This study claims that although actual processes in many developing countries are 
displaying many incrementalist features, they are not sufficiently disjointed. Decision-making 
still takes place within a hierarchical, centralist structure of government wherein the 
'expertise' of higher officials plays a large role. It may be that certain top politicians are 
involved in planning through their position in cabinets, but legislatures are not, while neither 
many other institutional actors are allowed (or are in sufficient position) to participate. This 
study will demonstrate this by an analysis of Pakistan. 
1.3 Monitoring and planning 
It is argued in this study that monitoring has a different design as well as impact within a 
centralised planning system from that within a more explicitly disjointed incrementalist 
planning system. Before such differences are discussed at greater length, a definition is 
presented which abstracts as much as possible from the substantive functions that monitoring 
may have, and, by contrast, focuses on procedural aspects. Concentrating on procedural 
aspects is in the interest of the universal applicability of the definition, since it can then be 
applied to any kind of monitoring, from project monitoring to programme monitoring even 
to monitoring of the weather by satellites. Monitoring will meanwhile be contrasted with its 
'twin' concept of evaluation, in order to bring out more clearly the essentials of the two 
concepts. This differentiation is also deemed appropriate given the conceptual confusion as 
to the respective meanings of monitoring and evaluation, which still prevails in the literature 
on these concepts (Patton 1987, p. 106; Van de Putte 1991). 
1 4 A main criticism of this approach has been that if policies are to be decided through a process of mutual 
adjustment of all actors in society, this would under capitalist and mixed economies lead to a predominance of 
decisions in favour of those who can wield financial powers, i.e. big firms and corporations, and large 
government institutions. This is true, but history shows that there is also a danger of alliances between financial 
power and government power in centrally led economies. Ultimately, democracy is the best safeguard against 
the long-term negative consequences of such power configurations. 
19 
Monitoring is the standardised and regular collection of concise, relatively un-valuated 
information and its subsequent (speedy) processing in preparation of routine decision-making 
with respect to pre-defined purposes and activities. Monitoring has a predetermined point of 
reference. 
Evaluation is the non-standard and more irregular15 collection of usually already processed 
information and its associated elaborate analysis and explicit valuation provided by the 
evaluators with respect to specially defined purposes and activities, and in preparation of 
major decisions. Evaluation often has, but does not necessarily have, a predetermined point 
of reference. 
As can be seen, the definitions do not speak out on such issues as whether monitoring fits 
better with the machine-like control exercised by rational comprehensive planning than the 
irregular practice of stakeholder-based evaluation or partisan analysis with 'disjointed' 
incrementalism. In the particular way they are formulated the procedures can have a place 
within both planning methodologies. The definitions also sidestep other issues such as whether 
monitoring is only an internal activity and evaluation external (cf. UN ACC Guidelines 
1984), whether monitoring is only concerned with the present as opposed to evaluation which 
deals with the past (Van de Putte 1991), whether monitoring is for day-to-day control and 
evaluation for learning or policy development, whether it is to be done by a separate unit or 
as a regular function of all staff involved (IFAD 1979), whether monitoring can question the 
assumptions of the project (cf Deboeck & Kinsey 1980, p. 10) and whether monitoring is 
solely concerned with targets, time-frames and budgets (Valadez & Bamberger 1994) or 
whether monitoring covers the inputs, outputs and activities, and evaluation the effects and 
impacts (World Bank 1981). 
The definitions also avoid a statement as to whether monitoring is intended for 
project/programme implementation and not for programme impact assessment, or that it has 
to use systematic (scientific?) social research procedures, such as implied by Rossi & 
Freeman16 (1985, p.19; p.141). Even the position by Crane (1988, p.471) about monitoring 
yielding basic 'data' and evaluation rendering (only) the critical value judgments on which 
the outcome of the study depends (through valuation), is not subscribed to: monitoring may 
be concerned with registering value judgments or making analytical statements. However, the 
severe limitations imposed by the need for conciseness and speed are to be kept in view here. 
Those must have a negative effect upon the depth of analysis and valuation that monitoring 
instruments can yield. In sum, the essence of monitoring lies in its fixed purposes set out ab 
initio, the fixed point of reference (e.g. targets in a project document), regularity and speed 
of observation and reporting, conciseness in view of the standardisation of data collection 
procedures, and (therefore) relatively unanalysed supply of information. This means, in 
practice, that monitoring is usually producing information on the basis of which the managers 
1 3 Nowadays, many donor agencies schedule mid-term reviews or ex-post evaluations of their projects almost 
as a matter of course. This is not seen here as 'regular' in the sense of periodic and frequent and continuous, 
such as associated with monitoring. 
1 6 There is something to say for this position, since the term evaluation could then be distinguished from the 
term review, which in the general usage implies less scientific rigour. The adjective systematic could also be 
associated with the concept of monitoring, but is deemed sufficiently characterised here by the word 
standardised. 
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are to make their own analysis and on the basis of which it could be decided (ad hoc) to 
initiate a diagnostic study in view of a specific problem or even an evaluation exercise17. 
Monitoring under RCP conditions 
It is, however, posited that the monitoring of development programmes under conditions of 
centralist planning is quite different from that conducted under systems which rely on various 
centers of authority. First of all, monitoring through hierarchical systems may serve different 
purposes. It can be assumed that an important purpose is to collect information 'from the 
field' of use for the conception of the next master plan (usually a Five Year Plan). Another 
purpose is feedback as to the compliance with decisions taken earlier, with the specific aim 
to supervise and if necessary overrule the implementing agencies involved18. The latter is 
all the more important in societies where the plans and objectives of central planning may 
easily be thwarted by limited implementation capacity and largely unknown conditions at the 
local level. Monitoring is then a means to enforce, coerce, and, when necessary, re-establish 
the control necessary to safeguard the original planning objectives and avoid the contingency 
of implementation moving away from them. Given the need for the centre to weigh different 
objectives and to compare progress amongst a number of different areas and departments, 
there would be a focus on unambiguous proxies of the progress, which in practice means 
financial indicators. If physical indicators are included, then there is a strong stress on their 
'objective verifiability'19. Since the reporting of problems may divert the attention away 
from the ultimate objectives, these would not normally be the focus of such systems. 
Problems would be regarded as 'bottlenecks'. The focus of monitoring would not be 
coordination between departments except on a technical level; since the objectives and targets 
are laid down by the centre, these would not form part of the coordination process20. The 
effort would be to create one monitoring system or at least keep the number of systems as 
small as possible, while encompassing as many levels as possible, and cater to as many 
demands as possible. 
This view is also held by the widely read Casley & Kumar (1987, p.8). However, most of the U.S. 
evaluation literature as well as those of international development agencies assume monitoring and evaluation 
to be closely related, and makes no systematic distinction. Rossi & Freeman (1985) even speak of 'monitoring 
evaluations'. Frequently the term 'program evaluation' is taken to mean both monitoring and evaluation, or else 
the acronym M/E system is systematically employed (Valadez & Bamberger 1994, p. 13-14). However, even 
Valadez & Bamberger, who support the combined term, concede that in many developing countries only 
monitoring systems are in use. 
1 8 The advent of the science of cybernetics in the 1950s and 1960s was important to this idea (Ashby 1956; Beer 
1967). In the cybernetic model of organisations, the quality of the decisions taken by the head would be 
critically dependent upon the quality of the information channels leading to it. Feedback is what turns diverse 
elements in a group into a homeostatic system; it is the only effective mechanism for controlling endemic 
variation and system disintegration (Beer 1967, p.31). See also the Law of Requisite Variety as formulated by 
Ashby (1956), discussed later in this chapter. 
" In a workshop in East Asia, it was reported that project managers expect monitoring systems to produce 
information that is 1) accurate, 2) objective, 3) reliable, 4) relevant, 5) timely, and 6) action-oriented (Deboeck 
& Ng 1980, p.7). These were all expectations difficult to meet. 
2 0 Since the reporting system would be vertically directed, from implementing departments to the 
funding/supervising department, technical coordination between two line departments through such a reporting 
system would be a detour. Only at the stage of a conflict, requiring a verdict from a higher authority, would 
such reporting systems perhaps be an option. 
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Monitoring under conditions of disjointed incremental planning 
Under conditions of disjointed incremental planning, meaning the reliance on various 
authority and stakeholder centres, monitoring can be assumed to serve the function of 
generation and exchange of information in the context of coordination as well as competition 
between organisations (for instance between implementing and funding agencies). Rather than 
one monitoring system, many different ones would be expected, complementary and possibly 
competing and overlapping. Horizontal monitoring systems, with reporting between 
organisations not hierarchically related (such as with funding and implementing agencies) 
would be at least as important as vertical systems. For instance the exchange of information 
between a Land Revenue department and a Road Building department. The focus on mutual 
adjustment and policy evolvement would in practice mean a tilt towards problem identification 
and their resolution. Monitoring would address the need to continually refine and adjust the 
policies, plans and programmes in the light of implementation capacities and changing local 
conditions. A learning function would be more important in such a system; accountability and 
central control would be much less the predominant concern. The need for a common 
financial denominator of the progress booked in various areas and institutions would be 
correspondingly less. There would be more variety and less standardisation in systems due 
to the greater number of information sources, with some of them perhaps not qualifying for 
the label of monitoring system in a literal sense, but yet contributing to the overall cross-
checking and multidimensionality of information. 
There may be also organisational differences in monitoring systems operating under 
different planning systems. Under hierarchical systems, the lines of communication can be 
expected to be long and unidirectional. One pyramidal system, covering in steps both intra-
departmental and interdepartmental communication, and converging towards the centre, would 
be regarded as most appropriate. This would then also lead to a preference for large 
management information systems. Under disjointed incrementalist systems, the lines can be 
expected to be shorter and multidirectional (many agencies reporting something to each 
other), whereas intra-departmental systems would have very different functions from inter-
departmental systems. Multiple small management information systems would be expected. 
Perhaps the main difference lies, however, in the assumptions regarding the nature of the 
information yielded by the two systems. In systems working under conditions of central and 
rational comprehensive planning, the 'facts' collected are assumed to be unbiased, true and 
objective reflections of reality as given by one government department to another (other 
institutions are not included in the system), and as given by the rapporteur to his superior(s). 
Concern for efficiency and simplicity would then lead to only one rapporteur reporting on a 
phenomenon in a comprehensive way; multiple systems all yielding fragmented or partial 
information on the same phenomena would be discouraged. Given that both rapporteur and 
audience are regarded as 'rational' and reality as factual, information would not be suspected 
to be multi-interpretable. Information would be treated as common property within 
bureaucracies and internal monitoring reports would be assumed to be able to function also 
for external reporting purposes. Cybernetic many-one operations in information, in order to 
summarise and simplify, would be the norm (Beer 1967, ch.4). Strategic/opportunistic and 
perspectivistic biases in information would be seen as aberrations and to be avoided21. 
2 1 This thesis makes a distinction between strategic and perspectivistic biases in information. The former relate 
to deliberate and opportunistic misrepresentations of reality, in order to advance certain interests of persons or 
organisations. Habermas (in Prbpper 1993, pp. 10-11) has defined strategic activity of organisations as directed 
at furthering (hidden) objectives through the explicit use of money and or power (authority). A serious attempt 
(continued...) 
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Deviations from laid down policies, delays, cost overruns, etc., would be seen as in need of 
punitive action. 
The hierarchical information system would, as a result, tend to avoid or understate any 
issue that might give rise to controversy; information would be 'thin' in content and 
'neutrally' worded. In disjointed incrementalist systems, there would normally be more 
institutions involved in implementation, including non-governmental or semi-governmental. 
Since they would be explicitly identified as stakeholders, there would be more implicit 
awareness of perspectivistic and strategic biases in the information submitted. These would 
then tend to be 'discounted' as much as possible. Their biases would come to light more 
easily, since there would be more than one stakeholder reporting on each phenomenon. This 
would eventually lead to more detailed and improved reporting by all stakeholders. The 
submission of perspectivistic information might meanwhile come to be regarded as an 
opportunity to increase the depth of understanding of the multidimensionality of reality. Many 
departments would gain valuable new information while implementing policies or 
programmes. Lindblom (1979, p.524) has even put forward that 'partisan analysis' by interest 
groups is the most characteristic analytical input into politics, and also the most productive 
(italics added). Such partisan analysis could not escape from also being conveyed through 
reporting systems if these were available. Since disjointed incrementalist planning is a more 
continuous process of refinement of policies and programmes, decision-making would also 
be more explicitly resemble bargaining and mutual partisan adjustment (Lindblom 1959; cf. 
March & Simon 1958). 
It may be clear that if these assumptions are correct, disjointed monitoring systems must 
be superior to hierarchical systems under centralist conditions; the crux lying in the adjective 
disjointed. It is too early to answer the questions raised in the first section of this chapter. But 
a precondition to the success of performance monitoring of programmes is its being set up 
in accordance with a planning and management system which recognises the advantages of 
disjointed decision-making; success seems less likely if monitoring is set up in accordance 
with RCP principles. A main focus in the Pakistan case study that follows will be the extent 
of malfunction of such kind of monitoring. It has to be mentioned that the hypothesis 
regarding better results of systems under disjointed incrementalism can only be made more 
persuasive, but not tested rigorously, due to the fact that such systems are not in operation 
in Pakistan. 
1.4 Some interpretations of the concept of monitoring 
Given the greater openness towards new and less rigidly central planning systems since the 
end 1970s, it would be expected that the available handbooks on monitoring (and evaluation) 
for programmes and projects in developing countries incorporate at least some of the new 
ideas presented above. Whether this is indeed the case is checked through a short review of 
literature on monitoring, concentrating on the interpretations given in the more widely used 
guidelines as published by large development agencies. Since international donor agencies 
have played an important role in the development of the concept (Valadez & Bamberger 
1994, p.5), some of these will be reviewed first. 
2I(...continued) 
at coordination through 'communicative' activity is not undertaken. Perspectivistic biases are seen as relatively 
unavoidable due to the structural position of the observer/rapporteur as stakeholder. In practice there will 
however be normally a sliding scale between the two. 
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Of the more influential monitoring guidelines, only those of the United Nations, the World 
Bank, and IFAD are reviewed in some detail. Most other guidelines published by 
international agencies, are not considered here to differ fundamentally. As an example of the 
use of monitoring by planning agencies in developing countries, the monitoring concept as 
held by the Federal Planning Commission in Pakistan will also be reviewed. 
United Nations 
The United Nations started work on integrating the various monitoring and evaluation 
approaches followed by its agencies (including the World Bank and IFAD) in the mid 1970s, 
upon setting up an Administrative Committee on Coordination Task Force on Rural 
Development. This ACC was composed of all the heads of the UN organisations and chaired 
by the UN Secretary General. Although the final report: 'Monitoring and Evaluation -
Guiding Principles for the Design and Use in Rural Development Projects and Programmes 
inDeveloping Countries' was published only in 1985, workshop reports were published much 
earlier (1976) and therefore its influence must also be dated back earlier. From this work it 
can be concluded that the main effort was to reify the concept of monitoring from a 
procedure to a system, and to give it a fixed place in the project/planning cycle. At the same 
time it is clear that it did not prove as easy to generalise about monitoring as it appeared on 
first sight. The definition of monitoring in the ACC Guidelines seems straightforward enough: 
"Monitoring is the continuous or periodic review and surveillance by management at every level of the 
hierarchy of the implementation of an activity to ensure that input deliveries, work schedules, targeted 
outputs and other required actions are proceeding according to plan. (p. 13)" 
A footnote attached, however, states that monitoring of a project by an external donor 
agency through its staff of consultants is defined as 'supervision' for the purposes of the UN, 
whereas the term monitoring is reserved for national project authorities for its own 
management purposes. Furthermore it is stated that: 
"The purpose of monitoring is to achieve efficient and effective project performance by providing 
feedback to project management at all levels. This enables management to improve operational plans 
and to take timely corrective action in case of shortfalls and constraints. Monitoring is thus a part of 
the management information system and is an internal activity. As an integral component of the 
management function, and hence an essential part of good management practice, monitoring needs to 
be conducted by those responsible for project/programme implementation at every level of the 
management hierarchy" (p. 14). 
Evaluation, in turn, is defined as: 
"a process for determining systematically and objectively the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and 
impact of activities in the light of their objectives. It is an organizational process for improving 
activities still in progress and for aiding management in future planning, programming and decision-
making." (p. 14) 
In a later statement, the learning function of evaluation (beyond the scope of the project) 
is also stressed (p. 15), while a basic distinction is drawn between ongoing evaluation and 
terminal and ex-post evaluations. 
Some sour comments could be made with respect to these seemingly 'middle of the road' 
definitions, such as that for the UN Task Force control rather than communication or 
coordination is the focus. Monitoring is regarded entirely an internal activity performed by 
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is done by a separate unit in a project, or by another agency commissioned to do the 
monitoring. 
The ACC Task force sees the two 'processes' of monitoring and (ongoing or terminal/ex-
post) evaluation as forming a unified system (p. 16); indispensable parts of a project cycle. 
The systems approach is clear. It is therefore not surprising that the processes of inspection 
and audit, intended to investigate to what extent a process or performance conforms to 
predetermined procedures or standards and to report on the extent of conformity or any 
irregularities, are seen as entirely separate. How to fit these into the harmonious system, is 
somewhat more problematic. 
The Guidelines state that, in a project, the M&E unit has to be situated near to the project 
management, and in a programme at a central level, either on a regional or on a national 
level. The mechanics of information generation are assumed to be similar. However, the first 
case is project-internal monitoring, and the latter project-external monitoring, as it is most 
likely dealing with more than one organisation. That this may have important effects on the 
nature of the information generated, is not addressed. The Guidelines even point out that 
given the paucity of trained M&E staff and other resources in developing countries, it may 
be desirable to begin with an M&E unit at central level. That the needs at the various levels 
are different is not recognised. The Guidelines also state, rather arguably, that monitoring is 
more important within projects, and evaluation more at the sectoral or central levels. 
Much attention is devoted to the technical issues of determining information needs, 
formulation of indicators22, data and sources, measurement and assessment of project effects 
and impacts, and to special topics of interest within M&E, such as target group participation, 
women in development, nutrition, and environment. 
Problems of reliability of monitoring information are discussed only in terms of the size 
of sample surveys and other methods of data collection (see also an earlier Technical 
Workshop Report by ACC 1976). The problem noted in previous sections of this chapter, 
concerning the perspectivistic and strategic nature of much of the information in project or 
programme monitoring systems, is not addressed. Such biases as would relate to either tunnel 
vision of staff or ulterior motives for consciously (not) reporting certain aspects of progress 
to the higher management, both within and outside their project/organisation, are not 
recognised. 
International Fund for Agricultural Development 
InlFAD's 'Guidelines on Monitoring and Evaluation' (1979, p. 16), there is some recognition 
of the issue of "incompatibility between the MOE team's responsibility to measure the 
effectiveness of project implementation and its functional requirement to assist in the more 
efficient management and implementation of the particular project to which it relates. The 
first is a performance checking function while the other is a staff role. There is thus a risk 
that project management will, at worst, regard monitoring and ongoing evaluation as a threat 
and, at best, as an unnecessary or marginal activity restricting its own discretion to make 
what it sees as appropriate adjustments in the course of implementation." But it cannot 
recommend more than: "This risk must be countered if both the MOE team and project 
management are to function properly. [...] the risk of lack of cooperation can be greatly 
reduced if role relationships are clearly outlined in the design of the project and its MOE 
component" (pp. 16-17). There is also some recognition of the seriousness of filtered 
Indicators are defined as "specific (explicit) and objectively verifiable measures of changes or results brought 
about by an activity" (ibid., p.37). 
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component" (pp. 16-17). There is also some recognition of the seriousness of filtered 
information due to interests of those involved in implementation vis-á-vis management. This 
leads the IFAD to a stipulation, at variance with the ACC Guidelines, that the M&E team 
should not be part of the project's field management team. This may in IFAD's view mean 
also that other project staff should be excluded from monitoring routines - an often too 
expensive solution in practice, as well as unwise for other reasons23. 
World Bank 
The World Bank's 'Guidelines for the Design of Monitoring and Evaluation Systems for 
Agriculture and Rural Development Projects' (1981) define project monitoring technically and 
substantively like the other two organisations: 
"the provision of information for management to assess progress of implementation and take timely 
decisions to ensure that progress is maintained according to schedule. Monitoring assesses whether 
project inputs are being delivered, are being used as intended, and are having the initial effects as 
planned. Monitoring is therefore an internal project activity, an essential part of good management 
practice. [..] The essence of monitoring the implementation of various components is the comparison 
of achievements against targets" (p.4). 
Unlike IFAD's guidelines, and much like the UN ACC Guidelines, there is no recognition 
of the problem of ambiguity in roles of reporting staff and other biases due to conflicting 
interests between field staff, monitoring units and project management. Much less is there a 
discussion of how to take these into account. In the design of project-specific M&E systems, 
the following technical issues are seen as critical: the review of project objectives and 
selection of indicators, the identification of M&E information users, determination of the 
sources of data and information, special studies, methodology and frequency of indicator 
measurements, data processing, data analysis, reporting, requirements of staff and logistic 
support, training of staff, and cost estimates. Of the guidelines discussed here, this one takes 
the most positivist scientific approach to monitoring observed24. 
Pakistan's Federal Planning Commission 
The previous guidelines for monitoring, or M&E systems are mainly intended for individual 
projects, while having been geared more towards foreign aided projects. It is time to look at 
an example of guidelines written by a government agency dealing with many run of the mill 
projects. In this study, the Planning and Development Division in Pakistan (the secretariat 
of the Federal Planning Commission) is chosen, because of its considerable experience and 
interest in multi-sectoral programme monitoring. 
2 3 IFAD (1979, pp. 10-11) defines monitoring technically and substantively as: "the timely gathering of 
information on project inputs and outputs and on conditions and complementary activities that are critical to the 
attainment of project objectives. It utilises benchmark information collected during the inception phase and 
continues throughout the project's life-time when it enables comparisons to be drawn between actual inputs, 
outputs, conditions and activities with the expected or planned levels". 
2 4 As will be clear also from the study by Valadez & Bamberger (1994) referred to in section 1.6, but also from 
for instance publications of the World Bank Operations Evaluation Department (1995), the World Bank has 
come a long way since its textbook of 1981. There has been more attention for perspectivistic and strategic 
biases. But still, in the 1990s, most attention has gone into the identification of 'key performance indicators' 
within comprehensive Performance Measurement Systems at project-, subsector- and sector levels. As Kumar 
(in OED 1995, p. 148) has warned with respect to these indicators: "A key assumption is that managers will 
be able and wilting to make rational decisions in light of the information gathered". 
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The governmental procedures and system of planning including monitoring have been 
described in a comprehensive 'Manual for Development Projects' issued by the Projects Wing 
of the P&D Division (1991). A review of this manual first of all reveals that the ideal of the 
rational comprehensive planning paradigm is very much alive in the P&D Division25. 
Monitoring is discussed in system-theoretic and even cybernetic terms as providing feedback 
of "timely and useful information not only to the project management / implementation 
agencies but also a feed-back to the policy makers" (ibid., p.98). The conceptual definition 
of monitoring is given as follows: 
"Conceptually, 'monitoring' means to check and assess the implementation status of a 
project/programme/plan during the implementation on a regular basis. The system of watching / 
monitoring the progress of programme / project implementation, besides being an important link in the 
project cycle, helps in the identification/analysis and removal of bottlenecks and expediting action 
where projects have stalled or fallen behind schedule. Project Monitoring is invariably done with the 
active participation of the Project Management and is, therefore, quite distinct from 'inspection' which 
is generally undertaken at a higher level but not very regularly. In fact, Project Monitoring is a tool 
to serve the interests of both the Project Management and the Planners, as they share a common 
concern for the timely completion of projects within the approved cost, scope and time schedule 
(p.98)." 
Contrary to the UN ACC Guidelines, a distinction is made between internal and external 
monitoring, the first being within projects, the second being undertaken by "an outside central 
agency like the Projects Wing of the Planning and Development Division" (ibid., p.99). 
"The internal monitoring unit has to feed the external monitoring unit with necessary information. The 
external monitoring unit makes efforts for the preparation of special review reports and collection of 
information on the spot, through field visits, to countercheck the validity of the information being 
provided by the field staff" (ibid., p. 100). 
From this description, it is clear that monitoring is seen as comprising activities performed 
at two levels, with the first level directed at project management but also providing 
information to the second level which will digest this information and also check its validity. 
Thus the two systems are seen as capable of feeding into each other. 
The P&D Division recognises that there may be problems with the validity of the 
information, but there is no analysis of the reason for this situation. Project staff and central 
planners are assumed to have the same interests. That an important reason for problems might 
be that project management is not keen to send information that may lead to repercussions 
up to high levels of decision-makers beyond their own agency is not acknowledged. 
The manual equates planning with the preparation of plans for the economic and social development of the 
country. Projects are seen as the main means to implement plans. Although economic policies are within the 
purview of the P&D Division, they are less emphasised than the development programme, a portfolio of 
projects. Projects are seen as "the cutting edge of development". By this is meant that "without projects, it is 
unlikely that general development plans which hasten economic growth and further a range of social objectives 
will be fulfilled" (ibid., p. 18). "Under a systematic planning procedure, planners [not politicians - wk] 
determine general guidelines for the fulfillment of overall development goals which are further translated into 
sectoral objectives, along with overall resource allocation between them. Sectoral planning needs more specific 
information about the resources and constraints of the sectors concerned. After the collection of this 
information, disaggregated project programmes are devised which are individually appraised in the light of 
guidelines and macro-economic parameters provided by the higher-level planners" (ibid., p. 19). 
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Conclusions 
Most of these guidelines, then, at best, produce some statements as to the problem of biased 
information, but none of them use this point as the foundation for the organisation of a 
monitoring system. Because institutions are supposed to be acting rationally in a Weberian 
sense, strategic behaviour and biases are treated as anomalies. Both national and international 
agencies adhere to such views; more modern, post-positivistic insights have not yet filtered 
through in the seventies and eighties of the 20th century, at least not in the guidelines of aid 
agencies and national monitoring agencies (see also Rebien 1996, p. 81). A few more 
conclusions are in order. 
1) The traditional approach in the manuals is highlighted by the fact that the greatest 
challenge in monitoring is viewed as the definition of the issues to be monitored, and 
the translation of these into substantive indicators. In other words: technical or 
subject-specific issues. It is assumed that a standard set of indicators and one main 
rapporteur can satisfy the information needs of all interested parties. The information 
itself is seen as unidimensional and factual. The purpose of monitoring is generally 
seen as a concise and objective report of the status of a project so that management 
can 'let the facts speak for themselves' and decide accordingly. 
2) In most cases, engineering projects are assumed to be much more easy to monitor than 
'social' projects. There is little recognition of the possibility that engineering projects 
can be equally, or even more, beset with strategic or perspectivistic biases of data 
manipulation (cf. also Casley & Kumar 1987, p.4). 
3) Monitoring is generally considered to be an internal management activity, even if 
there are widely differing views as to who are to do the monitoring: a special unit 
without implementation responsibilities (IFAD) or all project staff involved in 
implementation (UN ACQ. While most guidelines struggle with the question where 
exactly to place the M&E unit, none seems to pay much attention to the shades 
between internal monitoring and external supervision, and their effect on the nature 
of information. Programme management is insufficiently differentiated from project 
management. For instance, if a federal (funding) agency like the Federal Planning 
Commission's Project Wing sends its progress forms to a project implemented by a 
health department in a province, is that internal monitoring, and how will the 
information returned be affected by the fact that the flow is directed to the federal 
level and not exclusively the health department's own senior management? 
4) In guidelines on monitoring within projects or organisations, there is similar lack of 
attention to the problems of field staff reporting to their superiors. The need for 
counter-checking of information is discussed here and there (P&D Division Pakistan) 
but it remains unclear how to organise a system which systematically takes into 
account all the stakeholders involved (including beneficiaries) into a mutually 
counterchecking and counterbalancing system. 
5) The positively coloured concept of monitoring is usually separated from the negatively 
coloured concepts of inspection and audit. In so far this is intended to convey the 
impression to project staff that there is nothing to fear from monitoring, this is 
questionable. Monitoring systems inescapably collect information which can also be 
utilised for accountability purposes, to check staff's performance and fix 
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responsibilities. Most monitoring systems even focus on staff performance issues. 
Ignoring this fact in the design can lead to too rosy expectations as to the quality of 
data to be generated. It is precisely the reason why the solution lies in multiple and 
not single systems. 
Monitoring in the literature 
It has to be noted that guidelines exclusively geared to monitoring systems (in the sense 
defined here) are scarce. Mostly, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) techniques are discussed 
in combination, with the bulk of the attention going to evaluation. Most M&E handbooks, 
if they are not agency-specific, are subject/sector specific (e.g. the design of a system for 
monitoring agricultural extension projects). Such literature is mostly concerned with the 
problem of defining indicators and applying appropriate methodologies, rather than ensuring 
that stakeholders' views are adequately incorporated and being concerned about how to cope 
with perspectivistic and strategic biases26. 
Another central theme in the general literature is the institutional setting of monitoring, 
internal or external to the project. For instance, Deboeck & Kinsey (1980, p.iv) record the 
view of participants to a M&E workshop in East Africa regarding rural development projects, 
that project internal systems are deemed best, also because project-level users rank highest 
in priority (and donor agencies lowest). The crux that several systems are required, either 
competing or interlocking, and each geared to a separate stakeholder primarily, is not 
appreciated, as is argued here because such a notion goes beyond the prevailing positivist 
paradigm27. 
Synoptic literature on monitoring, applicable to a range of possible subject matters and 
organisational arrangements and classifying these systematically is almost completely absent 
(cf. Rebien 1996, p. 169). Similarly, literature spelling out methodologies for the monitoring 
of large multi-sectoral programmes in development countries has remained scarce. Where 
such exists it is usually nationally-oriented, and of a descriptive type (e.g. Hussain 1991; 
Planning and Development Division 1991). This lack of attention is unfortunate given that 
monitoring systems with such purposes are in existence in planning departments in many 
developing countries (Waterston 1965; Valadez & Bamberger 1994). 
The observation that monitoring continues to be the poor relation of evaluation in social 
science literature is significant in itself. It demonstrates that monitoring systems are perceived 
as less problematic, dealing with what is considered as relatively non-controversial, factual 
information. The avalanche of literature on evaluation methodologies, on the other hand, is 
2 6 Clayton (1980,p.9) has summarised the typical problems of monitoring systems in development projects: 
"inadequate monitoring and evaluation is commonly associated with poor system design (producing more data 
than is needed or that can be processed), inadequate staffing of M&E activities, inability to handle base-line 
studies early enough (these strictly should be initiated prior to project implementation), substantial delays in 
processing data (usually through inadequacy of processing facilities but sometimes due to staffing shortage) and 
a consequent delay in data analysis and preparation of results (often due to shortages of senior professional staff 
but also to faulty design of field surveys, which produce data which cannot be used). And finally, if all the 
foregoing deficiencies are avoided and an effective monitoring and evaluation system produces the required 
results, they often remain unused by project staff". 
2 7 For instance, Deboeck & Kinsey note (March 1980, p.6): "Since the needs of the various user-groups are 
seldom identical, there is a potential demand for a data base far broader than would be needed only by project 
management. The danger in such circumstances is that M&E units may be expected to be all things to all users, 
something for which they are not well equipped." But the setting up of different systems by different parties 
is not offered as a solution; one integrative system continues to be the norm. 
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symptomatic of the fact that 'valuation' techniques, as scientific tools, are viewed as much 
more complex and challenging (Rossi & Wright 1984). 
The specific problems to which the prevailing approach to monitoring has led in South Asia 
are discussed in the following section. 
1.5 Experiences with monitoring systems in South Asia 
This study is fortunate in being able to review fairly recent experiences with government 
monitoring systems in South Asia, based on the work of Viqar Ahmed and Michael 
Bamberger for the Economic Development Institute (EDI) of the World Bank in the late 
1980s (Ahmed & Bamberger, 1989)28. From their seminar report 'Monitoring and 
Evaluating Development Projects; the South Asian Experience' it can be concluded that in all 
South Asian countries29, a hierarchical and interlocking system of monitoring and evaluation 
is operative such as identified with central planning systems described above. The system is 
usually controlled by a central planning agency, responsible for formulating the Five-Year 
Plans and Annual Plans and, due to the felt need for central control of the development 
process, for both monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the plans30. Apart from 
an overall monitoring system for these central planning agencies focusing on 'national' and 
foreign aided projects, there are sub-systems at the state/provincial levels under the control 
of Planning and Development Departments. These systems also serve internal purposes in 
many departments, although in some of them there are additional systems. In most of the 
countries, performance auditing systems are being developed within the Accountant General's 
Departments, but these have so far remained embryonic and it can be questioned whether they 
are not token measures. Major projects frequently have their own monitoring units and 
systems. Lastly, there are a variety of monitoring systems active for parastatal organisations. 
All systems are expected to be open and report to higher or lower levels of management when 
required. 
The functions of the monitoring and evaluation systems of central planning agencies are 
usually directed both at planning and implementation, i.e. they are supposed to serve both 
learning and control functions. The focus of the systems is, however, the control of 
implementation. Evaluation of operation and maintenance, impacts and sustainability of the 
projects/programmes has received little attention (ibid., p.6). Whereas all countries of the 
region have both development and recurrent budgets, the monitoring systems in place 
concentrate on the former. The systems usually comprise standardised monthly or quarterly 
reporting covering all or a selection of the development projects and associated reviews held 
in the central planning agencies, either at the national or at the state/provincial levels. The 
main source for completing the standard report forms is the implementor of the project. At 
the level of the national planning agency, the information is occasionally complemented by 
site visit reports, inspections or evaluations held by special wings. At the level of the state 
or province, such counter-checking and evaluation systems are usually not present, or 
rudimentary. 
For a similar review of progress reporting systems, mainly but not completely confined to South Asia, see 
Waterston (1965, pp 355-65). 
2 9 India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Maldives. 
3 0 In India, however, monitoring is controlled by two agencies, one the Planning Commission, which evaluates 
social sector programmes, centrally managed and sponsored projects, and the Ministry of Programme 
Implementation, which monitors megaprojects mainly. 
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Problems 
In spite of the fact that most monitoring systems were started soon after independence, and 
that considerable experience with their operation must have been built up, all systems 
continue to face problems. With thousands of projects to be monitored, progress information 
is frequently late, not answering the right questions or too costly to collect (ibid., p.3). In 
addition, it is widely recognised as incomplete, carelessly collected or in some cases 
deliberately falsified (ibid., p.9). Also, the information is, in the main, focusing on 
quantitative and financial aspects, to the neglect of other aspects. Because monitoring is 
focusing on the development budget, and neglects maintenance and operation issues, much 
of the information cannot be interpreted meaningfully for (comprehensive) planning purposes. 
A general complaint is that the monitoring systems of central agencies do not serve the needs 
of project staff at local level at all: project staff tends to look upon central M&E systems as 
a waste of time, a nuisance, or even a threat (ibid., p.9). Usually, central governments 
require agencies to provide standardised quantitative data on all projects rather than allow 
them to tailor the M&E systems to suit the information needs of each project (ibid., p. 10). 
Sometimes, it was observed that the monitoring and evaluation systems at both the central and 
project levels respond more to the information needs of the donor agencies than to the needs 
of project/programme management (ibid., p.5). 
Frequendy, project M&E systems are required to produce information of use to a large 
number of government and donor agencies all at the same time. All of these 'stakeholders' 
have different demands, a situation which often leads to difficulties with respect to settling 
the format of monitoring systems. These systems often change, which is not conducive to the 
continuity of data and the morale of reporting staff. In other cases, projects are required to 
report in different formats to many different agencies, which makes monitoring a time 
consuming and costly affair. 
A further characteristic of most M&E systems in South Asia is the serious underutilisation 
of the data. Data collected during the monitoring of a project is often filed and forgotten once 
project implementation is completed, in spite of the learning/planning co-objective of the 
systems. In none of the South Asian countries, there is any systematic creation of a national 
data bank that can be used for planning future projects31 (ibid., p.8). In some cases, it is 
even observed that not only project management is reluctant to report problems, but central 
monitoring agencies are also reluctant to receive reports that document problems, which they 
do not wish to confront and many of which are already known to them (p. 11). 
A finding in all of the countries of South Asia, is that central M&E systems have a 
controversial history, usually one of many false starts. Due to the considerable degree of 
central economic planning, central agencies have often sought to use monitoring as an 
instrument of financial control and budget allocation. This has frequently led to protest by 
line ministries that their autonomy and financial independence is being eroded by a super 
ministry, and in some cases this has resulted in a reduction of power or a relocation of the 
central monitoring agency. In a number of countries, this has even led to the central 
monitoring agency being transferred from one central agency to another, while in other cases, 
different ministries such as Finance and Planning are developing parallel central monitoring 
systems. It was noted that at the time of the seminar, in every country of South Asia, the 
central M&E system had been operating in its present form for less than three years at the 
time of the study (ibid., p.4). 
3 1 It is mentioned, however, that Pakistan's Auditor General's Office had recently begun the creation of such 
a data bank to compile data on the cost and time duration of different components of project implementation. 
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Ahmed & Bamberger (op.cit., p.9) conclude that: 
"the highly centralized nature of M&E systems means that they are seen primarily as an instrument for 
central government to control managers - not as a management tool to improve project performance. 
One potential danger is that current M&E systems tend to weaken project managers by reducing their 
areas of responsibility and making them subject to increased central control. In many cases the 
monitoring information produced by the project M&E unit must be sent to the central M&E agency 
for compilation and analysis. The CM A [central monitoring agency], rather than the project manager, 
decides what actions are to be taken to correct certain categories of problems that have been identified. 
In addition to causing delays, this makes the manager less directly accountable and reduces his/her 
incentives to improve project performance. 
Of course, all of these problems should not be blamed on the M&E system since they are a product 
of centralized planning in all of the South Asian countries". 
1.6 General problems of monitoring systems 
In a recent comprehensive handbook on monitoring and evaluation techniques, Valadez & 
Bamberger of the World Bank (1994, p.27 ff.) have summarised the problems with the 
current approaches to monitoring and evaluation in developing countries. In their view these 
can be classified into four main groups: (1) organisational and political problems, (2) 
managerial problems, (3) problems of focus, and (4) methodological problems. Although 
Valadez & Bamberger seem to be speaking mainly about evaluations, their classification can 
also be held to have relevance to monitoring. 
Four types of problems 
Organisational and political problems of monitoring systems can be called the main concern 
of this study. According to Valadez & Bamberger (1994, p.25), political dimensions of 
monitoring and evaluation have been by and large neglected in literature on developing 
countries, in spite of the fact that they have been widely discussed in the United States, which 
produce most of the literature on monitoring and evaluation. Since central monitoring 
agencies exercise considerable influence over resource allocation and over decisions 
concerning the future fate of the programmes they are monitoring, they position themselves 
in the centre of a power play amongst other powerful actors in the development process. In 
consequence, these agencies are often switched between departments or have their powers or 
resources greatly reduced. The power play also leads to concentration in the monitoring 
systems on certain actors (information sources) to the exclusion of others. This study argues 
that there is also an effect on the information submitted. 
Managerial problems are, to a large extent, interlinked with the political and organisational 
problems. They relate, according to Valadez & Bamberger, to the failure to establish clear 
procedures for identifying the main users of the information they produce, for comparing the 
importance of studies requested by different national and international organisations, and for 
defining the kinds of information required by each potential user. However, in the view of 
this study this can be seen as again largely an effect of being immersed in a power game: the 
political context of monitoring. Programme managers are, according to Valadez & 
Bamberger, reluctant to comply with monitoring systems imposed on them from above due 
to their wish to minimize accountability, due to their lack of confidence that monitoring 
products will yield practical benefits exceeding their cost, and due to the lack of rewards. 
Monitoring systems not imposed from above are often not evolved within projects, for fear 
that written materials might fall into the wrong hands and may be misunderstood. (It can be 
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added that within many projects, therefore, reviews of progress are done on an informal 
basis, through staff meetings, and on the basis of personal, unsystematic observations.) 
Another set of managerial problems relates to the difficulties of recruiting and retaining 
qualified staff for the monitoring units within the public sector. 
Problems of focus of monitoring systems reduce their effectiveness: practically all of the 
monitoring systems for public sector development programmes focus on capital investment 
to the neglect of recurrent expenditures. Thus, such monitoring systems are reduced to 
gauging the implementation process only. The biased and partial image of progress that this 
produces is not conducive to analysis for development planning and not a sufficient input for 
impact evaluation. A similar problem is that monitoring systems are generally seen to be 
more concerned with inputs than with outputs, whereas they generally operate in the context 
of annual plans rather than medium or long-term plans. This means that monitoring systems 
have come to be preoccupied with short-term objectives. 
Methodological problems have beset monitoring systems, as has been pointed out by many 
other studies. In this vein, Valadez & Bamberger (op.cit., p.28) mainly discuss the problems 
of impact evaluations, sample surveys and quantitative methods, but it can be held that 
monitoring systems similarly suffer from design problems, ranging from choice of indicators, 
neglect of qualitative indicators, lack of incorporation of diagnostic studies (Casley & Lury 
1982), insufficient validation of data, to bad formats of forms and badly designed computer 
processing systems. This study adds that monitoring systems may suffer from failing Ashby's 
Law of Requisite Variety (1956, ch.ll). 
This cybernetic law states that "R's capacity as a regulator cannot exceed R's capacity as 
a channel of communication". In other words, "the quantity of regulation that can be achieved 
is bounded by the quantity of information that can be transmitted in a certain channel" (ibid., 
p. 195). When the statement is applied to monitoring systems, then being short of requisite 
variety means nothing more than that the information delivered by these systems will be too 
simple or biased to cope with (or to display an adequate picture of) the actual complexity of 
the situation (see also Beer 1967, p.50; Haynes 1974, p. 10). With such systems, adequate 
regulation or control cannot be achieved. How a system can be concise and yet encompass 
requisite variety is one of the main methodological headaches of monitoring systems. 
It can be concluded that Valadez & Bamberger have taken the attention for political 
dimensions into the mainstream of World Bank guidelines on aid evaluations and to some 
extent project monitoring systems. Still, it is contended here that much further work is needed 
to spell out the exact implications for monitoring systems; this case study is a contribution 
to such work. 
The four types of problems will be the focus of the evaluation of the functioning of 
monitoring systems for public sector development programmes in Pakistan. As mentioned, 
the hypothesis is advanced that political and organisational problems are most pertinent to 
understanding the 'failure' of these systems, but all four problem areas will receive separate 
attention, in order to compare their relative importance. 
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1.7 Some clues from organisation theory 
The analytical framework of this study is political32. In the absence of a well-developed 
monitoring discipline, it draws on ideas from (1) planning theory, (2) organisation theory and 
(3) evaluation theory. The main ideas of relevance to monitoring as derived from planning 
theories have already been outlined, so this section discusses those from organisation theory, 
while the following will concentrate on those derived from evaluation theory. It must be 
recognised that these ideas form part of a wider scientific interest in the perspectivistic and 
strategic aspects of policy and decision making. This interest was incipient already in the 
1950s, but came to blossom in the 1970s and 1980s, and has led to new post-positivistic and 
post-modernistic paradigms for the social sciences in the 1990s33. As such, if there is a 
restriction to organisation theory and evaluation theory in this study, it is only in order to be 
concise. 
Traditional and new organisation theory 
This study is concerned with monitoring both between and within organisations, and therefore 
organisations can be said to be at its heart. Most government departments in developing 
countries are based on traditional organisational models, and their monitoring systems and 
practices are embedded in these. The original organisational models are still very influential 
as normative ideals in the West as well (Prôpper 1993, p.43, 56, 61)34. The following 
features were important in these models: scientific management, material incentives, 
specialisation, standardisation of work processes, pre-programming of employees, the 
congruence in objectives of managers and subordinate staff (Taylor); the importance of having 
one leadership as ultimate authority, the reification of planning and monitoring into separate 
management activities and units (Fayol); the singleness of functions of public organisations, 
and the superiority of rational, rule-bound and dispassionate bureaucracies which would 
reduce disloyal, arbitrary or corrupt behaviour of its officers through the security offered 
(Weber). All these features were assumed to lead to efficient and predictable results of 
organisations. In the interest of what Weber calls 'instrumental rationality' 
(Zweckrationalitât), most such models also assumed public organisations to be naturally 
inclined towards coordination and cooperation rather than competition. 
Later organisational models often went in the other direction. They saw more benefits for 
organisations from less repetitious and 'machine-like' work (which would be leading to 'de-
skilling'), from improvisation, and non-material incentives. The newer organisational theories 
(based on Barnard) emphasised that human relations (Mayo), or human resources (Likert) -
not rules and regulations - were important to the efficient and predictable functioning of 
organisations. Still, to some extent, they expounded the optimistic view of organisations as 
being rational, although not necessarily the individuals in it (cf. Perrow 1986, p.67). 
But gradually more models started focusing on explanations why so many 'classical' 
bureaucracies were less than fully effective, and even displayed non-rational behaviours. They 
Palumbo (1987, p. 18-19) defines politics as meaning more than narrow partisan politics among political 
parties; it refers also to the interactions of various actors within and among bureaucracies, clients, interest 
groups, private organisations and legislatures as they relate to each other from different positions of power, 
influence and authority. 
3 3 This interest has to the knowledge of this author not touched the study of monitoring systems in the social 
realm as yet, but this study wishes to be a first contribution. 
3 4 This section leans on Propper (1993) and Perrow (1986). See also Turner & Hulme (1997, ch.l). 
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came to argue that the human capacity for rationality was 'bounded' and that therefore 
'satisficing' behaviour both in and of organisations was more likely and more realistic than 
(Weberian) optimising behaviour (March & Simon 1958). Important strands in organisation 
sociology even came to claim that organisational functioning was, in fact, irrational and 
arbitrary because of the fundamental indecisiveness and self-interest of man (March & Olson 
1976). Or they argued that intra-organisational functioning was determined by conflicts of 
interest, internal competition and rivalry, which might, however, also have positive effects 
in a Lindblomian sense (cf. Whetten 1982; Pröpper 1993, ch. 10). 
Relevant ideas 
The development of system and network theories contributed to an explicit recognition that 
(1) organisations can display other logics than instrumental ones, and (2) even public 
organisations with clear mandates are often behaving like rivalling organisms instead of 
harmoniously cooperating entities together forming a monolithic bureaucracy (with varying 
evaluations of its effects: some calling competition and conflict a benefit in disguise, others 
a liability)33. 
Of particular interest to this study are the theories of Selznick (in Pröpper 1993, p. 179) 
who distinguishes between the concepts of organisation and institution. The former is viewed 
as a formal system of rules and functions, the latter as an organism capable of reaction to and 
adaptation to the environment, self-preservation being the most pressing objective of the 
institution. Real life corporations / bureaucracies incorporate aspects of both36; any formal 
organisation gradually 'institutionalises' and thereby becomes, from 'executive', a 'statesman' 
(i.e. a political entity). The official functions and objectives of organisations thereby also 
potentially vary from their unofficial functions and objectives, and this carries implications 
for their activities and communication with the organisational environment. Cyert & March 
(1963) corroborate that organisations usually have multiple, contradictory, ambiguous and not 
operational goals: organisations often do not specify operations or steps that must be taken 
to achieve their objectives, whereas criteria do not exist to determine whether they have been 
achieved adequately. For instance, satisfactory achievements or profits of an organisation in 
a given year might be at the expense of satisfactory results three years hence. The ambiguity 
in objectives of organisations must bring an element of randomness to their reporting of 
progress. 
This randomness is only relative, however, and easily translates into systematic bias. March 
& Simon (in Perrow 1986, pp. 125-128) have put forward the view that organisations impose 
their own set of concepts on their staff for the sake of the necessary 'uncertainty absorption'. 
All information is filtered to fit the organisation's conceptual scheme of things. The reliance 
on only few sources of information, or only one information processing unit is preferred in 
order in order to preserve organisational consensus. In this view, unidimensionality of 
information is not so much an outcome of a positivist paradigm, as of needs inherent to any 
organisation. Organisational logic would furthermore demand that in case of failure, 
individuals are blamed rather than the system itself. The implications of the latter theory for 
monitoring are clear. Reporting systems would, in case of project failure, serve the (hidden) 
3 5 Such theories have been used to explain phenomena in India. Chaturvedi (1988) for instance, concluded on 
the basis of a study of departmental cooperation patterns, that coordination between departments was not the 
norm, but only the exception resorted to in times of crisis. Non-interference and non-intervention were the norm 
rather than cooperation and coordination. 
3 6 This study will use the two terms organisation and institution interchangeably: most organisations in the 
public sector have become institutions in Selznick's terms. 
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function of attributing fault to individuals rather than the organisation itself; another 
organisational rather than positivist ground per se for the deliberate filtering of information 
conveyed through such systems. 
Interorganisational networks 
This study is concerned with the influence of inter-organisational relations on monitoring 
systems. Since the 1970s, attention for interorganisational networks have come to the 
forefront of organisation theory. Of importance are, first of all, Pfeffer & Salancik (1978). 
Their open systems theory maintains that the prime factor of importance to the understanding 
of organisations is their constant and primordial need to secure resources within a potentially 
hostile and continually changing environment. The relevance of such observations in the 
conditions of mutual dependence between funding and implementing agencies in Pakistan, and 
the implications for monitoring systems, are self-evident. Ways out from the strains of 
resource-dependence are the differentiation of the organisation into subunits or the 
diversification of activities (ibid, pp.274-275). Both strategies are moving away from the 
single-objective, instrumental view of organisations. The escapes are, however, only possible 
if slack resources are utilised, resources which must be created for this specific purpose. Such 
solutions, it may be assumed, will then also improve the quality of interorganisational 
coordination and reduce sycophantic biases in inter-organisational reporting. However, if such 
resources cannot be created easily, such as in the resource scarce conditions of most 
developing countries, then there is a serious problem: "Organizations dealing with a large set 
of diverse environmental elements without sufficient slack resources face difficulties in 
managing and resolving the competing groups therefore confronted" (ibid., p.275). 
Chaturvedi (1987, p. 37 ff.), lastly, has drawn attention to two other relevant aspects of 
inter-organisational relationships than resource-dependence, namely domain-consensus, and 
regulation- compliance. The former refers to the "fight by organisations for a piece of the turf 
and acknowledging the right of others to a piece for themselves". Regulation-compliance 
relates to the acceptance by organisations of hierarchical relations among them. If the two 
relationships are disputed, then interorganisational relations as a whole will become more 
troubled. This will also affect, it can be imagined, interorganisational reporting systems 
CWhat business is it of other organisations to know about the problems of our projects?' 
'What right has the other organisation to control us?'). Chaturvedi (op.cit., p.50) concludes 
: "One of the attributes of public agencies is that their domains are clearly prescribed by a 
mandating body. [..] However, [...] a singular problem is that such a definition of domain 
is a static one and does not incorporate the evolutionary changes that may occur during the 
course of time. [...] such shifts may result in fairly wide difference between the prescribed 
and the operating domains." In the context of this study, the question arises: how are 
monitoring systems affected by changing interorganisational relations and changing 
paradigms? 
Conclusion 
From the perspective of this study, the earlier organisation theories are an important resource 
to explain the intentions and orientations of monitoring systems; the later theories give clues 
as to why the practices and operations in practice can be different, and point to possible new 
setups. But because organisations will be organisations, they also point to the limitations to 
the potential for improvement of any organisation and the rationality they can bring to public 
action. This will constrain for instance the disjointed incrementalist planning approach put 
forward in section 1.3, as a means to improving information and decisions. Thus, recent 
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organisational theory seems to indicate that there are absolute constraints to the types and 
quality of information that reports from organisations can furnish. 
1.8 Some clues from evaluation theory 
Evaluation theory has undergone similar shifts in the paradigm as organisation theory and 
planning theory, although its genesis is to be dated somewhat later than both other fields of 
inquiry. The earliest professional literature can be dated back to the 1950s in America and 
shows that evaluations were under the influence of the heyday of the rational comprehensive 
planning ideology. The many social programmes started in the United States in the early 
1960s as part of the government's 'war on poverty' initiative led to a proliferation in 
evaluations being undertaken (Rebien 1996, pp. 12-13). Evaluation became a profession, then 
an academic discipline. 'Reading' social developments, evaluations were to be objective 
statements made by scientists in the employ of policy makers. Evaluations were to be 
preferably value free responses to value free 'instrumental' questions37. As Guba & Lincoln 
(1989), and also Shadish, Cook & Leviton (1991) observed, quantitative measurement and 
description of a reality external to the evaluators were the crux of these evaluations, and 
thereafter the identification of cause-effect relationships, the calculation of comparative 
advantages and disadvantages of approaches, and the rating of levels of effectiveness and 
efficiency. Since policy-makers were assumed to be rational, utilisation was not a serious 
issue in the design of evaluations at this time. Utilisation would be depending only on the 
technical quality of the evaluation itself; with a good evaluation its utilisation would be 
automatic. 
Changing ideas in the 1970s 
In the early 1970s, the rationalist paradigm surrounding evaluations began to be contested and 
evaluation experts such as Weiss began to criticise the evaluations conducted so far as narrow, 
unrealistic, irrelevant, unfair and unused (Weiss in Rebien 1996, p.23). In the 1980s the 
positivistic position had come to be "roundly condemned by many" (Kelly 1987, p.284). 
Gradually, the new evaluations began to incorporate more qualitative information (see e.g. 
Patton 1990). They turned from summative or product-oriented, 'definitive' evaluations, to 
formative, i.e. process- and recommendations-oriented. They began to see fundamental 
differences between more 'wicked' and more 'benign' issues in the social realm, the former 
pertaining to indescribable, elusive or value laden phenomena (such as public safety), the 
latter to more hard and technical issues (Rittel & Webber in Friedmann 1987). They began 
to more systematically incorporate perspectives of the main stakeholders in programmes, both 
to increase the likelihood of use of the evaluations by these stakeholders, and to do justice 
to a reality which was perceived to be multidimensional (e.g. Patton's 'utilisation focused 
evaluation' (1986); Lawrence's (1989) 'stakeholder approach'). In order to transcend the 
3 7 Kelly (1987, p.284) has written that the value neutrality notions of logical positivism led in the sixties and 
seventies to a goal-achievement evaluation model which permitted "passing value judgments back to program 
managers and governmental policy makers who in turn can pass responsibility back to legislators. By focusing 
on the effectiveness of the means to attain ends specified by others, researchers are able to convince themselves 
that they are maintaining their value neutrality." 
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limitations imposed by 'political' or otherwise biased official goals of programmes38, some 
recommended 'goal-free' evaluations and advised to even shed all guidance from either 
programme or evaluator theories in the evaluation exercise (Scriven 1972). This was also 
viewed as necessary because, under the influence of organisation theory, it was recognised 
that programmes were often the unintended and continually changing products of bureau-
political games played by actors at different levels in the organisation and with different 
perceptions as to the programme's goals (Allison 1971). Peck & Rubin (1983, p.686), for 
instance, concluded: "inhouse evaluations and contract evaluations provide a convenient 
vehicle for legitimizing organization requirements". Some evaluation analysts advised to make 
the theories behind social programmes more explicit, as well as those chosen by the 
evaluation researchers to study the programme, in order to enlighten the user with the 
inevitable theoretical (i.e. partial) perspectives from which both the programme and the 
evaluation were undertaken (Chen 1990). 
Generally, there was more recognition of the inevitability of the perspectivistic biases of 
evaluators, who approach their subject from their professional background and experience, 
and therefore may see certain but not necessarily all aspects of relevance. Some, like Marsden 
& Oakley (1991), argued that projects are arenas of struggle, and that therefore an actor-
oriented perspective in evaluations would lead to the most valuable insights. This was also 
in the wake of a wider sociological debate, calling for attention to such aspects (Bierschenk 
1988; Crehan & Van Oppen 1988; see also articles in Frerks & Den Ouden (1995) and in 
Sociología Ruralis). 
Many of these realisations and refinements led to increasing comprehensiveness and 
methodological complexity of these evaluations, and concomitant increases in costliness. 
Mainly for programmes and projects in developing countries, alternative styles of evaluation 
called Rapid Rural Appraisal (McCracken 1988; Kumar 1993), Participatory Rural Appraisal 
(Chambers 1983, 1997), or Beneficiary Assessment (Salmen 1989, 1995) were advocated. 
Political aspects of evaluation 
A related strand of evaluation theories stressed the importance of coming to terms with the 
'politics of programme evaluation' (Palumbo 1987). Evaluators became aware that they were 
often only pawns in power games played by institutional principals and that their findings 
were not used if not favourable (see e.g. Weiss 1987, p.62). This led to the finding that the 
ultimate aim of evaluations from the side of those commissioning them was often not 
'instrumental' but opportunistic. Similarly, it was found that the objectives of many 
programmes are often held deliberately vague, are compromises, and that few goals even 
have majority support (cf. Floden & Weiner 1978, p. 11). In the wake of such findings came 
the realisation that evaluators should take a greater political responsibility themselves, leading 
to some analysts even expounding a view that evaluation was in the first place an ethical 
activity (Newman & Brown 1996)39. Weiss (1987, p.54) argued for inclusion of the study 
of political goals of programmes, so that it would be clearer "why some programs survive 
despite abysmal outcomes, why some that look fine on indicators of goal achievement go 
Allison (in Propper 1993, p. 155 ft), an organisation sociologist had already claimed that goals of 
organisations were often resultants rather than choices, and emerging from bureau-politics. Players of 
bureaucratic games at different levels of organisations often perceive quite different faces of an issue and may 
therefore differ markedly in the actions they prefer. 
3 9 Some policy analysts also realised that evaluations might not take place for the very reason that they might 
be threatening to certain interests. That so many organisations yet involve in evaluation is surprising for instance 
Wildavsky (1972). 
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down the drain, and which factors have the most influence on the making and persistence of 
policy". That evaluations cannot be neutral and objective 0scientific') verdicts on 
programmes is now widely accepted in the (mainly American) evaluation discipline, including 
that evaluators must always take a stand about the efficiency, effectiveness and even the 
relevance of programmes*0. Often the most important questions to be asked in evaluations 
are not the efficiency and effectiveness of a programme, but which of the many and often 
conflicting goals are to be pursued by it. 
Strategic interests of evaluators 
A smaller concern, often raised outside the evaluation discipline itself, was the effect of self-
interest from the side of evaluators. For instance, Chambers (1974. p. 125) concluded that 
internal 'co-opted' evaluators resembled "parasites in their concern not to kill their hosts". 
Wildavsky (1972, p.520) in an article about 'the self-evaluating organisation' found 
evaluations conducted internally so unlikely to yield good information that "organization 
members would have to be rewarded for passing on bad news". Wildavsky asks the rhetorical 
question how to convince administrators to collect information that might help others but can 
only harm them. He comes to recommendations that are rather tongue in cheek. "The very 
idea of hierarchy may have to give way to shifting roles in which superior and subordinate 
positions are exchanged so that each member knows he will soon be in the other's position. 
The self-evaluating organization clearly requires an extraordinary degree of mutual trust" 
(ibid., p.520). 
New paradigms 
In a volume called "The Paradigm Dialog', Guba (1990) argues that there may be three new 
paradigms developing in the evaluation discipline, next to the older positivist paradigm: post-
positivism, critical theory, and constructivism (or post-modernism). 
Post-positivism maintains that a real world driven by real natural causes exists, but that it 
is impossible for humans truly to perceive it with their imperfect sensory and intellective 
mechanisms (Guba 1990, p.20). As Phillips (1990, p.45) argues however, objectivity remains 
the "regulative ideal". Methodologically, Cook's (1985) 'critical multiplism' is emphasised, 
relying on triangulation techniques. "If human sensory and intellective mechanisms cannot 
be relied upon, it is essential that the findings of an inquiry be based on as many sources -
of data, investigators, theories, and methods - as possible" (Guba 1990, p.21). 
Critical theory is an umbrella of divergent theories which might be more appropriately 
labeled "ideologically oriented inquiry, including neo-Marxism, materialism, feminism, 
Freireism, participatory inquiry, and other similar movements as well as critical theory itself" 
(ibid., p.23). In programme evaluations, the focus is usually power; programmes are looked 
at from the side of the oppressed, rather than from the side of the 'government' such as is 
often the case with post-positivists (the equivalent of power being called control in that 
paradigm). Critical theory adherents in evaluations generally reject the claim of value freedom 
made by positivism (Popkewitz 1990). They make a point of exposing the values inherent in 
A political stand is self-evident when a negative verdict is given in terms of any of these three criteria. But 
also if evaluators speak out positively on these criteria, it is argued that a political verdict is given at least 
implicitly: the evaluators agree with the goals themselves. Because evaluators, if they want to be more than 
pawns, cannot avoid to speak out on the relevance of programme goals, instrumental rationality has been 
superseded. For instance, announcing the success of an agricultural policy in terms of efficiency and 
effectiveness, would carry the implication that such a policy is preferable, also compared to alternative uses of 
the resources engaged by such a policy (Palumbo 1987). 
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any inquiry, and see it as their task to combat 'false consciousness'. Because of the 
implication that there must also be a realist 'true' consciousness, Guba (1990, p.24) criticises 
that there appears to be a logical disjunction: a realist ontology coupled with a subjectivist 
epistemology. 
Constructivists in the evaluation discipline are for instance Guba & Lincoln (1985, 1989). 
Constructivists share earlier reflected views as to the theory and value ladenness of facts, but 
add a position of relativism: realities' exist only in the form of multiple mental constructions, 
"dependent for their form and content on the persons who hold them" (Guba 1990, p.27). 
The methodology is hermeneutic, actor-oriented and dialectic: "depicting individual 
constructions as accurately as possible [...] comparing and contrasting these existing 
individual (including the inquirer's) constructions so that each respondent must confront the 
constructions of others and come to terms with them" (ibid., p. 26). Notions of causality are 
rejected, as well as the possibility of generalisation of evaluation findings. 'Thick description' 
becomes the norm (Green 1990, p.237). Kelly (1987, p.290) has pointed out that if reality 
exists only in the minds of the individuals, "only ideographic statements specifying particular 
times, particular spaces, and particular contexts are possible." 
This study's position 
This study agrees with much in the post-positivist view, whereas constructivism is rejected 
since its ultimate consequence would be that all human communication, as well as science, 
becomes an impossibility. It is the "death of reason" (Hassard 1993, p.1). The constructivist 
view is logically contradictory (see also Norris 1997); how can a constructivist evaluator 
climb into the skin of another person, and reflect his or her view accurately? If all 
observation is unique, then why is there a need for confronting the constructions of others 
and coming to terms with them? If generalisations are not possible, then evaluation has lost 
its learning function. Even consensus creation (as pursued by constructivists) seems an 
impossibility; and why should consensus creation be desirable at all? Constructivists are 
perhaps in die final analysis not as radical as they claim themselves. In fact, there are a fair 
number of evaluation analysts (Firestone 1990; Patton 1990) who have taken a pragmatic 
view and claim that in practice the three new paradigms all lead to the same kind of 
evaluations. 
This study is undertaken from the view that reality must be constituted by observable or 
perceivable phenomena (things, facts, occurrences); without these no understanding is 
possible between people. But their observation can never be complete and proclaim truth 
about them. Phenomena have many sides and dimensions, which may not all be 
simultaneously visible to one and the same observer. They may indeed have as many 
dimensions (sides) as there are viewpoints. The appearance of a phenomenon will therefore 
always depend on the perspective of the observer. If a phenomenon looks principally the same 
to many observers, then this means that the viewpoint of these observers is usually the same. 
Those phenomena for which there are many common observers and perspectives may be 
called facts. This, however, does not mean that other perspectives are not possible on any of 
these facts, or do not produce other truths concerning the observed. 
If the positivist social scientist adheres to a correspondence theory of truth, whereby 
"reality is viewed as being objective, discernible to skilled researchers, and capable of being 
interpreted correctly in sentences exhibiting isomorphism between the empirical world and 
theories about the world" (Kelly 1987, p.280), the post-positivist social scientist adheres more 
40 
to a consensual theory of truth; triangulation being the method to approach it*1. "Given [...] 
ambiguity, democracy requires that multiple investigators conduct analyses of the data so that 
rival plausible interpretations will be disclosed. Research on critical national policy issues 
requires multiple value perspective and multiple meta-analyses to identify commonalities" 
(ibid., p. 288). It can be argued further that only democracy (majority view) will then be the 
suitable framework for taking decisions in the social and public domain. 
This study also disagrees to some extent with post-positivism, though mostly from a 
practical point of view: not only, as Patton (1990,p.l87) has commented, is triangulation as 
a method very expensive, the comprehensiveness and methodological complexities of such 
evaluation render it a very difficult undertaking. Moreover, as Patton (1987, p. 120) has 
argued, many post-positivist evaluators (such as Palumbo) claim that they can represent the 
public interest as opposed to 'specific interests'. But since there are inevitably multiple 
publics, who can claim to represent them all fairly? A more practical strategy for evaluators 
seems to be more deliberately partisan, and for policy-makers to rely on more than one 
information flows, and more or different evaluations to bring the multidimensionality of 
reality into perspective. It is then up to the decision-makers, rather than the evaluators, to 
'triangulate' and take the proper decisions. As Lindblom & Woodhouse (1993) have argued 
(but a point not yet picked up in the evaluation discipline except by critical theorists): in 
explicitly partisan analysis (evaluation) within a pluralistic context lies the greatest 
contribution to policy making42. Monitoring systems could arguably be confined to those 
dimensions of reality which are relatively less contested; the question of course being which 
are those dimensions. But the restriction to the less contested dimensions is not essential for 
monitoring to yield valuable information. This study will also show that in the domain of 
project and programme monitoring systems even the dimensions which are regarded as more 
straightforward (such as project finance) are, in practice, full of pitfalls and therefore much 
more contestable than generally assumed. 
The politics of monitoring 
As is clear from the above, an important part of this study is engaged in unravelling the 
politics of programme monitoring; in applying a relativity theory of monitoring. This is so 
because the information yielded by monitoring is generally used for taking immediate 
management decisions, and because the monitoring agent, much more than the outside 
evaluator, is a major stakeholder him/herself in the outcome of this decision-making. His 
direct material stakes (his professional reputation, his job, other 'rents') might be more 
important for gauging and passing on information than his or his organisation's conceptual 
scheme of things. Because monitoring is concerned with such questions whether programme 
staff have done their work well and in time, accountability issues are always right around the 
corner. If personal benefits are less at stake, then monitoring reports are often still used 
strategically, but now to promote the interests of the organisation vis-a-vis other organisations 
in its environment. The assumed concern with objective and basic information is thus often 
not observed in project/programme monitoring systems: because the information is basic and 
4 1 Denzin (in Patton 1990, p.187) has identified four basic types of triangulation: (1) data triangulation - the 
use of a variety of data sources in a study; (2) - investigator triangulation - the use of several different 
researchers or evaluators; (3) theory triangulation - the use of multiple perspectives to interpret a single set of 
data; and (4) methodological triangulation - the use of multiple methods to study a single problem. 
4 2 Fortunately, it seems, in policy analysis (as in evaluation) some issues are more straightforward than others. 
Some observations are shared even by the otherwise most antagonistic opponents, and consensus will be then 
easy to achieve. Other phenomena will remain more contested and decisions will be more difficult to take. 
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in project monitoring directly related to accountability, it is not objective. Therefore, such 
systems can be assumed to always give a coloured image of reality. 
Although this view is largely unsupported by detailed research, some such evidence was 
found by Kelly (1987, pp 274-275). She reports that studies of performance measurement and 
monitoring (PMM) undertaken in the United States in the 1980s have confirmed that in such 
systems, politics is intimately interwoven. Politics is particularly evident in those stages where 
meaning is to be given to specific indicators. The example is given of a comparative study 
of state mental health programme performance measurement systems from three states. The 
findings led to a conclusion that value judgments and political trade-offs were integral parts 
of the PMM systems. 'Fudge factors' and qualitative judgements were found needed to adjust 
the data reported to the system so that artifacts and radical changes in indicator scores that 
might result in arbitrary and undesirable intercounty comparisons, could be removed. It was 
also recognised that what was left out of such systems in terms of indicators was as important 
- and as political potentially - as what was included. Lastly, it was found that organisations 
were usually reluctant as to their cooperation with the establishment of inter-organisation 
management information systems, because these were seen as leading to enhanced external 
control. Ahmed & Bamberger's findings on monitoring in South Asia come to mind here. 
This study will investigate and substantiate such findings using material collected in Pakistan. 
1.9 Organisation of the study 
The subject of this book is the monitoring of development programmes in poor countries, 
with Pakistan as the case study. It deals with the assumptions behind this kind of monitoring, 
the procedures, the practices, the hidden dimensions, the problems and their possible 
solutions. The monitoring referred to in this study is, in practice, mainly based on reporting 
systems for progress with large numbers of government implemented projects in capital 
investment programmes, as supervised by government planning/funding agencies. This book 
is therefore not primarily concerned with other important kinds of monitoring that can be 
distinguished in the world of development policy. For instance, it does not focus on project-
internal systems, or department-internal monitoring systems. Neither is it about monitoring 
by international donor agencies, or about methods for the collection of monitoring data in thé 
field. This is not to say that reference will not be made to such methods and systems; there 
are of course many linkages. 
In the case study that follows, two strands will be pursued. First, attention will be devoted 
to the origins and modalities of positivist bureaucratic organisation and rational 
comprehensive planning in Pakistan. The main hypothesis is that they lead to malfunctions 
in the implementation of the development programme and a waste of government resources. 
Secondly, various monitoring systems as operating in Pakistan (particularly Azad Kashmir) 
are analysed. The main hypothesis here is that the organisation of the monitoring sub-system 
and specifically inter-organisational reporting, similarly leads to malfunctions and a waste of 
effort. It is hypothesised that the planning system works in such a way that the emphasis in 
monitoring is on progress reporting by implementing agencies, to the neglect of other types 
of monitoring. Special attention will be devoted to the role of strategic and perspectivistic 
behaviour of departments and their rapporteurs, as well as the potential of improvements in 
report formats. On the basis of recent organisation theory and evaluation theory, the 
hypothesis is advanced that organisational filters and personal predilections of rapporteurs 
colour the information reported to such an extent, that the supposedly technical, objective 
progress reports are in fact not objective at all. Lastly, the hypotheses will be checked that 
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there are distinct effects visible on the nature and quality of progress reports from (1) the 
limited perspective that current capital investment programmes offer on 'development', and 
(2) the need for conciseness in monitoring systems while their subject is the complex world 
of projects. 
Evidence and illustrations will be given based on information collected and experience 
gained during an almost seven year long stay in Pakistan. From June 1990 to August 1994, 
the author was working in a UNDTCD project in the State of Azad Jammu and Kashmir 
(AJK), and from October 1994 to May 1997 in the context of a Netherlands funded project 
in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), one of Pakistan's four provinces. Both projects 
had, as one major objective, the improvement of systems for the monitoring of projects 
funded through the public sector development programme. The main empirical information 
for this study stems from Azad Kashmir, but the author's other experiences in Pakistan, first 
and foremost in NWFP, and to a lesser extent at the federal level and in the other provinces, 
will also be utilised. Since in the period 1994-97, the author was also involved as an adviser 
to the Social Action Programme in NWFP, examples and case material from this programme 
will also be integrated. The study is based on a study of relevant literature on Pakistan43, 
computerised project databases in AJK, a large and representative sample of AJK project 
dossiers, reports on and experiences with the Social Action Programme and the UNDTCD 
project, interviews with key informants, and participatory observation. Statistical materials 
regarding projects and monitoring reports mainly concern the period of 1990 to 1994, but 
certain findings have been updated based on information obtained in early 1998. Information 
regarding Pakistan's political and planning history has similarly been updated upto early 
1998. For further details on the study's sources of information the reader is referred to Annex 
1. 
The next chapters in this study 
Chapters 2 through 4 discuss the planning context, within which monitoring and project 
reporting systems are employed. Chapter 2 traces the history of planning and monitoring in 
Pakistan in the context of its society and political history. Pakistan's diversity and 
idiosyncrasies are set against the attempts to conduct rational comprehensive planning. 
Chapter 3 introduces Azad Kashmir and investigates whether the main preconditions for the 
success of rational comprehensive planning are being met in the context of a smaller, sub-
national microcosm. Chapter 4 takes the opposite perspective and analyses how, in the context 
of these conditions, the various control instruments of the Planning and Development 
Department are being utilised. The chapter focuses on the five year plan, the project approval 
process, the annual development programme, the project workplan, and various monitoring 
and evaluation instruments. It concludes with a review of the consequences of the type of 
planning practiced for the implementation of the development programme. 
Chapters 5 through 7 concentrate on reporting systems employed to record progress with 
government projects and programmes. Chapter 5 discusses the old reporting system for the 
development programme in AJK, which functioned until around 1991-1992. It focuses on the 
information content in terms of its three main substantive components: financial progress of 
projects, physical progress, and problem reporting. Apart from technical aspects, it also looks 
at die extent to which the reporting of each of these components is affected by strategic, 
departmental interests. Chapter 6 elaborates this theme by analysing two technically improved 
4 3 The literature list in this study separates literature on AJK, Pakistan and South Asia from other literature 
used. 
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reporting systems, one for the federal government, the other for the AJK government. The 
attention here goes to the effects of the format of the reports on the information submitted, 
the audience for which the reports are intended, the purpose of the submission, and the 
category of stakeholder submitting. Experiences with the project monitoring system used 
within the United Nations Development Programme will also be reviewed, as well as those 
with a survey into the Social Action Programme in Pakistan. Chapter 7 deals with biases due 
to the conciseness constraint in monitoring systems, its relation with the 'wickedness' of the 
subject of many project monitoring systems, and the biases due to the nature of the 
development programme in Pakistan. 
The final chapter presents conclusions and elaborates on the implications for monitoring 
theory and planning practice. 
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CHAPTER 2. POLITICS, PLANNING AND MONITORING IN PAKISTAN 
Pakistan, a country with over 130 million inhabitants and the ninth most populous nation in 
the world, harbours great diversity. This diversity, in populations, physical environments, and 
constituent historical areas, is much like India's, and seems to the author of this study much 
larger than in other countries in the region such as Bangladesh, Nepal, or Sri Lanka. The 
diversity has to have some bearing on the internal cohesion of the country, which is widely 
acknowledged to be small, and its overall management, which has been precarious throughout 
its fifty year history. 
How politics, planning, and monitoring have adapted in this country context, is the subject 
of this chapter. In line with the views of many other social scientists, this study claims that 
throughout Pakistan's political history, the so-called civil-military bureaucracy has been the 
dominant actor. The second claim is that this bureaucracy has been officially pursuing 
positivist, rational comprehensive planning (RCP) principles since independence, and up to 
this day. The third claim is that also the Governments have been under the spell of this 
paradigm for a long time. This is perhaps not surprising, since the military regimes under 
which Pakistan has lived were to a large extent the exponents of civil-military bureaucracy. 
Only in the last 10 years, when there were democratically elected governments, there has 
been a dilution of the paradigm at the political levels but, as is claimed here, not at the 
administrative levels. 
A few explanatory notes are in order first. When the government is discussed in this study, 
it is referred to the political government of the country, as opposed to the administrative 
machinery of the state, which is the permanent (unelected, appointed) bureaucracy or the civil 
and military administration. In many states, the administration (or executive) is formally 
headed by the President, and the same applies to Pakistan, but in Pakistan's history, 
government and President have often coincided, for instance under periods of military rule 
or adherence to a presidential (versus parliamentary) political system. When it is stated that 
the civil-military bureaucracy has dominated the country, it is implied that the unelected, 
administrative machinery has dominated the business of government. 
One more explanatory note is in order. The analysis will refer on several occasions to the 
view that Pakistan is a centralist state, and that Pakistan's administration is following a 
rational comprehensive planning paradigm. The relationship between centralism and RCP is 
obvious but it is not implied that centralism is not possible with a more incrementalist 
paradigm (albeit not disjointed incrementalism). However, whereas incrementalism does not 
exclude the possibility of centralism, rational comprehensive planning is not possible without 
centralism. The very nature of such planning requires central and conscious choices regarding 
the relative rates at which - and the places where - industry, agriculture, transport and 
communications, housing, and the like are to be supported. 
2.1 Introduction to Pakistan 
Pakistan as a nation was created on the 14th August of 1947 through the proclamation of 
independence and simultaneous partition of the colony of British India into two new states: 
India and the Republic of Pakistan (see map 2.1). Pakistan was initially a discontinuous 
country, with a western wing comprising four provinces called West Pakistan, and an in 
population larger eastern wing on the other side of its neighbour India, called East Pakistan. 
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Map 2.1 Pakistan, with location of Azad Jammu & Kashmir 
Source: Government of Pakistan 
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The main reason for the partition had been the desire of the All India Muslim League party 
representing the Muslims of the subcontinent, to create their own homeland. The assumption 
that adherence to the same faith would lead to unity proved unjustified. Problems of ethnicity 
and governance of the two units led to further 'partition' into Pakistan and Bangladesh in 
1971; this time involuntary from the perspective of the western half of the country. A civil 
war was waged by the Bengalis to force through what the present Pakistan calls 
dismemberment, and Bangladesh secession. Further tendencies towards disintegration of the 
country have been making headlines frequently, but have not led to new secessions. 
Nevertheless, provincially oriented independence movements such as those for Punjab, 
Sindudesh, Balochistan, Pakhtunistan, and Muhajirland (independence of Karachi) have had 
a distinct effect upon the history of the country, calling for martial law proclamations and 
suspension or dismissals of democratic provincial governments at some time or other. Indeed, 
a recurring theme in Pakistan's historical literature is the issue of cohesion of the country. 
The lumping together of disparate provinces and princely states and other 'areas' on the east 
and west side of the subcontinent under the common denominator of Pakistan has been seen 
as in and by itself not sufficient to generate a nation in the true sense of the word. The 
populations of these provinces and areas have had very few other commonalities than Islam 
(but there is an important Sunni-Shia divide running through the country) and subjugation to 
British rule in the past; otherwise they have constituted different ethnicities with different 
languages and societies. Even in the more homogeneous post-1971 Pakistan, civil disturbances 
on the verge of civil wars have played havoc for extended periods in urban Sind (Karachi, 
Hyderabad), rural Sind, Balochistan, and parts of North West Frontier Province (Malakand, 
Swat, Waziristan) and the Northern Areas, and a main purpose of the Pakistani army and 
police has become the containment of the violent centrifugal forces in society rather than the 
defence of the country against international foes. 
Political and constitutional turmoil 
Politically and constitutionally, the state has been in turmoil since its inception. As Braibanti 
wrote in 1987 (in Khan, p.v-6): 
"Since its establishment in 1947, Pakistan sustained more fundamental constitutive changes and traumas 
than any other state established after the Second World War. It has functioned under five different 
constitutions and changed its internal allocations of power four times: from five provinces to two, then 
to five, then to two and finally to four. It has moved from a parliamentary to the presidential system, 
returned to a parliamentary form, and then modified that form by strengthening the presidency. It has 
survived the physical and emotional shock of the loss of slightly more than half its population and a 
portion of its territory through the secessional establishment of Bangladesh. There have been three 
periods of martial law and during much of this time legislative and political party processes were 
suspended. Three wars with India were fought. Ingenious, courageous attempts to adapt ideology and 
structure to its own cultural context were made". 
International tensions 
Tensions with India grew right from the start, in the wake of the bloodbath unleashed among 
Muslims and Hindus at Partition in which perhaps two million people lost their lives, and an 
exodus involving some 10 million people (Kochanek 1983, p. 17-18). This, in combination 
with the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India, disputed by Pakistan, set the 
stage for a conflict-ridden relation with Pakistan's huge neighbour which has not improved 
to this day. Apart from the wars with India, the effects have been loss of potential trade, high 
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demands on the national exchequer from the side of the Pakistani military, and large influence 
of the army in politics as a result of perceived security concerns1. 
Tensions have also risen on the other border of the country, with Afghanistan, especially 
since the military intervention of the Soviets in 1979. Here the effects have been of an 
entirely different nature but were no less serious. The invasion by the Soviets, and later the 
civil war in the country after the Soviet army withdrew, led to an Afghan refugee population 
in Pakistan of around 3.5 million, placing a heavy burden on the economy and 
administration. The refugee problem and the way this was manipulated by the Afghan rulers 
has led to conflicts with the local population, eventually to a large extent destroying the 
common bonds of the Pathan tribes on either side of the border. The nature of the civil war 
and resultant breakdown of the state in Afghanistan also led to the flourishing of large drugs 
and arms trades in which Afghans and Pakistanis have become heavily involved. It is 
generally claimed that the Afghan situation has led to a 'kalashnikov' culture in Pakistan, to 
widespread drugs addiction and a drugs mafia, to smuggling and black marketeering, and that 
these developments in turn have contributed to a general climate of diminished respect for the 
law. 
A tradition-bound country? 
Pakistan has been called a tradition-bound country. A 'modern' or Western outlook, whatever 
it may stand for, would not have pervaded the country. This is in many ways a 
simplification. Pakistan is diverse and important segments of the population such as the upper 
and emerging middle classes, look at the West as much as to their own origins, or to other 
Muslim nations (Baxter et al. 1988, p.219). Certainly this author would corroborate that 
Western concepts of planning and management have been absorbed by the country's 
bureaucracy as well as politics at its apex. Nevertheless, there are many societal features 
which can be associated with traditionalism in the country, the most important of which are 
probably tribalism, clannism and 'feudalism'. 
Tribes such as the Pathans in NWFP are what Lindholm (1996) calls segmentary lineage 
systems, where central authority is strongly rejected at all times except those of severe 
external threat. Many tribal societies rely on a combination of agriculture and pastoralism 
which may involve nomadism for part of the family. In the tribal code of life, family honour, 
bravery, hospitality, male equality, endogamy and strong individualism play a large role. The 
prevalence of inter-tribal as well as intra-tribal blood feuds (among cousins) is the other side 
of the coin. 
Clan, caste or what is locally called biraderi societies are highly village-oriented and 
prevail in areas dominated by settled agriculture where the importance of good neighbours 
is greater than in more mobile tribal situations. Biraderis rely on mutual support and 
interdependence within clans or castes, and often cover entire settlements / villages. Biraderis 
are more familiar with central authority, be it from princely rulers or feudal landlords or 
presently the state machinery. Influences from the Hindu caste system impinge on the 
biraderis, with its explicit rejection of equality and basis in rank, hierarchy and subordination 
(Sinha 1990, p.34). A cult of individualism is also not preeminent like in tribal societies: the 
individual is tightly knit into a well-structured kinship network which determines his status, 
mobility and success. 
1 Until the present day, Pakistan spends the highest proportion of its GDP in South Asia on defence capacity 
(6.2 percent). Ayesha Jalal (1991; 1995, ch.4) has called Pakistan a political economy of defence. This economy 
has found it necessary to retain firm control over provincial resources in the interest of keeping military 
expenditure to a staggering 43 percent of the federal government budget after debt servicing (in 1994-95). 
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The tribal / communal or clan divide runs basically along the borders of NWFP and 
Balochistan on the one side (as tribal societies) and Punjab and Sind on the other (as clan-
and caste based societies). Although the two belong to different socio-cultural realms, they 
have in common that they break up overall society into more localised segments and networks 
in which there is heavy reliance on reciprocal relations and mutual obligations as much as 
there are exclusionary, antagonistic relations with other tribes or clans / castes. It is in this 
vein that Jalal (1995, p.211) calls Pakistan (as India) a mosaic of local societies. 
Tribalism and clannism are sometimes called an impediment to the economic development 
of the country, since they appear to stand in the way of the individualism supposedly needed 
for the flourishing of capitalism (Weiss 1991, p.22). Similarly, they are deemed to have 
impeded the development of more formal organisations in the country, capable of 
transcending primary group loyalties. However, they can also be seen as defence mechanisms 
in a state which has not so far developed overarching social security networks. Some authors 
have claimed that they do not impede capitalism perse, since extended families, biraderis and 
tribes enable quick raising of entrepreneurial capital (Kochanek 1983). Of importance to the 
argument of this study is that it may be conjectured, as has been done by Lindholm (1996), 
that tribalism and clannism have particular political implications: politics would be dominated 
by local issues, be based on loose and shifting alliances constantly brokered and re-brokered, 
without thematic or ideological issues playing a major role. 
The prevalence of feudalism has been called a drain on the country, on account of 
economic inefficiency and the domination of national and provincial assemblies by feudal 
landlords. Feudalism, a term of common derogatory usage in Pakistan like the term 
corruption, connotes a situation whereby rural landlords, mainly in Sind and Punjab, own 
vast tracts of land, and thereby have a strong grip on the communities on these lands. In 
Sind, medieval practices of bonded labour (haris) are still reported frequently in the press. 
Feudals conniving with the bureaucracy (deputy commissioners) to bend the judiciary in their 
areas in their favour, are potent vote catchers. Due also to the particularities of the electoral 
system in Pakistan, as derived from the British, it is possible that they become the sole 
representatives of constituencies with only 25 percent of the votes. Feudalism is more 
prevalent in Pakistan than in India or Bangladesh due to its wider disparities in land 
ownership. Because the agrarian landowners have had significant political power from the 
British days onwards, the big landlords have been able to resist attempts at land reforms 
better than their counterparts in the other countries. Feudalism as a factor in politics focuses 
on local issues to the detriment of a crystallisation of political forces along non-regional 
thematic issues. 
Patronage 
Although not investigated specifically for Pakistan so far (but see Waseem 1994), many 
spectators would agree that Pakistan's political culture is rampant with patron-client 
relationships and political clientelism (Schmidt et al, 1977). Some of the consequences of 
political clientelism as seen by Landé (1977, p.88) are: 
"(1) It provides specific benefits for some members of all sectors of society, thereby minimi ¡ring 
intercategorical, including interclass, hostility, and reducing the bitterness of conflict between the 
political parties as well as between other organized groups. At the same time, it produces dissatisfaction 
among those other members of all sectors of society who have not received their share of specific 
rewards. (2) By permitting favoritism to undermine the impersonal administration of justice, it 
contributes to [...] near anarchy [...] and it erodes public confidence in the system of government. (3) 
It causes changes in governmental policy to be secular rather than cyclical, for it makes change depend 
not upon the alternation in power of the two political parties but mainly upon long term changes in the 
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constellation of forces in [...] society, as well as upon the accident of an individual president's personal 
views. (4) It produces a system whose responsive and distributive capabilities are quite high, but whose 
extractive and regulatiye capabilities are exceedingly low. (5) It makes the mobilization of political 
support immensely costly both in money and effort. [...] (6) Finally, it leads to that preoccupation with 
personalities, offices, and spoils, and that lack of interest in policy or ideology". 
Lack of non-governmental organisations 
Primordial loyalties to kinship, tribe, clan, community and feudal lords have had a negative 
impact on the formation of formal organisations in the country. The overall level of 
institutionalisation of (non-governmental) organisations in the country is very low even in 
comparison with India (Kochanet 1983, p.300 ff) and much of the rest of Asia (see also 
Uphoff & Esman 1974, p.30, 122). Pakistan has relatively few non-governmental 
organisations that cross the boundaries of tribe or clan, much less professional associations. 
The NGO-based Aga Khan Rural Support Programme and the Orangi Pilot Project, famous 
and successful as they are, have largely remained exceptions. In the 1990s, the number of 
registered NGOs has risen like in the rest of the developing world - most of them totally 
dependent on government funds (Hulme & Edwards 1997, p.3,7). There are now said to be 
some 15000 registered NGOs in Pakistan including small community-based organisations 
(SPDC 1997, p. A-156). However, as confirmed by many observers, their professionalism, 
grassroots-basis, and not-for-profit orientation can often be questioned. Many of them exist 
on (government) paper only, as declarations of intent to start activities as soon as funds 
materialise. In the areas of the Social Action Programme, NGO performance has been found 
to be very weak so far (ibid., p. A-158 ff). 
Even business associations are hampered by the fragmentation of kinship loyalties. The few 
in existence are ridden with ethnic conflict, in spite of their joint interests. A government 
policy actively opposing the formation of independent professional non-governmental 
organisations (or taking them over) has not been conducive to their institutionalisation 
(Kochanek 1983, p.310; Haroon 1986). Even in the more 'pluralistic' 1990s, there are few 
signs that the situation has turned up significantly (Kochanek 1995). 
Corruption 
The mosaic primordial loyalties mentioned and the breakdown of society are perhaps the main 
reasons for the lack of internalisation of concepts of 'the common good' and identification 
with the aims of the nation as a whole. This, in turn, may have contributed to the rise of 
various forms of corruption and nepotism in the country. The significance of political and 
administrative corruption in Pakistan has been widely acknowledged, not only internally, but 
increasingly internationally. Human Development Reports of the UNDP have made mention 
of it, and recently Transparency International, a Berlin based organisation, has started to 
publish findings of annual surveys among Western businessmen. In 1996, they concluded that 
Pakistan was the most corrupt country in Asia, second world-wide only to Nigeria; a year 
before they positioned Pakistan at a third place on the world list (see also Bardhan 1997). 
Whilst the then government, in the person of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, immediately 
denied the existence of corruption in government in front of the international media, the 
general mood, also reflected in national newspapers, is that this survey cannot be very wide 
of the mark. Corruption is increasingly seen by the population as the main problem holding 
back the development of Pakistan (cf. Afzar 1992, p.74 ff; Lohdi 1994; Jamil 1996). 
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Political corruption manifests itself in bribes paid to politicians2 for the approval of contracts, 
the appointment of government staff, and the granting of licenses or permits. Administrative 
corruption, believed to be even more widespread, manifests itself similarly in bribes being 
paid to bureaucrats for approving or holding up contracts and licenses, appointing staff, 
fudging accounts, speeding up file movements, increasing unit costs, land rates and other 
'transaction costs'. In fact the two types of corruption are intertwined. In a wider sense, 
favouritism, pilferage, tax evasion and the frequent defaulting on soft loans of state owned 
banks by politicians, government employees, and cooperative societies are equally prevalent 
manifestations of an increasingly 'soft' state. 
Administrative and political diversity 
In its administrative structure, Pakistan's diversity is great. Pakistan is a Federation consisting 
of four provinces and two special areas: the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
along the border with Afghanistan, and the federally administered capital, Islamabad. In 
addition, but formally not part of the Federation, there are the Federally Administered 
Northern Areas (FANA) and the State of Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK). These areas are 
deemed unsettled by Pakistan but are governed in the meantime by the federal government 
under a variety of arrangements. The four provinces are unfortunately not of roughly equal 
size and development. They vary greatly in geographical size and population, with the largest 
province Balochistan occupying 40 per cent of the country but containing only five percent 
of the population. Punjab, conversely, is in population larger than all the other provinces 
combined (a situation fairly exceptional in the world3). The political power that this has 
entailed has led to a national assembly biased in its favour. Since East Pakistan, due to its 
population size, was in the same position versus the rest of the provinces before its secession, 
the problem of Punjabi numeric predominance represents a frightening precedent. It has led 
to a general antagonism between Punjab versus the other provinces. This is reinforced by the 
fact that most of the military consists of Punjabis and that, overall, their representation in the 
federal bureaucracy is even higher than proportional4. 
The democratic system in Pakistan, when it is not set aside by governments, is based on the 
British 'first past the post' plurality system, whereby the country is subdivided in political 
constituencies at both federal and provincial levels, and the political candidate winning the 
highest number of votes wins. Given the fragmented nature of society, this usually leads to 
a situation of a candidate not winning more than 20-40 percent of the votes and yet 
representing all. It also leads to a practice whereby, after elections, only the public 
representative's vote bank which is heavily clustered in villages, biraderis (castes) and tribes 
(cf Nicholson & Khan 1983, p.315), benefits from government support. The absence of a 
proportional representation system in the country leads to the underrepresentation of these 
parties in assemblies which may have a large national or provincial vote bank, but insufficient 
to dominate any one constituency in particular. While this may have advantages too 
2 Politicians are in this study those public representatives elected to national, provincial or state parliaments 
(including (prime) ministers), plus those electoral candidates that were defeated but which occupy public roles 
by virtue of their importance to political parties in power. 
3 In most countries of the world, no single state or province has an absolute numerical majority in population, 
cf. Human Development Report 1993 (UNDP, p.68) 
4 At the same time, this potentially explosive inequality has led to the enforcement of a rigid egalitarianism in 
the distribution of resources in the country (on the basis of population size), as well as the quota based 
recruitment system to government posts. Both of these measures create their own problems for the economic 
development of the country. 
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(discussed at length e.g. in Waseem 1994, pp.211 ff), a disadvantage is that it can reinforce 
the conflicts already pervading society at the local level, since the elected representatives are 
under pressure to do favours to their own voters to the detriment of others. This applies 
especially to the situation, prevalent in Pakistan, of dissolved or ineffective elected local 
bodies unable to counteract the effects of patronage by members of provincial or national 
assemblies. Another problem is, as noted, the predominance of petty regional and local issues 
in national and provincial assemblies. 
Religion 
Religion has also played a distinct role in the government style of the country. Pakistan is a 
republic created in the name of Islam and, although far from being a theocracy, theocratic 
provisions are well-founded in the Constitution. The role of Islam in the state has been a 
highly charged subject all along, due to partition and artificial lumping together of Muslim 
dominated provinces of the former British India. It has led to several attempts at establishing 
a theocratic republic, but generally, Islam has not had the unifying force in Pakistan that was 
expected of it. Different concepts of Islam have dominated the governments in Pakistan 
(Ahmed 1986). A major issue has been the role of democracy in an Islamic state (or the role 
of Islam in a democracy). Some Islamic scholars and politicians (Maududi) have claimed that 
democracy and Islam are incompatible; the state should be ruled by those best versed with 
the Quran. There can be only one truth and divine law should rule over man-made law. It 
is sure that this argument has been used to justify military take-overs of the country's 
governments. Ziring (1980, p. 168) opines: "The intense activity concerned with the 
establishment of a viable Islamic state is in direct conflict with predilections aimed at the 
development of constitutionalism. Despite Pakistani efforts at balancing off Islamic 
requirements with constitutional principles, the two systems are diametrically opposed and 
one must invariably take precedence over the other." Although controversial, it is worth 
pursuing this argument a little further. 
It has been claimed that Islam, more than some other religions, places heavy emphasis on 
external authority, the importance of tradition as a guide to human conduct and obedience. 
As Kochanek (1983, p.29) observes, the Quran is God's final and authoritative revelation to 
mankind, and provides for a comprehensive set of rules which catalogue God's commands 
to guide man's actions. Any reform and change will then produce a dilemma of reconciling 
revealed truth in the Quran with new circumstances and experience. Rather than deciding on 
this reconciliation through democratic means, Islam has developed a strong juridical tradition 
where religious leaders (the Ulenta) play a dominating role as exegetes. 
Kochanek (ibid., p.30) has argued also that Islam, like any religion, has accustomed people 
to particular organisational forms. Islam does not have a highly structured organisational 
system to enforce its doctrine: the prophet Muhammad vigorously opposed any organised 
priesthood. Instead of an organisational structure, Islam came to place special emphasis on 
leadership as a means of guiding prayer and the community. The state, as guided by the 
religious leaders, was seen as the prime mechanism to enforce religion and unity. Thus, the 
case is made that Islam, going against the subcontinental tradition of personalised rule 
systems, has favoured the establishment of strong unitary and homogeneous states, suppressed 
regionalism, and has hampered the rooting of democratic forms of government, as well as 
the flourishing of non-government and secular organisations in the country (see also Ziring 
1980, pp.53-54). 
More important perhaps than the alleged indirect negative impact of Islam on democracy 
and formation of organisations, is the immediate effect that the debate on the role of Islam 
in the state has had on the development of law in the country. The development of law has 
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been problematic. The fact of so many Constitutions and amendments to these are only one 
indicator of this. The Shariah Law, added on to the Constitution by the first government of 
Nawaz Sharif (1990-1993), is, in practice, not reconciled completely with the law of the land 
which is to a large extent based on British law. Paradoxically, a great interest in legal affairs 
in the country by the general public, and the presence of a large community of legal 
professionals has not led to a stable law environment. The reconciliation of existing laws with 
the Shariah / Islamic law has held back the development of law in many fields, for instance 
town planning legislation (AERC 1991, p.4). 
All in all, Pakistan's diversity and idiosyncrasies have put a heavy strain on the formation of 
stable political institutions and legal environment in the country, necessary pre-conditions for 
the effectiveness of comprehensive planning (and to some extent disjointed incremental 
planning as well). Out of the last 50 years, some 25 have been under military or quasi-
military rule. The instability also contributes to the continuation of underdevelopment. 
2.2 Underdevelopment in Pakistan 
As is mentioned in most introductory texts on the country (e.g. Dekker et al. 1988), Pakistan 
carries most of the classical features of a low-income developing country. These include a 
GDP per capita around US$400, a high population growth (one of the highest in the world: 
3.1 percent annually), rapid urbanisation, poverty, a large gap between the rich and the poor, 
a very high rate of illiteracy, high share of low-productivity agriculture in the economy (48 
percent of employment and 24 percent of the GDP), low employment in the industrial sector, 
a growing but not very productive services sector, reliance on foreign aid and remittances 
from a large migrant labour force abroad, a large army with manifest influence in politics, 
corruption, underdeveloped health care for the majority of the population, squalid housing 
conditions for a large sub-section of the population, and an infrastructure lacking in provision 
of electricity and drinking water, sanitation and roads. 
Some have qualified this situation, such as Burki (1991, p.5): 
"Pakistan exhibits many of the characteristics of a middle-income country: it is less dependent on 
agriculture than most low income countries and has an industrial sector that is comparable in size and 
diversity to those in many middle-income nations; it has a vast reservoir of highly trained labourers; 
it has a large middle class that numbers more than 30 million people; and it is as urbanised as the more 
developed countries of East Asia and the Middle East." 
This is undoubtedly the case, but other features specific to the Pakistani economy could be 
brought into the equation to turn the argument again, for instance the high internal and 
externa] indebtedness of the country, the extremely low savings rate, the very small foreign 
investments, and the destabilising effects of inflation (between 7 and 13 percent annually) 
coupled with persistent depreciation of the Pakistani Rupee against international currencies. 
A worrying aspect also hazarding planning is, lastly, Pakistan's high reliance on cotton and 
its products in its foreign trade, in the context of continually declining terms of trade and the 
vagaries of nature. 
Economic performance 
In the evaluation of Pakistan's economic growth patterns since independence, Malik et al. 
(1994, pp.66-68) conclude that in the 1960s upto the 1990s, the increase in the Gross 
National Product (at constant factor cost) has been at a compound annual rate of around 5 
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percent. Due to the high population growth, however, the per capita income grew at an 
annual rate of just over 2 percent over the years 1949-50 to 1987-88. The 1960s were the 
years of highest growth rates; in the 1970s the influence of the oil crisis and international 
recession was felt, compounded by a nationalisation policy which led to reduced investment. 
In the 1980s, these policies were to some extent reversed, while the influence of greatly 
increased remittances from Pakistani workers in the Gulf states began to positively influence 
Gross National Product. From a study of Economic Surveys published since this evaluation, 
it would seem that in the 1990s, economic growth has become erratic and has tailed off, 
perhaps to an average per capita growth rate of only 1 percent annually. 
In relative terms, the level of wealth or poverty in Pakistan can be evaluated on the basis 
of international comparisons of Purchasing Power Parities estimates (PPP). If these are 
looked into, it must be concluded that Pakistan's population is generally better off than most 
other countries of South Asia, such as India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. It is slightly 
worse off than Sri Lanka. According to World Development Report 1997 (Table 1), the PPP 
of GNP per capita in Pakistan, if the United States would be indexed at a 100 in 1995 (or 
US$ 26,980), Pakistan would be at 8.3 or US$ 2,230. India on the same scale would have 
an position of 5.2, Bangladesh 5.1, and Sri Lanka 12.1. In comparison, countries such as 
Thailand recorded 28.0, Brazil 20.0, and Indonesia 14.1 in the same year. The wage of a 
skilled labourer (masons, carpenters) in 1992-93 was recorded by the Economic Survey as 
6 dollars per day, that of an unskilled construction worker at 3 dollars. 
The Purchasing Power Parity, as the GDP per capita, does not reveal the potentially large 
gap between poor and rich. According to Pakistan's Economic Survey 1994-95 (p.5), 
published by the Government, this gap is not larger than in most other countries in the 
region, a fact confirmed on cursory glance from Table 5 in the World Development Report 
1997 on income distribution (Gini index of 31.7). However, the Economic Survey states that 
the gap between the richest and poorest sections of society has been widening in the 1990s 
(see also the Seventh Five Year Plan, p. 15; Noman 1995, p.2). More importantly, the 
unusually large black economy in Pakistan, based on tax evasion, political and bureaucratic 
corruption, smuggling and drugs trafficking, is not accounted for in the figures, and must 
have a negative effect on income disparities since they work in favour of those holding 
power. Noman (1990, p. 168), has estimated the annual value of the drugs trade at 8 percent 
of GNP, an amount that remains unaccounted for in the official statistics. Recent estimates 
of the overall size of the unofficial economy, are as high as one-half of the official economy 
(Europa Publications 1997, p.878). 
Social sector development 
A general notion, now widely accepted in Pakistan and outside, is that the country has lagged 
behind in social sector development in comparison with the rest of the world. The literacy 
rate is one of the lowest world-wide, including South Asia, and is currently estimated at 37 
percent - 49 percent for males and 24 percent for female literacy (GOP, Economic Survey 
1994-95, p. 105). Levels of literacy less than half that size are encountered in the rural areas, 
a cause of their high (hidden) unemployment levels as well as lack of organisation. 
Education, but also health, rural water supply and sanitation, have historically been neglected 
in terms of government attention, which has been directed more to defence requirements, 
government employment creation, and infrastructure development (and, presently, debt 
servicing). For instance, expenditure on development-related sectors such as social, 
community and economic services including subsidies was at 32 percent of the federal budget 
(after debt services) more than 10 percent less than that for military expenditure (in 1994-95). 
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The lack of literacy and education in wide sections of the population has not benefitted the 
economy nor the development of political institutions. 
Economic prospects 
There is much disagreement on the economic outlook for Pakistan. The first Nawaz Sharif 
Government was set to make Pakistan another Asian tiger, a target which was deemed 
feasible given that the economy was supposed to have displayed high annual growth rates 
between 5 and 7 percent through much of its history. The later Benazir Bhutto government 
was not referring to the concept of Asian Tigers anymore, but was yet confident that Pakistan 
could easily make it to the status of a middle income country (a position not yet achieved in 
1998). It is worth going over this issue in some detail because rapid development of the 
economy in Pakistan may, in itself, tilt the balance to more public resources and better 
government (an hypothesis advanced by Caiden & Wildavsky (1974), following Landau). The 
country has widely acknowledged large economic potential in terms of irrigated agriculture, 
hydro power, as well as oil and gas and other mineral reserves. In that sense Pakistan is not 
comparable to many other developing countries with smaller natural resources. Pakistan, as 
Burki has highlighted, has also a sizable reservoir of well-educated people with 
entrepreneurial skills (in spite of the low literacy rate). In addition, the uneducated masses 
still make up a vast and extremely cheap labour force to be used for industrial development. 
It is for this reason that well known economists such as Shahed Javed Burki (1991), Omar 
Noman (1990), and international establishments such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the 
Asian Development Bank, are still fairly positive about Pakistan's economic future. 
But this optimism is not reflected by most of the people this author has met, and neither 
by the editorials of the national newspapers. They are supported by a growing number of 
economists writing in these newspapers and magazines (see also Jalal 1995; Afzar 1992, 
p.91). The cost of living is rising sharply for large sections of the population, not least those 
working in the public sector. Doubts are cast sometimes on the correctness of the statistics 
used by the Government to support that the economy is growing faster than the population 
growth rate. Even when growth is occurring, history shows that it is easier to achieve high 
growth rates on a very low base, than to sustain these at a relatively advanced stage: Pakistan 
should not assume that earlier growth rates are any guidance to future growth rates. Is a take-
off occurring? Pakistan, unlike India, is not included in the list of emerging markets in The 
Economist. Given the unstable environment in which, for instance, sectarian violence, 
kidnappings and strikes have become endemic in the economic centres of Karachi and Lahore, 
little foreign investment is coming forward even with the opening up of the economy; in 
1996-97 it was only US$ 950 M and 27 percent down on the previous year's levels. 
Similarly, in this environment, internal private investment is not as high as it might be 
without the conditions bordering on anarchy. At the same time, the press is dominated by 
scandals of corruption, bankrupt corporations and banks, political 'horse trading', 
mudslinging and 'character assassination', civil unrest, banditry (dacoity) and general 
lawlessness. Ultimately, the evaluation of Pakistan's potential as well as the positive effects 
economic growth might have on the quality of government and bureaucracy remains a matter 
of speculation. 
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2.3 Politics and bureaucracy at the national level 
It is the claim of this study that political and economic developments since Pakistan's 
independence can be linked to the rise and decline of a centralist, developmentalist ideology 
in the country. An analysis along these lines will not detract from the main thesis by leading 
political analysts of the country's history, such as Sayeed (1966, 1968, 1980), Alavi (1983, 
1989), Waseem (1987, 1989), Noman (1990), Jalal (1991, 1995), and Malik (1997) that the 
appropriation of government by certain sub-sections of the population (military, bureaucrats, 
feudals, industrialists, 'the establishment'; Punjabis) has shaped the governments of Pakistan 
and their policies. This study argues, however, that the flourishing of the doctrine of central 
planning has had its own distinct impact. 
An 'administrative' paradigm before independence 
A centralist and rationalist paradigm informing the leaders of the nation is not something that 
started off with independence. A hierarchical, rule-bound colonial administration was imposed 
on the very fragmented and 'charismatic' or 'patrimonial' government systems in the 
subcontinent for a period of a hundred years5. Although some experiments with democracy 
had been allowed by the British in the twenties and thirties of this century, they involved only 
local bodies and provinces or states, but never elections at the national level. The provinces 
of Punjab, Sind and NWFP were even ruled directly from Delhi, without any form of elected 
local government (Waseem 1989). A corollary was that the growth of political consciousness 
was constrained in these provinces. As was proudly observed by the famous Simon 
Commission, in British India "government was administration" (quoted in LaPorte 1988, 
p.239). Impersonal, efficient administration became the norm for government. 
The induction of the local elite in the lower positions of the colonial administration 
brainwashed it into similar conceptions of government as administration. The political nature 
of decisions taken by the British administrators was not recognised as such. The foundation 
of the British administration was embodied in the Deputy Commissioners who, at the district 
level, combined administrative, developmental, political and judicial functions. Sayeed (1968, 
p.280-282) has claimed: "In no other Provinces of British India did this system strike such 
deep roots as it did in the Provinces of the Punjab and the North-West Frontier". The local 
officers who were later to inherit the country's administration had no clear concept of the 
distinction between the two spheres of political and administrative decision-making and had 
only limited experience with democracy. 
A central planning paradigm after independence 
After independence, efforts were directed at creating a Government of Pakistan in the 
tradition of the seemingly apolitical 'administration' that had dominated British India. This 
was already apparent from the fact that the nation's founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 
chose the essentially administrative position of Governor-General and had left the political 
position of Prime Minister to somebody else6. In the short period that he was still to live, 
he often transgressed the limits of his administrative powers7 and thereby set in a trend 
5 Heady (1991, p.224) has argued that the imposition of Weberian bureaucracy in India through the Indian Civil 
Service preceded and even inspired the development of such bureaucracy in Great Britain. 
6 In contrast, Nehru in India did take up the position of Prime Minister. 
7 For instance, Jinnah toppled the NWFP provincial government within 14 days; the Sind Chief Minister was 
sent home by him within seven months (Noman 1990, p. 11). For a detailed discussion of the administrative and 
political powers of Jinnah see Sayeed (1968, ch.8). 
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whereby the apex of the administration came to view itself as the guardian of the state, to 
take charge of the business of government (Sayeed 1980, p.26). Provincial governments were 
dissolved easily in those years, and even Prime Ministers could be, and were, dismissed by 
Governors General (Sayeed 1966, pp,63-64; Noman 1990, pp. 10-12). The domination of the 
Provinces by the Federation was assured by the elite cadre the Civil Service Pakistan (CSP), 
part of which was posted in the Provinces but, like in the British days, was only responsible 
to the central government. Ministerial control over the civil service was not permitted during 
the first ten years of independence and LaPorte (1988, p.249) observed that "the 'steel frame' 
of the Viceregal system, the ICS/CSP [civil service], was vested with powers to control, 
direct, and administer." 
The Constituent Assembly which had been elected on the basis of a very restricted 
franchise under the Government of India Act of 1935, was continued after independence, and 
was allowed to act as both legislature and constitution-making body (cf. Callard 1957, p.77 
ff; Jalal 1995, p.51). Due to the fear that the numerical majority of Bengalis in the new 
country would lead to their domination of the new Legislative Assembly and therefore the 
next Government of Pakistan, national elections were delayed by the West Pakistani 
dominated political top and civil-military bureaucracy until after the completion of a new 
Constitution (Noman 1990, p. 13). Since the Assembly could not easily agree on a 
Constitution due to ethnic divisions, such elections did not take place for many years and the 
administrative style of government continued to expand its history of habituation and 
precedent, while the reputation of politicians in the Constituent Assembly steadily declined. 
There were also other factors leading in the same direction. Jalal (1991, p.31) has claimed 
that centralism in Pakistan was fomented by the immediate needs of the country after 
partition, when its resources were extremely low and, contrary to India, a central government 
bureaucracy had to be created almost from scratch. The need for military investments to build 
a credible defensive capacity against the second most populated nation in the world, was met 
by draining the provincial governments of resources and limiting their sovereignty; central 
control was deemed indispensable for this. 
The attempts at creating harmonious and efficient governments at the central and provincial 
level therefore largely failed in the first decade of Pakistan's existence (contrary to India). 
When the Constitution was finally ratified in 1956 and the prospect of national elections 
loomed, the military seized power. Their justification for the imposition of an undemocratic 
military government on the country in 1958 was, to a large extent, based on the assumed 
inability of parliamentary governments to run the country, as supposedly demonstrated by 
weak political parties and corruption in politics (Ayub Khan 1967, chapters 5 through 7). 
There was of course the fear for a Bengali majority in Government which put off the Punjabi-
muhajjir based civil-military bureaucracy. But also another reason was stated. Partly under 
the influence of the times, rational, central and even military planning was deemed essential 
for the development of the country, and this was viewed as incompatible with democratic and 
provincialised politics (Ayub in Sayeed 1966, p. 105; Sayeed 1980, p.42, 55) !. With the overt 
8 There has been a debate about the role of the civil-military bureaucracy in the delaying of the establishment 
of a democratic structure in Pakistan. Some writers have come to radically different evaluations than that of this 
author. For instance, Braibanti (in Khan 1987a, p.90) has written that the continuation of the British and 
change-averse style of administration after partition, may have been desirable in the midst of serious political 
instability. Notions of the bureaucracy being the 'steel frame' of the country are being supported by such writers 
as Burki (1991), Sayeed (1968, p.299), Khan (1987b), and others, who do not see a correlation between an 
'over-developed' bureaucracy and an 'underdeveloped' political domain in the Riggsian sense (Chowdury 1988, 
pp. 132-133; see also Goodnow 1964). 
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sanction from international powers and such institutions as the IMF and the World Bank, 
themselves captivated by this paradigm in those years, 'economic development' was 
proclaimed the legitimising focus of the new undemocratic government of the country (cf. 
Papanek 1967, pp.86-87). 
The United States of America started pouring in funds and technical assistance in its 
pursuit, followed by other international donors, such as for instance the Netherlands, for 
whom Pakistan was one of the first countries to provide development assistance. A great deal 
of technical assistance was devoted to the methods and techniques of central planning and 
management of the economy. Pakistan's major new government institution, the Federal 
Planning Commission, relied on the Ford Foundation's Harvard group of Western planning 
experts, who were engaged in macroeconomic techniques of forecasting and drafting of plan 
documents (Waterston 1963, pp.34-35). Much attention was paid to training in planning over 
the years, and hundreds of senior civil servants were imbued with the concepts of central 
planning. 
General Ayub Khan 
Ayub Khan, the leader of the military take-over, proclaimed himself President of the country 
in 1958 and created - for purposes of legitimacy - a non-party based, indirectly elected 
national assembly, through a system of Basic Democracies. In the early 1960s, he asked these 
to endorse his presidency, and got this done. The election of some 80,000 'Basic Democrats' 
into local councils, the predominance of civil servants within district councils, and the 
abolition of political parties and provincial governments were in the meantime intended to 
neutralise the potentially complicating influence of supra-local politics (Nicholson & Khan 
1983). The mood of the time was that professionals should run the government; democracy 
at best had a place at the local level5. Interest groups outside the government had to be 
controlled and coopted. As Kochanek (1983, p.310) has noted: group action was seen as 
illegitimate and a threat to government authority. 
Strategies developed by the World Bank and IMF were adopted by Pakistan, based on the 
primacy of economic growth and the principle of 'functional inequality', with intended 
concentration of capital in a few hands for purposes of maximum reinvestment, and trickle-
down effects only in later stages10 (Sayeed 1980, p.57 ff). The Ayub government favoured 
an interventionist role of the state, trying to mould capitalism through regulation of the 
economy in combination with a curtailment of labour rights and freedom of press. Licenses 
and permits (especially for imports and exports) became important instruments of economic 
management (Waseem 1989, p.204). The 'Green Revolution' for which Pakistan became 
famous favoured Punjabi farms of a size of over 25 acres disproportionally (Sayeed 1980, 
p.57; Alavi 1976). The result was that Pakistan's GDP in that time rose substantially, by on 
' According to Altaf Gauhar, Information Secretary under Ayub, the general view in Ayub's cabinet was that 
all the people were not qualified to form opinions on matters like fiscal policies, legal technicalities, scientific 
developments (Gauhar 1993, p. 176). Ayub felt that "politically, our people are immature. They are in the 
process of emerging from the tribal and feudal state. By and large, their horizon and thinking is still 
individualistic, tribal and parochial. However, there are signs that after a couple of generations are reared in 
an atmosphere of freedom and suitable education [...], a national outlook will emerge. Until then we shall have 
to be continually on our guard, and may even have to do things to save people against themselves" (ibid., p. 
182). Even politicians were viewed as irresponsible and immature (Ayub Khan 1967, p.49). 
1 0 There was a current in modernisation theory in those days that held that the military were perhaps the most 
effective agents of modernisation and development (cf. Samuel Huntington's views in Saeed (1980, p.55)). 
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average more man six percent per year. Optimism initially ran sky high". However, the 
inequalities that ensued and tensions which the policies ultimately unleashed, became major 
reasons for the regime's downfall after almost 11 years in 1969. 
Ayub's demise led to the abandonment of the more typical trappings of rational 
comprehensive planning but the paradigm itself was not abandoned. Ayub's main successor 
(after a brief military interregnum), Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, represents in Pakistan an era of 
socialist and populist 'planning' which this study also associates with RCP. 
Z.A. Bhutto 
Bhutto was the first prime minister of the country who had come to power through national 
elections, and inspired his government with populist ideals focusing on the poor. In the 
Bhutto era, which lasted from end 1971 to 1977, central planning was to be the main 
instrument again, to carry out Bhutto's ideals of 'democratic socialism'. In this phase it 
translated not so much into formalised plans but into the sudden imposition of state controls 
on big business and the nationalisation of major strategic industries, as well as the banking 
and insurance sectors. Due to the absolute majority of the Pakistan People's Party in the 
National Assembly, a private army to enforce his rule, as well as limiting clauses rapidly 
added to the 'democratic' 1973 Constitution, he was able to impose his will on the country 
as a true dictator (cf. Baxter et al. 1988, p.205; Ali 1996, p.32). However, Bhutto had not 
counted on the strength of provincial dissent, and dismissed a non-PPP government in the 
province of Balochistan, crushing the resistance movement there violently. He also dismissed 
the non-PPP government in NWFP. The increasingly centralist and authoritarian tendencies 
in his government led to a mass resistance movement, which after his re-election in 1977 
(disputed widely on the claim of electoral rigging), eventually led to his dismissal and even 
hanging by the military, and the imposition of martial rule in the country by Bhutto's 
handpicked general Zia-ul-Haq. The Bhutto era, while hailed in terms of foreign policy 
(Baxter op. cit., p.212) was condemned, amongst other things, for having led to reduced 
investments by a private sector paralysed by the fear for further nationalisations to be carried 
through by Bhutto. 
In fact, the nationalisation drive followed the corporatisation and regulation drives of the 
previous regime, during which public corporations and authorities were created wherein their 
cumulative budgets were larger than that of the government itself (LaPorte 1983, p.250). 
Although a principal motive for their creation was that such corporations would have greater 
flexibility than regular government 'line' agencies, a consequence was the further elimination 
of legislative (read: political) control over expenditure in the country. The loss of 
administrative control over such entities was meantime much smaller than it seemed, since 
many were run by bureaucrats and military on secondment or in ex-offiao capacities. The 
corporations and authorities quickly came to be controlled by the administration, and to such 
an extent that their independent status was rendered only nominal. This reduced their 
effectiveness greatly. In later years, the number of corporations, authorities (and later again, 
privatised institutions), would rise further. Due to undiminished regulations and co-opted 
management, room for independent maneuvers remained small and administrative influence 
stayed of paramount influence to their survival (cf. Haroon 1986). Thus, the ideal of 
comprehensive planning was still carried forward although the methods changed drastically. 
Papanek (1967, p.2) wrote in his well known book: "Pakistan was widely regarded as one of the half dozen 
countries in the world with the greatest promise of steady development. In the face of its pitiful resource and 
capital endowments at independence, and in comparison with other countries, Pakistan's performance was 
outstanding." 
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General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq 
Bhutto's successor Zia-ul-Haq reverted to some extent to Ayubian policies but, paradoxically 
for a military dictator, with some dilution of the more extreme forms of centralism and more 
attention for accommodation of regional/provincial interests (Waseem 1989, p.384). Thus he 
followed the international trend whereby centralist planning was less manifestly enforced, 
albeit for different reasons than the inadequacy of such planning itself. The politically isolated 
Zia had to create a constituency for himself by pacifying provincial bureaucrats and some 
social groups with a clientelistic hold on the population12. A characterisation of his eleven 
year regime cannot be complete without mentioning Zia's drive for further 'Islamisation' of 
the country. In itself perhaps inspired by a world-wide wave of politicisation of Islam, it was 
for Zia a device to give legitimacy to his seizure of power (compare Ayub's legitimisation: 
economic development). This may not have anything to do with this study's argument of 
positivism and RCP ideals running as a red thread through much of the history of the public 
sector in Pakistan. But Islam as interpreted by Zia was akin to a totalitarian ideology whereby 
a strong leader, deriving his inspiration from the Quran, paternalistically knows best for his 
state subjects and rules through decree13. The parallels of this type of Islamisation with 
positivism and rational planning should be clear, although it must be conceded that Zia's 
Islamisation was never much more than a social ideology (Kennedy 1996, p. 33). The major 
effects were meanwhile the reinforcement of bureaucratic administration of the country, now 
with an increased grip of the very autocratic military onto the civil bureaucracy. In order to 
accommodate the bureaucracy and military further through job favouritism, most of Bhutto's 
nationalisations of industries, banks and insurance agencies were not reverted back to their 
original owners. 
The present democratic era 
The post-Zia era of democratically elected governments which started in 198814, witnessed 
finally some dilution of the centralist planning ideals, with reigning political parties, the 
judiciary and the provincial governments in a strengthened position. Privatisation, structural 
adjustment and deregulation have become key concepts in the jargon of the four main 
democratic national governments which have been in office since that time. Privatisation of 
large government organisations has taken place, for instance WAPDA (the electricity provider 
in Pakistan) and many industrial and banking units. Other huge privatisation initiatives are 
still on the cards, such as with Pakistan Telecommunications, Karachi Electricity Supply 
Company and the Pakistan International Airways Corporation. Similarly, some forms of 
deregulation have been carried through. The rationale for this retreat of government in the 
economic sphere came as a result of an international wave of disillusionment with the state 
as the most efficient provider of public goods and services. In Pakistan, the loss-making state 
units mentioned had become an enormous drain on the national exchequer. 
1 2 It was Zia who initiated the trend to provide public representatives with discretionary funds for their 
constituencies. These block allocations are now seen as a privilege of every public representative and are used 
completely for extending political patronage without any regard for planning considerations. (Jalal 1990, p.325; 
Sahibzada & Mahmood 1992, p. 1112) 
1 3 interestingly, the main Islamic scholar of the time with respect to the relation between Islam and 
Government, Maulana Maududi, similarly came to reject democracy as a model for the government of an 
Islamic state (Nasr 1996). 
1 4 This is not counting the non-party based national elections called in March 1985, which led to the puppet 
government of Junejo, in May 1988 dismissed by Zia. 
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As democracy in Pakistan has entered into its tenth year, the keyword labeling this decade 
is political turmoil. The Government seems unsettled by the growing awareness that the 
currently fashionable policies such as liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation lead to a 
decreased grip on the economy and less chances for that other, albeit usually concealed, 
prime objective of the elected governments in Pakistan: to offer public sector jobs to their 
political clientele. Particularly, increasing constraints on government expenditures imposed 
by the IMF since 1988 in the context of a structural adjustment programme have caused 
dilemmas as to the choice of priorities. On the other side, the constitution has been amended 
so many times that it is unclear what powers it gives to whom under which circumstances13. 
The country's courts have become a major arena where political conflicts are being fought 
(Newberg 1995; Kennedy 1995). Not a month passes that 'references' against politicians and 
political decisions are not being filed in one court or another. The constitutional confusion 
is evident from the fact that two successive presidents did not allow three elected governments 
to fulfil their respective tenures of five years. In the original constitution of 1973, the 
President did not have the discretion to dismiss nationally elected governments. This was 
added to the document by President Zia-ul-Haq through the Eighth Amendment in 1985. The 
successor to Zia (who perished in an airplane crash in May 1988), Ghulam Ishaq Khan, 
invoked this Amendment to dismiss first Benazir Bhutto's coalition government in 1990, and 
a second time to dismiss Nawaz Sharif s coalition government in 1993. His successor, 
President Farooq Leghari, used it a third time, to dismiss the National Assembly and the 
second PPP led Government of Benazir Bhutto in 1996. Although a number of assemblies 
have been elected since 1988, only in 1997 a two thirds majority could be mustered to 
remove this constitutional amendment which had until then replaced a prime-ministerial 
dominant form of government with a presidential-dominant system (Kennedy 1995, p. 17). 
It is to be hoped that this recent change will ultimately reduce the political turmoil and 
constitutional confusion that Pakistan has been in. The signs upto now (early 1998), with 
resignations from office of both the President and Chief Justice at end 1997 as a result of yet 
another constitutional crisis, are not good (The Economist Country Report, 1st quarter 1998). 
Accusations that Prime Minister Sharif was infringing upon the Supreme Court's 
independence over the filling of vacancies demonstrate that the constitutional rights and 
obligations of executive, judiciary and legislative are still to be settled. 
As will be seen later, a positivist, rational planning ideal still inpires the bureaucracy at 
central and provincial levels. Politics, which long associated itself with the national planning 
paradigm, is currently in two minds as to its application given the history of unsatisfactory 
results, and the pressing needs for piecemeal accommodation of all the conflicting interests 
that Pakistan's different elites represent. Even at the national level, haphazard political 
incrementalism in politics is more and more in conflict with rational planning as favoured by 
the bureaucracy. This has also fostered the antagonism between the two where politicians 
reproach bureaucrats for being authoritarian, corrupt and inefficient, and bureaucrats equally 
condemn politicians for incompetence, corruption, and interference with strategy 
implementation. 
1 3 As Ziring (1980, p.167) bas noted: "Pakistanis have treated constitutions as though they were experimental 
devices. If dissatisfied with the original, try another. Discard it and attempt something else. " 
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2.4 Politics and planning at the provincial and local level 
The question may be raised how the different attempts at imposition of centralist, 
authoritarian planning have shaped politics and planning at the provincial and local levels. 
The previous section put forward that bureaucracy and central government converged in their 
adoption of the rational comprehensive planning paradigm, at least up to the period of the 
democratic governments at the end of the 1980s. In the present section it is argued that the 
provincial level bore the brunt of centralism in the eras of authoritarian government, but that 
in the current democratic era their powers have increased. Government at the local level, 
however, has not (yet) benefitted from the increase in political prerogative at provincial 
levels. 
Federal-provincial relations 
In Pakistan's history, the secession of East Pakistan in 1971 stands out as the major example 
of the problems that authoritarian governance and insufficient representation of major regional 
groups can lead to. But as was noted in the previous section, the establishment and 
subsequent dissolutions of provincial governments by the centre took place from within two 
weeks from independence day, and continued throughout Pakistan's history. The explosive 
issue of the Bengali majority had in the 1950s already led to the creation of the One Unit 
scheme in West Pakistan, whereby the then four Provincial Governments were amalgamated, 
to the discontent of all governments except Punjab. After the creation of Bangladesh, the four 
provinces in Pakistan were resurrected and given elected governments as well as larger 
powers through the Constitution of 1973. But Prime Minister Bhutto yet found himself 
dissolving two of the four Provincial Governments a few years later. So much for the 
sovereignty of the Provinces in the Federation. During the reign of Zia-ul-Haq, all provincial 
governments were dissolved again, to be replaced by 'kitchen cabinets' of political 
appointees, and only in the last years of his rule, provincial governments were allowed to be 
created through the ballot box. In the 1990s, the restoration of parliamentary democracy 
could not prevent dissolution of many provincial governments and assemblies on the basis of 
the 8th Amendment invoked by Provincial Governors and on the instigation of the President 
of Pakistan. Only with the repeal of this Amendment in 1997, the elected provincial 
governments stand a better chance at following their own political course. This is, in a 
nutshell, the political history of provincial governments in Pakistan. 
With the restoration of democracy at the end of the 1980s, the tussle between the provinces 
and the centre over the distribution of the centrally collected financial resources initially 
increased (cf. Ali 1996). Historically, more than 80 per cent of the entire federal and 
provincial budgets was raised through centrally levied taxes, customs and other revenue, for 
example those of public corporations. The distribution of these central resources was based 
on a formula derived from population sizes of provinces, as established by the decennial 
Population Censuses. As the provincial governments and bureaucracies became more 
articulate, the results of these censuses became more and more contested. Other surveys and 
census results were called upon to establish the backwardness of certain regions, so as to 
influence the central government to change the formula in their favour. The NWFP and 
Balochistan succeeded in convincing the Zia Government in granting them some 10 percent 
of the resources before the formula was applied. This was on the basis of their economic 
disadvantages as well as the pouring in of millions of Afghan refugees in these areas. At a 
later stage, the provinces of Punjab and Sind took advantage of the fact that they were 
allowed to make use of loans from their own provincial banks. The large indebtedness which 
was the result, eventually led the federal government to provide debt relief to these provincial 
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governments. Thus, the distribution of federal resources over the provinces became an 
incremental process of bargaining. 
In 1991, the fight over resources was temporarily settled with the National Finance 
Commission Award. This Award meant a redistribution of the federal pool of resources, so 
that provincial governments could directly retain certain resources generated in their own 
provinces. For instance, NWFP was allowed to siphon the large profits generated from 
hydropower at the Tarbela dam in their province. There were also some redistributions of 
federally collected taxes. This went some way towards increased financial sovereignty of the 
Provinces but the delays in the holding of the 1991 Population Census indicates that there are 
still severe tensions in federal-provincial, and inter-provincial relations. Due to fear that a 
new Population Census might establish new population ratios amongst the Provinces, it was 
delayed seven years and could only be held in March 1998'*. The renewal of the five year 
valid NFC Award of 1991 was still awaited early 1998 (the time of writing this); considerable 
differences between Provinces had led to a delay in this case as well. 
As a consequence, the discretionary powers of the federal government have weakened 
somewhat in very recent times, but they remain considerable due to the primacy of federal 
over provincial legislation, the continuing domination of the provincial bureaucracies by 
federal cadres such as the District Management Group which occupy most of the provincial 
secretary posts, and the federal government's revenue collecting powers. In NWFP, federal 
assistance constituted 60 percent of provincial revenue, profits from Tarbela dam 
hydroelectric power 20 percent, and internal revenue amounted to only 20 percent of the 
available resources in 1996. In AJK, own resources generation through taxes and other 
sources (notably the sale of lumber from forest exploitation) amounted to 30 percent of the 
budget, with the remainder being provided by the Federation. It must be said that such a level 
of external financing as provided by the Federation of Pakistan is by no means uncommon 
in many other developing countries, and only moderately higher than in most federations in 
the developed world17 (see also Prantilla 1988). 
Political interference in the administrative realm 
The dependence on federal funds, federally seconded bureaucracy and federal policies, has 
led to a situation where the provincial assemblies concentrate on the administrative and 
operational aspects of these policies. This is not to say that provincial governments, and 
certainly the provincial bureaucracies, have not tried to follow the path of rational planning. 
They tried, but they had much less power than the federal government, and their powers were 
often suspended. With a strong federal government in place during most of Pakistan's history, 
provincial politicians did not regard it expedient to focus on legislation and policy making, 
even when they were allowed to wield power in Assemblies. Provincial policies have been 
developed in the typically provincial subjects, such as primary and secondary education, 
1 6 For instance, the size of Karachi, dominated by the anti-PPP party of MQM, has grown disproportional and 
the census might ultimately improve its power base. For the holding of the Census, all four provinces have to 
be ready on the same day, and for a long time, one government or another was able to stall the process. 
1 7 The UNDP 1993 Human Development Report (p>70) records Pakistan's provincial financial decentralisation 
ratio as 24 percent, less than half of India's 56 percent and countries such as China and Nigeria, but slighdy 
higher than the rates of Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, South Africa, and Indonesia. In the developed world, Canada 
has an expenditure decentralisation ratio of 41 percent, Australia 37, Switzerland 30, Germany 24, and the USA 
23. Revenue decentralisation ratio's display the same features. 
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health, agriculture, local government and water supply18. But such policies, as they continue 
to be prepared by bureaucrats, do not fare well in the present period of democracy. It can be 
observed that political governments which initially approved policies developed by 
bureaucrats, disown these later, due to their need to extend political patronage. The allocation 
of resources to areas with particular economic potential, for instance in terms of irrigation, 
is biased by the political need to spread the resources equally and therefore thinly among their 
clientele. Merit-based recruitment of government employees such as teachers has been 
similarly made difficult by the need of politicians to fulfil promises made during election 
campaigns to their constituents - recently there was even evidence of secret fixed quotas for 
members of parliament, against which they were allowed to nominate persons for employment 
(SPDC 1997, p.66). High government officers, on the other hand, need to give such 
politicians some of the spoils of implementation prerogative, to prevent them from snatching 
more serious power at the policy formulating end19. The phenomenon of discretionary 'block 
allocation' to each MPA and MNA has been a notorious development in this respect. 
The weakness of local government 
The continued forces in favour of centralism in combination with the growing power of 
provincial governments and Assemblies have not been conducive to the strengthening of the 
lowest tier of government in Pakistan, those of the local government bodies. If Pakistan's 
diversity has not by itself led to disjointed incrementalism in its government and 
administration, then it is principally for this reason: the lack of political, as well as 
bureaucratic and professionalised countervailing power from the local level. The extremely 
low levels of literacy and education especially in the rural areas must be an important factor 
explaining this, quite apart from the active marginalisation of this sphere of government by 
the national and provincial governments. 
Local bodies in Pakistan - which must be ranked amongst the weakest in the world -
consist in principle of two tiers: one of elected councils at the district level, and one of urban 
and rural councils. The rural councils consist of clusters of villages called Union Councils and 
the urban councils include Town Committees, Municipal Committees, and Municipal 
Corporations, depending on their size. Union Councils are generally of a size between 5000 
In fact, not as much is happening here in recent times as is often believed. For instance, under SAP, 
provincial policies for education or health were not legislated. Only in the sector of drinking water, there was 
legislation (SPDC 1997, pp.25-35). 
1 9 Chaturvedi (1988, pp. 157-158) has made a claim for the situation in India that it may be bureaucratic 
inefficiency and lack of coordination between departments that has forced politicians to interfere with 
implementation. It may be true for Pakistan also: ... "the system [...] develops an insensitivity towards those 
stakeholders for whose benefit the system was created in the first place. When these stakeholders find their 
needs being neglected and the system itself inaccessible to them, they begin to rely on their political 
representatives not only to voice their needs, but also to intercede on their behalf. The absence of 
communication between the system and the stakeholders can be seen as primarily responsible for strengthening 
the political system as a grievance handling function. The political worker, dependent as he is on these 
stakeholders for his very survival, is much more responsive to their needs, particularly those of the more 
influential. To a very great extent the initiation of interference in the working of the departments by political 
representatives in the working of the departments can be attributed to a lack of effectiveness of the system to 
cater to their needs. [...] The power of the political representative is directly proportional to the extent that 
communication is absent between the bureaucratic system and its clients. [...] a steady shift of power from the 
administrative system to the political system occurs." 
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and 30000 people and therefore constitute fairly sizeable municipalities. District councils 
generally cover between 250,000 and 2,000,000 people, and are therefore also sizeable units. 
According to Jamil (1996), local and district councillors have historically experienced great 
demand for representation vis-a-vis the administration and the government. This demand has 
led to resentment from provincial elected representatives (MPAs) and national assembly 
members (MNAs), who have consequently sought to weaken the local government tier. Up 
till the end of the 1970s, all local government decisions including those on their bylaws were 
subject to approval by controlling authorities such as the provincial government and their field 
level functionaries such as Deputy Commissioners (Siddiqui 1992, p. 135; Alavi 1976). 
Through the enactment of new provincial Local Government Acts since then, more autonomy 
has been granted to local bodies, but many constraints from outside have remained: 
Firstly, a Divisional Coordination Committee headed by the Commissioner exercises 
indirect controls over local councils in the name of coordinating their activities and resolving 
their disputes. For instance, council members can be suspended. 
In the second place, various officials of the provincial government (i.e. Deputy 
Commissioners and officers of the Local Government and Rural Development Department) 
have inspectoral and supervisory authority over the local councils. 
Thirdly, in the absence of a formal controlling authority, the provincial Local Government 
and Rural Development Department officials have become the final arbiters, particularly in 
matters of suspension and dissolution of local councils and their elected leaders (ibid., 
pp. 135-136). 
In the fourth place, although the revenue generating powers of local councils have 
increased to some extent, they are still small in comparison with the wide ranging, mostly 
social, functions to be performed by these councils (Pasha et al. 1992, p.viii). Only paltry 
sums are raised by the district and local governments in AJK, for instance20. In 1989-90, 
only Rs 48 million was raised by local bodies through tax receipts (AJK Statistical Yearbook 
1990).In addition, the provincial and federal government still hold large leverage due to the 
grants which they provide at their discretion. 
A fifth constraint is that the funds transferred to local governments are very small in 
absolute and relative terms. A comparison with the situation in for instance the Netherlands 
is instructive. Whereas in an area such as AJK the Government's resources channeled to the 
Local Government tier is a meagre four to five percent (1990), in the Netherlands it is around 
22 percent (1988)21. (The Netherlands, as a unitary state, transfers much less to provincial 
governments than Pakistan: 1 percent versus 20 percent in Pakistan). According to the 1993 
Human Development Report (UNDP, p.69), the ratio of expenditure decentralisation in local 
government22 in Pakistan was at around four percent in 1987/88 lower than in many other 
developing countries; in most developed countries (including federations) it was between 15 
and 45 percent. 
2 0 It has to be mentioned that most councils shy away from using tax raising powers, which are viewed as 
unpopular measures. In practice, only those local bodies above the status of the rural Union Councils raise 
revenues. 
2 1 Of a central government budget of Dfl 184042 million, the municipalities were transferred Dfl 40171 million 
in 1988 (Miljoenennota 1988); the provinces Dfl 2180 million. The amount for local bodies in AJK is Rs 131 
million and includes recurrent as well as development funds; it also includes funds for municipal authorities. 
A sizable part of these funds does not go directly to the local bodies in the way that it is transferred to the 
municipal authorities in the Netherlands. It is spent through supra-local projects. 
2 2 Local government expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure. 
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Another constraint on the independence of the local councils has been that the elections 
were usually decided to be held on a non-party basis. The large variation in election models 
applied over the years has led to an unstable rooting of political processes at the local level 
(Bhatti 1992). At the time of writing (early 1998), most of the local and district councils and 
even the urban committees in the Provinces had been dissolved or had expired for years, with 
only a rudimentary administrative presence usually consisting of one low grade clerk (a 
provincial employee) taking care of administrative affairs at the Union Council level. 
Professional planners or other municipal officers capable of the planning of land use and 
facilities or the monitoring of projects or regulations descending from higher levels were 
conspicuous by their absence23. District councils were similarly understaffed. Political 
decisions of immediate importance to villages were being taken care of partly by MPAs and 
MNAs who, however, have limited time to attend to all local affairs of the district, and also 
may be of a political orientation different from the 'feudal', biraderi, or tribe dominating the 
particular localities at hand. Programmes heavily biased towards areas and groups in favour 
of the particular reigning political constellation obstruct the policy of rational and equal 
distribution of government services over the country. 
On the other side, the provincial government itself has had a negative effect on the quality 
of local government, due to its granting of only small powers for revenue generation24, and 
the gradual withdrawal of functions such as primary education from the district and local 
councils. Overlapping functions with local development authorities on the one hand, and 
provincial or federal departments on the other, are more and more in evidence. Lastly, funds 
are increasingly being placed directly with MNAs, MPAs and Senators, rather than local 
government bodies, for executing local development projects (ibid., p. 126). Such 
centralisation (but now at the provincial level) continues even under the more piecemeal and 
haphazard planning conducted at the present times. 
2.S Socio-cultural aspects of bureaucratic behaviour 
The bureaucracy in Pakistan has been raised in the traditions of authoritarianism and 
paternalism which this study related to the British colonial legacy on the one hand, and the 
rise of the positivist paradigm on the other. Since colonialism played a role in many 
developing countries, and the central planning paradigm witnessed an international rise in this 
century, it could be argued that the findings of this study may be equally applicable to all 
systems influenced by these factors. The question remains how strong the traditions 
A few more comparisons may be illustrative. In the USA over 60 percent of all government staff are local 
government employees (cf. Heywood 1997, p. 129); in the Netherlands it is 28 percent - the number of local 
government staff however being much larger than central government staff (Van Deth & Vis 1995, p.222). In 
Pakistan, it is most likely less than 4 percent. In 1992-93, there were around 150,000 employees including 
19500 in District Councils (Bhatti 1994, p.31), most of whom placed in urban areas. Only some 9000 
employees were stationed in the 4500 Union Councils, where they wore working with meagre annual budgets 
of around Rs 120,000 on average (ibid., p.51). In AJK, Bhatti (op.cit. p.71) conies to 1457 local council 
employees in 1992; 2.5 percent of all 58000 government employees in that year. In the Netherlands, the average 
number of employees of municipalities below 20000 inhabitants was 7.1 per 1000 inhab. in 1982; the ratio rises 
with municipality size (Van der Meer & Roborgh 1993, p.84). 
2 4 The UNDP Human Development Report 1993 (p.69) puts the proportion of local government revenue as a 
proportion of total government revenue at 6 percent, which is not uncommon to poor countries, but in most 
industrialised countries it is much higher. 
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mentioned are embedded in the Pakistani bureaucracy and whether are any traits which are 
specific to it. 
Hofstede's international comparisons 
Sociological studies of bureaucratic and political behaviour in Pakistan are extremely limited 
in number; recent studies that could meaningfully determine whether and to what extent 
Pakistani bureaucratic culture differs from that of other countries are almost completely 
absent. Hofstede's classic international studies of the cultural values of employees of the IBM 
company in some 40 countries of the world (1980, 1991) give some clues as to the 
international position of Pakistan in socio-cultural terms. Hofstede studied such cultural traits 
as power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and masculinity. Power distance 
relates to the degree of inequality in a society, as manifest from the relation between 
superiors and subordinates. Uncertainty avoidance relates to the degree of risk avoidance 
behaviour in society, and the tolerance of ambiguity. Individualism (as opposed to 
collectivism) is related to the degree of 'looseness' of society. Masculinity, as opposed to the 
concept of femininity, is associated by Hofstede with the way assertiveness is appreciated in 
a society, as opposed to modesty. 
From Hofstede's findings it is clear that Pakistan is extreme among the countries selected 
(both Western and non-Western) only in terms of the level of individualism. Pakistan scores 
lowest in these terms (i.e. highest in terms of collective culture) together with some other 
developing countries (but not all) in the sample. The value of training opportunities, physical 
working conditions, and use of skills on the job would be regarded as more important to 
collectivist societies than goals such as having sufficient personal time, freedom of approach, 
and challenging work. Pakistan occupies a middle position among nations in terms of power 
distance, or the perceived hierarchy between bosses and subordinates23. Pakistan scores a 
little above average in terms of uncertainty avoidance in decision-making. The implication 
for this research would be perhaps less frank and bold reporting of progress with projects 
than in a society with higher individualism and a lower level of uncertainty avoidance, such 
as the Netherlands. 
Budgetary uncertainty and bureaucratic behaviour 
The notion that culture may have an important effect upon the bureaucratic (and political) 
style of government has been disputed by some social scientists (cf. Perrow 1986, p. 115). 
Caiden & Wildavsky (1974, pp. xv-xvi) claimed, after a study of planning bureaucracies in 
some 80 low- income countries (with twelve case studies) of Latin America, Africa and Asia, 
that they had not found culture to be a significant variable in the explanation of the variety 
of bureaucracies observed (as neither did political structure). Indeed, these bureaucracies 
displayed a remarkable degree of similarity in their behaviour. They were all rigid and 
relatively inefficient. Caiden & Wildavsky claim that it is the prevailing poverty in the 
country, coupled with a high degree of uncertainty with respect to the size and availability 
of resources, which has led to inertia, lack of decision-orientedness and red-tapism which can 
be observed in all Third World bureaucracies alike. Due to lack of budget and extreme 
uncertainty over resources as well as the number of claims daily made on it, multiple 
decisions and reconfirmations of decisions are made as to each issue, diffusing in the process 
2 3 Hofstede would have expected Pakistan to have a larger level of power distance, and explains the variation 
on account of possible smallness (read: unrepresentativity) of the sample but possibly also the equalising 
influence of Islam (ibid., p. 129). 
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any single officer's final responsibility. Such bureaucratic formalisms and autocratic 
behaviour patterns, Caiden & Wildavsky claim, can also be observed in developed countries, 
if for one reason or other, administrations are temporarily confronted with extreme budgetary 
uncertainties. In Pakistan, budgetary as well as political uncertainties may account for at least 
part of the bureaucratic style. 
The social environment of the bureaucracy 
However, Braibanti (in Khan, 1987a) and others, such as Hafeez (1991), Kennedy (1987) and 
Jalal (1995) do see a relation between the pressures of the social environment surrounding the 
bureaucrat and politician, and the style of administration. Although this study generally 
subscribes to the views of Caiden & Wildavsky described above, it is likely that there are 
some idiosyncrasies of relevance here. Braibanti (op.cit., p.67) claims that: "A clear concept 
of personal loyalty and impersonal obligation to fixed bureaucratic canons has not permeated 
society. Loyalty to kin and caste (biraderi) is held to a greater virtue than adherence to an 
abstract impersonal notion of equity." Lindholm (1996) has called attention to the conflictive 
nature of tribal and clan based societies such as in Pakistan. In his view (and those of other 
anthropologists such as Grima (1995)), this is connected with the fact that these societies are 
based on segmentary patrilineal lineages where conflict resolution is problematic. Attention 
is sometimes also drawn to the prevalence of status-consciousness (as a result of caste society, 
feudalism and the importance attached to arabic descendence) in large parts of the 
subcontinent (Hafeez 1991). 
The colonial legacy 
Writers such as Hafeez (1991), Sinha (1990), Jalal (1995) and particularly the widely quoted 
Braibanti (op. cit., pp. 100-136) stress the socio-cultural after-effects of a hundred years of 
colonial rule upon the bureaucracy. First of all, Braibanti noticed irresponsible attitudes from 
the side of lower reaches of the bureaucracy, originating in his view almost inevitably from 
the situation of having been long ruled by a colonial power26. Secondly, autocratic and 
paternalistic behaviour was fostered by the fact that British India's system inherited by 
Pakistan was based on a phase in which high-ranked officials underwent (and still undergo) 
absolute power in the district, as Deputy Commissioners. This is perhaps one of the reasons 
for the persisting phenomenon, widely condemned in Pakistan, of a large amount of 
'discretion' being exercised by top bureaucrats, in contravention of the standard rules and 
regulations, and thereby bringing a measure of patrimonialism rather than rationality into the 
bureaucracy27. Thirdly, the many contradictions in society have led to very cautious, 
conservative, aloof and risk averse behaviour by officers representing their society. "In a 
society so full of intrigue, of tribal animosity, of vengeance, and of incredible biraderi 
pressures for favoritism, the mere posture of familiarity inevitably creates a reputation for 
partiality which leads to actual partiality" (ibid., p. 113). In the absence of serious political 
power at the local level (through local government bodies or effective non-governmental 
organisations), the total pressures of the entire social realm are brought to bear upon the 
Pressures toward mediocrity, discouragement of initiative and a defeatist attitude in his view also came from 
peers. Subfle group pressures characteristic of village life were often applied to the bureaucratic group. Braibanti 
describes this "babu" mentality as often avoiding decision, a tendency to "delight in disagreement with each 
other" and "to flourish their knowledge of rules only to differ and demolish" (ibid. p. 117). 
2 7 The terms patrimonial and rational bureaucracy refer back to Weberian insights. It should perhaps be stressed 
here that the reliance on discretionary powers is not usually in contradiction with the letter of the rules, which 
often make allowance for 'exceptional circumstances', but certainly with the spirit of these rules. 
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single person who represents bureaucratic power in microcosm. Fourthly, the need for 
political and regional compromises in post-partition Pakistan have led to a need for equal 
representation of officers in the government from different regions and minorities. This led 
also to the recruitment of many officers from classes different from those recruited in the 
British times. These officers came from lower classes, and were unaccustomed to command 
in the class and caste ridden society of South Asia. Braibanti (op.cit., p. 106) observes: "The 
petty functionary was thrust into positions beyond his remotest expectations, and his inability 
to muster the psychological and intellectual resources necessary to rise to the challenge was 
a disturbing factor in morale and bureaucratic efficiency." 
Influence from the planning paradigm 
Some elements of conflict within the bureaucracy may be related to the emergence of the 
rational comprehensive planning paradigm itself rather than to socio-cultural or colonial-
administrative factors. The continuing controversy between generalists and specialists in the 
higher echelons of the bureaucracy, is a well-known example. This is related, in itself, to the 
structure of the bureaucracy, which has remained centred around administrative functional 
entities (or cadres) with varying power. The Pakistan Civil Service was the elite generalist 
cadre until Z.A. Bhutto's time, and was then replaced by the equally elitist cadre of the 
District Management Group (DMG). Officers of this cadre, often educated in the humanities, 
are frequently appointed in secretary or higher positions in both federal and provincial 
departments. They may be shifted after a few years to other positions which are equally 
outside their qualification or substantive experience. The notion that a man of intellect and 
wide experience can 'understand the world correctly' in whatever technical field he may be 
placed, is essentially positivist. The claim by 'technocrats' (such as physicians, engineers and 
economists), that the senior positions should go to substantive specialists can be related to the 
rise of the rational comprehensive planning paradigm with its emphasis on scientific 
specialisms. In this sense, the paradigm meandered from a position where 'man can observe 
the world correctly, to 'the specialist can observe his field correctly'. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
technocrats have gradually obtained more opportunities to rise to the top of their departments. 
The conflict between generalists and specialists was, however, as much based on the fact 
that the generalists of (mainly) the DMG were posted by the federal government in provincial 
departments and only responsible to it28. In this sense, the need for central control in 
Pakistan may have had its own impact on intra-bureaucratic rivalry. In Azad Kashmir, for 
example, the five senior-most positions in the bureaucracy are all reserved for federal 
bureaucrats (the Chief Secretary, the Additional Chief Secretary, the Accountant General, the 
Secretary Finance, and the Inspector General Police). As said, in Pakistan's provinces, most 
of the Secretary positions in departments are held by members of federal rather than 
provincial civil services.29 
Jalal (1990, p. 31) has related the superior position and wide ranging powers of the officers of the Central 
Superior Services, later the Civil Service Pakistan and again later the DMG to the need for central control 
which, in her view, at least initially, was much greater than in India. 
2 9 Some authors have called attention to the effects of the cadre system and the generalist-specialist dichotomy 
not only on bureaucratic conflict, but also on its orientation towards development in general. Kennedy (1987, 
p.xviii) opines that the cadre system has retarded the process of administrative reform, and has contributed to 
administrative inefficiency as it is only marginally related to job performance and encourages politics in 
bureaucracy. UNDP (1991, p.122-24) thinks that die persistence since the colonial times of multiple cadres 
functioning in one and the same department has led to excess compartmentalisation, not conducive to a creative 
atmosphere based on free exchange of ideas. The study also points out that the dominance of the generalist 
(continued...) 
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The bureaucracy as a conflict ridden universe 
It may be concluded that the Pakistani bureaucracy has developed into a conflict-ridden 
microcosm of society due to socio-cultural and other factors. As such it has been far removed 
from the Weberian ideal of an impartial and depersonalised rule-bound machine30. This is 
also evident from the extreme reliance by the bureaucracy on the judiciary to settle 
administrative conflicts (as documented by Braibanti), which can be called a typically 
Pakistani phenomenon. The magazine The Economist (Jan. 1991) once carried a special 
survey on the legal practice in the world, where it positioned Pakistan on top of the list of 
countries with legal professionals per quantity of population: a proportion almost double to 
the second country on the list: the United States of America. A large proportion of the 
clientele comes from bureaucrats who are unable to settle their administrative grievances 
through non-litigious means. 
Braibanti (op. cit., p. 131) notes, however, that it is perhaps unrealistic to limit the analysis 
of bureaucratic social environment to the socio-cultural environment or the administrative 
practices. Transcending all of these determinants was the problem of political instability, 
changes in ministries, declarations of martial law and other factors which profoundly affected 
and perhaps even caused the circumstances described above. 
Implications 
The implications for the subject of this study are that in such an environment, (1) 
dispassionate planning and implementation is more difficult to carry through and (2) that 
bureaucratic reporting may be biased by non-rational and personal interest related 
considerations. Officers would be very concerned with their status and would therefore be less 
inclined to own up to their possible misjudgments or mistakes they might have made. They 
might be excessively concerned with promotions based on degrees and seniority, leading to 
their avoidance of risk prone activities and keeping a low profile. They might, on the other 
hand, use bureaucratic means to do favours or fight out conflicts related to their kinship, 
clans or tribal relations; they may also try to do favours for their tribal or clan members. At 
the lower, clerical, levels of the bureaucracy, bureaucratic reporting may suffer from the low 
level of education received, which may make clerks insecure and prefer not to write down 
anything that can be misconstrued or could be the cause of later ridicule. They may be 
obsessed with rules and regulations and try to avoid all that might lead to controversy. 
Budgetary and political uncertainties may have led to excessive reliance on formalisms. All 
of this would affect the honesty, openness, and boldness with which government staff would 
participate in a monitoring system (interestingly, for the Indian bureaucracy, Mehta (1989) 
came to similar observations). Of course, the proviso indicated in the beginning of this 
section, that Pakistan should perhaps not be seen as extreme in terms of power distance and 
uncertainty avoidance in a worldwide context, should also be kept in mind. The conjectures 
made are reviewed in more detail in later chapters. What remains to be discussed in this 
chapter are the idiosyncrasies of the planning and monitoring systems in Pakistan. 
2'(...continued) 
approach to administration has meant that Pakistan has not been able to take full advantage of modern 
educational developments in specialist administration (such as health administration, engineering management, 
education management, etc.) (ibid., p. 126). 
3 0 It is not implied here that the German sociologist Max Weber himself favoured the predominance of such a 
bureaucracy in modern times; rather to the contrary. With a Weberian bureaucracy is only meant a bureaucracy 
in accordance with the ideal-type as described by Weber. 
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2.6 The budgeting and planning system in Pakistan 
As concepts of central planning matured internationally and in Pakistan in the 1950s, the idea 
that development would be speeded up by specifically targeted government investments gained 
currency (LaPorte 1983, p.253). By separating the 'non-development' expenditures from the 
development expenditures, it was assumed that development could be engineered with 
precision. Since the investments would yield very positive returns, development budgets could 
be financed from loans, not revenue. From this realisation, it was only a short step to the 
bifurcation of the government budget into a public investment (or development) budget, and 
a non-development (or recurrent) budget. The former would finance investment projects of 
a specific duration into infrastructure, productive and social sectors; the latter would maintain 
and operate the products created by the investments, and apart from this, finance other 
permanent activities of the state, defence, and liabilities such as salaries of government staff 
and interest payments31. 
Like in many other developing countries, a developmentalist ideology led in practice to a 
bifurcation of budgets, to different financial/accounting systems, and two different 
government departments in charge of these budgets (UNDTCD 1991). The Finance 
department would be concerned with managing the recurrent budget. A newly created 
Planning Department would be, as a sort of task force on development, concerned with 
investment policy and management of the development budget. This separation of functions 
into two departments was not deemed a problem for the required comprehensiveness of 
planning, since both were assumed to work jointly and dispassionately for the government, 
which would ensure the necessary supervision and take the decisions in high-level 
committees. 
Limitations in practice 
As was postulated in the previous chapter on the basis of findings from organisation science, 
departments have a tendency to function as organisms and the comprehensiveness that 
planning was theoretically aiming for, has suffered in practice. Central planning came to be 
associated with the public investment budget, instead of the entire government budget. 
Important policies, for instance in education but outside the immediate concerns of education 
investments, were developed outside the purview of the planning machinery. Some economic 
policies not related to physical investments, e.g. those on imports or exchange rates, were 
initiated elsewhere. The planning machinery, which was centred around first a Planning 
Board in the early 1950s, then upgraded to a Planning Commission, and then a Planning and 
Development Division from the 1960s onward, never managed to bring the recurrent budget 
into the fold of central planning32. Instead, the Finance Division came to control the 
management of the development budget at an increasingly detailed level, by gradually 
imposing conditions upon the release of funds for these projects. Unable to dominate the 
3 1 Waterston has noted (1965, p.227): "The idea of separating capital from current estimates and expenditures 
in a government capital budget first gained acceptance in some countries during the depression of the 1930s, 
when governments greatly increased outlays on public works to provide employment.' 
3 2 This was not unusual in developing countries, as noted by Waterston (1965 p. 230): ... 'experience in some 
less developed countries has demonstrated that a divided budget may lead to practices which make it especially 
difficult to coordinate capital and current expenditures. In these countries a capital budget may be prepared by 
a central planning agency and a current budget by a ministry of finance without coordination.' UNDTCD (1991, 
p.49) has similarly observed that the frequent split in development and operating budgets has developed into 
a dichotomy which "erodes coherent and unified budgeting". 
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Finance Division and dissatisfied with their role on the receiving end, the planners became 
more and more absorbed in the management of their investment projects, to the detriment of 
overall economic planning. With the Planning Minister almost completely removed from the 
daily management of 'his' department, the senior planning officer in Pakistan has the power 
to approve funds to be spent on development projects with fairly little recourse to political 
sanctions. At the time of writing this study, the head of the planning department in Pakistan 
can approve projects up to a size of Rs 100 million (equivalent to US$ 3 million). Only those 
projects of a larger size have to be referred to a (national) political body for their individual 
approval. This appropriation of executive power by the planning agency may have saved it 
from marginalisation by the Finance Division, but it led to a disengagement of planning (as 
conducted by planning departments) from overall financial management (as conducted by 
finance departments). As was argued by UNDP (1991, p. 112), the institutional division has 
also led to a neglect of considerations of impact of development projects on recurring 
expenses. 
Another limitation on the comprehensiveness of rational planning has been Pakistan's 
federative structure, with a division of tasks and functions between the Federal Government 
and that of the Provinces. A unitary state would have probably offered better chances for 
coordinated RCP. Federal ministries and provincial departments are implementing federal and 
provincial projects with occasional overlaps and only marginally coordinated through the 
national committee structures and national Five Year Plan preparation. For instance, there 
is no national (sectoral or intersectoral) Quarterly Review Meeting where federal and 
provincial projects are reviewed in conjunction. 
Organisation of planning 
But before embarking on further evaluation this study shall take a step back and describe the 
specific planning bodies and their functions in Pakistan in some detail. At the time of writing, 
these consisted of the Federal Planning and Development Division, Planning and 
Development Departments in each of the four provinces as well as in Azad Kashmir, and 
planning cells in some line departments at the federal and provincial levels. The domains of 
the federation versus those of the provinces are circumscribed by the Constitution: there are 
federal subjects, such as power generation and national highways, and provincial subjects, 
such as education (below university level), health and agriculture. This also applies to 
planning. As it is, the federal Public Sector Development Programme is much larger than the 
provincial programmes combined; in the 1996-97 budget, federal ministries were allotted 40 
percent of the budget, and provincial departments 25 percent; the remainder being allotted 
to special areas and programmes, and national authorities and corporations. 
The P&D Division is formally chaired by the Prime Minister of Pakistan (and not the 
Minister for Planning and Development), but has a high grade officer for its day-to-day 
management, the Deputy Chairman. The provincial P&D Departments are usually chaired by 
Additional Chief Secretaries (ACSs), similarly high ranked officers one step below the 
provincial Chief Secretary and one step up from the Secretaries of line departments. 
Generally, the ACSs are in charge of the day-to-day management of the Annual Development 
Programmes as well as their own departments. Because of their high rank, they can order any 
department to implement a certain decision as to projects under the Annual Development 
Programme. Additional Chief Secretaries are aided by Secretaries in the Planning and 
Development Departments, who control staff working in various sections. In NWFP, for 
instance, there is a Planning and Development Department with some 20 sections, each 
headed by a Chief and sometimes an Assistant Chief, and one to three Research Officers. 
Below these 'gazetted' staff positions, there is support staff. In addition to this, there are 
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specialised departments under the P&DD, such as the Bureau of Statistics and the Special 
Development Unit. To give an idea of sizes and workloads: in NWFP, the annual 
development budget including foreign aid is around Rs 8 billion, which is equivalent to US$ 
250 Million for some 1700 projects; the P&DD technical sections (not counting the attached 
departments) include some 260 staff, around 75 of which are officers (grade 16+). The 
federal Planning and Development Division works essentially in the same way. What these 
planning organisations have in common is that they function as secretariats and technical 
advice units to decision-making committees, which are either chaired by ministers or, 
significantly, by the administrative heads of these planning organisations themselves. - This 
makes them more than just advisory and technical bodies, and invests them with executive 
(i.e. political) power. The federal Planning and Development Division in Islamabad in 
addition has the (unofficial) role to control and check the provincial planning departments and 
their programmes. This is done for instance through the setting of the overall standards, rules 
and procedures for planning. Control is also exerted through its filter function for provincial 
projects above Rs 100 Million33 that have to be approved by the Federal Government, and 
its hosting of the Annual Plan Coordination Committee, which advises on the size and 
composition of the overall development budget and its provincial shares. 
Functions of planning 
As for the official functions of these planning bodies, those of the federal Planning and 
Development Division can serve as an example. They are reflected in Box 2.1 below. 
When this is studied, it can be observed that the functions are wide-ranging but not always 
clearly demarcated. Conspicuous features are that the policy formulating role of P&DD 
versus those of other bodies is not laid down precisely, and that it is not clear what kind of 
monitoring is to be undertaken. This vagueness is perhaps in the interest of flexibility, but 
it has led to domain conflicts with other departments throughout the history of planning in 
Pakistan. It can be also seen that the P&D Division, like its counterparts in the field, has 
expanded with functions beyond those of planning, in a bid to expand its legitimacy and 
power base. (As was noted, P&D Departments in the provinces have similarly expanded their 
base by establishing attached departments such as Bureaus of Statistics, area development 
departments, and the like.) A last point to be noted is that a principal task often associated 
with planning in the West, namely spatial planning, does not figure prominently in the Rules 
of Business. Indeed, town and country planning in Pakistan, and in general in South Asia, 
has remained a big lacuna, in spite of the fact that most of the public investment undertaken 
by the development programme has spatial consequences and would benefit from land use / 
structure plans both at municipal and district levels. 
The functions of the provincial Planning and Development Departments are broadly the 
same as those of the Federal P&D Division. They are to coordinate the Annual Development 
Budget, coordinate the Five Year Plans for their province, liaise with the Planning & 
Development Division, scrutinize and often approve proposals for projects (but not write them 
- this is done by the line departments), coordinate monitoring and the associated review 
meetings concerning project implementation, and extend advice to the provincial government 
with respect to economic policies. The latter function usually translates in the collection and 
maintenance of statistics. 
In these times, when provincial governments are essentially paying for their projects through provincial 
funding, this arrangement may not survive, leading to another weakening of the P&D Division's central 
planning role. 
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Box 2.1. Functions of the Federal Planning and Development Division, Pakistan 
i) (a) Preparation of a comprehensive National Plan for the economic and social development of 
the country; 
(b) Formulation, within the framework of the National Plan, of an annual plan and an annual 
development programme; 
(c) Recommendations concerning orderly adjustments therein in the light of new needs, better 
information and changing conditions. 
ii) Monitoring the implementation of all major development projects and programmes; identification of 
bottlenecks and initiation of timely remedial action. 
iii) Evaluation of on-going and completed projects. 
iv) Review and evaluation of the progress achieved in the implementation of the National Plan. 
v) Identification of regions, sectors and sub-sectors lacking adequate portfolio of projects and taking 
steps to stimulate preparation of sound projects in those areas. 
vi) Continuous evaluation of the economic situation and coordination of economic policies. 
vii) Organisation of research in various sectors of the economy to improve the database and information 
as well as to provide analytical studies which will help economic decision making. 
viii) Association with the Economic Affairs Division in matters pertaining to external assistance in 
individual projects, from the stage prior to preliminary discussion up to the stage of final signing 
of documents with aid-giving agencies. 
ix) Development of appropriate cost and physical standards for effective technical and economic 
appraisal of projects. 
x) Coordination of all work pertaining to: 
(a) Indonesia - Pakistan Economic and Cultural Cooperation (IPECC); 
(b) Iran -Pakistan Joint Ministerial Commission; 
(c) Turkish - Pakistan Joint Ministerial Commission. 
xi) National Logistics Cell. 
xii) Administrative control of -
(a) Economists and Planners Group; 
(b) Pakistan Institute of Development Economics; and 
(c) Overseas Construction Board. 
Source: Rules of Business Planning & Development Division (1991, pp. 10-11) 
The functions of the line departments' planning cells in turn are mainly confined to a 
supply function to the P&D Departments. They consist of drafting or 'consolidation' of 
project documents for their departments, and drafting or collation of progress reports for 
review meetings organized by the concerned P&D Department. Although the departmental 
planning cells have generally remained under the control of their own Secretaries, the above 
mentioned cross-functional controls exerted by the ACS have often put these sections in a 
difficult position. 
Political control 
The planning machinery itself is formally headed by the National Economic Council (NEC) 
as chaired by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and which has as its members the federal 
ministers, provincial Chief Ministers, and the Prime Minister of AJ&K. The NEC approves 
the annual development plans, the five year plans and the economic policies. The NEC has 
an Executive Committee (ECNEC) which is chaired by the Federal Minister of Finance. The 
ECNEC approves individual development projects of a size above Rs 100 Million, whether 
originating from federal ministries or provincial departments. This political control, in 
combination with the Finance Minister being in charge of the ECNEC, would seem to 
guarantee the comprehensiveness of the planning process, but in practice there are drawbacks. 
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Since the NEC and ECNEC only convene a few times per year, the agenda is always very 
large and in practice the orientation of the public investment programme is left to the 
Planning and Development Division and the economic policies to the Finance Division. A 
few committee meetings cannot generally guide all the proceedings and check the large daily 
flow of approvals that are taken at the various levels of the bureaucracy. 
As can be seen from Figure 2.1 below, the approval fora below the NEC and ECNEC are 
dominated almost totally by the administration34: the Deputy Chairman (a high-level 
bureaucrat) can approve federal projects upto Rs 100 M in the Central Development Working 
Party; ACSs upto the same amount for provincial projects in the Provincial Development 
Working Party. Secretaries can approve projects upto Rs 20 M in a federal ministry, Rs 7.5 
M in a provincial department, and Rs 1 M in AJK35. What is striking at all these levels is 
the weak position of the Planning and Development ministers in their departments. They do 
not chair any of the decision-making committees and do not involve themselves in the actual 
day-to-day management of the departments assigned to them. Frequently they even have 
offices far removed from the location of their departments. This situation is perhaps not 
surprising given the history of precedent and habituation, which has also resulted in 
administrative rules confining their influence. The lack of political involvement in policy/plan 
preparation is not restricted to the Planning and Development Department. With the possible 
one exception of the Finance Minister in Pakistan, all ministers both at federal and provincial 
levels have a weak grip on their departments. When ministers are concerned with their 
sectors, it is usually to intervene in their Secretary's prerogative to appoint staff or in the 
allotment of contracts; much less in the process of policy/plan preparation. (Of course, 
ministers have advocacy and ceremonial functions as well.) 
Rise and fall of the Planning Commission 
Formal arrangements as to the role of the NEC, ECNEC and Federal Planning Commission 
do not reveal much about their actual powers as coordinators of development in the country. 
Below, the position of the Federal Planning Commission shall be concentrated upon. 
The Planning Commission has had a rise and relative decline in Pakistan's history, 
commensurate with the rise and decline of the planning paradigm (as described by Waterston 
(1963), Ahmed & Amjad (1984), and Aslam (1991)). In the 1950s it gradually rose from an 
isolated and small board largely ignored/resented by the other departments, to a central 
position in the government. It was President Ayub who, using the slogan of development as 
the legitimisation for his assumption of power, raised the status of the Planning Commission 
to a Division in the President's Secretariat. Ayub himself assumed the chairmanship and 
appointed a Deputy Chairman bureaucrat with the status of Minister for operational 
management. 
3 4 Except for AJK, where there is a Cabinet Development Committee in between the - administrative -
Development Working Party and the federal approval fora. 
3 5 In itself this may be an effect of the British colonial times, when secretaries were British Indian Civil Service 
officers and ministers were Indian politicians; the former had status often exceeding those of the latter. The 
special status of secretaries as administrative heads of departments is still to some extent unchanged, in that they 
continue to have direct access to the president, prime minister or provincial chief ministers, and to governors. 
Furthermore, secretaries have been assigned financial responsibilities; they are principal accounting officers of 
their departments. As Braibanti notes (in Khan, 1987), if a minister disagrees with the secretary on a financial 
issue, it is not the minister's view which is controlling; rather the issue is submitted by the Secretary to the 
president or governor for orders. Similarly, according to the rules of business, a minister cannot propose an 
administrative issue; this is the prerogative of the secretary in charge of the administration. 
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Figure 2.1 Decision-making structure as to development projects and programmes in 
Pakistan, 1991 
NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL (chair: Prime Minister) 
- approves 5-Tear Plans 
- approves annual plans 
CABINET COMMITTEE ON ENERGY chair: Prime Min.) 
approves national energy projects 
NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY (chair: Prime Hin. 
- approves national highways > Rs 60 M 
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL (chair: Finance Minister) 
approves all other 
projects above Es 100 M 
ECONOMIC COORDINATION COMMITTEE 
(chair: Finance Min.) 
- reviews/approves ind. projects financed by private sector (PICIC, ADBP, etc.) 
CENTRAL DEVELOPMENT WORKING PARTY (chair: Deputy Chairman FPC) 
- approves federal projects > Rs 20 s < Rs 100 M 
- clears for ECNEC other projects > Rs 100 M 
I 
PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
WORKING PARTIES (chair: ACSs in Provinces) 
I 
AZAD KASHMIR CABINET DEV. COMMITTEE (chair: PM of AJK) 
approves projects < 100 M clears projects > 100 M 
T approves pr.< 60 M 
clears proj.> 60 M 
NORTHERN AREAS COUNCIL (chair: Minister for Kashmir Affairs) 
- approves pr. < 
- clears proj. > 
DEPARTMENTAL DEVELOPMENT WORKING PARTY IN FEDERAL MINISTRIES (chair: Seer.) 
approves projects < 20 M clears other projects 
DEPARTMENTAL DEVELOPMENT WORKING PARTY IN PROV. DEPARTMENTS (chainSecr.) 
AZAD KASHMIR DEV. WORKING PARTY (chair: ACS of AJK) 
NORTHERN AREAS DEV WORKING PARTY (chair:Secretary KANA) 
approves projects > 7.5 M - approves pr.< 20 M - approves proj.< 20 H 
in certain sectors 
DIVISIONAL DEVELOPMENT SUB-COMMITTEE (chair: Div. Commissioner 
DEPARTMENTAL DEVELOPMENT WORKING PARTY IN AJK DEPARTMENTS (chair: Seer.) 
- approves projects < 1 M - approves projects < 7.5 M in certain sectors 
Note: decision-making committees for FATA and Federal Capital have not been reflected here. 
Source: (inter alia) Manual for Development Projects, Federal Planning Commission, 1991 
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The Ayub 'Decade of Development' is generally regarded as the heyday of national planning. 
The planning process was institutionalised, provincial planning departments were established 
and many planning cells were created. All economic committees still in existence to this day 
were created in those years. The Planning Commission was given representation on all the 
important economic decision-making organs. 
Five Year Plans 
The Second Five Year Plan (1960-65), finalised under Ayub, was a success, also due to the 
political stability in those years. Economic growth was significant, and Pakistan came to be 
seen as a model of central planning for all the developing world to follow. Delegations from 
then poor countries such as South Korea came to learn from it. In the opinion of Myrdal 
(1968, p.757) in his classic and authoritative study of South and South-east Asia, Pakistan 
was one of the developing countries most seriously concerned with economic planning (a 
conclusion shared by Agarwala 1983). ) 
All the subsequent Five Year Plans prepared by the Planning Commission and the 
provincial departments have had less success, but this has not prevented the administration 
from continuing to prepare these up to the present day. The Third Plan, although similarly 
conceived in the Ayub years, faced a much worse time than the Second, due to the influence 
of the war with India in 1965 and the negative distributional effects of the second plan which 
was based on the strategy of 'betting on the strong'. It could not be implemented because of 
societal dissent and the downfall of Ayub in 1968. The Fourth Plan (1970-75), published 
under the Yahya Khan military government, faced an even worse fate due to the upheaval 
connected with the war and subsequent secession of Bangladesh, and later the change to the 
PPP government. Bhutto dismissed not only the plan but also ignored the Planning 
Commission, whose image had become tarnished due to its close association with the military 
regimes and the growth philosophy. Planning in the spirit of the Planning Commission was 
given a new lease of life by Bhutto's Brutus, Zia-ul-Haq, and the Fifth Five Year Plan (1978-
83). As Aslam (1991, p. 12) stated: "The Planning Commission was dusted off after a fairly 
long period of relative inactivity". A full time Deputy Chairman was appointed after a lapse 
of many years and the Commission was expanded as well as given better regional 
representation. Due to such factors as political unrest, Afghan war and the refugee influx, the 
oil crisis of 1979, economic recession in the West (1980) and the increase in interest rates 
(1981), the Fifth Five Year Plan had many problems but still had a "creditable performance" 
(ibid., p.72). 
The Sixth Plan (1983-88), also published in the Zia regime years, was similarly judged a 
"qualified success" because the economic growth levels were satisfactory (ibid., p.78). In the 
later 1980s, the Planning Commission was gradually confined to the role of coordinator of 
the annual development budgets of the federation and its provinces and special areas. 
The 7th and now 8th Plan (1988-93; 1993-98) were well written documents but had little 
influence, first of all, due to the disrupting influence of many changes in governments and 
interim governments. Secondly, important parts of the development budget were taken out 
of the purview of the P&D Division. The Nawaz Sharif government (1990-1993) constituted 
its own committees for highways and power (see Figure 2.1 on page 76), bypassing the 
Planning Commission which in its view was only delaying the approval of its pet projects. 
In this way, perhaps some 40 percent of all the development funds came to be channeled 
outside the purview of the Planning Commission and ECNEC. The main rationale for the 6th, 
7th, 8th and the new 9th Plans seems to have become their usefulness for backing up requests 
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for foreign aid from international donors (Afzar 1992, p.8)36. Due to the difficulty at making 
hard choices and the need for giving due lip service to all sectors with a view to securing 
foreign aid, the plans stress all things under the sun37. The mid-term and final evaluations, 
also prepared by the Federal Planning Commission, echo these Plans in terms of their 
excessive detail and little overall assessment. 
Declining proportion of the development budget 
The circumstance that the development budget has historically been financed out of internal 
and external loans and not out of revenue, has recently further weakened the position of 
planning as a whole. Even the most legitimate investments are being questioned on the 
grounds that Pakistan's debt position has become untenable (the total external debt is 
estimated at US$ 32.2 billion by the Economist Country Profile 1998, 1st Quarter). At the 
same time, planning has lost executive power due to the steadily declining portion of 
investment in the overall budget. Whereas in the 1970s it still could avail over some 40 
percent of the entire government budget (excl. defence), this proportion in the 1990s is no 
more than around 20-25 percent38. This trend is perhaps inevitable, because all investments 
made have to be maintained on the recurrent side of the budget. But the main reason for the 
relatively small resources devoted to 'development' is Pakistan's inability to generate internal 
resources for development. It has an extremely low tax base. Given the inelastic nature of 
most recurrent expenditures (salaries and debt servicing) and the sacred, undisputed nature 
of the defence budget, it is the development budget which in the 1990s has borne the brunt 
of the 'resource crunch'. 
Increased power of other players 
Other factors have also contributed to the recent demise of central technocratic planning. 
Some of them have already been discussed briefly. The award of the NFC by the Nawaz 
Sharif government in 1991, meant a weakening of central planning, due to the greater 
resources it allowed the provinces from the federal divisible pool for financing their own 
development plans. This development is bound to have affected the planning and coordination 
functions of the NEC and ECNEC, while the other side of the coin is that the provincial 
planning departments, currently without earmarked development grants or loans from the 
federal government, have been put more at the mercy of their own short-term oriented 
finance departments. The combined influence of an increased 'quantum' of public 
representatives with differing, mainly local, interests has also made the pursuance of central 
planning more difficult for the bureaucracy in the 1990s. A last important factor has been 
privatisation of some government functions, and of many parastatals. Projects of the Water 
and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), the National Highway Authority (NHA) and 
the Oil and Gas Development Corporation do not pass the filters of the Planning Commission. 
But international donors seem to pay less and less attention to such plans, in comparison to developing 
countries' compliance with structural adjustment conditionalities, or other concrete policy measures relating to 
social progress or human rights. 
3 7 At the provincial levels. Five Year Plans are not published, but drafts with plan statements are submitted to 
the Federal Government for inclusion in the national Five Year plan: 
3 8 A trend to smaller investment portions in rising government budgets is perhaps normal. In Western countries, 
investment budgets constitute generally no more than 5 percent of the overall government budget, although in 
absolute terms, they are much larger than the investment budget in Pakistan. The World Development Report 
1997 (pp. 198-199) reflects an average capital investment proportion of 16.8% of the Pakistan central 
government budget in 1990-95 (including defence etc.); in the Netherlands it was 4.5% in the same period. 
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Since these bodies preempt a very sizable part of the government investment budget, it has 
become more difficult for the Planning Commission to coordinate, let alone set the national 
priorities in the present power configuration between centre, provinces, assemblies, army and 
important (semi)privatised authorities. 
2.7 The monitoring system in Pakistan 
In the first chapter it was announced that the analysis on monitoring would be focusing on 
systems for government development programmes. These systems in Pakistan exist at two 
levels: the federal level and the provincial level39. Monitoring at the federal level deals with 
the federally planned and implemented projects and, depending on the level of centralism 
exerted by the particular government in power, also projects planned / implemented by 
provincial departments. Provincial monitoring deals exclusively with the implementation of 
provincial projects. The history of federal and provincial monitoring in Pakistan has been 
described by Khan (1989), Hussain (1989) and Al-Jalaly (1991) and the following review 
borrows from these sources. 
Monitoring by the Federal Government 
Project monitoring by the Federal Government has had a checkered history. Before 1958, 
implementation monitoring was handled by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. As with 
planning itself in those years, inter-agency conflicts thwarted the project monitoring attempts 
at central level. In 1958, when the Planning Board was elevated to the status of Planning 
Commission, it was also given the responsibility for project monitoring in the country. 
Concomitant with the perception that monitoring was essential to enforce plan 
implementation, it became the charge of a separate Projects Division right at the top: in 
President Ayub's Secretariat. A year later, the Projects Division was amalgamated with the 
Planning Commission. It had two wings, one the Planning Wing, the second the Progress 
Wing. Each was headed by a Secretary. In 1962, the Progress Wing was abolished, allegedly 
due to serious resistance and non-cooperation from the executing agencies / line ministries. 
At the same time, monitoring responsibilities for provincial projects were given to the newly 
created provincial planning and development departments. The technical sections of the 
Planning Commission were strengthened to do sectoral reviews for (mainly) the federal 
projects. The loosely structured sectoral reviews at the federal level take place until this day, 
as distinct from provincial practices where central quarterly review meetings are held where 
all sectors are discussed and which are based on proformas. 
In 1966, the Project Wing was reintroduced at the P&D Division of the Planning 
Commission, but now with the focus more on appraisals than monitoring of on-going 
projects. Thus, it can be concluded that even during the heyday of rational comprehensive 
planning, when monitoring was stressed as an instrument of central control, it was not able 
to function effectively. A main reason for this is that the resistance to central planning was 
not only fostered by provincial governments but also by federal ministries themselves, acting 
as organisms opposed to what they saw as external attacks. 
It could perhaps be argued that monitoring by the Accountant General should be added here. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, some headway has been made with performance auditing of major projects; Performance Audit Cells 
have been created in all provinces and special areas in Pakistan. Still, this is more evaluation than monitoring 
per se, whereas both the quantum and use of such audits has been so small that in this author's view it does not 
qualify here for a longer discussion in its own right. 
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In 1972, under democratic government and disregard for the Planning Division from the 
side of Bhutto, the RCP ideology still found expression, witness the introduction of an 
approach that appeared to have been successful in another Asian country under the spell of 
rational comprehensive planning. A National Development Progress Centre was created on 
the pattern of the famous Malaysian "Operations Room". It was tried for six years - but then 
it was abandoned, due to lack of political support and the faded image of the Planning 
Commission. In 1974, serious attempts were made to computerize the monitoring of large 
projects. But this attempt went the same way: project executing agencies resisted cooperation 
while there was also a lack of staff in the Implementation and Progress Section of the 
Planning Commission. In this time, a number of standard formats for project proposals, 
feasibility studies, project monitoring, project completion, and evaluation, were developed 
within the Planning Commission, that have survived until today. They are called, 
respectively, the PC-I, PC-II, PC-III, PC-IV, and PC-V40. In a later chapter some of these 
forms shall be reviewed in detail. 
In 1978, under Zia-ul-Haq, the Implementation and Progress (I&P) Section of the P&D 
Division under the Ministry of Planning was reactivated and assigned the task of monitoring 
all projects in the Public Sector Development Programme (1200 during 1978-79). Continuing 
to heroically assume that all federal ministries would comply obediently and promptly with 
the requests for progress information, the Section in practice lacked information. In order to 
justify its existence, it had to focus on field monitoring of a limited number of projects 
instead. In 1983, still under Zia, the Projects Wing in the P&D Division was again set up 
with as its most important functions monitoring and evaluation. From then on, it would 
conduct field visits of 50 to 100 projects per year, mostly federal but also some major 
provincial projects (i.e. around 2-4 percent of all projects). 
With the advent of elected governments in 1988 and in the wake of beginning computer 
automation, attempts were made again to re-introduce reporting systems covering the progress 
of all projects in the country. But these attempts were not very successful. Due mainly to the 
non-compliance by federal and provincial line departments, the aspirations had to be scaled 
down more and more. While at first all federal and provincial projects were expected to 
report, later the target was reset to include the federal projects plus the provincial projects 
of a cost above Rs 50 million. After this had also given dissatisfactory results, only federal 
projects were requested to complete the forms. Ultimately, only federal projects above Rs 50 
million were requested. As mentioned above, central reviews are currently not held anymore; 
sections in the Planning Commission study the reports and may call specific meetings. 
Thus, methodological and organisational problems have beset progress reporting at all times 
of its history. Whilst this is so, it yet deserves to be mentioned that those evaluations and 
reviews of projects that were conducted by the FPW have generally been of good quality. In 
the provinces, such evaluation wings do not exist41 and therefore, such project evaluations 
are not prepared (at least not on random basis; in the context of donor practice and pressure, 
evaluations of foreign aided projects do take place). The relative independence of the Projects 
Wing within the Planning Division must have contributed to the number and quality of (often 
mid-term) evaluations. As mentioned, it is a pity that not more of these evaluations are 
carried out - a consequence of the limited number of senior staff and budget assigned to it42. 
In fact, the PC-HI profonna was in vogue already before this time in a modified form, since 1952. 
4 1 Except perhaps in the Punjab where there is a Member Evaluation; but project evaluation such as in the FPW 
has not taken place. 
4 2 There have been NEC directives to increase the number to 300 per year, but their seriousness can be 
questioned given the continued lack of funds and staff assigned to the FPW. 
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Monitoring in the Provinces 
At the provincial and state (AJK) levels, the monitoring of project portfolios as a whole has 
fared somewhat better, in spite of the recurrent complaints expressed by the planners about 
the quality of the data generated. For the most part of the 1990s, the federal proforma was 
not used anymore, and a frequently changing format is being issued to line departments, 
usually at the end of every quarter of the financial year. Different from the experiences by 
the Federation, most provincial projects do return the forms, and central reviews are held 
occasionally to discuss the projects under the chairmanship of Chief Ministers (in AJK the 
Prime Minister). As has been mentioned at the beginning of this study, in a number of 
provincial Planning and Development Departments (including AJK), foreign aided projects 
have started to improve the existing monitoring systems in the early 1990s, and to introduce 
management information systems. As such they can be seen as results from the P&DD's 
struggle to retain a grip on the planning and implementation process. The attempts by the 
AJK P&DD and the UNDTCD project in it will be discussed at length in chapters 5 through 
7. 
Provincial central monitoring of all development projects is still influenced by the rational 
comprehensive planning paradigm. While the federal government has lost its grip on central 
planning and monitoring, the provincial planning departments cling to their role of controlling 
the insubordinate line departments in the process of implementation despite the fact that the 
power of the P&D Departments (P&DDs) has diminished in recent years. The fact that the 
central provincial reviews are still being conducted and that the reports for these reviews are 
still diligently being submitted, is the witness to this. Whether the system also works 
effectively and efficiently, will be investigated through a case study of Azad Jammu and 
Kashmir, which starts in the next chapter. 
2.8 Conclusions 
The administrative system established by the British under colonial rule was, by and large, 
continued after independence. In response to changed national needs and also in line with 
international developments, it came under the spell of a rational comprehensive planning 
paradigm. This paradigm led to the establishment of an elaborate planning system which 
initially seemed to contribute to satisfactory economic growth levels. However, due to 
internal unrest at the end of the 'development decade' in the 1960s, an international recession 
in the 1970s, increasing reliance on remittances from abroad in the 1980s and slowing growth 
in the 1990s, the relationship between national development planning and national 
development became more and more difficult to substantiate, and for many controversial. 
This study claims that the effectiveness of rational comprehensive planning was hampered by 
a number of disparate factors which have been described in this chapter: extreme societal 
diversity, primordial kinship loyalties and lack of identification with the nation, a 
controversial role of religion vis-a-vis the state, constitutional confusion as to the roles of 
legislative, judiciary and executive, a planning system disassociating development from 
recurring expenditures, and a swollen bureaucracy not devoid of conflict and organismic 
behaviour. 
Jalal (1995) has provided explanations why Pakistan and India, with a common past and 
societies went their ostensibly different ways in terms of politics after independence. First, 
she demystifies the notion that the present countries of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan have 
gone their separate ways in a real sense of the word: all three countries are in her view 
reigned by what she calls bureaucratic authoritarianism, in spite of a history of democratic 
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secularism in India and one of checkered dictatorial and democratic Islamic communalism in 
both Pakistan and Bangladesh. In all three countries, a rigid centralism was forced upon the 
different regions and sections of the society, for reasons of national integration (ibid., p. 158-
9) and efficient management of the national economy. The objective of national integration, 
paramount especially in the regionally and socially diverse India and in Pakistan even after 
the secession of Bangladesh, was deemed achievable through imposition of centralist decision-
making rather than muddling through the unpredictable process of continuous negotiations 
with regional governments for democratic accommodation of their interests. Jalal herself 
(ibid., p.256-7) concludes that centralism itself breeds ethnicism and regionalism and needs 
to be replaced by a more truly democratic process. For further guidance on this, she 
cryptically refers back to the past: 
"Historically, multiple and shifting social identities in South Asia have found their most comfortable 
expression in political arrangements based on loosely layered sovereignties. [...] South Asia's historical 
legacy of layered sovereignties and the prospects of imaginatively fashioning innovative frameworks 
of decentred democracies capable of reflecting not only the multiple identities of its people but also 
their unfulfilled socio-economic aspirations holds out a rare glimmer of hope." 
Incrementalist governance along provincial and constituency based lines is now paramount 
in Pakistan, even when the planning machinery is still going through the motions belonging 
to the era of the rational comprehensive planning ideal. But this incrementalism is not very 
disjointed, as the re-establishment of democratic government at national and provincial levels 
did not lead to a strengthening of local and district government. As long as this tier is not 
strengthened significantly, and some other conditions are fulfilled (an improved legal 
environment), the effectiveness of planning and monitoring may not be different from that 
of more technocratic and centralised planning. 
The next chapters will focus on the planning and monitoring system in one area of Pakistan: 
Azad Jammu and Kashmir. 
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CHAPTER 3. GOVERNMENT AND THE BUREAUCRACY IN AZAD JAMMU & 
KASHMIR 
The previous chapter has concluded that there are many frictions connected with the 
pursuance of the rational comprehensive planning ideal. These frictions are a consequence of 
conceptual weaknesses, but are exacerbated by the fact that the conditions for the success of 
RCP were particularly difficult to meet in Pakistan. The consequences of an incomplete and 
perhaps mutilated application of central planning practices have not yet been focused upon. 
One of the hypotheses of this study is that current planning practices lead to problems with 
the implementation of the development programme as well as waste of scarce resources. 
Validating this for Pakistan as a whole would be an arduous task, and this is not attempted 
by this study. The relationship can also be established in a smaller area in Pakistan, as long 
as it constitutes a microcosm of it. The setting of the case study in Azad Jammu and Kashmir 
(AJK) is based on the circumstance that the writer had an opportunity to obtain detailed 
information in the course of his employment in a project to improve the planning and 
monitoring system. Due to AJK's small size but nevertheless full establishment of all the 
government functions also seen in the Provinces, its case is believed to bring out all the 
complexities that planning and monitoring have to face even in what appears to be on first 
sight a simple situation. 
The chapter introduces the setting of the case study and focuses subsequently on the 
question whether the overall conditions in AJK are substantially different from those of 
Pakistan as a whole. First, a sketch shall be given of the position of AJK within Pakistan, 
its main socio-economic features, and then an assessment will be made whether the following 
parameters are conducive to comprehensive planning: (1) AJK's position in Pakistan; (2) its 
societal context, (3) politics, (4) staffing in the bureaucracy, (5) financial resources and 
departmental strategies, (6) the organisation of the Planning and Development Department 
(P&DD), (7) project management capacities and (8) data available for planning. All of these 
evaluations will point to a negative answer. In the next chapter, the consequences of this 
finding for planning practice and programme implementation will be elaborated; in three 
chapters thereafter, those for monitoring. 
3.1 AJK in Pakistan 
AJK's position within the political reality of Pakistan must first be explained1. The 'Azad' 
in Azad Jammu & Kashmir means free, indicative of a proclaimed liberated, independent 
status2. When in 1947 the Partition Plan was implemented, the accession of the many 
princely states to either India or Pakistan was left at the discretion of their rulers. Although 
it was expected that those states with a Muslim majority and contiguous with the main 
Muslim provinces would accede to Pakistan, the head of the biggest princely state, Jammu 
& Kashmir, chose to join the new state of India. This was much to the consternation of the 
Government of Pakistan; the state has a Muslim majority population. The Government of 
1 After this statement, AJK will be treated as a separate entity from "Pakistan', for comparative purposes, and 
also in accordance with general perceptions inside AJK. 
2 This study uses the name Azad Jammu and Kashmir solely for reason that this is the name accepted by its own 
(provisional) Government and also in Pakistan; it is not necessarily an endorsement of its political meaning. 
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India eagerly conceded to the Maharadja's wish, claiming that the State was an integral part 
of her territory for historical and cultural reasons. The Government of Pakistan, on the other 
hand, claimed that the spirit of the partition process had been violated. 
The conflicting positions led to a short war between India and Pakistan. In the process, 
some northern areas of the State of Jammu & Kashmir were taken by Pakistan and a western 
slice seceded and was proclaimed Pakistani territory by a Muslim liberation movement. India 
kept possession of the Central Valley of Kashmir, the Ladakh and most of the Jammu areas. 
The United Nations was asked to intervene, and a ceasefire was proclaimed. The two nations 
agreed that the ceasefire borders then established would be maintained for the time being, 
pending a permanent resolution of the Kashmir dispute. The State of Jammu & Kashmir 
would be split up into two parts, a northern and western part under Pakistan, and an eastern 
and southern part under India. The permanent resolution of the Kashmir conflict would be 
based on a UN supervised plebiscite to be held within a few years, under which the 
population of Jammu & Kashmir would be asked their preference as to joining with Pakistan 
or India. The plebiscite was never held and since 1973 India has claimed that more recent 
negotiations with Pakistan, concluded after another war in the context of the Indian supported 
secession of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), supersede the UN resolution. For India, 
Kashmir had become a bilateral issue. Since 1990, the 'Kashmir issue' has been making 
headlines due to a renewed revolt within the Central Valley against the federal government 
of India3. 
In the period 1948 until the present time, the dividing line between the Indian and the 
Pakistani side of Kashmir has changed only slightly, and the Kashmiri territory on the 
Pakistan side has been split up for practical reasons into the Northern Areas, administered 
direcüy by the Pakistan Federation, and what is now called the Azad State of Jammu & 
Kashmir, obtaining self-government through a Legislative Assembly since the early 1970s. 
This state receives a major share of its governmental resources from Pakistan as grants, while 
at the same time having been conferred a formal independence of Pakistan for symbolic and 
political reasons. 'Pending a permanent resolution of the Kashmir issue', as is the catch 
phrase (namely accession to either Pakistan or India, on the basis of a plebiscite), it has for 
instance been given its own president, parliament, prime minister and supreme court. 
AJK as case study 
Since this study is therefore concerned with what might, from an extreme viewpoint, be 
called a somewhat expensive 'project' for Pakistan, some readers may question whether 
AJK's case is not too exceptional to serve as the decor for a study such as the present one. 
It is argued here that it does not; many more areas in Pakistan can in fact lay claim to an 
exceptional status in one respect or other. In fact, AJK's governmental as well as planning 
system resembles that of a Province to a very high degree4. It resembles this more than that 
of special areas such as the Northern Areas or Tribal Areas or the Federal Capital. The four 
Provinces in Pakistan, like AJK, have their own elections for a Legislative Assembly dealing 
with provincial matters. They elect not a Prime Minister but a Chief Minister and a provincial 
cabinet, and have provincial police and provincial courts. The provinces do not have their 
own army but neither does AJK. AJK's public sector has the same bureaucratic structure and 
3 See for one of the better accounts on the Kashmir issue Lamb (1993). 
4 That planning and monitoring practices and problems in AJK were by and large the same as in the Provinces 
of Pakistan, was confirmed during a series of inter-provincial workshops with representatives of all planning 
departments in Pakistan, the findings of which have been laid down in two workshop reports (UNDP/DTCD 
1991, 1993). 
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follows, with minor deviations, the same civil service rules and regulations as apply in the 
Federation and the Provinces. Like the Provinces, AJK also derives most of its resources 
from the Federation. Like in the Provinces, therefore, and in spite of the nominal 
independence, the influence of the Federal Government of Pakistan over AJK's internal 
matters is massive, and successive AJK Governments have been wise enough to always pledge 
their total allegiance to Pakistan. It is the conviction of this author, based also on his 
experiences in other areas in Pakistan, that the conclusions of this study would not be 
different if a provincial administration had been taken as a case study. 
3.2 Introduction to AJK 
The Azad State of Jammu and Kashmir is, within the context of Pakistan, a small slice of 
mostly mountainous area. With 13,297 km2 it is in size comparable to Northern Ireland in 
Europe or Lebanon in the Middle East. Situated along the border with India, and to the east 
of Islamabad, it stretches for some 300 km in a band of around 50 km width from the 
mountain Nanga Parbat in the north, to a distance of around 150 km from the city of Lahore 
in the south. For the most part, high mountain ranges and wild rivers form the borders with 
India as well as Pakistan. When the map of AJK is studied (see next page), it becomes more 
understandable why the unofficial seat of the AJK government is Pakistan's capital Islamabad: 
although outside the territory of AJK, it is more central than the state's official seat of 
government Muzaffarabad5. Internal road links within the state are less developed than links 
going around the rugged area. In all, the area is small enough for experienced officers to be 
familiar with in its entirety, but communications are nevertheless difficult. A drive from north 
to south easily takes two days. 
Government system 
The government system of AJK has the same features as in the Provinces of Pakistan. It is 
layered into two main levels: a state Government with a Legislative Assembly, and a local 
government, consisting of district councils and local councils. The Legislature consists of 48 
members, 28 of which are elected from constituencies inside the territory of AJK, 12 from 
'refugee' constituencies in Pakistan, and a further eight are indirectly elected: five women, 
two 'technocrats' and one to represent Kashmiris settied outside Pakistan. From the 
Legislative Assembly a Cabinet of Ministers is constituted, selected by the Prime Minister. 
In 1990-91, there were 15 Ministers. The cabinet is formally heading some 34 subordinate 
departments and agencies, which can be grouped into financial/budgetary, 
political/administrative, and public service delivery organisations. The latter can be on the 
one hand further subdivided into those financed entirely by the recurrent budget, and those 
which derive funds from the development budget as well. On the other hand, a subdivision 
can be made into departments which are only functioning at the central level, like Services 
and General Administration department, and those (mainly the public service delivery 
departments) which have field formations in various tiers, such as divisions (or circles), 
districts, cities, and even villages. The large variety of departments and agencies even in a 
small state such as AJK can be observed in Figure 3.1 on page 87. It can be observed that 
5 It is of course also more posh, provides government officers with allowances for travel and daily subsistence, 
and lasüy, it is nearer to the corridors of real power. 
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next to executive and legislative levels, there are also the formally independent institutions 
of the President, and the court system, and some institutions with basic allegiance to the 
Federal Government, although paid by the AJK budget. 
Map 3.1 Azad Jammu and Kashmir, with districts in 1991, locations, and rivers 
Source: Shelter for Low Income Communities Project, 1991 
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Figure 3.1 Structure of public institutions within Azad Kashmir, 1991 
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At the local government level, there were in AJK 180 Union Councils (having 1854 
members), 14 Town Committees (having 76 members), 2 Municipal Corporations (having 61 
members) and 5 District Councils (having 195 members) in 1990. The five districts were, 
from north to south, Muzaffarabad, Bagh, Poonch, Kotli, and Mirpur District. 
Basic features 
Agriculture is the mainstay of the populace. 78 percent of all households in AJK has a foot 
in crop or animal husbandry (it is only 32 percent in Pakistan). Due to the very mountainous 
terrain, one seventh of the area is unusable even for grazing or forest purposes. Agricultural 
holdings are small, averaging 1.4 hectares per farm, half of which can be cultivated. 
Population density is high considering the broken terrain: it averaged around 200 persons per 
square kilometer in 1992 (the total population being over 2.5 million). Most of the population 
lives in farmsteads on their land and the number of nucleated villages is small; towns are 
almost absent, apart from Muzaffarabad and Mirpur (both had a population of around 
60,000). Contrary to much of Pakistan, 'feudalism' is almost absent from the state, and land 
ownership is not seriously skewed. Ethnic conflict is virtually absent; the population is 
ethnically fairly homogeneous, with only a small number of Kashmiris of Central Valley 
origin and a majority of Punjabis and Hazaras (a cultural mix between Punjabis and Pathans). 
The biraderi phenomenon is, however, very much in evidence in AJK. 
The rainfall is high in AJK - with some 1400 mm annually twice as much as in a country 
like Holland and this allows rainfed farming in many areas in spite of poor hill soils. Most 
of the fields are terraced and stonewalled and even in the less elevated Mirpur district the 
fields are always surrounded by earth bunds. In spite of this indication of high pressure on 
the land, agriculture is mostly practiced for subsistence purposes, and the average yield of 
maize and wheat is below one tonne per hectare. Even paddies by the river sides do not yield 
more than around 1500 kg/hectare. With 0.7 hectare cultivated area per farm this would then 
imply that most households would be just able to subsist on their own produce as far as 
cereals concerned. Since most families would also own a couple of buffaloes for milk and a 
few other ruminants for meat, the economy of AJK can be typified as based in subsistence 
agriculture. Depicted by some as a heaven on earth partly for this reason (the area's lush 
beauty being another), the reality is much harsher, and a big constraint is a population growth 
estimated at some 2.7 percent annually. This causes heavy pressure on agriculture as well as 
the overall economy, environment, infrastructure, and government services. Alternative 
employment has always been scarce; due to the absence of growth poles in the state (except 
perhaps Mirpur), part of the population has outmigrated or is commuting to Pakistan. AJK 
and particularly Mirpur district is in fact well known for its recourse to migration to the UK, 
US and the Gulf states. Remittances from there have supported many families and this is 
visible in the good housing conditions among a sizable subsection of the population. The large 
number of tiny shops and repair workshops strewn around the countryside is perhaps another 
indicator of at least some investment capital being available. Other investment opportunities 
are however very scarce, witness the absence of handicraft and industry and other business, 
perhaps mainly due to the inaccessibility of the area in spite of its proximity to the densely 
populated plains of the Punjab. Hidden in most statistics is that one twelfth of the labour 
force is employed by the state, and that they are employed under by far the best conditions 
88 
around6. As an employer, the Government is hugely important to the lives of the population 
partly for this reason. It also provides contracts for construction to local contractors, who 
employ local workers. Other reasons are the schooling facilities that it provides, and the roads 
and bridges it constructs/repairs for the scattered and inaccessible population. 
Non-governmental organisations at a level beyond that of the village are conspicuous by 
their absence. AJK does not harbour large organisations focusing on service delivery and 
productive activities such as the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme in the Northern Areas 
or the Sarhad Rural Development Corporation in NWFP. small community-based 
organisations in social service delivery are in evidence in a few places, but the significance 
attached to these, for instance in a study by the Ministry of Local Government et al. (1994) 
in the context of water supply, is exaggerated. They do not go beyond some private schools 
and local health clinics, and a handful productive or training-oriented activities. 
Main problems 
Some main socio-economic problems of the state as seen by this author are population 
pressure, weak base and low diversification of the economy, little business and industrial 
expansion, low average income (between Rs 5000 and 8000 annually per capita (US$ 250-
400)), low literacy rate (estimated at 43 percent in 1992) although somewhat higher than in 
Pakistan, poor health services, poor infrastructure and accessibility, and poorly developed 
alternatives to public sector service delivery. 
3.3 AJK's political history 
AJK has broadly followed political developments in Pakistan as well as its changes in 
administrative structure7 and it is argued here that this has not contributed to the political 
stability required for rational comprehensive planning. 
AJK Government and the Federation 
In the 1950s, AJK as a constitutional 'local authority' fell under the (federal) Ministry of 
Kashmir Affairs, and the Federal Government was authorised to nominate a President and 
Council of Ministers in AJK. This presented a good starting position for unfettered top-down 
planning, but in the early 1960s, the system was changed. Under the Basic Democracies 
system introduced by President Ayub, a president was to be elected through the votes of 
'basic democrats' (local councillors representing villages). In addition, a new body was 
created with which the President was to share power: the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council 
(in majority also elected by these basic democrats). This change was not allowed to settle, 
because after 1964, several amendments in the size and composition of the AJK Council were 
promulgated, reducing the democratic content of the Government in AJK. For instance, first, 
a Chairman was to be nominated from among the Council members by the federal Ministry 
6 This is estimated on the following basis. With a labour force in Pakistan averaging 27 percent of the total 
population according to census figures of 1981, a similar proportion in AJK would lead to an estimated labour 
force size of 675,000 people in 1990 (male & female). The AJK government employed around 55000 in the 
same year: 8 percent of the labour force. By comparison: in Western Europe, the figures vary between 11 
percent in Luxembourg and 31 percent in Denmark; in Holland it is 15 percent and in the UK 19 (Van Deth 
6 Vis 1995, p.223). The figure of 8 percent in AJK is an underestimate, however, of the real importance of 
this employment when compared to the employment alternatives available locally. 
7 For a - brief - account see Gilani (1988). 
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of Kashmir Affairs, and had to act as ex-officio President. In 1968, however, the Chairman 
was to be elected by the Councillors of the AJK Council themselves, from amongst its 
members. 
Developments in Pakistan, notably the resignation of President Ayub, soon overshadowed 
the significance of these amendments. They led to the induction of an AJK caretaker 
government into office. Until 1970, the federal Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, in the person 
of a Chief Advisor, occupied the central position in the AJK government. Reflecting upon 
this period in AJK's history, Chief Justice Raja Muhammad Khurshid Khan once made the 
comment: "It is sad that at times [AJK], which provides a formidable defence line for 
Pakistan, saw constitutional crises unheard of. The constitutional documents in those days 
came like water and went like wind" (in Gilani 1988, p.i). 
In 1970, following again developments in Pakistan, a new AJK Government Act with 
amendments in 1971 abandoned the Basic Democracies model of elections, and introduced 
a Legislative Assembly and President in AJK based on adult franchise along the lines of a 
constituency-based first-past-the-post plurality election system. After the promulgation of the 
Pakistan Constitution of 1973 by the PPP led Government of Z.A. Bhutto, a new Constitution 
in AJK in 1974 introduced again serious changes in the AJK Government system. Broadly 
speaking, a transfer was made from a presidential to a parliamentary system. The role of the 
Ministry of Kashmir Affairs was greatly reduced. A Prime Minister was introduced in the 
Government as a Chief Executive, and the President was largely reduced to a figurehead. 
Elections were held and led to the first directly elected Government in AJK. However, a 
measure of leverage by the federal government was ensured by the reinstitution of the AJK 
Council which was superimposed on the Government, and chaired by the Prime Minister of 
Pakistan (the most important other members being the President and Prime Ministers of 
AJK). 
Amendments introduced after the assumption of power in Pakistan by General Zia led to 
further confusion over the interpretation of the AJK Constitution of 1974 and whether it 
should be regarded as sovereign. Legal expert Gilani (op.cit., p.x) has opined that its 'true 
spirit' is that the Government of AJK should be held supreme. That it was not, was proved 
by President Zia-ul-Haq who dissolved the AJK Government at the end of the 1970s and 
appointed his own man General Hayat as head of a new Government. Hayat was assisted by 
a kitchen cabinet of political advisors and the old autocratic and bureaucratic style of 
governance was resumed. Hayat's tenure came to an end in 1988, when the democratic 
process in Pakistan was recommenced and elections were also held in AJK. 
Since then, there have been four single party governments in AJK, alternating between the 
AJK People's Party (an offshoot of the Pakistan People's Party) and the Muslim Conference 
(originally affiliated with the Pakistan Muslim League): from 1988 to 1990 the Muslim 
Conference, headed by Sardar Qajjum; from 1990 to 1991 the AJK PP, headed by PM 
Mumtaz Hussain Rathore; from 1991 to 1994 the MC, headed again by Sardar Qajjum; and 
from 1994 to the present, the AJK PP, but now headed by Barrister Sultan. The two main 
political parties differ preciously little in terms of issues. As Chidder (1995) has concluded 
for India, and as would be also applicable to AJK and Pakistan, the main bone of contention 
between the two is access to the state's resources for their respective biraderis to the 
exclusion of others. The biraderi divisions at the local level have contributed to a politics 
excessively oriented towards short-term material benefits, government employment for the 
jobless, higher salaries and promotion / transfer prospects for government employees, 
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government contracts for local contractors, and distribution of public facilities and services 
for favoured villages8. 
Because of the larger number of public representatives which are around in the present 
times, the influence of 'politics' on government and administration has increased greatly. This 
can in principle be viewed as positive, given the benefits derived from greater participation 
by major societal interest groups in public sector decision-making. But the exact roles of this 
body politic vis-a-vis the administration are not delineated unambiguously. The legal 
environment also poses question marks. For the benefits of disjointed incremental planning 
to exceed those of long-term oriented national development planning, more conditions need 
to be fulfilled. 
Moreover, AJK's dependence on the Federation remains of paramount importance to its 
politics; one of the four governments, that of Rathore in 1991, was even dismissed by the 
Federal Government. There are many avenues open to the Federation to influence the AJK 
Government. The purse strings are an important avenue, as well as the formal influence 
through the Kashmir Council, which is chaired by the Pakistan Prime Minister. Even 
opportunism by the AJK population helps the Federal Government. When the PPP is in 
power in Islamabad, the balance in the AJK polls is usually heavily tilted towards the AJK 
PP. When the Muslim League reigns, then its allied AJK Muslim Conference is likely to win 
the elections. The electorate in AJK expects a bonus by voting its allied party in AJK to 
power. (The expectation is usually realistic: with friends in Islamabad, the government will 
benefit.) Another factor may be less to do with opportunism of the AJK electorate. By some 
strange coincidence (but attributed by defeated parties to electoral rigging) a considerable 
portion of the 12 seats in AJK's Legislative Assembly, to be elected from 'refugee 
constituencies' in Pakistan, usually go to the party affiliated with the governing party in 
Islamabad9. 
All these factors give AJK's politics as well as its budget a measure of uncertainty which 
is bound to have consequences for the stability of its planning environment. 
Local Government in AJK 
The state of local government in AJK has been less sorry in the 1990s than in most parts of 
Pakistan: dissolutions have not occurred in recent times. However, after the four-year term 
of the local bodies expired in 1994, nominated administrators have taken over, and new 
elections were not held until the time of completion of this study. The effectiveness of local 
administration has remained limited also because the revenue raised by this tier is very low. 
It amounts to only 2-3 percent of the overall resources used; in Pakistan this was around 5 
percent; a figure influenced by the greater urbanisation and greater financial powers of urban 
councils in Pakistan. AJK's largely rural nature is reflected in the predominance of its Union 
Councils which have less financial and administrative powers than the Town and Municipal 
Committees. Resources transferred by the state government to this tier have been similarly 
paltry, amounting to perhaps 3 percent. 
8 It may be argued that the phenomenon of the biraderi is to a large extent a consequence of naturally evolving 
strategies to break up society in smaller political segments in order to increase these segments' chances of access 
to a sizable quantum of government patronage in the context of extreme resource scarcity. As was also argued 
for Swati tribal societies by Lindholm (1995), the allegiance of the biraderis to one party or the other is by no 
means a historically stable phenomenon. It may change overnight with the political winds of the time. 
9 The AJK PP accused the Nawaz Sharif Government in 1991 of manipulating the AJK elections in Pakistan 
to deliver all 12 seats to the Muslim Conference. More recently, the Muslim Conference accused the PPP 
Government of delivering 10 of the 12 seats to the AJK PP. 
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3.4 Staffing in the bureaucracy of AJK 
Next to a task-oriented structure and development-oriented mentality of the bureaucracy, its 
technical competence is a pre-condition for the success of rational planning. About the first 
two factors much has been already said in the previous chapter - the conclusion being that the 
administrative structure has not changed much since British colonial times (in spite of 
enormous expansion) and that 'development' has to share priority with other disparate 
concerns such as defence, organisational interests, and public sector job creation. About the 
staffing situation in the bureaucracy in AJK the following can be said. When the diversity of 
government departments is taken into account, and the numbers of staff employed in each of 
them (see Table 3.1), the bureaucracy certainly seems sizable enough to discharge her duties. 
In fact, the ratio of budget to staff is only around Rs 60,000 per employee, and this figure 
includes salary (on average Rs 30,000 annually)10. One would expect that with such a 
luxurious staffing position, prudent management of the resources would be facilitated. 
However, in some departments, there seem to be too many (support) staff around", whereas 
their salaries preempt scarce resources needed for investment as well as operation & 
maintenance expenditure. 
Grades and qualifications of government staff 
The positive effect that a luxurious staffing position may exert on public sector performance 
is mitigated by the predominance of staff with low qualifications. The number of officers in 
grade 17 and above - staff in possession of post-graduate degrees (MAs, MScs, etc.) - is only 
6.1 percent. In a Western country such as The Netherlands around 11 percent in the central 
government have such degrees; another 14 percent has had other forms of higher education 
equivalent to graduate degrees (Van der Meer & Roborgh 1993, p.323). An important 
department such as Food Department in AJK, which purchases and distributes in bulk staple 
food items such as wheat, cooking oil and sugar, is managed by only five officers of grade 
17 and higher. Similarly, the Finance Department is run by only 21 officers; Planning and 
Development Department by only 13. 
At the other side of the pay scale system, around one third of all government employees 
is in grades 1 to 4, and can boast only primary and occasionally middle school education (in 
the Netherlands this is 15 percent (ibid., p.323)). Such staff usually occupies positions like 
peons (messengers, office servants), cleaners, guards of buildings and forests, and drivers. 
They may smoothen the functioning of the administration, but have little effect on public 
service delivery. The usefulness of peons has gone down in recent years, due to the wide 
spread of the telephone, computer and fax in government offices. When organisations such 
as World Bank and IMF are promoting structural adjustment programmes and rationalisation 
of staff, it is usually this category which is deemed of excessive proportions. 
By comparison, in the Netherlands, the budget was Dfl 226,997 Million (Miljoenennota 1998 p.252), 
whereas the number of government employees was 718,953 in the same year (Van Deth & Vis 1995, p.222); 
the ratio budget to staff being Dfl 316000; 50 times as much as in AJK (Dfl = Rs 20). 
1 1 Turner & Hulme (1997, p. 119) give the example of the Management Services Division in Pakistan which in 
1990 undertook a 'scientific analysis' of workloads in 33 of the 43 divisions of the federal government. Out 
of a total of 14400 posts at the Secretariat level, 1294 (9 percent) were found to be surplus. The Pakistan 
Academy of Rural Development undertook a study of time utilisation in federal and NWFP government offices 
and concluded (Waheed et al. 1996, p. 119) that officers waste 40 percent of their time. But the methodology 
used is questionable. 
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Table 3.1 Sanctioned posts by Basic Pay Scale groups and AJK departments in 1990. 
Departments 
Azad Kashmir 
Percentage of total 
Total BPS 1-4 BPS 5-15 BPS 16 BPS 17+ 
55015 18121 29424 4091 3379 
100.00% 32.94% 53.48% 7.44% 6.14% 
29259 3773 20056 3684 1746 
4598 2342 1836 25 395 
4473 3838 587 2 46 
2827 1550 1205 11 61 
2198 1236 855 17 90 
1967 1212 621 57 77 
1144 470 585 3 86 
1135 672 390 1 72 
900 295 285 28 292 
830 378 399 31 22 
661 340 254 31 36 
603 290 249 11 53 
602 139 410 4 49 
492 228 178 17 69 
372 57 267 25 23 
371 196 158 12 5 
328 183 121 8 16 
253 133 103 5 12 
213 96 98 13 6 
162 43 98 8 13 
159 67 76 5 11 
151 41 99 3 8 
145 52 55 11 27 
129 67 33 13 16 
110 53 55 1 1 
102 29 46 6 21 
93 44 30 2 17 
89 36 32 11 10 
87 33 31 1 22 
87 43 28 5 11 
75 25 30 7 13 
64 24 27 3 10 
62 24 30 6 2 
59 26 23 1 9 
51 24 11 4 12 
36 14 12 2 8 
43 16 21 1 5 
23 8 6 6 3 
22 7 12 3 0 
22 8 9 3 2 
18 9 3 4 2 
1 Education 
2 Health 
3 Home incl. Police & Jails 
4 Electricity 
5 Public Works Department 
6 Forestry 
7 Animal Husbandry 
8 Agriculture 
9 University Azad Kashmir 
10 Industries 
11 Revenue 
12 Int. Hill Farming Dev. Pr. 
13 Local Govt. & Rural Dev. 
14 Judiciary 
15 Accountant General 
16 Food 
17 Auqaf (religious trusts) 
18 Excise & Taxation 
19 Zakat & Ushar (charity welfare) 
20 Intermediate Board 
21 Mirpur Development Auth. 
22 Co-operative Societies 
23 Services & General Admin. 
24 Assembly Secretariat 
25 Printing Press 
26 Finance 
27 AKMIDC 
28 Prime Minister Secretariat 
29 Islamic Law 
30 President Secretariat 
31 Planning and Development 
32 Information 
33 Civil Defence 
34 Dev. Authority Muzaff. 
35 Supreme Court 
36 Law 
37 Election Commissioners (2) 
38 Service Tribunal 
39 Prov. Transport Authority 
40 Public Service Commission 
41 Sports 
SOURCEr-Departments of Azad Jammu and Kashmir; AJK Statistical Yearbook 1990. 
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In the middle range of the pay scale system are such essential service delivery occupations 
as primary school teachers (in grade 5 and 7), secretaries to local councils (grade 5), 
paramedics (in grade 11), linesmen (grade 5) and policemen (grade 5). As can be witnessed 
from Table 3.1, Education Department alone employs more than half of all government 
employees, mainly as teachers and guards of schools. 
Incentive structure 
Of importance to the functioning of the bureaucracy is also the incentive structure - salaries, 
emoluments, pensions and general working conditions. The basic salary (1st step) of a senior 
most officer such as a Chief Secretary was Rs 10900 (or US$ 350) a month in early 1996; 
that of a beginning peon Rs 1245 (or US$ 40). Although allowances and emoluments do add 
perhaps 40 percent to these salaries, they are very low by Western standards. What is more, 
the salaries have gone down since 1972 in real terms for almost all grades above grade 3, as 
can be seen from Figure 3.2. For instance, a beginning grade 17 officer earning Rs 3880 in 
1996 would have earned Rs 5810 in 1972 in constant terms (i.e. 50 percent more). For a 
more senior officer, the decrease in value of salary is much worse. The newspaper The News 
(March 31 1996) suggested this might be one cause for some of them resorting to corrupt 
practices. It may also be a reason for lack of morale. 
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Government officers on the permanent payroll are entitled to build up pensions in the course 
of their service, but these have also declined in real terms. Other work conditions have 
probably gone up on balance for the officer staff. Many more officers than before now have 
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access to a government vehicle and use this also for private purposes. Gradually, some of 
their offices are being equipped with computers, photocopiers and faxes. This is in contrast 
with the lower staff; their work conditions have gone down. They are feeling the resource 
crunch by diminishing allocations for the purchase of the necessary stationery, the 
maintenance and cleaning of their offices or the payment of telephone, gas and electricity 
bills. 
Efficiency and competence of the bureaucracy 
The efficiency of any bureaucracy is difficult to measure, and should not be equated with the 
competence of the staff running it. Inefficiency and red tape can be, and are, the result of 
many factors surrounding a bureaucracy, most of which have already been indicated. Few 
studies are available addressing the quality of the various government employee cadres. The 
subjective but overwhelming impression is the wide divergence between senior and 
medium/lower cadres. The senior level administrators are generally viewed as competent and 
highly trained (cf Braibanti in Khan 1987, p.viii); at the medium and lower levels there is 
much more incompetence12. This lack of quality at the 'work floor level' is caused by 
Pakistan and AJK's educational system which pays insufficient attention to vocational and 
technical education, and is perpetuated by the absence of good in-service training for the 
lower grades (cf UNDP 1991, ch.6; National Manpower Commission 1991, ch. 9; 8th Five 
Year Plan 1994, p.313-15). 
Furthermore, many observers report that the general competence of the newly appointed 
officers seems to diminish rather than improve with time; the competence of the younger 
generation is perceived to be lower than that of the older generation. This was also confirmed 
by the observations of the writer of this study. While conducting a study of the dossiers of 
over a hundred projects, it was observed that the older dossiers, originating in the 1970s, 
contained better written documents than the later files. The difference was distinct. The 
reason probably has to do with the developments in the educational system. While the overall 
coverage of educational facilities is expanding and basic literacy rates are improving slowly, 
it is widely observed that the quality of primary, secondary and tertiary education has gone 
down, particularly in the later 1980s and 1990s (National Manpower Commission 1991, p.ix; 
UNDP 1991, ch. 4.3)13. Such features as teacher absenteeism, lack of educational materials, 
obsolete methods and materials, rote learning, widespread cheating on exams and buying of 
degrees are frequently reported on in the press, and have given rise to special donor 
supported programmes such as the Social Action Programme and the Primary Education 
Programme. Most Western universities are now equating a Masters Degree from a university 
in Pakistan with, at most, a Bachelors Degree in Europe or the USA14. One more result is 
that disparities in the quality of newly recruited officer staff are widening. At the grade 17 
level, which is the entry level of master degree holders, one can nowadays find both excellent 
1 2 Henderson (1992) opined that the technical competence of engineers in AJK left to be desired; in his view 
they needed to refresh/update their knowledge. 
1 3 This is corroborated by field surveys of primary schools through the Social Action Programme Project, 
funded by amongst others the World Bank and the Netherlands Government. 
1 4 In the Netherlands, for instance, the Netherlands Universities Foundation For International Cooperation 
equates a Pakistani MSc degree generally with two years of university; a Bachelors degree usually with a (six 
year) secondary school diploma (Preparatory Academic Schooling). In some cases, such as with engineering 
studies, the situation may be slightly different; an Msc would then be equated with three years of university 
in the Netherlands. 
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and very mediocre officers side by side. The excellent officers usually have either been to one 
of the top primary and secondary schools in the countries, or have gained a foreign degree13. 
Politicisation 
Another important factor which is widely mentioned as having lowered the quality of officer 
staff, is the politicisation of the recruitment process. This development began in the era of 
Z. A. Bhutto in the 1970s, who introduced the notorious lateral recruitment system (Kennedy 
1987). This allowed direct recruitment from outside the bureaucracy to administrative 
positions which normally would be available only to government servants through 
promotions. In the times of Bhutto, however, the effects were rather limited due to the small 
number of government staff which was allowed to make use of it. In the present era of 
elected governments, which started at the end of the 1980s, the phenomenon of lateral 
recruitments has resurfaced and assumed much larger proportions. Many government posts 
are now believed to be snatched by ruling parties to favour party workers and sons of 
important biraderi members. The Public Service Commissions are either bypassed, or have 
themselves been politicised by the appointment of subservient chairmen. In AJK, when the 
Muslim Conference came to power in 1992, the son of the Prime Minister, who was also a 
member of the Assembly, constituted a 'commission', bypassing the Public Service 
Commission, to elevate some 500 party workers to government officers, in violation of the 
rules. This situation could not be sustained, ultimately. When the party lost the next elections, 
all those staff were dismissed by the new government. 
3.5 The AJK Government budget 
An indispensable part of any evaluation of planning in a given area is a review of financial 
resources and budgetary outlays. Table 3.2 summarises the sources of the AJK recurrent and 
development budgets, including the funds of the AJK Council. An impression can be gained 
as to the largest government establishments and the distribution. If the revenues of the 
Electricity Department are excluded from the equation, then it will be clear that apart from 
taxes and federal transfers, only the Forest Department brings in some serious revenues, from 
the sale of lumber. Internally collected taxes including the revenues of all the departments 
came to Rs 962.089 M in the fiscal year of 1990-91; federal grants came to Rs 2245.816 M. 
Thus, AJK was for 70 percent of its Rs 3.2 billion budget dependent upon support by the 
federal government. 
Although this is perhaps not exceptional by international standards, conducting long term 
planning with such a dependence on the goodwill by the Federation to fund variable deficits 
is a difficult proposition. While the Provinces of Pakistan have been able, through the 
National Finance Commission, to settle their rights to fixed shares of the so called Federal 
Divisible Pool of taxes, AJK is not party to this, and relies on ad hoc decisions (i.e. charity). 
Ali (1996, pp.45-46), after Wheare, states that to ensure states' independence in the financial 
field, "grants [...] must not depend on the goodwill of the contributing government. They 
must be obligatory contributions about which the contributing government has no discretion." 
In the last few years, the funds granted by the Federation have not been sufficient anymore 
to finance the recurrent expenditure, which has been increasing by on average 20 percent 
1 5 There are of course exceptions of self-made officers, who are excellent and who would survive any education 
system well. 
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annually since the 1980s16. AJK has resorted to loans from commercial and state banks to 
finance the deficit. 
But nevertheless, broadly speaking, AJK seems to have been able to get its due share in 
the perspective of the overall resources of the Federation. With around two percent of the 
overall territory under the control of the Government of Pakistan and with also around two 
percent of its population, AJK gets between one and a half and two and a half percent of the 
country's overall federal and provincial budget (Rs 142.3 billion in 1990-91 excluding 
defence and interest payments17). 
It must be borne in mind that the federal budget cannot be entirely broken down to reflect 
the exact shares in the overall pie, and AJK like any other subnational government in Pakistan 
has been in continuous dialogue with the federal authorities arguing for a more generous 
treatment. The difference between two and a half and one and a half percent is after all 66 
percent. The Government of AJK is a poor government; the recurrent budget of Rs 2 billion 
(US$ 100 million) covered the salaries of some 55,000 state employees as well as operational 
expenses in 1990-91. The development budget, including the foreign loans, was equivalent 
to only US$ 50 million. Some US$ 150 million, equivalent to the cost of Amsterdam's 
admittedly expensive city-hall-cum-opera building was then the sum total of AJK's 
government resources with which it had to take care of its 2.5 million population. 
The problem is compounded by the apprehension of the AJK Government that if it would 
generate more revenues on its own, the Federal Government might take advantage of this, 
and in effect penalise AJK by slashing its subsidies proportionately. 
Foreign aid 
This review has so far excluded the position of foreign aid. AJK derives a variable amount 
of budgetary and technical assistance from a number of multilateral donors such as the World 
Bank (IDA), IF AD, OECD, and UNDP. The total annual value has gone up slowly in the 
1990s. It was around 17 percent in 1990-91 and went to between 20 and 30 percent of the 
development budget in recent years. Since few bilateral donors would venture to directly fund 
projects in AJK for political reasons, these are generally absent. (In the table, the amount of 
foreign credits is included in the development budget, but not the (much smaller) technical 
assistance grants.) When compared to the amount of foreign aid received by provincial 
governments, it cannot be concluded that AJK is doing much worse, but the variation in its 
receipts between years is perhaps even greater than those of the provinces. The federal 
government obtains around 35 percent of its funds for the development programme through 
foreign loans and grants (1996-97). AJK has been much less successful than provincial 
governments in acquiring federally funded projects (such as national highways) within its 
boundaries. AJK had almost none of any significant size in the early 1990s. 
1 6 From Rs 353 M in 1980-81 to Rs 2317 M in 1990-91; the latter "actual', when compared to the budget as 
reflected in table 3.2 also shows that the budget had been exceeded by more than 10 percent in 1990-91. Figures 
given to author by Finance Department. 
1 7 Calculated from Economic Survey Pakistan 1994-95, p. 132. 
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Table 3.2: The AJK budget and its sources, fiscal year 1990-1991. 
in Rs Millions 
Line Agencies Development Recurrent Estimated 
and/or sources of revenue budget budget revenue 
Education Dept. 149.521 582.000 7.500 
Electricity Dept. 200.000 372.000 400.000 
Public Works Dept. 420.160 120.000 40.000 
Health Dept. 75.000 115.000 5.000 
Local Govt & Rural Devt. Dept. 92.140 15.400 
Forestry Dept. 46.160 51.000 205.000 
Integr. Hill Fanning Devt. Project 90.000 
Agriculture Dept. 22.000 21.500 2.700 
Animal Husbandry Dept. 13.000 21.400 2.100 
Industries Dept. 25.000 6.450 2.400 
Tourism Dept. 14.540 2.000 
Muzaffarabad Devnt. Authority 11.650 
Mirpur Devt. Authority 11.900 
AK Minerals Devt. Corporation 8.000 
Planning & Development Dept. 5.650 3.732 
Other departments in AJK* 712.699 
other non-tax revenues in AJK 61.744 
local tax 79.095 
transportation tax 1.300 
stamp tax 18.000 
AJK Council** 137.250 
federal tax share 13.300 
federal aid to reduce recurrent budget deficit 1047.795 
federal development grant 1184.721 
AJK budget 1184.721 2023.184 3207.905 
Source: Government of AJK, Finance Department. Budget 1990-91 
* The most important expenditures incurred are for Food (Rs 247.7 ml) Police (Rs 143 ml), General 
Administration (Rs 133.102), and Pensions (Rs 70 ml). The corresponding departments do not have 
development budgets. 
** Through the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Council, federal property and wealth taxes levied within the AJK 
region are added to the budget. 
Budgetary uncertainty and departmental strategies 
The budget, meanwhile, is by no means a sure thing even within a fiscal year: budgetary cuts 
in the funds committed by the federal government frequently occur midyear and may run into 
the hundreds of millions of rupees. Similarly, taxes collected internally may vary substantially 
98 
from what they had been forecast. These uncertainties complicate planning in AJK, since 
budget cuts will usually first affect projects and operational expenses and only lastly salaries. 
They furthermore lead to the deployment of a large number of departmental strategies to 
preempt as large a share of the resource pie as possible. Since these strategies obfuscate 
rational comprehensive planning, some of them are outlined in Box 3.1 on the next page. As 
a point of reference is taken the survival and expansion strategies of departments as described 
in the classic study of budgetary behaviour in poor countries by Caiden & Wildavsky (1974, 
Ch.IV). Their relative importance in AJK is indicated. 
Without a strong P&DD & Finance Department able to at least keep a continuous check 
on the commitments made and un-made, the various strategies work towards budgetary 
growth beyond the means available, as well as budgetary undiscipline. 
Countering to some extent their effects is the fact that patterns of underspending are also 
encountered in AJK. Underspending is first of all a result of a lack of planning and budgeting 
capacity within the bureaucracy, so that by the end of the year, all the projected expenditures 
have not been made. It is considered better to overbudget and then underspend than to 
underbudget and then not being able to overspend (a strategy akin to the padding strategy 
described above). It may also be due to the poor incentive structure within the government, 
with low salaries as already discussed and a promotion policy which relies either on seniority 
or on political interference, but less on the proven efficiency of government officers. Thirdly, 
the three main expenditure sanctioning departments in turn employ a number of strategies to 
avoid overspending by departments, which may in effect result in actual underspending. Each 
of the three departments, the Planning and Development Department, the Finance Department 
and the Accountant General's Office applies multiple checks before a decision is taken 
causing delays so that at the end of the financial year, funds may lapse. The P&D 
Department has to authorise annual workplans of projects, the Finance Department has to 
authorise releases made to projects and departments, and the Accountant General has to write 
cheques drawn on the State Bank of Pakistan. All of this means red tape, and when there are 
delays these may be (subconsciously) deliberate, since in any fiscal year, the claims on the 
government kitty are far in excess of its actual contents and the government can never be sure 
the flow into the kitty will be sustained. As Caiden & Wildavsky (op.at., p.76) have pointed 
out, in many cases the delays serve the function to bring out which of the claims really has 
priority; those will usually be pursued most vigorously by the line departments. 
In this environment of absolute scarcity, budgetary uncertainty, large demands and 
deployment of various games and strategies by departments, Weberian behaviour and rational 
comprehensive planning is little observed. For these reasons, the preconditions for rational 
budgeting by the P&D Department in coordination with its brothers-in-arms the line 
departments are also not easily met. 
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Box 3.1 Departmentalstrategies Evidence in AJK 
Piercing the ceiling 
overspending presented asfait 
accompli 
This does not happen much on the development side: 
overspending without approval is anathema in AJK. On the 
recurrent budget side it takes place more frequently, mostly due to 
politically sanctioned recruitments beyond the Finance 
Department's control. 
Padding 
deliberately inflating requests for 
funds so that the inevitable cutback 
does not lead to problems 
Deliberate overestimation of costs takes place in AJK particularly 
when proposing either 'software' or agricultural or industrial 
projects which have a history of token cuts made by FD or 
P&DD. 
It is also the principal strategy used by departments when 
requesting for next year's required ADP or Recurrent Budget 
allocation. The ADP budget requested from the federal 
government is usually at least 35 percent higher than what is 
eventually obtained, in spite of the directive that it should not 
exceed the present year's allocation by more than 10 percent. 
The camel's nose 
Deliberate initial underestimation 
of the actual costs 
This takes place frequently when proposing expensive construction 
oriented projects, which, once started, are in a better position to 
obtain the actually required funding (through a cost revision). 
The imperative to spend 
Fast spending of the available 
funds out of fear of being cut back 
at a later stage 
Efforts are made by many departments to spend the allocated 
release as fast as possible to avoid that it is reclaimed by other 
units/departments, and to claim that a next release is required. 
(However, such efforts are being countered by FD which tries to 
slow down actual expenditures by putting up hurdles, e.g. requests 
for more information.) 
Obtaining foreign funding 
Increasing the departmental budget 
by foreign aid may also lead to 
extra government funds being 
made available 
Important strategy in AJK invoked by departments to raise more 
funds for projects and also to subsequently improve their claim for 
a greater share of the government funds because these are usually 
required as counterpart funding. 
Transfers 
Strategy to shift funds from one 
category to another, or from one 
account to another 
In AJK, transfers of funds for instance from development budget 
to recurrent budget are prohibited because the former is an 
earmarked grant from the Federation. Within the recurrent budget, 
FD does usually not allow transfers to take place until the year's 
end, but departments may counter this by including in the 
lumpsum budget provisions which can be used to stop gaps 
anywhere. 
Avoiding cuts and getting large 
increases 
Predicting that imminent disaster 
will take place; threatening to 
resign; instead of cutting the fat, 
proposing to cut back on necessary 
items that will most likely be put 
back in the budget 
In AJK, this may happen with recurrent budgets but it does not 
happen much with projects in the development programme. For 
foreign aided projects or pet projects of certain politicians, the 
technique is employed more frequently. A project director facing 
government budget cuts may call in his foreign counterpart to 
bargain with the Government for more funds on the basis of donor 
agreements. 
Coercive deficiencies 
Spending all in critical areas and 
then ask for supplementary 
appropriations 
This happens in AJK only on the side of the recurrent budget in 
certain departments. For instance subsidies on wheat, import of 
wheat and cooking oil; it generally applies to politically sensitive 
issues. 
Utilising political influence 
Bureaucrats utilising their contacts 
within the political government 
An important strategy employed in AJK by department heads to 
influence the Prime Minister to grant them a more favourable 
treatment than other departments get. 
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3.6 Planning & Development Department 
As discussed in chapter 2, the P&D Department has a special position within the overall 
departmental set-up. Apart from advisory and administrative functions, it has been bestowed 
with executive functions. It exerts controls in a somewhat awkward superimposition upon the 
normal controls exercised by the Finance Department. The P&DD can determine to a large 
extent the size of the allocations made to ongoing projects over a one-year period. The 
P&DD has to concur with the individual releases that the Finance Department is to make to 
the line departments. It has the power to approve new projects of a financial size below Rs 
20 Million without reference to government decisions (as long as it follows certain broad 
government policies). It can filter and delay or speed up the Government approvals of larger 
projects. Due to its coordinative functions for 'technical assistance', it can put itself in 
between line departments, the Economic Affairs and Kashmir Affairs Divisions in Islamabad, 
and international donor agencies, in the case of foreign aid projects. These can be called 
P&DD's main powers. Next to these, the P&DD has a few other roles to play, but these are 
less executive. It is supposed to do economic research in order to advise on economic policy. 
It is to coordinate the preparation of the Five Year Plan and to make sure the Plan is 
followed. It is to do monitoring of some undefined kind and coordinate the quarterly progress 
reviews. It is supposed to coordinate overall policies with respect to development and public 
investment because it is headed by the Additional Chief Secretary, who is higher ranked than 
the secretaries of the line departments18. The exact Rules of Business of the P&DD are 
copied in Box 3.2 below (1985, p.45). 
Box 3.2: The Government of AJK Rules of Business for Planning and DevelopmentDepartment. 
(1) Planning including policy and development. 
(2) Coordination of technical assistance. 
(3) Economic Research. 
(4) Coordination of statistics in general 
(5) Execution of all development schemes, programmes and proposals submitted by other departments 
and making recommendations to the Government thereon. 
(6) To evaluate the progress of development schemes and their critical appraisal. 
(7) Initiation of measures for giving suitable publicity to development Plan and educating the public 
on the results achieved from time to time. 
(8) Service matters except those entrusted to Services and General Administration Department. 
Many of the reasons why these powers are deemed by this study to be either not large or 
not invoked enough to enable effective rational comprehensive planning of the State's 
development activities have already been discussed in detail. The most conspicuous ones are 
repeated here: the questionable bifurcation of development and recurrent budgets; the 
instability of politics both at the state and federal level; the uncertainty with respect to the 
size of the budget from year to year and even within financial years; the growing interference 
from the side of members of the Assembly and 'party workers' with the implementation of 
projects; the organismic behaviour of government departments in the context of extreme 
1 8 As was noted by the UNDP/DTCD study of the department in 1990: the above list does not include the 
preparation and implementation of the ADP. Item (5) is ambiguous, since it is not the role of P&D to execute 
schemes. Item (7) was not performed by any staff of P&DD. 
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resource scarcity; and the lack of balance in higher and lower grades and qualifications of 
public sector staff. The factors described in the previous chapter (section 2.7) leading to 
decreased prestige of central planning in Pakistan in the last decade, may also have 
contributed to diminished regulatory authority for the P&DD in AJK. 
Structure and staffing of P&DD 
The impression of a weak P&DD is reinforced when the structure of the Planning and 
Development Department is taken into account. An organisation chart is presented below, 
applying to the year 1990-91. 
Figure 3.3 Organisation chart Planning & Development Department, October 
1990; officer staff (grades 16 to 21) 
Additional Chief Secretary 
Dir. General, Insp. & Eval. Programme Officer 
Joint Chief Economist 
(Research/FA/Coord/FYP) 
Asst. Dir. Statistics 
Assistant Chief 
Stat. Investigator 
Econ. Investigator 
Addl Dev. Commissioner I 
Education / Industry 
Assistant Chief Econ. Investigator 
Planning Officer 
Econ. Investigator 
Addl Dev. Commissioner II 
Forest/Agric/Animal Husb. 
Planning Officer 
Research Officer 
Chief Technical (Roads, 
(Buildings, Power, Water) 
- Assistant Chief Asst.Director Stat 
Research Officer 
Stat. Investigator 
Stat. Investigator 
• / 
Addl. Dev. Commissioner 
Health & Nutrition 
Planning Officer 
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A first conclusion is that there were only 24 officers of grade 16 and above (some five of 
which were not permanent staff members) to perform all of the substantive tasks of the 
department. If this number is set against the over five thousand officers of similar grade in 
the line departments, then it must be clear immediately that the potential for effective steering 
of the development process by P&DD is low. 
A review of the departmental organisation 
In 1990, a study was conducted into the functioning of the P&D Department by the head of 
the project "Development Planning in AJK" (UNDP/DTCD 1990). Systematic interviews 
were conducted with all senior staff and questionnaires were used to arrive at the following 
conclusions: 
1) In view of the many statutory functions that a planning department is required to 
perform even in a small state such as AJK (see above), there are very few professional 
staff. 
2) The departmental organisation does not have a complete line management structure: 
the span of control for the ACS is too wide; since the DG Inspection and Evaluation 
post is (rightly) not accountable for the work of the Section Chiefs, a Secretary 
position is missed at the grade 20 level. This means that there is a heavy burden on 
the top official: important decisions are all passed back to the ACS. In various 
sections, there was also a management tier missing: that of the (grade 18) Assistant 
Chief. This means that the Section Chiefs lose much time in delegating work to and 
training of inexperienced junior staff. Lastly, there are too few junior staff to each 
level of promoted staff. 
3) A glaring inadequacy is visible in the office of the Joint Chief Economist, who has 
to conduct the following important functions, each of which would merit a section on 
its own: ADP coordination, foreign aid, five year plan preparation, and 
statistics/economic research. As an indication of how little importance was attached 
in practice to all of these functions, it should be mentioned that the Joint Chief 
Economist was holding another position in a development project at the time. He thus 
could devote only half of his time to his P&DD responsibilities. 
4) An equally serious inadequacy is that the office of the Director General Inspection and 
Evaluation, is understaffed. For serious monitoring including field inspections, an 
expansion of this section with at least five more staff is essential. Furthermore, the 
DG position needs to be a regular staff member of the P&DD and not, as is the case 
in AJK, a 'deputationist' (an officer on secondment) from a line agency with primary 
allegiance to his parent department. 
5) The four substantive sections Education/Industry, Technical, Health and 
Agriculture/Forestry/Animal Husbandry, do not correspond to the current sectors 
reflected in the Annual Development Programme. In order to achieve a minimum of 
correspondence, at least one more substantive section would be necessary. 
6) The problem of not enough staff and specialisation is compounded by the fact that 
there is an excessive amount of deputation at the Section Chief level: four of the five 
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positions are taken by officers on deputation from line agencies which means they 
have been transferred to P&DD for only 2-3 years. If the deputationist positions of 
ACS and DG are also drawn into the picture, then it is clear that the senior managers 
have relatively little experience with P&DD management as compared to their periods 
of experience in their parent departments". Furthermore, the position of the 
deputationist vis-á-vis his parent department is essentially compromised: he cannot 
exert severe criticism of his department if he does not want to jeopardise his career 
prospects in the long run. The predominance of deputationists at the senior 
management level also leads to low promotion chances for junior P&DD staff and 
concomitant low motivation at these levels. Lastly, there are indications of insufficient 
degree of commitment to P&DD by deputationists (as they have also indicated 
themselves). 
7) There is not enough diversification in terms of background qualifications and 
experience in P&DD. In view of the nature of the Annual Development Programme, 
there are too few engineers and rural and urban planners; there is a relative 
overrepresentation of macro-economists. 
Thus, it may be assumed that the P&D Department as it was operating in 1990 was both 
structurally and functionally not in a position to exert a decisive influence on the development 
programme. Although it had large powers in principle (as derived from a RCP paradigm), 
wielding these was hampered by practical difficulties such as insufficient staff and other 
problems which have been mentioned above. P&DD is in this way 'cut down to size', and 
the reasons for this can only be conjectured. In the view of this author, they have to do with 
the political and departmental environment in AJK, which accepts central control on paper 
but in practice has difficulties with one departmental actor dominating the government 
investment programme. Politicians are ambiguous with respect to planning: they have no 
stake in a strong planning department since it would take away some of what they perceive 
as their discretion. Government departments surrounding the P&DD similarly have no stake 
in a very strong P&DD because that would mean a stronger institutional opponent. The 
Finance Department in particular is against strengthening the P&DD. It has no problem in 
sanctioning the creation of hundreds of new officer posts every year in other departments, but 
puts up many hurdles before it sanctions even one new post in P&DD. 
Even P&DD itself is ambiguous with regard to its institutional position. One the one hand 
it dreams of gaining that pivotal position in the development process, preferably unhindered 
by political influences. In AJK at the time, it tried many times - but with little success even 
in spite of the ACS's efforts - to incorporate the staff of the planning sections in line 
departments into its own cadre, in order to increase its control over the development planning 
process in these departments. And it also usually managed to approve for itself a few projects 
that improve the department in some way or other, leading to a few extra hands20. On the 
other hand, the P&DD has long resigned itself to the realisation that a pivotal position is 
1 9 The average period of the senior management served in P&DD was 2.6 years, outside P&D 20.2. Conversely, 
the average period of the junior management served in P&D was 8.8 years, and outside P&D 0.2 years 
(UNDP/DTCD 1990, p. 10). 
2 0 The trend to use the project as a mechanism for increasing departmental staff was noted to be much more 
pronounced in a Planning Department such as in NWFP, where almost half of all staff are employed on contract 
(i.e. temporary) basis. Other departments sometimes also manage to increase their core staff through this route, 
and try to move the staff over to the recurrent budget after project completion. 
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unattainable and that in order to gain access to the real power, to 'play the game', to 'give 
and take' is necessary. Perhaps for this reason it does not worry about trading some of its 
advisory functions in exchange for short-term controls as to project approvals and 
management of the annual development budget. 
3.7 Project management capacities in AJK 
The more comprehensive the planning pursued by the P&DD, the more important becomes 
timely and flawless implementation by line departments. The capacities of the various 
departments involved would be difficult to establish in an absolute sense, and even more 
difficult to compare. Nevertheless, a number of general observations can be made that put 
these capacities into perspective. If we limit ourselves to capacities in terms of project 
management, then these can be subdivided into two main areas viz. (1) the preparation of 
project documents and workplans, and (2) the implementation of projects in the field. 
Project preparation by line departments 
On the basis of a review of some 105 project documents in the project in which the author 
participated (Henderson & Kolkma 1992), the quality of project preparation was judged to 
be very uneven. Whilst project documents that were adequate in terms of technical description 
were in evidence in some departments (notably, Agriculture and Forestry), some other 
departments such as Education, Health and Public Works Department were observed to 
submit highly unspecific documents in which for instance the locations of buildings to be 
constructed were not mentioned. These were then left to be decided by political 
representatives. In the sector of road construction, such heavy lobbying would go on from 
the side of these representatives that a far too large project portfolio was the result, as well 
as sometimes questionable locations of these roads21. In such cases, the technical quality of 
the project documents would usually leave to be desired: since project approval would be 
assured anyway, detailed preparation before submission of the document was not deemed 
necessary anymore. The British engineer employed by the project mentioned above 
furthermore made a number of observations regarding the preparation of construction-oriented 
projects, which can be summarised as follows (Henderson 1992). First of all, the cost 
estimating procedures and processes were deemed by him to be inadequate. Many of the costs 
and prices used in estimates were based on a very outdated source, which was nevertheless 
mandatory for the preparation of PC-Is: the Government approved Schedule of Rates 1979. 
To lift the cost to more realistic levels, it was allowed that certain fixed percentages were 
added which, due to the long period passed since 1979, were of very high order (between 50 
and 150 percent). In addition to this, very rough but equally substantial 'remoteness factors' 
(to the order of over 100 percent of the items' scheduled cost) were added on, to inflate the 
price further. The remoteness factor would compensate for costs incurred in bringing goods 
to far places, but was yet a blunt instrument, since it did not take care of aspects, of 
accessibility other than distance, such as the quality of the road, and the altitude of the site 
and distance from the road. In all, the cost estimating processes were regarded as unrealistic 
and leading to waste of time and arithmetical error. A change to a system of cost estimating 
directly relying on current market prices was recommended, however difficult these were to 
2 1 Through a SAPP Field Review (MSU 1996) it was found that in Pakistan more than 80 percent of the district 
officers in education, health and water supply is bothered by political interference by public representatives. 
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establish in the absence of commercial but reliable price directories of construction items in 
Pakistan22. 
Other technical deficiencies noted were the lack of cost-benefit analysis in PC-Is or cost 
efficiency analysis (what the Department of the Auditor General in Pakistan calls output 
budgeting (1984)). Cost-benefit analysis cannot always be easily applied to social sector 
projects, but comparisons of the (unit) costs of projects with those in other places in Pakistan, 
or outside Pakistan, was not often attempted either. Technical deficiencies were furthermore 
the lack of submission of detailed drawings (often only floor plans of buildings) and proper 
locational maps, and the variable amounts reserved for contingencies and departmental work 
charges. 
For many of the more blueprint projects, technical and administrative rigidities seemed to 
prevent detailed cost estimating, whereas in the case of more complex projects (hydro-
electricity, irrigation schemes), the line departments were hampered by lack of expertise. The 
pooling of knowledge and the creation of specialised departments for quantity surveying and 
sections for land acquisition was recommended. 
A general deficiency, not confined to construction projects, was the lack of detailed 
statements on the annual phasing of physical work and the crudeness of annual financial 
requirement statements. Bar charts or Critical Path Analysis were conspicuous by their 
absence. This, together with the lack of properly specified project objectives and targets, was 
of considerable impact on monitoring and evaluation practices. 
Lastly, detailed statements as to the probable operation and maintenance costs of projects 
were seldom prepared, and pro forma percentages without justification were often substituted 
for this. 
Implementation of projects 
In a general sense, project implementation capacities in the public sector in Pakistan are 
notoriously weak, as in many developing countries with swollen and rigid bureaucracies. The 
required flexibility can often not be mustered. Of course there are exceptions. The Social 
Policy and Development Centre's (1997, p.59 ff) evaluation of project management in the 
Social Action Programme can serve as an example of the deficiencies noted (see Box 3.3 on 
the next page). 
In addition it should be mentioned that financial management is weak - the release of funds 
procedures involving the P&DD, Finance Department and the Accountant General's Office 
is invariably experienced to be very cumbersome. Similarly the procedures for payments are 
cumbersome, with multiple checks causing unpredictable delays. 
It is often claimed that the following implementation problems are particular to AJK: (1) 
AJK's particular geology as offshoot of the Himalayas, with steep areas covered by glacial 
moraine with boulders in an unstructured mix, which makes road (and building) construction 
difficult; (2) the short construction season in perhaps 25 percent of the territory, due to its 
altitude above 1800 metres and concomitant freezing/snowbound conditions in the winter 
time; (3) the occasionally extreme weather, notably cloudbursts leading to flash floods of the 
rivers and mudslides down the mountains; (4) the lack of qualified local contractors; and (5) 
the high price of land and difficulty in acquiring it. Whereas the first three problems 
mentioned are undoubtedly true, the last two problems are partly systemic and have to be 
seen in their proper context. They are exacerbated by certain practices and by an unclear legal 
environment. 
2 2 Such commercial price listings are common tools for engineers in Western countries. 
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Box 3.3 Project management deficiencies noted by SPDC in the context of SAP 
"selection [of the contractor for a project] is based on a Public Works Manual (unchanged since the mid 19th 
century) and the sole criterion is that the contract must be the lowest bidder, not the most responsive. The 
Manual requires that invitations must be advertised. Bids are normally submitted as a percentage mark-up 
on the official Schedule of Rates which bear little relevance to prevailing market rates, and are based on a 
Bill of Quantities which are incomplete with respect to both items of work and specifications of materials 
and standards to be achieved during construction. This ensures that modifications to contracts are inevitable. 
These variations and additional items are then negotiated at rates substantially higher than the mark-up bid 
originally. [...] 
Projects are normally managed by the line departments at their lowest administrative levels i.e. through 
district and subdivisional levels. These offices are headed by administrators lacking project management 
skills. Most of their time is spent on petty administrative chores and public relations whereas the bulk of 
their managerial tasks are performed by their lower staff e.g. sub-engineers, draftsmen, accountants, etc. 
The general attitude is that of a program administrator rather man manager. [...] 
The government services and administration rules are also outdated with the consequence that procedures 
for disciplinary action invariably do not punish the miscreant as the charge sheets are technically deficient 
and the courts rule in favour of the delinquent staff. Termination of services is unheard of in the government 
and the best than can happen to the "guilty of charge' is transfer to the head office to an administrative 
position." [...] 
Contracts and contractors 
Whilst AJK is a predominantly rural and poor area, and local contractors often run only small 
businesses, their development as an entrepreneurial and professional class is hampered by a 
Government which is not supportive and does not always employ professional standards. As 
was noted by the engineer referred to earlier, established tendering procedures were often not 
followed. Invitations to bid were insufficiently advertised, while occasionally, insufficient 
time was given for interested parties to react. Contractors were furthermore often not 
shortlisted before invitations to tender were issued, so that large numbers of unqualified, 
untrained and inexperienced contractors would come forward and a gradual weeding out 
process did not occur. This would then also lead to excessive amounts of time taken for the 
contract award. Sometimes, negotiations were conducted even after the contract award. 
Whereas in the West it is unlikely that bids for the construction of small buildings vary more 
than 10 percent, in AJK (and Pakistan) much larger difference between contractors' bids were 
frequemly observed, pointing to very uneven professional standards and qualities of 
contractors. This would not be a problem in itself, were it not for the already noted practice 
that the lowest bidder was awarded the contract irrespective of the quality of his proposal. 
The contracts themselves were regarded as excessively biased towards the employing 
department rather than to the contractors. The original standard contracts which were more 
balanced had mostly been amended by the addition of various clauses in favour of the 
employers (for instance exempting them from the payment of compensation "for the 
suspension of work due to any cause whatsoever" (clause 11 in the contract form used by the 
PWD). Typing errors were frequently encountered in the contracts, to an extent as to raise 
doubts as to their validity in court. Other practices were observed that seemed unfair, such 
as the barring of those contractors from tendering that were in the course of litigation with 
a department. Last but not least, rent-seeking behaviour by officials before and during the 
works, was reported by many contractors with whom the author of this study spoke, as was 
mentioned before. 
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On the other hand, the contractors were reported by many officials to rely on contacts and 
alliances with politicians, sometimes to influence the contract award, but more often to settle 
disputes with the departments in their favour. With poor quality of works having so many 
precedents, redress through the court system was becoming more and more difficult. 
It is then not surprising that the quality of contractors coming forward to implement the 
many government works has not improved with time and that bad performance by contractors 
is still regarded as a main bottleneck to the implementation of the development programme. 
Land acquisition 
Many line departments and their staff also regarded the delays in the acquisition of land for 
purposes of construction and the related cost escalation, main bottlenecks in the 
implementation of their departmental programmes and projects. Over 60 percent of all 
projects involved land acquisitions, while such projects were also more prone to cost revisions 
during their implementation23. Whether land constituted a more serious problem in AJK than 
in areas of Pakistan cannot be assessed, but a few factors make this likely for at least the 
rural areas: (1) AJK's high population density with very fragmented land holdings and 
generations-long encroachment of communal lands (Cernea 1992); (2) the unavailability of 
historical data due to the burning of a part of AJK's land record at the time of Partition; and 
(3) the lengthy process of land settlement in AJK by the Settlement Commissioner, which had 
not yet been concluded at the time of the study. 
Whilst the problems with land acquisition are evident and cannot always be correctly 
anticipated during project preparation, systemic factors also come into play. Although there 
is ample experience with land problems, these are still systematically underestimated and 
understated in project documents. The departments seem to prefer a project to be approved 
and then start working on land acquisition, to doing research into land issues before the 
submission of a project proposal. Much reference is made by departments to the compulsory 
purchase powers of the Government which are so wide-ranging that they would be able to 
overcome any problem. But in fact, every department should have the experience that their 
effectiveness is severely hampered by the jurisprudence created by lower courts and 
magistrates applying stay orders against the purchase or vacation of land. 
A fuzzy legal environment affecting implementation 
Having said this, the fuzzy legal environment does create some unexpected difficulties. Many 
land acquisitions undertaken in the context of projects end up in court, where they take years 
to settle. With contradictory formal laws and customary practices and a rich history of legal 
precedent based on discretion exerted by one party or another, stalemates easily ensue. That 
these exist also in other areas than land acquisition, is evident from an analysis conducted by 
AERC (1991) in the context of advice on support to housing schemes. It came to the 
conclusion that local government legislation generally conflicted with the wide discretionary 
powers given to development authorities. Another problem noted was that federal legislation 
was often not in consonance with state/provincial legislation. 
The propensity for litigation by the population in AJK (as in Pakistan, see the previous 
chapter) is meanwhile of such a nature that it works as an almost independent complicating 
factor. Many government employees use the court system to litigate against decisions taken 
by their departments. Cernea (op.cit., p. 192) reported the existence of some 50,000 cases in 
On the basis of a file study mentioned, it was calculated that 62.5 percent of all projects had land as a budget 
item; of all projects for which a cost revision was submitted, 73.6 percent had land as an item. 
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AJK pending in courts due to forest offenses committed and contested by farmer families. 
Given that there are perhaps 300,000 families this amounts to a proportion of one in every 
six. 
Thus, the existence of some specific problems in the realm of implementation is 
corroborated from this short review of circumstances in AJK. Other areas in Pakistan surely 
have their own implementation problems, and it is not seriously claimed here that AJK 
presents a worse situation. The intention was merely to show that some problems were also 
systemic and affect the ease with which comprehensive planning can be conducted in AJK (as 
in many other areas). 
3.8 Data for planning in AJK 
A last aspect that makes rational comprehensive planning a difficult exercise in AJK, is the 
lack of planning data, which is even greater than in Pakistan. Due to AJK's particular status, 
it was so far not included in a number of regular censuses and surveys in Pakistan, whereas 
its small size seems to have led to less attention from the side of social scientists as well: 
almost no political or socio-cultural study is available on AJK. The last All Pakistan 
Population Census was last held in 1981. The census that was due in 1991 was held only in 
March 1998 due to political controversy in Pakistan. In the population censuses held so far, 
AJK has not had the benefit of the long questionnaire sample survey which is included 
elsewhere. This survey determines many benchmark data on employment, economic activity, 
education, and migration. Some other regular surveys held in Pakistan have also not been 
extended to AJK (as they haven't been to all special areas). For instance, in the annual 
Household Income and Expenditure Surveys, AJK is not separately shown so there is no 
official source which can compare AJK's household wealth relative to that of the provinces. 
AJK derives most of its statistical data from the decennial Population Census and Housing 
Census, and the five yearly Agriculture Census and Animal Husbandry Census. These are 
major federal government initiatives; smaller ones are those related to price statistics and 
agricultural labour surveys. Important other censuses such as that of the Establishments, have 
been performed relatively recently (1988), but due to inefficiency of the Federal Bureau of 
Statistics and lack of pressure from the AJK Government, it has not been published for AJK 
separately. If it was it would have provided the first economic and locational data on shops, 
businesses, factories and all government establishments on complete count basis. Similarly 
other useful planning information would have become available to AJK, for instance, 
availability of roads in villages, private doctors and clinics, bank branches, sources of water, 
garbage removal arrangements, and cooperative societies. Other important federal government 
surveys from which AJK has been excluded are for example the Pakistan Demographic 
Survey, the Labour Force Survey, the Census on Manufacturing Industries, the Private 
Building Construction Survey, the Census of Electricity Undertakings, and the Annual 
Establishment Enquiry. 
Apart from this lack of government surveys, there are also only a handful of other survey 
results available: two studies (1982, 1993) by the Punjab Economic Research Institute on 
farming and socio-economic aspects respectively, a baseline rural survey by AERC (1990) 
and a study on housing for low income groups performed under a World Bank financed 
project (Shelter, 1992). AJK, contrary to the provinces, has no Bureau of Statistics. A small 
section in the P&D Department is collating basic statistics obtained from federal agencies and 
AJK departments. Once in every two three years an AJK Statistical Yearbook is published. 
Extrapolations from sometimes very old statistics are an important method for updating the 
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tables. A few departments publish also some statistics on their own sectors, albeit irregularly. 
Commonalities with Pakistan 
Although even in a worse position, AJK has in common with Pakistan as a whole that there 
is an absolute dearth of data, due to a lack of civil registration and documentation of the 
economy. Local authorities generally do not hold a proper record of births, deaths and 
marriages. In spite of a jungle of registration and license requirements for employment, 
business and property, much (the informal economy) still escapes the attention of the 
authorities, whereas what is registered, is often not properly aggregated for purposes of 
statistics and planning. This even applies to public finance statistics, as was for instance 
observed by a UNDP study (1991, p.253): there are differences in presentation between 
provinces and the federation, a lack of published information according to functional 
classifications, a general lack of transparency, and an accounting system that makes it difficult 
to analyse the economic impact of fiscal policy. 
Maintenance of record on the ownership, sale, tax and utilisation of land is also a major 
area of deficiency. This is in principle the responsibility of the Revenue Department, but it 
uses antiquated methods of measurement and record keeping. The Revenue Department, 
forever concerned with the 'settlement' of land, does not as yet work with a complete set of 
cadastral and topographical maps. Neither do most other departments work much with proper 
maps and plans; the local government bodies are too small and weak to be able to perform 
proper land use planning based on maps. 
Most importantly perhaps, like in Pakistan, there is ubiquitous cynicism from the side of 
both population and bureaucracy regarding the validity of the statistics produced. This leads 
to a situation that even what little statistics is available, is often not being utilised properly. 
3.9 Conclusions 
The context in which planning takes place in AJK is perhaps somewhat more homogeneous 
than in Pakistan, but nevertheless a large number of factors make comprehensive planning 
and perhaps also disjointed incrementalist planning difficult. These factors can be summarised 
as an unstable political history and environment, constitutional uncertainties particularly in 
the relation with Pakistan, overstaffing in the lower grades and understaffing at the higher 
grades, low and decreasing competence of most staff, uncertain dependence on the Federation 
in terms of financial resources, lack of effective district and local government, no NGO 
'centre-field', departmental strategies leading to a scramble for access to government 
resources in the context of insufficient political supervision, certain specific implementation 
problems, a lack of planning data, and a Planning and Development Department not in 
position and not disposed to follow through rational comprehensive planning. 
Because of the mistrust of politics and other stakeholders in planning, the bureaucracy as 
one of society's most powerful interest groups tries to keep up the pretence of technocratic, 
rule bound and objective planning. This would obviate the need for participation of elected 
representatives and third parties in setting out the government objectives, policies and plans. 
Comprehensive or at least technocratic planning is the rationale for the existence of the P&D 
Department in particular, and therefore it holds up the pretence of it in spite of compromises 
already made with other departments and also political circles. As will also be seen later, it 
has adapted to haphazard realities, and is trying to play the game for as much control of the 
resources as is possible. This means giving up some of its role as dispassionate advisor to the 
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Government on comprehensive planning and concentrating on short term planning focusing 
on projects. 
In the next chapter the amount of actual control that the P&DD exercises on the planning 
process is looked at in greater detail. The consequences of the planning process in terms of 
implementation of the development programme shall be evaluated. 
I l l 
CHAPTER 4. THE P&D DEPARTMENT'S CONTROL INSTRUMENTS 
The previous chapter argued that AJK's context is not conducive to RCP, while some 
limitations were also identified that would constrain the application of disjointed incremental 
planning. This chapter assesses to what extent, given this context, the planning instruments 
available are made use of by the P&D Department in AJK. The main instruments at the 
P&DD's disposal are the Five Year Plan, the project approval process, the Annual 
Development Programme, authorisations for budgetary releases to projects, and the 
monitoring and evaluation system. The focus is the measure of control and slippage in control 
over each of these instruments; subsequently the consequences for implementation of the 
programme in the field are addressed. This will set the stage for a detailed review in further 
chapters as to the quality and relevance of the information yielded by progress reporting 
systems to the P&DD, and the extent to which these can be improved. 
As discussed in chapter 1, current organisational theory often views departments as 
organisms with a logic of their own, as plagued by multiple and often conflicting goals, and 
as operating within an environment constraining their behaviour in unpredictable ways. Thus, 
this chapter will analyse the P&DD's control instruments with specific attention for such 
factors. It will be shown that for each of the control instruments identified, organisational 
(strategic) factors compromise their full force as well as instrumental rationality. 
The chapter is based on a number of reports produced in the context of the project in 
which the author participated. Extensive use will be made in particular of findings of a study 
of the files available with the P&DD of some 105 projects included in the ADP of 1990-91 
(Henderson & Kolkma, 1992). The latest information available for these projects, as per the 
ADP 1997-98 has been incorporated. Details on this study, its sample and representativity 
are included in Annex 1. 
4.1 Macro-planning and the Five Year Plan 
In theory, the Five Year Plan (FYP) is the main instrument for macro-planning for the 
country. It is positioned in Pakistan in the middle between the long term (20 year duration) 
Perspective Plan and the Annual Development Plan (ADP), but is considered the most 
elaborate statement on the course that the country's development has to take in the view of 
the Government. The Five Year Plan also assumes importance, given that other types of 
sectoral or regional policy formulation are not undertaken frequently. An often heard criticism 
in Pakistan and AJK is that the Assemblies are not properly assuming their responsibilities 
in policy legislation. Much of the legislation is in fact left to presidential (i.e. bureaucratic) 
ordinances rather than properly voted Assembly bills. The Five Year Plan is also supposed 
to guide the project selection process1. It is usually prepared both at the federal and at sub-
national levels. At the time of writing this study, the Ninth Five Year Plan was being 
prepared simultaneously at the federal level and in Azad Kashmir. In this study, the Seventh 
Five Year Plan (1988-1993) is focused upon. It is described in some detail in order to convey 
its flavour and evaluate what is the role of the P&DD in its preparation. 
1 This is also apparent from the format of the Annual Development Programme, which includes a column in 
which for each project, the plan provision is to be included (Planning and Development Division, 1991, p. 
128). 
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AJK's Seventh Five Year Plan (1988-93) 
The AJK Seventh Five Year Plan is a 113 page document with three parts: an introduction 
and overview, sectoral chapters, and a list of proposed projects. The introduction emphasises 
that AJK is "one of the most underdeveloped regions of the country", which needs "massive 
investment on the basis of national imperative beyond economic credentials" (GOAJK 1989, 
p.l). 
The Plan presents a one page review of the size and performance of the Sixth Five Year 
Plan. It is stated that only three quarters of the approved Rs 4.1 billion had been released by 
the Federal Government. To indicate the favourable absorption capacity for investments in 
AJK, it is reported that 101.7 percent of the releases were utilised, and that the major 
beneficiaries had been the sectors of Transport and Communication, Power, and Rural 
Development. 
A following section lays down the strategy and objectives of the Seventh Five Year Plan. 
The paramount objectives are mentioned as "efficient growth of output and improvement in 
quality of life". As further guidance it is stated that: "These objectives could be realized 
through improvement of infrastructure for growth in the rural areas, public services like 
health and education for all sections of society and generation of employment opportunities" 
(ibid., p.4). 
A subsequent discussion of the plan size and investment priorities states that the Working 
Group on Regional Development had regarded a Rs 12 Billion programme as the minimum 
requirement, but that "in the context of the national plan", the AJK Public Sector 
Development Programme was fixed at only Rs 5.22 Billion. Since projects unfinished during 
the previous plan would need further funding, Rs 1479 M would be preempted, "leaving only 
Rs 3470 M for new schemes and initiatives". The document then presents a table displaying 
the sectoral allocations which is reproduced below. 
Table 4.1 Sectoral allocations proposed in the AJK Seventh Five Year Plan. 
Rs in Million 
S.No. Sector Proposed Allocation Perc. 7th Plan 
1. Agriculture 574.200 11.0% 
2. Industries & Minerals 156.600 3.0% 
3. Education 783.000 15.0% 
4. Health 522.000 10.0% 
5. Water & Power 1513.700 29.0% 
6. Transport & Communication 1200.500 23.0% 
7. Physical Planning & Housing 469.800 9.0% 
Total 5219.800 100.0% 
Source: Seventh Five Year Plan, GOAJK, p. 4 
Some separate attention is given to the issues of rural development and plan 
implementation. Rural development is said to be receiving special attention through the 
involvement of local bodies institutions and to this end, some ten percent of the budget would 
be set aside for distribution amongst these bodies. These "have been fairly successful in 
invoking self-help in construction of rural roads, primary school buildings, rural water supply 
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and irrigation channels etc." The remainder of the funds would be spent at the State 
Government level through its line departments. 
In the one page section on plan implementation it is stated that there are "many problems 
associated with the project cycle". By and large, line departments are held responsible for this 
lack of planning capacity. An "upgradation of the ability of the sponsoring agency to 
formulate schemes" is proposed (ibid., p.6). A proposal is also added for political 
consumption: 
"The problem of in-ability to synchronize estimates with resources could be resolved through the 
introduction of commitment budgeting concept which means funding according to financial plan of the 
project. This could best be done by undertaking the exercise of priority ranking, and identification of 
core projects in each sector. Along-side these projects planning, monitoring and evaluation cells in the 
departments should be created/strengthened to discharge their assigned duties with full vigour and 
competence." 
After these general sections which, in all, comprise seven pages, each of the sectors is 
discussed separately in a chapter. Usually but not always this starts with a discussion of the 
sixth plan results, to then go on to some features of the seventh plan. 
The Five Year Plan concludes with a 42 page annex listing the 176 ongoing and 215 new 
projects proposed to be funded. From this listing it is clear that almost the entire five year 
budget has been allocated to projects, and that there are, apart from the Transport and 
Communication sector, very few block allocations for as yet unidentified projects. 
Problems with the Seventh Five Year Plan 
In the above, the organisation and contents of the AJK Seventh Five Year Plan have been 
sketched in broad lines. Many officers, both inside and outside P&D Department have 
confided to the author not to be very impressed with the document. It is not hard to see the 
reasons why. To mention just a few shortcomings: the rationale for the chosen sectoral 
distribution of the funds available (see Table 4.1 above) is stated nowhere; neither are overall 
or sectoral growth targets presented - this in contrast to the national Five Year Plans. For 
example, it is said that the share of the education sector has increased most of all, some 44 
percent increase compared to the Sixth Five Year Plan allocations. But why this is so is not 
explained. The length and organisation of the sectoral chapters is haphazard, indicative of the 
fact that their drafts have been written by the line departments without much guidance as to 
the contents from P&DD. There is no systematic discussion in most of the chapters of the 
problems encountered, the objectives set out, the policies already adopted or required, and 
the targets to be met. 
The P&DD officers usually give the following excuses for the low quality of the document. 
The first is that the line departments do not have planning capacity and therefore come up 
with weak drafts of the sectoral chapters. Since, in the delicate balance of powers between 
P&DD and the line departments, heavy emphasis is placed upon the ownership of the targets, 
the P&DD does not easily re-write information that has come in from more authoritative 
sources. If there is a problem with the information, then P&DD usually prefers to ask for re-
drafting of the chapter by the line department, but for this there is not always enough time. 
(To avoid re-writing, the departments come late with their first drafts.) As far as the 
introductory chapter is concerned, which is to be written by P&DD itself, officers point to 
the lack of economic data. Whereas the Five Year Plan of the Government of Pakistan can 
rely upon national accounts (however questionable they may be) to determine the rate at 
which the various sectors can be pushed forward, in AJK the situation is very different. 
Regional accounts are not prepared since AJK is not fully covered by the Federal Bureau of 
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Statistics and has not created its own facilities. It is very difficult to estimate the relative 
importance of the sectors within AJK and the investments needed to boost them. As a 
consequence, the sectoral allocations made in the Five Year Plans cannot be justified in 
economic terms. Because the economic investment required is not known, the size of the 
complementary social and infrastructure investments can also not be determined properly. In 
the absence of a 'rational' or 'scientific' logic for determining the size of the sectoral (and 
regional) allocations, the whole exercise of drawing up a FYP is seen as a slog. Past patterns 
of expenditure in various sectors, including commitments already made and projects that are 
carried over from the previous plan are presented as the main justification of the plan's foci. 
Mistakes and misrepresentations in the Plan 
But in addition to gaps and biases, there are also mistakes and misrepresentations in the 
Seventh Five Year Plan. For instance, on page 5 it is announced that the Local Government 
Department gets ten percent of the total plan outlays: Rs 522 M would be channeled to it. 
However, Local Government is not mentioned as a separate sector in the table, and only in 
the project list of the T&C sector is some provision made for funds to be channeled to Local 
Government Department (Rs 94 M). In the other sectors, all available funds have been 
divided amongst projects managed by departments other than Local Government department. 
A gap of Rs 428 M or eight percent of the total Plan is thus unaccounted for. 
Another mistake is that the FYP assumes that the Special Development Programme, which 
is an earmarked grant from the Federal Government, is not part of the FYP allocation of Rs 
5220 M. This grant is mentioned to be Rs 512 M on page 7, so that the overall FYP would 
be in fact Rs 5712 M, which it is obviously not. It should have been obvious to the P&DD 
that this grant was to be spent in the mainstream sectors. In this way, the FYP conveys the 
impression that the total funds available would be Rs 5220 M plus Rs 428 M plus Rs 512 M 
= Rs 6160 M or 18 percent larger than the commitment made by the Federal Government. 
Whether these 'mistakes' were made deliberately, as a padding strategy - to show that the 
Government has a larger investment plan than in actual fact is the case - remains a matter of 
speculation. No matter what the reasons are for the misrepresentations, in this way it becomes 
very difficult to monitor whether the sectoral allocations made in the FYP are actually 
adhered to in the preparation of the ADPs 2. 
General causes for the weakness of the Plan 
The following additional causes can be identified for the weakness of the Plan. Firstly, public 
representatives, private sector organisations, NGOs and local governments have not been 
invited to participate in the preparation of the Plan and there is therefore also no input from 
those sides and no ownership. Of course the Plan is ultimately approved by the Cabinet, but 
such an approval goes by almost unnoticed, since the Plan is usually in too advanced form 
and at a too late stage to allow serious modification. For instance, the AJK Seventh Five 
Year Plan was published only in November 1989, almost one and a half year into the Plan 
period. The lack of involvement of politicians and other major stakeholders in the preparation 
of policies and plans seems to be deliberate, as was witnessed by the project in which the 
present writer was working. 
A consultant was brought in especially to assist in the preparation of the Eighth Five Year 
Plan. The consultant was asked by the project to lay down a procedure for producing a better 
2 This is borne out by the fact that the GOP Evaluation of the Seventh Five Year Plan has a table with sectoral 
expenditures which is not comparable with that in the AJK FYP (cf 1995, pp.62-63). 
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and consensus based plan. She laid down the ground rules for involvement of district and 
local governments in the preparation of the Five Year Plan, through consultative meetings, 
and involvement of the private sector through the establishment of a private/public- sector 
consultative mechanism (Newels, 1991). The consultant emphasised the need for the 
establishment of Cabinet Development Committee working groups (i.e. politicians) in crucial 
policy formulation areas. Sectoral workshops were to be held based on a clear strategy 
formulation methodology. An interim policy paper was proposed to be approved by the 
Cabinet before the actual plan was supposed to be written. Political ownership was further 
to be guaranteed by establishing a sub-committee to the Cabinet Development Committee in 
charge of plan preparation, to which the P&DD would act as a Secretariat. The involvement 
of politicians was deemed essential especially in the absence of a proper regional database on 
which to base decisions. The consultant even came up with a detailed structure outline for the 
Eighth Plan and a plan preparation schedule. 
All this was in vain. In spite of having a blueprint readily available, the approach was not 
adopted by the P&D Department. Instead, a year later the Government requested the project 
to fund another mission by the consultant, this time to write the Eighth Plan for it. The 
planners who had written the Seventh Five Year Plan did not wish to go through the motions 
again for a Plan which apparently had relevance only as a symbol of planning. Since they 
were impressed with the quality and scientific language of the consultant's reports, they 
presumed that a more 'scientific' Plan would give the P&D Department more prestige and 
power. The request was turned down by the project. 
It is interesting to review the reasons why the strategy laid down by the consultant was not 
followed. Although the observations presented here are supported by interviewing of key staff 
in P&DD, they remain essentially conjectures. The main reason brought forward was that 
P&DD neither wished to make itself depend on a Cabinet Committee and nor did it wish to 
go through the consultative process with the district/local government tiers and with the 
private sector organisations. P&DD feared that forces would thus be unleashed that would 
make the Five Year Plan unrealistically big and lacking in internal coherence. It feared the 
Plan would become a political wish list. Clearly, it had no confidence in the political control 
to be exerted by the Cabinet Committee proposed. It wished to keep for itself (and the 
bureaucracy at large) the monopoly on development initiative. The P&DD was afraid it would 
later bear the brunt of it with a politically sanctioned document that was not implementable. 
What it meant was probably that it feared to lose what little control it presently had over the 
planning process by shielding the FYP from disruptive forces outside the bureaucracy. 
A second cause for the weakness of the Five Year Plan is that the bulk of it was. in actual 
fact, prepared by line departments, acting as organisms (or institutions, in Selznick's terms, 
see section 1.7) more than as organisations. Such departments are fundamentally competing 
with each other for the scarce resources that the Government and the P&D Department can 
allocate (cf. Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). Since P&DD already tries to keep politicians, the 
public in general and the private sector out of the Plan preparation process, it tries to woo 
the bureaucracy by not interfering too much in the departmental plans. The result is a collated 
plan in which each sectoral chapter is an advertisement for a programme. Every sector has 
priority. This is also borne out by the finding that the smaller the funds for a certain 
department, the bigger its chapter on intentions and policies. The most strongly entrenched 
departments, i.e. those with the largest lists of projects and greatest sectoral allocations, pay 
least attention to drafting a FYP policy chapter. The sectors of Water, Power, Transport & 
Communication, and Physical Planning and Housing may serve as examples. Conversely, the 
most endangered departments (as will be seen later) make the most elaborate presentations 
in the plan: Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Minerals and Health. There is an inverse 
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relationship with the budget. Thus, if one did not look at the budget but only at Plan policy 
content, the plan's focus would seem to be exactiy on those sectors which in actual fact are 
least supported by funds3. The ostensible orientation of the plan is therefore completely 
opposed to implementation realities. The Plan thus lacks in internal coherence and gives no 
development direction. 
A third cause for the weakness of the AJK Five Year Plan, even more so than with that 
of the Government of Pakistan, is that it focuses on the development budget, this being in the 
direct purview of the planning department, to the complete neglect of the recurrent budget, 
which is at least double its size, but managed by the Finance Department. 'Development' in 
a wider definition than capital investment may, however, have as much to do with the 
recurrent budget as with the development budget. For instance, improving the working 
conditions of teachers through salaries and emoluments may have a significant bearing on 
developing human resources. But this option is not given full attention in the FYP since the 
budgetary consequences are beyond its purview. Government farm subsidies are usually given 
through the recurrent budget, similarly the import and distribution of essential foodstuffs is 
handled through that budget. Such policies have a direct effect on developing or discouraging 
agricultural production and may even go against the project approach adopted through the 
development programme. Likewise, the operation and maintenance budgets of the Public 
Works Department are of crucial importance to the quality of the roads and buildings in AJK 
but they are not covered by the Plan. Conversely, many roads projects in the development 
budget are actually restoring and maintaining already existing roads and are not contributing 
to a growing stock of roads. Thus, the distinction between activities funded by development 
and recurrent budgets is blurred, thereby contributing to arbitrariness in the coverage of the 
FYP (section 7.3 deals with this matter more comprehensively). 
To give another example, the local government tier and its locally generated revenue 
budget is mostly outside the purview of the Plan. A role for District Development 
Committees, which are usually moribund but sometimes, for political reasons, revived, is not 
laid down. District development plans are thus not generated and cannot be used in the frame 
of an overall plan". 
As a last point, it has to be mentioned that the Plan does not take into account the various 
fiscal, economic, social and spatial policies - some of which are federal - that may reinforce 
or weaken the chances of development. Thus the Plan cannot, at present, guide the overall 
policies in the various sectors of Government intervention. Whilst this weakness is not 
explicitly acknowledged by the P&DD, the limited coverage of the FYP budget must have 
a discouraging effect on taking a comprehensive approach to the formulation of the plan. 
The strategic context of the Plan 
The sum total of it all is a plan document written by the bureaucracy in which an explicit 
account of choices made is avoided. The implicit choice made is that past patterns of 
expenditure are the guide to the future investments. These patterns must in fact be seen as the 
negotiated end result of myriad micro-decisions taken at many levels in an internally divided 
bureaucracy (with politicians trying to butt in through all sorts of official and unofficial 
3 The Industries and Minerals sector with three percent of the budget take up 17 percent of the text; the Water 
and Power sectors with 29 percent of the budget occupy only three percent of the text. The two biggest sectors 
with almost 52 percent of the budget are discussed on six pages, whereas the other five sectors with 48 percent 
get 54 pages. 
4 The main role of DDCs is confined to making requests for projects funded out of the Local Government 
Department's block allocations. 
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routes). As soon as any department threatens to seriously expand, other departments turn on 
it for fear of bearing the brunt of this expansion; the continuous struggle tends to a balance 
of forces (with occasional disturbances). This is what one would expect to happen with 
departmental recurrent budgets; it is all the more significant that the same applies to their 
investment budgets. The Plan does not seem to be a serious attempt at a comprehensive policy 
guideline, but a document pretending, through its sheer existence, that the bureaucracy is 
controlling the planning process rationally. Within the bureaucracy itself, the Plan has little 
value; departments continue to fight for bigger shares of the turf, with as a result a wandering 
pattern of sectoral public investment over the years. 
The internal weakness of the Plan as a compromise within the bureaucracy has 
repercussions for its usefulness as an instrument of control/monitoring by P&DD. P&DD has 
little moral authority to enforce what has no internal logic and is written by other departments 
anyway. What has been prepared by line departments in the first place is easily overruled by 
the same line departments. Outside the bureaucracy, the respect for the plan is absent, while 
politicians strike back by not owning it. They were not seriously involved in the preparation 
stage. To give just one telling example of this: the then Minister for Planning and 
Development professed to the author neither having read the Plan nor having any desire to 
do so. Contrary to the ADPs, the Five Year Plans are not enacted by the Legislative 
Assembly. 
As an instrument giving policy guidance or enabling control by the P&DD the plan 
therefore largely fails. The main purpose of the Five Year Plan in AJK is to show the federal 
government, donor community and perhaps the general public and politicians that the 
bureaucracy is still 'planning' (after all these years). This is not to say that the plan does not 
contain some handles for control by P&DD. Two can be mentioned: it sets guidelines for the 
size of the sectoral allocations over a five year period (although the federal government does 
not guarantee that the budget will indeed be forthcoming), and (in AJK) it lists all the projects 
to be approved and implemented. We shall see in the next two sections whether these control 
instruments are being utilised to guide the approval of projects and the annual sectoral 
allocations. 
4.2 Micro-planning and the approval of projects 
The approach towards planning in practice taken by P&DD and the bureaucracy at large can 
be typified as a planning-by-project approach (Newels 1991, p. 13). "The day-to-day practice 
of planning [...] appears to evolve around the processing, approving and monitoring of 
individual sector projects subsequently listed in the Annual Development Programme (ADP)". 
In this section, it is analysed whether the project approval process follows the FYP 
guidelines, and if not, what is the specific control exerted by the P&DD. 
Project approval 
Projects in AJK are approved in three forums: the Development Working Party (DWP), the 
Cabinet Development Committee (CDC), and the Executive Committee of the National 
Economic Council (ECNEC) at the federal level for the projects of a size above Rs 60 
Million (in 1991; later it became Rs 100 M). The large projects will have to pass all three 
levels before their implementation can commence. The Development Working Party is 
chaired by the ACS (Dev.) and can approve projects up to a size of Rs 20 Million. It further 
clears (or rejects) projects of a larger size that are to be approved by the higher forums of 
CDC and ECNEC. The Cabinet Development Committee approves projects above Rs 20 
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Million upto Rs 60 Million and is chaired by the Prime Minister of AJK; the ECNEC 
approves projects of a cost higher than Rs 60 Million and is chaired by the Prime Minister 
of Pakistan. 
Projects of a size upto Rs 20 Million are then approved at the bureaucratic level. The 
larger projects are politically approved. The P&D Department serves as a technical advice 
body for the CDC, and the P&D Division in Islamabad for the ECNEC. To give an idea 
about the quantum of commitments made at each level, the following results of the file study 
can be presented. Of all 424 ongoing projects in the ADP of 1990-91, 57 percent were 
decided by the bureaucratic DWP, 39 percent by the political CDC and 4 percent by the 
Federal Government through ECNEC. In terms of finance the situation was reversed, when 
19 percent of the overall project portfolio's budget was decided by DWP, 37 percent by CDC 
and 44 percent by ECNEC (Henderson & Kolkma 1992, p.38). 
Whereas this corroborates that the role of 'Government' in the decision-making process is 
important in AJK (and perhaps more so than in Pakistan), it has to be understood that the 
P&DD (the ACS) still exerts considerable leverage, because of its role of clearing house. All 
projects to be approved by the CDC or Federation first have to pass the bureaucratic P&DD 
level. In the absence of a Planning and Development Minister actively involved in his 
department, the PM has to take all decisions. This he no doubt gladly does, but nevertheless, 
he has limited time to study all the proposals before him. His own secretariat does not guide 
him technically; he is dependent on the P&DD's and other departments' advice. It is rather 
seen that the PM (and other politicians) lobbies behind the screens for including projects in 
the project portfolio, than that they control the project approval process as a whole, and from 
a comprehensive viewpoint. Emphasis is on project identification rather than appraisal. 
We shall turn now to the question whether the Five Year Plan and particularly its list of 
projects was followed with regard to the approval of projects. Some results of the same file 
study are pertinent here (ibid., p. 14-16). 
Relation with the Five Year Plan 
The relation of the project to the Five Year Plan is addressed in two items of the official 
project document format (known as PC-1 and in Pakistan famous as well as notorious: the 
AJK PM once called them "Permanent Curse 1" in a public meeting). Item 4 asks for the plan 
provision of the project: (a) If it is in the Five Year Plan, the actual allocation for the project 
has to be specified, (b) If it is not included, it has to be specified what warrants its inclusion 
in the Plan and how it is proposed to be accommodated financially. Item 5 then asks for the 
relationship of the project with the objectives of the sector. (Annex 4 contains a copy of a 
PC-1 form, with the example of the Education sector.) 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 on the next pages show the extent to which the project proposals in 
AJK are based on the Five Year Plan. 
A first finding is that less than half of all project proposals answer the question whether 
they were included in the FYP positively: in around one third of the cases no answer at all 
is given or 'n.a.' (not applicable / not available) is indicated (see Figure 4.1). This was to 
a large extent related to the fact that these projects were conceived in the period of the Sixth 
Five Year Plan, which was prepared in draft form, but never published. In a further fifth of 
all cases it is stated either that the project is ongoing, that it is a revision of an earlier project, 
or that it has been included in the ADP. Of all PC-Is which stated that the project was not 
included in the Five Year Plan only very few gave special reasons warranting its inclusion 
in the ADP. In most cases where a project was not included in the FYP, the issue in item 4 
(special reasons) was ignored. Thus, when a major divergence from the FYP project list was 
deemed necessary, there was usually insufficient justification in the PC-1 and neither any 
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explanation of the effect that this divergence would have on the other commitments already 
in the plan. 
Of the PC-Is which stated that the project was included in the FYP, nearly three quarters 
did not indicate the budgetary size allocated for the project in the FYP. The accuracy of the 
answer to the question on inclusion in the plan was tested and as figure 4.2 indicates, only 
40 percent rightly indicated the project to have been included in the FYP, whereas 22 percent 
correctly stated that it was not included. The remainder gave confusing statements. 
Financing of projects not in the Five Year Plan 
There are generally two possibilities open to departments proposing to finance projects not 
originally included in the Five Year Plan. They can either remove another financially 
equivalent project from the plan or they can take smaller sums from a number of projects. 
Whichever is adopted the fulfillment of the plan objectives are bound to be jeopardised5. On 
the basis of the sample, it could be estimated that the block provision was indicated as the 
source of funds in more than half of all the projects which were not in the Plan. Their total 
cost amounted to Rs 950 M or more than three times the size of all block provisions in the 
5 Probably for this reason the Federal Government's Manual for Development Projects (1991, p.25) lays down 
that ... "a project in any sector shall be eligible for consideration only if it is identified by its entry in the 
approved plan." .. "Projects aided by foreign sources are an exception and are generally included". 
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Plan6. 
The financing of these unscheduled projects is a major problem for the completion of the 
targets of the FYP, particularly in a climate of financial stringency and because less funds 
are likely to be made available than are required for the approved FYP7. Apart from self-
financing projects, which are very few in number, the solution has to come from either 
intersectoral or intrasectoral reallocation of funds. In the PC-1, solutions were seldom 
indicated, probably because no department wished to curtail its other projects and hoped that 
the Government would get the funds somewhere else (cutting projects in other sectors). As 
can be witnessed by Figure 4.3, in only 12 percent of the sample, intrasectoral reallocation 
was mentioned as the method of financing. In fact, however, intrasectoral reallocation must 
be considered the principal route for the funding of new or larger-than-foreseen projects. 
Simply then the funding of other (ongoing and new) projects in the sector will be decreased 
or re-phased to accommodate the new project. Given the large number of new or higher-cost 
6 As noted earlier, the Seventh FYP excluded large block provisions apart from relatively minor ones in the 
Transport & Communication and Physical Planning & Housing sectors (worth Rs 264 Million and Rs 40 
Million each). Most of the FYP funds were committed to finite projects even though some of the proposed 
projects were so vaguely formulated that they could, in fact, be called a form of block provision. But these 
could never cater to all of the claims made on them over a five year period. 
7 See also the previous section. For the Seventh FYP, of the projected Rs 5220 M, only Rs 4916 M was made 
available. There is also a confusion about the nature of the commitment in the FYP; AJK expects in fact an 
inflation corrected FYP allocation from the Government of Pakistan. In this light, the allocations actually made 
were only Rs 3793 Million in 1988-89 Rupees or 73 percent of the commitment (Government of Pakistan 1995, 
p. 62-63). 
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revised schemes and the likelihood that rescheduling is the main route for new unforeseen 
projects to be accommodated in an ADP then the result of this practice will be the thinning 
of resources for an ever increasing portfolio of increasingly delayed projects, leading to 
inflation and other problems, possibly even the non-completion of some projects. 
One escape from this spiral would be a financial monitoring system dealing specifically 
with those projects which were not in the FYP or which were approved with a different 
budget. This should be basically the business of the sponsoring department, but P&D 
department and the decision forums (DWP, CDC) could be kept updated on a regular basis, 
to see how much of the budget in each sector was exhausted, how much committed through 
the FYP, and how much remains for new unforeseen projects, or project revisions. 
Relationship with Five Year Plan objectives 
With regard to the relation of the project to the sectoral (FYP) objectives as could be worked 
out from the project documents, the following was found by the file study. Most PC-Is 
contained only very brief answers to the question on sector objectives. Generally, no 
department seemed able to do better than give a short description of the project and its intra 
and inter sectoral relationships. In many cases, such objectives were specified as "to provide 
better transport to the public", as with most road projects. If policies, objectives, and targets 
had been worked out and made specific in the Five Year Plan then better quality answers 
would perhaps have been given. In other words, the project documents lacked quality in this 
respect also because they could not be properly related to the Five Year Plan or any other 
policy statement. 
Thus, the conclusion is that P&DD had difficulty to control the approval of projects from 
the point of view of the Five Year Plan guidelines, because these were of insufficient quality 
and detail and were not followed by line departments. Nor could P&DD keep out entirely the 
122 
influence of politics from the decision-making process. This was witnessed by a number of 
projects justified on the basis of 'Government directives'. Since departments were fighting 
for a larger piece of the turf and politics was disowning the FYP, rational comprehensive 
planning could not be pursued. Of course, absolute and rigid adherence to the FYP is not 
required even by technocratic planning but the extent to which the plan was ignored in AJK 
is revealing of the real situation of incremental planning. And especially when the type of 
planning conducted in AJK can be condoned given the overall context then more focus should 
have been put on the monitoring of at least the pattern of sectoral allocations. 
P&DD's scrutiny of project proposals 
If the departments do not care about heeding the Five Year Plan in their PC-Is, then the same 
can be said of the P&DD, witness the working papers it presented on each project for 
discussion by an approval forum. In 69 percent of the cases studied, there was no mention 
at all of the FYP, although this is a standard issue in the working paper format. Looking at 
the contents of these working papers, the following observations can be made based on the 
sample drawn for the file study. The main issues discussed are micro-financial and micro-
technical. 
Financial issues raised in the working paper focused on the cost of works which in the 
view of the P&DD could usually be budgeted cheaper than the line department had 
done (45 percent of all project proposals), or on the departmental charges and 
contingencies that line departments claimed which in the view of P&DD were too 
high or not according to prescribed procedures (22 percent). There was much less 
attention for issues such as whether there is sufficient allocation in the ADP (or FYP) 
to fund the project (15 percent). The overcommitment of project portfolios was 
seldom elaborated to the extent that an overview was given of the utilisation of the 
budget of the line department in terms of its Five Year Plan allocation. (An overview 
of such a utilisation position was of course not included in any project document 
either.) Although the likely recurrent cost of projects after their completion was often 
given scant attention by the line departments, this was very seldom the subject of 
critique by the P&DD scrutineers. 
Micro-technical issues also featured importantly in the working papers. Many 
technical errors (in the view of P&DD) were usually pointed out in the designs of 
construction works (59 percent), whereas P&DD also frequently complained that there 
was missing or wrong information in the PC-1 (38 percent of all working papers). 
The availability of land and its budgeted cost was also often discussed by P&DD (22 
percent). Lastly, the number of vehicles that are required for projects were fairly 
frequently the focus of criticism by P&DD (14 percent).8 
Other issues, such as economic/social issues, or those concerning beneficiaries, 
featured much less. 
P&DD is thus mainly interested in ensuring that project proposals are technically sound and 
that they are not inflated ('padded') in terms of their proposed cost. As UNDP (1991, p. 112) 
has concluded: 
8 In 62.5 % of all projects, land was a budget item, in 19 % vehicles, and 12 % government staff. 
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"the mechanisms for allocating resources to provincial development programmes have encouraged the 
provinces to view annual development programmes as bidding documents, leading to substantial 
differences between requests and allocations. Provinces must then discard projects in a context in which 
the planning process itself does not provide a means for reconciling requests and allocations. Indeed, 
the whole administrative process of project evaluation is designed for the evaluation of in-project 
feasibility and not for the comparative analysis of projects or the trade-offs between development and 
non-development expenditure.'' 
This does not mean that there no are differences in the approach to departments. As 
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show, some departments get a harder time than others. Projects proposed 
by departments such as Agriculture and Animal Husbandry take almost double the average 
time to be approved (two years instead of one). The originally proposed costs for these 
projects are also slashed much more than in the other sectors: whereas Agriculture proposals 
were around 312 percent of their finally approved cost, the average was some 117 percent 
of the approved cost. Many of its projects are decided only after constituting a special 
committee which is to scrutinize the proposal - the distinguishing feature being that these 
committees for often relatively large projects are again solely consisting of bureaucrats (and 
usually the same, overworked officers). The general perception of many government officers 
is that fomenting these sectors9 is a luxury which can be afforded only after the 'necessary' 
investments have been made in roads, electricity, irrigation, schools and dispensaries. 
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The nature of the approval given 
The nature of the approval finally accorded presents another dimension of the extent to which 
P&DD exerts control over the planning process. Two factors bear out once more that P&DD 
seems not in position to enforce a rigid control over the planning process: (1) some 20 
9 These departments are often referred to by the urban press and government officers as "white elephants'. 
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percent of all projects are started based on some form of anticipatory approval, and (2) almost 
80 percent of all project approvals are conditional. 
An anticipatory approval can be given by the ACS, PM or the Chairman of the ECNEC 
(Prime Minister of Pakistan), depending on the size of the project, and is usually time bound 
(six months or a year). In practice, it is given more by the AJK Prime Minister and Chairman 
of ECNEC (the PM Pakistan) to the larger projects. It can be calculated on the basis of the 
file study that projects to a joint value of around 45 percent of the budget, have been subject 
to an anticipatory approval before the full approval was granted (or the revision approved). 
While one reason for this was the fact that meetings at the CDC and ECNEC level are held 
rather infrequently, the main reason was that departments were seen to take a lot of time to 
react to requests for additional information or re-costing from these higher levels. No matter 
how valid the reasons, the start of a project through an anticipatory approval arrangement is 
usually not conducive to serious improvement in the quality of the project's design later 
on1 0. The camel's nose principle applies here (see section 3.5). 
The conditional approval is an approval given to a project proposal on condition that 
certain stipulations are met, e.g. additional information is provided by the sponsoring 
department, a re-costing is done, or certain items are added or deleted. This kind of approval 
is often given by P&DD under pressure of the line departments or the Government, to avoid 
that further time is lost in re-drafting the PC-1. Although the conditions are intended to 
improve the project proposed, the better solution would be not to accord approval before the 
conditions have been carried through in a redrafted PC-1 and another approval meeting held. 
The consequence of the conditional approval is similar to that of the anticipatory approval: 
more confusion is created. The document is approved but changes still have to be made to 
it. It then becomes necessary for P&DD to withhold the Administrative Approval that it 
1 0 This conclusion is corroborated by research conducted by the Federal Projects Wing for federal projects, as 
referred to in Sahibzada & Mahmood (1992, p. 1115-6): such projects usually ran into serious problems later 
on. 
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normally has to issue after the approval of a project by a forum. Delaying the Administrative 
Approval has two advantages, and one disadvantage. The advantages are: (1) P&DD has 
some way of leverage that project documents are improved even after the basic approval by 
the forum, and (2) if the portfolio of ongoing projects is already very large, then the addition 
of a new project can be put off to a more convenient time (but the project usually becomes 
more vulnerable to 'politics'). - The second advantage is perhaps dubious, since the main 
moment to consider whether the available funds are sufficient to allow another technically 
sound project to be added to the portfolio, should be at the forum approval stage, not later. 
The disadvantage is that the later the Administrative Approval is issued, the more the cost 
estimate will be out of tune with the steadily inflating costs of goods and services. Since 1989 
or so, Pakistani inflation rates have stood at figures around ten percent annually, so a 
contractor's profit will progressively diminish with time if there is no upward revision of the 
cost estimate. He will be likely to try to limit his losses for instance by using lower quality 
materials. 
Even without considering the delay between forum approval and administrative approval, 
the P&DD scrutiny and approval process takes on average some 6.5 months. The file study 
estimated that the delay between forum approval and administrative approval takes another 
5.9 months, so that the average PC-1 cost estimate is already one year (i.e. ten percent) out 
of tune with the prevailing cost structure once the project is in a position to start. 
4.3 The Annual Development Programme 
Next to the preparation of the Five Year Plan and the approval of projects, the P&DD in 
principle exerts influence on the planning process through its coordination of the preparation 
of the Annual Development Programme. The ADP is essentially a list of projects which have 
been granted an allocation from the lump sum provided each year by the Federal 
Government. An example of a page of the list is given by Table 4.2 on the next page. By 
varying the size of the allocations for individual projects, P&DD and the line departments can 
optimise the speed with which the projects are implemented in AJK. The ADP is prepared 
over a long period of consultations with departments, AJK Government and Federal 
Government, and published at the end of June. It is subsequently approved by the AJK 
Assembly on the 1st of July, with or without a few amendments made to it, which are added 
to the book as a corrigendum. All projects with an allocation are grouped by sector and by 
sub-sector, and then in accordance with their approval status. Somewhat confusingly, projects 
which are approved are called on-going, whereas those which are not yet approved are called 
new. The issue of whether the on-going projects have actually started or not is thereby 
obfuscated. The inclusion of the new projects with allocations in the ADP, in anticipation of 
their approval during the year, is even against the advice of the Federal Government: only 
approved projects should be admitted to the ADP (P&D Division 1991, p. 123). But due to 
pressure from the line departments as well as the Government, this advice is not heeded. 
Every year, at the moment of issue of the ADP still unapproved projects take up between 5 
and 20 percent of the new ADP. 
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Table 4.2 Sample page from 
Sector: Agriculture 
Annual Development Programme of AJK, 1993-94. PUBLIC SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 1993-94, AZAD JAMMU S KASHMIR Sub-Sector: Crop Husbandry (Rupees in Millions) 
Unique 
Reference Ser. 
me of the Project with Status i Location 
2 
Date of First Approval/ 
as per 
(Last)PC-I 
Total of which: EEC Own Aid 
(Credit) 
Financial Progress 
lture upto June, 1992 
Budget Estimates 1992-93 
Revised Estim-ates 1992-1993 ture upto June, 1993 -- ( 7 * 9 ) — 10 
Allocation for 1993-94 
Total of which: FEC Own Foreign Aid (Credit) 
13 
Progress in Percentage Terms 
Expend-iture 
PovnTIrl 
Dpto June, 1993 Expected upto June, 1994 
DCjUUU 1993-94 
14 15 16 
85 h 95 * 1.804 
1001 1091 -0.700 
63 * 73 ! 11.586 
501 711 4.645 
100 J 100 % 
0N-G0Œ3 PROJECTS Setting Dp of Farm Mecha-nisation Organisation in Azad Kashmir (Revised) 
Cereal Crops Improvement and Production Programme through Onstation/Onfara Research 
Procurement S Distribut-ion of Agricultural Inputs (Fertilizers and Improved Seeds) 
Strengthening of Agricul-tural Training Institute for Training of Extension Farmers 
Production of Disease Free Healthy Potato Seed in Azad Kashmir 
16/12/86 30/06/93 
21/11/87 30/06/92 
20/11/88 30/06/93 
16/04/89 30/06/95 
22/10/89 30/06/92 
29.314 39.890 (Rev.) 
7.659 
43.051 
6.665 15.852 6 45.004 
2.000 2.043 151 Ex 
13.456 27.836 
5.784 
20.415 
6.279 
2.043 
10.800 
1.875 
7.715 
1.995 
6.000 
1.875 
1.628 
33.836 
7.659 
27.215 
7.907 
2.043 
4.250 
4.250 
3.300 
AJK's ADP strategy 
Logically speaking, the ADP has to be prepared taking into account at least five factors: (1) 
the actual size of the federal grant, (2) die allocation for every sector as per the FYP, (3) the 
needs of projects as per their individual financial phasing, (4) the priority of projects, and (5) 
implementation realities affecting the speed with which ongoing projects can absorb the funds 
as planned in their project documents. 
If the first factor is in accordance with the commitment made in the Five Year Plan, and 
no projects have been given allocations which were not in the FYP, then the annual allocation 
to each sector may deviate from that in the FYP in accordance with factors 3, 4 and 5, as 
long as at the end of the five year period the total utilised is roughly the same as foreseen in 
the FYP. Let us first see if the Seventh Five Year Plan sectoral utilisations have been in 
accordance with their proposed allocations. Figure 4.6 compares the two. 
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From this figure the conclusion can be drawn that most of the actual sectoral allocations 
deviate from the FYP proposals. As was concluded earlier, this is in line with the perception 
that the FYP is not used seriously for guidance in the preparation of the ADP. 
If the Five Year Plan sectoral allocations do not give practical guidance, then the position 
with respect to FYP projects becomes all the more interesting. Is the list of projects in the 
Seventh Five Year Plan being followed? If it is, then a substantial number in for instance the 
ADP of 1990-91 should be also in the FYP. After comparison it is clear that the number of 
projects included in the ADP 1990-91 had already exceeded the total number of projects of 
the FYP (454 as against 392). Outside the Transport & Communication sector (T&C), some 
53 of the 291 projects in the ADP were not included in the Seventh Five Year Plan. In the 
T&C sector, there were 173 projects in the ADP, 102 of which were not mentioned by their 
title in the FYP; a number already far too large to be funded out of the two relatively small 
block allocations mentioned in that sector. On the other hand, as far as the new FYP projects 
were concerned, 82 were not yet included in the ADP 1990-91; some 40 percent of all new 
FYP projects (cf. Kolkma & Mir 1991, pp. 20-21). In other words, die ADP of July 1990 
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had already gone significantiy off the rails of the Five Year Plan published in November 
1989. 
Financial requirements of projects 
Since the ADP 1990-91 had a different composition from that proposed in the FYP, it then 
becomes necessary to see how much these projects needed in terms of allocation in order to 
do justice to their own financial phasing. This could not be checked in detail", but a proxy 
calculation was made to estimate the projects' financial requirement in 1990-91. The 
following parameters needed to be known for this: the total number of projects in the ADP 
with more than a token allocation (443), their joint cost (Rs. 11327 M), and the average 
duration of the projects (2.75 year)12. -The latter figure was an estimate, derived from the 
sample taken in the file study; the intended durations were not properly registered in all cases 
in the ADP book. With a roughly constant budget every year it can be argued that the same 
number of projects should be admitted to the ADP as are dropping out due to completion; 
their total cost should be equal to the size of the annual lump sum13. In such a case the ADP 
would on average require Rs 11327 M / 2.75 = 4119 M to complete the projects on 
schedule. However, the ADP budget was only Rs 1012 M in 1990-91, four times less than 
what would have been required. Even if the PC-Is were over-optimistic with respect to the 
implementation capacity and the duration of projects should have been expected to be double 
the proposed period or 5.5 year on average, then still the ADP would need more than twice 
the amount that is actually allocated by the Federal Government. Since the annual lump sum 
provided by the Federal Government oscillates within fairly well known limits, it is clear that 
there was vast slippage by P&DD and the rest of the bureaucracy in terms of the management 
of the development programme. Far too many projects were approved and admitted into the 
ADP. This overcommitment, which translated into insufficient annual allocations for the 
projects, must then have led to all sorts of huge delays in the completion of projects. The size 
and effects of these delays are further discussed in section 4.6. 
In large part, the overcommitment is due to the effects of the strategic behaviour of 
departments which is insufficiently contained by the P&DD. They try to cut as large a slice 
of the collective pie for themselves as possible, by submitting more project proposals for 
funding than would be good for the ADP as a whole and even for the effectiveness of their 
own programme. Whether other departments will suffer from the decrease in funds available 
for their projects, is not their first concern. Politicians also play a role in this, on the one 
hand because they are often used to support project proposals, and on the other hand because 
they themselves like to come with new project proposals which the departments then have to 
translate into PC-Is to be submitted to the approval forums. For departments, there is even 
some logic in keeping a very large portfolio of projects afloat. In the capricious conditions 
of AJK, projects may have to be halted at any time because of an unforseen lawsuit involving 
land acquisition, contractor problems, strikes, weather disasters, etc. Being able to shift funds 
To check this properly, the capital break up of all ADP projects needs to be found out, and their actual start 
dates. 
1 2 These figures are net; they exclude some 41 projects mentioned in the ADP which had no allocation and 
were more or less completed, but still shown to account for the previous year's expenditures incurred. They 
also include a number of projects (5) that were included by the Assembly through a corrigendum. 
1 3 Such reasoning provides for an important rule of thumb: in order to avoid overcommitment, every year no 
more projects should be approved and included in the ADP than the value of the ADP budget. So if the ADP 
grant from the Federation amounts to Rs 1 billion, then every year, projects to a value of Rs 1 billion can be 
approved and included; including more would lead to overcommitment. 
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around from one project to another then still enables absorption of the available funds14. 
(But this would perhaps excuse a 50 or 100 percent larger portfolio but not the four times too 
large size encountered in AJK.) That there is at any time a large number of half-finished 
buildings and uncompleted projects which are subject to disproportional wear and tear and 
do not yield any benefit for the period of their being incomplete, is another matter. 
Unpredictable foreign aid 
Another factor leading to deviation from the Five Year Plan is the unpredictability of foreign 
aid. The importance of foreign aid to the Annual Development Programme has grown in AJK 
in the 1990s, as can be seen from Figure 4.7. The importance of foreign aid has grown to 
a level comparable to that experienced in Pakistan. In 1990-91, this influence was still 
relatively small, at 12.5 percent of the ADP; in Pakistan it was between 30 and 40 percent 
in those years (e.g. 39 percent in 1991-92). But in 1996-97, the influence had grown to 
almost 30 percent, more or less equal to that in Pakistan in that year. This growing influence, 
not foreseen in, let alone guided by the FYPs, can to a large extent be attributed to the 
increasing resource problems of the country. Due to the large uncertainties connected with 
foreign aid in general, the adherence to the FYP has become even more difficult than it 
already was. The problems are exacerbated by the fact that many foreign aid projects also 
commit large local funds. 
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1 4 Srivastava (quoted in Chaturvedi 1988, p.78) also noted this practice in India, where Executive Engineers 
would have a definite stake in starting as many projects as possible: (i) their confidential report would take into 
account the money spent in [...] projects and number of projects started, and (ii) it is much easier to spend or 
absorb larger financial allocations if there are a large number of incomplete projects. 
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Is AJK's budgetary overcommitment exceptional? 
The question may be raised whether the overcommitment in AJK is exceptional when 
compared to ADPs in Pakistan. There are some indications that this is indeed to some extent 
the case. In AJK, the ADP allocation was in 1990-91 8.9 percent of the cost of the overall 
project portfolio; in 1991-92 it was even less: 8.2 percent13. For the ADP of the Federal 
Government, the percentage was 11.516. This may seem a small difference, but it is not: the 
annual amount available to a federal project is 40 percent larger than that to an AJK project. 
A different formulation of this situation is even more striking: whereas in AJK, 12.2 ADPs 
are needed to finance the project portfolio, in the Federation it is 'only' 8.5 such ADPs. The 
latter is still a serious overcommitment, but smaller than in AJK. When the figures available 
for the ADP of North West Frontier Province are analysed, a percentage can be found, 
similar to that of the Federal Government: 12.4 (in 1995-96), or equivalent to 8.1 ADPs". 
Mixed stakes of the P&DD 
It would be wrong to assume that P&DD is itself not aware of the damaging effects of too 
large a project portfolio. However, it is too weak to resist pressure from politicians in power 
and other (larger) departments advocating great benefits to be gained from inclusion of their 
projects into the ADP. In a sense it is also addicted to development as pursued through 
projects; it is the department's raison d'etre and therefore it seems to some extent biased 
against pushing the financial constraint argument too far (that is conveniently regarded the 
duty of the Finance Department..). Projects are after all supposed to be yielding greater 
returns than their costs, so it is quickly assumed that there can be little wrong with just a little 
more deficit financing. There are also other considerations. Fearing to become unpopular, 
P&DD sometimes goes along with grand new schemes with a lot of political support but 
which, in actual fact, cannot be financed without having severe repercussions on the 
completion of other projects. It likes to believe those who claim that foreign aid will be 
forthcoming in support. It gladly accepts the Prime Minister's reassurance that he will obtain 
the required funds from the Federal Government through lobbying. It goes along by 
presenting to the Federal Government each year a draft version of the new ADP which is on 
average 30 to 40 percent higher than what it already knows it will finally get18. 
The larger overcommitment than in the Federal Government's ADP may be explained as 
follows. The Federal Planning Commission is constrained to be more conservative than AJK. 
It provides the secretariat to the National Economic Council which determines the overall 
resource distribution and the amount available for public investment. It cannot be seen as 
easily to seriously inflate the government budget. The AJK Government, on the other hand, 
1 5 The ADP budget 1991-92 was Rs 1142.448 and the cost of the project portfolio Rs 13914.420 M. The 
significant rise in size of the project portfolio was mainly due to the inclusion of the Neelum Valleys Hydro 
Project, with a cost of Rs 2.6 billion. In years afterward, the total cost would however rise further, inflating 
the overcommitment. 
1 6 This was calculated after a study of the PSDP 1991-92. After excluding the special area lump sums, cases 
where project costs were not reflected, and the huge token allocation for Kalabagh Dam (Rs 122 billion), a total 
project portfolio to the value of Rs 506162 billion remained, with an ADP allocation of Rs 58.3 billion. 
1 7 The ADP in 1995-96 was Rs 8.85 billion in NWFP; the total project portfolio Rs 71.592 billion. 
Unfortunately, earlier figures were not available to the author, or were not properly interpretable due to 
ambiguities regarding the amount of foreign aid involved. 
1 8 The federal government's ADP format includes three columns for the projection of required allocations for 
each project after the current year, to assess the commitments for the next years. This attempt at a rolling plan 
statement for the public investment programme was used for the draft ADP as submitted to the federal 
government, but not for the final ADP in AJK. 
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may be more prone to invoking the principle of the camel's nose due to its greater remoteness 
from the ultimate source of funding. Expensive projects of national importance are included 
in the budget (such as the Neelum Hydel Project or the Muzaffarabad-Kohala Road) and the 
department and Government then start lobbying for their take-over by the Federal 
Government's ADP on account of their unsustainability within the AJK budget19. It seems 
therefore that earmarked grants from the Federal Government lead to highly strategic 
behaviour from the side of AJK and contribute to budgetary overcommitment; such grants 
do not promote prudent behaviour by subnational governments. 
Another example may illustrate this further. Once, a substantial financial grant offered by 
a multilateral donor for forestry development was declined, because the federal Economic 
Affairs Division (EAD), coordinating foreign aid, imposed the condition that this grant would 
not be additional to the ADP grant received from the Federation. The purpose was to prevent 
AJK from benefiting disproportionally from foreign aid. Although the EAD urged AJK to 
accept, AJK saw no reason to accept grants with strings attached, which would only replace 
the normal development grant from the Federation. That this behaviour for Pakistan as a 
whole implied a net loss of resources, was not its foremost concern. It can be surmised that 
the inclusion of AJK in the formula of the NFC award (like the Provinces) would promote 
more responsible behaviour in this respect. 
Obfuscations in the presentation of the budget 
Some devices may be employed by P&DD to present a rosy or more concealing image of the 
ADP to the public and perhaps to the Federal Government. Basic information such as the 
starting dates and intended closing dates of projects are semi-deliberately often left out of the 
ADP, so that other parties outside the bureaucracy have difficulty in assessing what is going 
on. Similarly, some information on foreign aid is left out or underestimated. In the 1990s, 
the P&DD began to use the democratic phenomenon of frequently changing Governments and 
their likes and dislikes to drop projects from the ADP. It created annexes to the ADP book 
for this particular purpose. Since 1993-94, the ADP contains two annexes, one with a list of 
approved projects which do not get any allocation, the other with a list of projects which are 
'identified' but not approved. From the fact that they do not even get a token allocation it is 
clear that these projects are only put in the ADP to appease politicians or departments but are 
not expected even to be approved over the year. When the government changes or when 
priorities change, these pet projects are quietly dropped from the ADP. However, the 
government does not change every year, and neither do all of their preferences, so these 
projects may eventually still be implemented. At the same time P&DD cannot prevent a new 
government from adding new pet projects to the ADP. The period 1989 to 1996, with three 
successive, democratically elected governments in power, has led to higher numbers of new 
projects admitted to the ADP, as can be seen in Figure 4.8, but without increases in the 
overall ADP lump sum, as can be seen from Figure 4.9. 
1 9 This argument may not convince at first sight, since the NWFP as another subnational government would be 
subject to the same tendency, and it is not: it has a smaller overcommitment. However, the NWFP may be 
assumed to be more prudent for another reason: most of its ADP budget is not a federal grant such as the one 
that AJK receives, but a federal cash development loan at commercial interest rates. 
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4.4 Annual Plans of Operations and Annual Plan 
P&DD theoretically has to approve, or at least concur with, the approval of an Annual Plan 
of Operations (APO) for each of the projects in the ADP. This rule gives the P&DD in AJK 
an edge over its opposite numbers in the Provinces, where the submission of an APO before 
expenditure can be incurred is not required20. The APO is also submitted to the Accountant 
General's Office, which has to verify and sign the cheques; the AG waits for a letter of 
concurrence sent to it by the P&DD. The APO is thus an additional instrument of control 
beyond that of the ADP, to influence the speed at which (components of) projects are 
executed. The P&DD reinforces the instrument further, by publishing an Annual Plan around 
October which, like the ADP, contains a list of all projects, with their physical targets (as 
reflected in the APO, but often only percentages), and progress booked upto the end of the 
previous year. The APOs give P&DD a chance to influence the types of activities within 
projects. Once again the findings of the file study will be employed to check whether this 
instrument is actually used or not (Henderson & Kolkma 1992, ch.9). 
In the year 1990-91, only around one third of all project files in the sample contained a 
copy of the APO. After enquiries it turned out that the Public Works Department was 
unofficially allowed to deviate from the rules by sending a list of projects with their adjusted 
financial requirements, presumably due to the sheer number of their projects requiring funds. 
If the projects of the Public Works Departments are not counted, then the overall rate of APO 
submission rises to over two thirds. Nevertheless, this result points to poor control by the 
P&DD, a finding which was corroborated by interviews with the P&DD staff. They did not 
generally utilise the APOs for any other purpose than filing. What is more, most of the APOs 
were not submitted at the start of the financial year, but over the entire period of the year, 
with peaks before Review Meetings and at the very end of the year, when unspent ADP funds 
lapse (see Figure 4.10). Interviews corroborated that the APO was often submitted only just 
before the first expenditure was to be incurred, something which was not necessarily at the 
start of the year. This is perhaps understandable from the point of view of the line 
departments, but it did not make the work of the P&DD much easier. P&DD would normally 
insist that all APOs be submitted to it in July, so that it could plan which department would 
be given what releases in a particular quarter. But this did not happen, and the P&DD did 
not punish non-complying departments or projects afterwards. 
Quality of APOs 
After looking at the APOs submitted to P&DD, it had to be concluded that their quality was 
often very low. Only the Agriculture and Education sectors gave useful and detailed 
information by which the projects could be monitored in some detail. Other than in these two 
sectors, the APOs distinguished few individual items and gave targets only as percentages or 
sums of money. The departments' activities, as distinct from financial inputs or physical 
outputs, were seldom made clear in the APO. Quarterly breakdowns, essential for monitoring 
timing of inputs and activities were only occasionally included in the return. 
In the Provinces, the P&DDs have to give a formal authorisation for the release by the Finance Departments 
of funds to projects, but this is not linked to prior submission of a workplan by the project. 
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Financial reappropriations between projects during the year 
Sloppy planning practice as regards release of funds was witnessed even more starkly by the 
frequent resort to budgetary 'reappropriations' in the second half of the financial year. Figure 
4.11 gives an image of the degree to which deviations were carried through and shows that 
revised allocations were frequendy made in all sectors of the ADP, in spite of the financial 
rules which state that reappropriation between development schemes is allowed only in very 
exceptional cases (Ali 1995, p. 381). Whereas the shifting of allocations between projects 
within sectors and eventually also between sectors was, in part, a consequence of the intra-
annually changing size of lumpsum funds provided by the federal government to AJK, the 
main reasons lay between 'bad planning' and 'programme management' by line departments. 
Time and again, it turned out that certain projects which were supposed to spend funds could 
not in actual fact absorb these, whereas others needed more than what was foreseen. Every 
one in five of all projects in the ADP could not even begin to absorb their proposed allocation 
over the year (due to contractor problems, land, etc.). There was thus extensive shifting of 
funds between slow and fast moving projects, rendering the APO almost obsolete the moment 
it was issued. Whereas a timely adjustment of project budgets to realities in the field is in 
principle positive, the frequency with which it occurred in AJK (86 percent of all APOs 
submitted) was indicative of die fact that even the ADP was not able to guide the 
implementation process (and much less the Five Year Plan). The consequences of APO 
practices for the monitoring system and for the accountability of the implementation process 
will be taken up in following chapters. 
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4.5 Reviews and monitoring by P&DD 
For monitoring and evaluation purposes, the P&DD can, in principle, rely on the following 
mechanisms: (1) field tours / project visits by Section Chiefs and by the Inspection and 
Evaluation Section, (2) specially commissioned surveys or evaluations of projects, (3) 
progress reports for individual projects and their review in meetings where all parties 
concerned are present, (4) completion and post-completion reports for projects, (5) reports 
prepared by the Prime Minister's Inspection Team, and (6) evaluation rounds connected with 
the preparation of the Five Year Plan or FYP Evaluation reports. 
Field tours and site visits 
Field trips to visit projects are supposed to be conducted on a regular basis by all Section 
Chiefs, but before the project in which the author participated started, there were no specific 
instructions as to their frequency, neither their exact procedure. Very few field visits were 
conducted in practice. In the study of 105 project files, not a single written report was found 
from any section chief detailing a project visit, although there existed a (rudimentary) format 
for this even before the UNDTCD project appeared on the scene. The Section Chiefs 
interviewed commented that they did occasionally go on a site visit, but that the findings were 
usually verbally communicated with the ACS; written reports were not prepared. They gave 
as reason that they were overloaded with office work and could not find the time to visit the 
projects systematically. From personal observations the author would say that if any visits 
took place, they were not seriously prepared, and that they usually dealt with other issues 
than a systematic check on progress as compared to the targets. It can be presumed that some 
other reasons are as important as the one given by the chiefs. The first is that a field visit 
requires a vehicle, driver, and travel and daily subsistence allowance, which is not always 
easy to obtain from the sanctioning authorities. The second is that officers of the P&DD and 
the line departments are in various ways connected with each other, and open criticism is 
something to be risked very selectively. As was noted in the previous chapter, some of the 
Section Chiefs were working on 'deputation' from their parent line departments, and thus had 
a stake in selecting their criticisms very carefully, in order not to jeopardise their career 
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prospects. In other cases, officers might be connected through the family or clan; they might 
be acquaintances or friends. What has been called cross-functional controls by Wilson (1988) 
may also apply in AJK: officers of senior grade may wield an influence over officers of lower 
grade even in departments other than their own, leading to fear of open criticism because of 
the possibility of retaliation from unexpected corners. As a last reason the following can be 
ventured. Officers who were conducive in approving (faulty) projects may not be the most 
interested monitoring agents. Since a main reason for problems with projects must lie in 
faulty preparation, criticisms made in the field may ultimately also reflect badly upon the 
P&DD as scrutineers and approvers of projects. At least one Section Chief was frank enough 
to admit to having felt such a hesitation. 
To avoid the latter constraint, the P&DD had instituted a section headed by the second 
most senior officer next to the ACS, the Director General Inspection and Evaluation (see also 
section 3.8). The rationale for the designation of such a high rank to inspection and 
evaluation was exactly the avoidance of negative effects of cross-functional controls and a 
monitoring unbiased from the perspective of mixed roles and responsibilities. However, in 
practice, the office of the DG was severely understaffed, whereas the DG himself felt that 
he was of too high a grade to get his feet dirty and do serious field checks. In the files of the 
section, only three instances of a (small) field tour or 'diagnostic report' of a particular 
project with a problem could be found over a period of three years. What had happened with 
these reports was not clear; written follow-up was not in evidence. Although the idea of a 
special Inspection and Evaluation Section was appropriate, it was not properly carried through 
to become an effective instrument of control. 
Monitoring' through contacts between P&DD and project staff 
In fact, there was a general belief that frequent informal, unsystematic contact between 
project staff and P&DD staff could sometimes substitute for formal field trips. Muzaffarabad 
is a small place, and contact between senior officers in charge of projects takes place in 
various ways. Even though certain officers were suspected to be corrupt, and in some 
departments most were viewed as such, then they were still regarded as government servants 
and 'for the file' their word had to be taken. The atmosphere seemed to be that if officers did 
not join forces whenever they were not already in conflict, then the already high discord 
between departments and staff might well jeopardise the entire bureaucracy. 
Also, a frequent comment voiced was that 'the problems are known to all of us', i.e. they 
are systemic in origin and therefore cannot be resolved in the context of one field visit. For 
instance, if a road is sub-standard in construction, then this is to do with such factors as the 
quality of contractors available which is not good in AJK or Pakistan, the fact that many of 
these contractors are protected by politicians with whom they have connections, the 
insufficient supervision by the Public Works Department due to overload of work, the 
endemic but unprovable corruption leading to substandard materials being used, too small 
releases of funds due to an overcommitted ADP, etc. To blame one Executive Engineer for 
sub-standard work would then be 'unfair'. The gist of this argument is that in order to make 
any project run well, it is necessary to change the whole system - something which was 
viewed as not possible or practical. This led ultimately to a weariness with regard to initiating 
concrete field visits of individual projects that was in marked contrast to the enthusiasm also 
encountered when talking in general terms about the need for monitoring. The latter was 
apparently often used as a metaphor for cleaning up government, or even society as a whole. 
This may be one reason why P&DD chiefs continued to complain in general terms about the 
lack of monitoring, and usually expressed a wish in public to go to the field and check project 
progress in more depth. Also their junior colleagues in the sections expressed a wish to do 
137 
this, as was also corroborated by the returns of a questionnaire administered to all staff of 
P&DD in the UNDTCD project (UNDP/DTCD 1990, p. 15). It is perhaps irreverent to 
surmise that these junior officers had such an interest precisely because they felt less 
responsible for project approvals within their sections than their chiefs. When these more 
junior staff were sent on a trip, as was very rarely the case, then the results were often not 
accepted by the Section Chiefs, let alone the line departments. Lack of experience and 
expertise of such staff, which often had a non-technical qualification, was cited as the reason. 
One Assistant Chief, working under the DG Inspection and Evaluation, once made a field 
tour of a number of projects. His report was put on the agenda of the Review Meeting, but 
the findings were not discussed and nothing else was done with his report. 
Some of the projects which were foreign aided, would have steering committees to which 
P&DD senior staff members, such as the ACS or the Joint Chief Economist, were delegated. 
Once or twice a year these committees would meet, and the agendas of these meetings would 
then also necessitate file preparations and sometimes field visits, which was then regarded as 
'monitoring'. Similarly, special meetings would sometimes be called to discuss special 
problems to do with the management of the Annual Development Programme, such as for 
instance the sudden need for relief and rehabilitation due to a flood in AJK. Thus, the 
frequent allegation of a lack of monitoring by the P&DD would sometimes be countered by 
the argument that the Quarterly Review Meeting was not the only occasion for the P&DD to 
keep abreast of developments with the ADP. 
Special exercises 
An idea that found currency within the P&DD occasionally was to either set aside a nominal 
amount of the ADP, say one or two percent, for monitoring, or alternatively to set aside one 
or two percent of each project budget to monitoring. At the time of the file study in 1991 
such a rule was ordained by the then ACS. Setting aside a specially earmarked fund from 
which surveys or special monitoring or evaluation studies could be commissioned, was 
however never implemented in practice. The motions that have to be gone through in order 
to write Terms of References for surveys of projects or specific project evaluations, the 
advertisement and bidding and contract award process were in practice too daunting even for 
the Inspection and Evaluation Section, which in principle was in the proper position to 
undertake such 'monitoring projects'. In a way, the UNDTCD project, which was supported 
also by ADP counterpart funds, was itself a consequence of the periodically resurfacing 
determination to 'do something about monitoring'. The project, however, never intended to 
engage in actual field monitoring, only set up a monitoring system and train officers in field 
monitoring. It therefore did not serve the purpose for some P&DD officers, who had 
expected that substantive (and external) monitoring would now be undertaken in earnest. 
Neither was the idea of including an earmarked allocation for monitoring within project 
budgets ever implemented seriously. Lack of funds was usually given as the main reason. 
Only in the case of foreign aided projects, money was sometimes set aside for a midterm or 
final evaluation. 
Reporting for central Quarterly Reviews 
In the absence of regular field checking of progress by P&DD itself, the main mechanism for 
the control of the implementation process and feedback to planning was the Quarterly Review 
Meeting organised by the P&DD, under chairmanship of the Prime Minister. These reviews 
were big meetings of usually one and very occasionally two day duration, based on hundreds 
of project progress reports submitted by line departments and working papers submitted by 
P&DD which were in turn based on these reports. All projects and all sectors were supposed 
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to be discussed during these reviews, and decisions taken as required. Occasionally, in third 
quarter reviews, decisions would also be taken to reappropriate funds within sectors among 
slow and fast moving projects, or among slow and fast moving sectors. Although the review 
process will be looked at in detail in the next three chapters, a few features can be discussed 
here, such as the frequency of the meetings in practice. The following pattern was recorded 
for the Quarterly Reviews in the period 1990-1994. 
Table 4.3 Quarterly Reviews in AJK in the period 1990-91 to 1993-94. 
Quarterly Review Date Minutes issued 
Ist of FY 90-91 26/12/90 14/2/91 
2nd of FY 90-91 not held n.a. 
3rd of FY 90-91 not held n.a. 
4th of FY 90-91 not held n.a. 
Ist of FY 91-92 9/12/91 8/1/92 
2nd of FY 91-92 not held n.a. 
3rd of FY 91-92 27/4/92 20/5/92 
4th of FY 91-92 not held n.a. 
Ist of FY 92-93 19/11/92 15/12/92 
2nd of FY 92-93 25/1/93 17/3/93 
3rd of FY 92-93 18/5/93 n.a. 
4th of FY 92-93 not held n.a. 
Ist of FY 93-94 not held n.a. 
2nd of FY 93-94 not held n.a. 
3rd of FY 93-94 3/5/94 18/5/94 
4th of FY 93-94 not held n.a. 
The table demonstrates that ten of the sixteen possible quarterly reviews were never held 
and, even if the P&DD is excused for never holding a fourth quarter review meeting, then 
it can be seen that still six of the twelve scheduled meetings were not held in the four years 
studied. The reason for not holding the fourth quarter review was that this meeting was seen 
as less important: by July the financial year is closed and financial decisions would carry no 
more effect. It should be noted, however, that in most of the Provinces in Pakistan, this 
meeting (called Annual Review) was usually taking place. Reasons for canceling one or more 
of the other quarterly review meetings are generally to do with the political situation or the 
absence of the PM. For instance, in the third quarter of 1990-91 the AJK PP led government 
was dissolved and the PM therefore not available anymore to chair the meeting. That the 
ACS, who is empowered to take over the chair of the meeting, did not do so is a measure 
of the weak position that the P&DD apparently feels itself to be in. That also the Minister 
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for Planning and Development does generally not take over the chair is a reflection on the 
lack of political ownership of the programme at this level. 
To these Review meetings were called all ministers, all secretaries to the government, all 
heads of attached departments, all P&DD chiefs and furthermore a variety of other parties 
in some way involved in the ADP, such as the Accountant General, the Chairman of the 
Prime Minister's Inspection Team, the Inspector General Police, the Land Settlement 
Commissioner, the Revenue Commissioner, and the Political Adviser to the PM. All in all 
they were around 55 different parties invited to the meeting; a considerable number also made 
their appearance. However, it was also found that some of the responsible ministers would 
not show up or stay the whole meeting. Chairmen of district councils were not usually called 
to the meeting; only in 1993-94 they were called to a Review meeting, under the influence 
of a district review then just having been held by the then Prime Minister21. Perhaps they 
were so stumped by this invitation that none of the five turned up. 
The P&DD prepares an agenda and working paper for the meeting, which is circulated to 
all. The agenda makes sure that the financial progress is discussed overall and by district, as 
well as the progress with the programmes in all major departments. The follow-up on 
decisions taken in the previous meeting is also sometimes included in the agenda. 
Occasionally, certain items are included which are not strictly to do with the Review of the 
ADP, such as requests made by departments for additional funds, or the need to cut back on 
the whole programme due to the Federal Government's resource constraints. 
The Review meetings, as witnessed from their minutes, would seldom pay much attention 
to the working paper (see also section 5.7). The PM would ritually make a statement that the 
departments should speed up their activities, before delving in the details of departmental 
programmes, and especially those of high profile projects. Depending on the time that the PM 
would have available, a department would get anything from five minutes to three hours of 
attention from the PM. Occasionally, only one or two departments would be discussed, and 
then the other departments sent home without any review of their programme. Occasionally, 
a snap decision was taken that could obviously never be implemented, such as for instance: 
"The Chair observed that general maintenance of roads is very poor and directed the department to 
bring all roads on acceptable maintenance standard by the end of current month." 
The overall impression was of a fair amount of disorganisation in the conduct of the 
meetings. 
After the meetings, and sometimes quite late (as can be seen from Table 4.3 above), the 
minutes would be sent out to all participants, and an attempt at follow-up on these decisions 
would sometimes begin by the P&DD. Letters would be sent out to the departments with the 
request to implement the decisions taken. The next working paper would then return to these 
decisions, and report whether the department had indeed implemented the decision. In most 
of the cases seen over a period of four years, the answer was no, an indication of the 
importance attached to the Review Meetings. However, in the days between the issuance of 
the working paper and the holding of the meeting, the department would then still try to 'do 
the needful' and occasionally succeed, as was documented by the minutes. As far as the 
monitoring of the Five Year Plan was concerned, it was noted that except for perhaps one 
2 1 In the period between 1990 and 1997, a total of two district-based project reviews were held (Muzaffarabad 
and Bagh). They were both held in 1993, on the instigation of the Prime Minister Sardar Qajjum. The main 
reason for these meetings may have been political: Bagh and Muzaffarabad were the main constituencies for the 
PM. Prime Ministers before him and after him did not call such meetings. 
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Review Meeting held soon after the publication of the Five Year Plan, its targets would not 
figure in the agendas, working papers, or discussions. 
The impression is perhaps now established that the Review Meetings were an exercise in 
futility, but that would be wrong. The Review Meetings were useful, they were 'better than 
nothing', but yet fell short of what is actually required. Due to their faulty preparation and 
hapha2ard organisation, whereby the PM as chairman conducts the meeting 
extemporaneously, the results were a drop in the ocean of the decisions that might have 
usefully been taken. The meetings concerned the development (i.e. public investment) 
programme, and largely exclude the 'normal' programme concerning for instance staffing, 
operations and maintenance issues. This important omission was not corrected by some other 
review routine for issues pertaining specifically to the Recurrent Budget. Other omissions 
were: (1) P&DD did not countercheck the information received from the line departments by 
submitting its own reports on field visits (barring a few exceptions), and (2) neither were 
there any other stakeholders in project progress who were required to report formally and 
independently to the Reviews. For instance, local councils or district councils might have 
been asked to submit a report on the progress with the development programme within their 
areas. Similarly, the Deputy Commissioner might have been made to report independently 
on (problem) projects. 
The question can be raised what was the function of the Quarterly Review in practice. It 
would appear that the Review Meeting first of all served the important objective to brief the 
PM on certain projects and sectoral programmes. This is also evident from the conduct of the 
meeting: all discussion was focused on the PM who chaired the meeting somewhat like an 
old-fashioned teacher in a classroom. All communication was directed to him. Secondly, the 
Review conveyed the impression to the implementing departments that they were being 
watched and might come under the unsympathetic gaze of a usually unpredictable Prime 
Minister interested in 'setting examples'. Since the PM might wish to blame the bureaucracy 
for slowing down the required speed of development if his government was itself the target 
of criticism, he was usually after a few cases of apparent bungling to prove this point in 
general22. Thirdly, occasionally some departments might have developed a conflict over an 
issue, which they needed the highest authority or another authority present in the room to put 
to an end (if they could not find access to the PM through different routes). Fourthly, some 
departments might wish the PM to take responsibility for a decision that they did not like to 
take themselves. 
Project completion reports and post-completion reports 
Another mechanism available for monitoring and evaluation purposes is the official federal 
government requirement that for each completed project, a so-called PC-IV proforma is filled 
out as a completion report. The proforma checks whether the targets laid out in the project 
document have been achieved, and if not, it asks for an explanation. It also asks the 
department to spell out the financial and staff requirement after project completion. The 
sample taken of the files of completed projects indicates that such PC-IVs were returned for 
only 10 percent of all cases. Closer analysis of these cases revealed that they were sent to the 
Finance Department, copy to P&DD, and usually for projects which needed to transfer staff 
liabilities from the development budget to the recurrent budget. The Finance Department 
would not sanction such a transfer without the PC-IV having been submitted. The focus of 
these PC-IVs was therefore procedural and there was often no real analysis or explanation of 
This is why in those years occasionally even press officers were invited to the Reviews. 
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project progress, of successes and failures. Problems caused by other agencies or factors 
beyond the control of the reporting agency were mentioned but nowhere were internal 
problems mentioned. All projects were said to have achieved their targets. As a tool of 
evaluation therefore they were found to have little significance and the conclusion is again: 
the forms are a missed chance due to insufficient enforcement by the P&DD. A similar 
finding applied to the federal PC-V form, officially required to be completed also in AJK, 
but which was not utilised at all. This ex-post project completion form is in theory to be 
filled each year for five years by the line department, focusing on the effects and impacts of 
the project. 
The Prime Minister's Inspection Team 
The PM's Inspection Team consisted at the time of study of a chairman (a retired army 
colonel), a grade 18 engineer seconded by the PWD, and a research officer. The inspections 
usually concern completed projects and focus on irregularities. They could be initiated by the 
team itself Con random basis'), but also under instructions from the Prime Minister's 
Secretariat, for instance if there was a rumour about a malpractice. The reports were sent to 
this Secretariat and to the department concerned. The Inspection Team was said to function 
with flurries of activities, when 3-4 inspections were undertaken every month, and with 
periods of complete inactivity. The activities of the team were extremely low key and seldom 
anything was heard of them; most inspections were said (by one of its members) to have 
found no irregularities. The P&DD was not normally in the know about the inspections, a 
situation which seems odd given that the Inspection and Evaluation section of the department 
had partly the same function. 
Five Year Plan evaluation 
The mechanism of the required Five Year Plan evaluation, lastly, could be potentially an 
important incentive to triggering a special check whether development as a whole was on 
target. Unlike the situation at federal government level - but not at odds with the Provinces -
AJK did not issue its own formal midterm or end evaluation report for a Five Year Plan. It 
submitted, however, a small evaluation of its programme to the Federal Planning Commission 
for inclusion in the national FYP evaluation reports. Since these submissions did not exceed 
three pages, they can by no means be called serious exercises. The focus of the small Five 
Year Plan review was usually on financial utilisation, whereas for each major sector, a few 
physical achievements were compared with the targets. Special surveys or data gathering 
rounds were not undertaken. 
All in all, the focus of the P&DD's monitoring and evaluation endeavours was (and is) the 
quarterly progress reporting exercise conducted by line departments and the associated 
Reviews organised by the P&DD and chaired by the PM. The reluctance of the P&DD to go 
out in the field and do its own checking and learning was seen as chronic. The type of 
information submitted by the line departments and its shortcomings will be subject of further 
discussions in the next chapters. 
4.6 Implementation problems and the results of planning in the field 
It is time to see the effects of this haphazard planning process upon the implementation of 
projects in the field. The Department of the Auditor General of Pakistan in its Performance 
Audit Guidelines has summarised the indicators of poor performance as follows (1984, p.2): 
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1) time overruns (implementation delays); 
2) cost overruns; 
3) slow build up to full production; 
4) higher than warranted operating costs; and 
5) lower than anticipated benefits. 
This study can quantify the first and the second indicators. For the other indicators the 
available evidence is mainly circumstantial. 
Time overruns 
Time overruns of projects are endemic in AJK as they are in Pakistan (as we shall see later). 
The original intended project durations as found by the file study varied from three months 
for certain feasibility study projects to nine years for one or two 'programme projects'. Most 
of the projects (57 percent) were supposed to take two years or three years, and the average 
original project duration was calculated at around 33 months (2.75 years). However, after 
having integrated findings of a review of the ADPs upto 1997-98, the average real duration 
of the ADP projects that were in the sample of 1990-91 was estimated at 114 months or 
around 9.5 years. The average time overrun of a given project was therefore almost seven 
years or 250 percent! Since almost all projects recorded significant time overruns23, this 
study assumes that the most important explanation for the time overruns must be the 
excessively large portfolio of projects in the ADP. This led to severe under-allocation of 
funds to projects in any given year, holding back their completion. In 1990-91 the average 
project was of a budget of around Rs 20 Million but the average allocation in the ADP was 
only Rs 2.2 Million. This means that the average project got only one ninth of its total budget 
in a year and corroborates that such a project will take nine years to complete. However, 
other than financial problems will also have contributed to time overruns, for instance 
technical (bad estimating) or administrative problems (land acquisition, etc.). 
Effects on the rate of return of projects 
Time overruns, according to the rules, can be incurred without requiring an official 
administrative revision of a project. They are not deemed to have such serious consequences 
for the scope of a project that the approval of a project revision becomes necessary. 
Nevertheless, there are important negative consequences for the overall benefits of a project. 
As also pointed out in the Performance Audit Guidelines (1984, pp. 27-35), any delay in the 
completion of a project must have negative implications for its Internal Rate of Return and 
Net Present Value. The example of an irrigation scheme as used in the Guidelines may serve 
to make the point. The IRR and NPV are to be calculated over a certain period of time, say 
30 years for an irrigation project in Pakistan. If the (discounted) benefits exceed the 
(discounted) costs over this period by a percentage of 12, then, according to the Planning 
Commission, it is regarded as viable (or 10 percent according to the World Bank). If it 
remains below these percentages, then it is regarded that the reservation of funds for this 
project is not justified, and had better be diverted to another project, or be utilised within the 
private sector. 
2 3 As can be seen from table Al-1 in Annex 1 by comparing the columns PRODUR (original intended duration 
of the project and DURMONTH (final duration of project), only 5 of the 105 projects did not record a time 
overrun; of these five, at least 2 were canceled before project completion. 
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Now suppose that within the 30 years period, the period of completion of the irrigation 
works is delayed due to implementation problems. This will first of all reduce the quality of 
the work due to the greater effects of wear and tear on unfinished buildings, and due to other 
cost escalating factors (see below). But there are also two additional effects, according to the 
Guidelines. One is that the operating costs of the scheme will be diminished (for the period 
of the delay). The other is that the period of increased agricultural yield due to irrigation is 
also diminished (for the period of the delay in completion). Since the benefits have to exceed 
the costs, the overall Net Present Value of the project will necessarily decrease with the 
increase of the delay. The Guidelines state that the overall benefits of the project are highly 
sensitive to this implementation delay factor. In the example chosen, it is calculated that if 
the capital works are not finished within the envisaged one year but in four years (of the 30), 
then the whole project will not be viable anymore. The Net Present Value will have gone 
below 0 and the IRR reduced to a figure below 12 percent. The essence of the argument is 
that funds invested have to yield benefits calculated over a period which includes the 
construction period and the period of build-up to full production, and which should not be 
extended if the benefits start to accrue later than foreseen24. Thus, project benefits are 
sensitive to implementation delays and if the latter are serious then they decrease the Net 
Present Value of projects to far below zero25. In other words, if the Government ties up 
funds in unfinished projects and does not complete these as per their schedule in order to start 
up other projects, it may be better for the economy as a whole to make the same funds 
available to for instance the private sector. 
The present allocative system practiced is oriented to starting more projects than can be 
justified on the grounds of economic efficiency. Both politicians and bureaucracy are involved 
in this, politicians because they are anxious to show that they have initiated something 
concrete, and departments because they wish to apportion as large a piece of the turf by 
committing funds to as many projects as possible, and then bargain for increased allocations 
to be able to finish them. 
One more example may elaborate the point. Suppose the primary education sector is 
allocated Rs 100 M each year in the ADP. If twenty schools with a capacity of 500 seats each 
can be built with this money, then economic efficiency would dictate that these twenty 
schools are built within the same year. In the next year, the new allocation of Rs 100 M can 
then be utilised to build twenty more schools. By the start of year two, 10000 children could 
then be offered education in twenty schools; by year three, 20000. The system practiced in 
AJK and large parts of Pakistan is that, in year one, works on forty schools are started. On 
each school Rs 2.5 M is spent. No school would be finished by the end of year one; all forty 
schools would be finished by the end of year two. Only by the start of year three, education 
can be offered to (20000) children. The loss is one year of education for 10000 children. This 
is a simple example. Since the delays in the completion of schools are much larger than 100 
percent, the loss in benefits are greater than the example chosen indicates. The example also 
reveals that the same kind of losses due to implementation delays occur in social sector 
projects for which an IRR or NPV cannot easily be calculated. 
But even if they are extended, the inclusion of the longer implementation/build-up period, must lead to a 
reduction in Net Present Value. 
2 5 In the example chosen, other sensitive items are the build-up to full production, which may be affected by 
for instance a slower adoption by farmers of new packages and techniques; higher than foreseen construction 
costs; variations in crop yields and crop prices; and higher than foreseen labour costs (if tractors are not 
adopted). 
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Time overruns also have one other negative effect upon the performance of the project. In 
Pakistan, a 'cost escalation' factor is allowed as a separate budget line to the value of 6.5 
percent of the cost in year two, and 13 percent in year three (and so on). The purpose is to 
compensate for the eroding influence of inflation. Allowing for cost escalation in budgets is 
in principle good, but in practice there are still drawbacks. First of all, the allowed rate has 
been an underestimation of the inflation rate in the 1990s which has been minimally 10 
percent. Secondly, the file study calculated that the approval process for an average project 
takes around one year, so that project implementation is usually already one year 'behind' on 
the date of the cost estimate. The one year delay is not accounted for by the cost escalation 
budget line. Thirdly, if the implementation process itself is taking longer than expected, then 
inflation further gets a grip on projects. Contractors will have to make a profit, and are 
widely observed to cut on quantity or quality if prices or wages rise and they are given 
insufficient funds to finish the job in time. As was noticed, most of the projects are delayed 
by more than 200 percent. Since delays need not in themselves require an official project 
revision, there is a tendency to avoid such administrative hassles. Only in very serious cases, 
a revision of the approved cost of a project is applied for. The consequence is then that the 
executing department (or their contractors) will 'save' on the quantity or quality of materials, 
equipment, or works required. The result in practice is a loss in the quality of the project 
output. This loss shall be quantified later, after the significance of cost overruns of projects 
has been discussed. 
Cost overruns 
Cost overruns can be a consequence of time overruns, as discussed above, but also of lack 
of planning/designing capacity in the first place, or unforseen circumstances. They may be 
related to the fact that projects were deliberately undercosted initially, in order to increase 
their chances of being approved. (This was called the 'camel's nose' strategy.) In AJK, it has 
happened particularly with large construction projects, such as irrigation schemes and hydro-
power projects (the practice was also noticed for federal projects, cf. Chaudhry 1983). While 
an overall 44 percent of all projects undergoes a formal cost revision at some point during 
their implementation, the total increase in cost of the portfolio was of the order of 
43 percent26. Thus, bad planning, in some cases changes to the scope of projects, and, to 
a lesser extent, calamities must lead to very serious cost overruns on any given, approved 
development programme of AJK. 
The necessity for a cost revision of the project in itself further contributes to 
implementation delays. There is a requirement that for as long as the approval of the project 
revision takes, the works have to be stopped. Through the file study it could be calculated 
that the administrative processes do not go much quicker than in the case of original project 
approvals; they take again almost one year to complete. This contributes further to lower 
rates of return of the project, even if it is properly executed, and does not suffer from low 
quality. 
This percentage is calculated only over the government funded portion of the project budget - foreign aid is 
excluded from the calculation. Sahibzada & Mahmood (1992, p. 1117) mention for the federation that delays 
in implementation had raised the cost of development projects from Rs 104 billion to Rs 126 billion, which may 
be an underestimate since it was probably calculated over a sample of projects which were reviewed by the 
Projects Wing, i.e. a sample of still ongoing and not yet completed projects. 
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Effects on the quality of output 
Time overruns are likely to have an eroding effect on the intended quality of output. The 
unfinished state of many buildings perennially under construction, but in fact abandoned over 
long intervals, leads to quicker than normal dilapidation. There is, however, a more serious 
effect, which can be demonstrated by a pro forma calculation. Given that the approval 
process takes one year as from the last cost estimate in the PC-1 and that there is an average 
delay of over six and a half years during implementation of the project, 93 months of delay 
would mean that the project has to somehow accommodate at least 100 percent unforseen 
inflation (compounded at the rate of 10 percent annually). If the recorded and actually 
sanctioned cost revision is in the order of only 43 percent, then this must lead to 57 percent 
hidden losses which are likely to be compensated for by reduced quality of output. The 
symptoms are there for everyone to see: substandard cement mixtures and other materials 
used for buildings and structures; cracks appearing sometimes immediately after delivery of 
the building; roads with thin surfaces, potholes and cracks; fewer teachers trained than 
targeted or less well trained than intended; smaller quantities of seeds distributed than 
intended; fewer trees planted; smaller coverage of irrigation works; large electricity line 
losses due to poor standards of construction, etc. etc. 
Cost and time overruns in all sectors 
The overall pattern of significant time and cost overruns applies to all major sectors of 
investment, such as is evident from Figures 4.12 and 4.13 on the next page. Only the 
departments dealing with the Agriculture sector seem to be less plagued by the phenomenon, 
although the average time overrun is still almost 90 percent. But this may be due to strategic 
reasons. In the departments of agriculture and forestry particularly, there are a large number 
of projects which are in fact 'serial projects', or phases of programmes of long duration. For 
instance there is a project called Reforestation of Blanks Phase II, the second of seven 
'projects' of a programme which is scheduled to take 35 years. What is not achieved in the 
first phase can then be argued to be achieved in a later phase, with a new project. Had such 
phasing through the mechanism of 'serial projects' not been possible, then these projects 
would perhaps also have had to be extended or re-budgeted, in order to achieve their physical 
targets. 
Low maintenance and operation budgets 
The already lower than anticipated benefits may be further jeopardized as a consequence of 
insufficient budgets made available by the Government for operation and maintenance 
(O&M). These too low recurrent budgets are a constant source of criticism by the 
departments responsible for operation and maintenance of public buildings, such as the Public 
Works Department. It has to maintain all roads in landslide hazarded AJK with a meagre 
annual budget of Rs 50 Million (1990-91). Another consequence is the gradual encroachment 
of maintenance or reconstruction oriented projects in the development programme. These are 
2 7 It is assumed that the cost overruns are related to implementation problems and inflation, not to real changes 
(expansions) in the scope of schemes. This assumption was tested and to a large extent corroborated in 
Henderson & Kolkma (1992). In fact, a few schemes were revised downwards in terms of their scope due to 
funding problems. Expansions in the scope of schemes did occur, but were usually of a nature that "more 
earthwork was needed than originally foreseen, due to site conditions'. Almost invariably such requests for 
changes in the scope of a project was accompanied by other reasons for cost revisions, such as design problems 
or inflation (see also section 6.5). 
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for instance labeled 'reconditioning of roads', 'reconstruction', 'improvement', 'renovation'. 
P&DD may occasionally oppose this trend, arguing that such investments do not lead to an 
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investments do not lead to an increase in the resources of the state (which is a main intention 
of the development programme). But at the same time it does not pay enough attention to O 
& M requirements of projects after their completion at the time of their appraisal. For 
instance, although there is a question in the PC-1 regarding the recurrent costs of projects, 
the P&DD was almost never witnessed by the file study to take up such issues in the working 
papers for the project approving committees. In the rare cases that it did, it usually concerned 
the take-over of staff positions created under the development budget. That these costs of 
projects are significant, was noted during the file study. From the information in the PC-Is 
concerning recurrent costs, it was calculated to be equivalent to around Rs 511 M annually. 
Any investment made can thus be estimated to lead to an annual recurrent cost liability after 
its completion, equivalent to 20 percent of the investment cost (Rs 511 M / (Rs 7078 M/2.75 
years)). 
These recurrent costs as put in the PC-1 are almost surely seriously under-estimated, given 
the camel's nose strategy employed by line departments. 
Apart from poor outputs of projects, the planning process also produces bureaucratic 
inefficiencies, which are for instance apparent from the fact that 25 percent of projects need 
anticipatory approval, and that 44 percent of all projects need to go through a revision. All 
this requires extra man-hours of attention and extra red tape. Bad planning at the start then 
comes back to haunt the planners at a later stage. 
Waste and malfunctions in Pakistan 
These problems, significant as they are, are by no means particular to AJK. Although no 
publication in Pakistan has ever quantified time and cost overruns for completed projects, 
some corroborations can be found in studies for instance performed by the Projects Wing of 
the Federal Planning Commission. Chaudhry (1983) analysed 160 larger projects specially 
reviewed over a period of five years, to find that some 70 percent of these had been revised, 
and had exceeded their implementation period already even although they were not yet 
completed by the time of the field visit. Some 75 percent of the projects had to deal with cost 
escalation. All these ratios could only rise with time. From another study of the Projects 
Wing (1985), it could be calculated that for a number of randomly selected still ongoing 
projects, the cost overrun was already 24 percent, and the time overrun 75 percent. And in 
Pakistan's Seventh Five Year Plan (1988, p. 156), lastly, it is mentioned that the results of 
project monitoring studies showed that out of 154 projects reviewed, 55 percent were revised, 
86 percent were behind schedule, 94 percent lacked proper implementation schedules, and 
56 percent had cost overruns. 
As far as the quality of works delivered, no example could probably better catch the 
realities on the ground than the following. Specially trained civil engineers of the National 
Transport Research Centre in Islamabad had made 785 surprise visits to a great number of 
roads in Pakistan and filled some 1050 questionnaires, to check whether roads were generally 
being built to specifications. It turned out that not a single road could be found that had been 
built properly28. The findings were corroborated by the Japan International Cooperation 
Required construction techniques of removing six inches of top soil plus all the organic matter, proper 
grinding of the fill material in 12 inches and its compaction to the specified degree had not been followed. The 
filling material was never placed according to the specification, while in 44 percent of the cases even shrubs 
and roots were not removed before the material was laid. The thickness of the sub-base was found less than 
required in half of all cases, whereas the concrete used was of insufficient quality in 80 percent of the cases. 
As far as surfacing concerned, in most cases the compacted base-course layer was not even and not properly 
(continued...) 
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Agency, which had prepared a National Transport Plan for Pakistan. The World Bank, lasdy, 
had ranked Pakistan's road construction work as among the poorest in the world in its study 
on 'Road Deterioration in Developing Countries' (NTRC 1990; The Muslim, 4-3-1991). 
Effects of corruption and other malpractices 
So far, the negative effects of widespread, though difficult to pinpoint, practices of corruption 
have remained outside the discussion. According to a few contractors interviewed, bribes 
were required to be paid by them in all cases of government contracts. It was stated by them 
that generally some 17 percent of the cost of the contract had to be returned unofficially to 
the officers supervising the contract award. This could, however, vary with the 
circumstances. It was claimed that the bribes were in some departments distributed in fixed 
rates amongst the government employees, thus pointing to the possibility of the 
institutionalisation of such corrupt practices. A quantification of the significance of corruption 
in the development programme cannot be undertaken here due to lack of hard evidence. If 
the bribe ("commission') off the contract cost is indeed a normal occurrence, then the result 
will be again lower quality of project output because the contractor has to recoup elsewhere 
what he has had to surrender. Corruption and favouritism can take many forms. As far as 
contract award was concerned, it could start from insufficient advertisement of the calls to 
tender, provision of crucial information to befriended contractors, the award of the contract 
to bidders with insufficient qualifications, the application of unit rates to sub-standard 
materials, supplies and equipment, etc. In other cases, it could refer to speed money for file 
movement, and commissions on appointments, transfers and promotions. 
Apart from corruption, a wide range of malpractices as committed by government 
employees may also contribute to low quality of project output or service delivery, or simply 
to high cost of administration. These practices occur in all countries of the world, and the 
question of their significance in AJK cannot be quantified. They are referred to here mainly 
to indicate that they exist in AJK as anywhere else; completely dispassionate and efficient 
administration is hard to find. The range of malpractices can be studied from a listing made 
of cases as reported by the Auditor General in his annual report on AJK for 1988 (in their 
sequence of reporting). From Box 4.1 on the next page it is clear that apart from corruption 
and neglect, pilferage and fraud are methods witnessed which deprive the Government of 
some of its resources29. 
Thus, corruption and other malpractices can be assumed to have a negative influence on 
the quality of project output which is independent of, as well as additional to, the effects of 
bad project design, implementation problems and bad resource planning. 
2 8(... continued) 
the cases, longitudinal drains had not been provided, shoulders were observed to be loose and uneven, whereas 
the pipes used in culverts were of inferior quality. 
2 9 The reports are offered to the Public Accounts Committee in the Legislative Assembly, but often not easily 
approved: only when the Government has changed, there is reason to make more of the malpractices carried 
out by the (previous) administration. 
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Box 4.1 Listing of malpractices reported by the Auditor General in 1988 
1) shortage of items on physical verification of stock 
2) sale proceeds of items or fees or cesses not remitted into treasury 
3) insufficient accountal of item in the record 
4) misappropriation through insufficient carrying forward of balance in stock register 
5) loss due to non-confiscation of earnest money 
6) excess payment made to contractor 
7) non-recovery of cost or cess or trust fund 
8) fictitious or non-allowable purchases (of petrol, articles, etc.) 
9) non-remittance of charges for private use of Govt vehicle 
10) irregular payment of electricity charges for residential building 
11) expenditure shown incurred for repair / spare parts but not established from the vehicle logbook 
12) irregular payments to officers who were on leave without pay 
13) peons being appointed without posts and paid salary 
14) drawing of amount from treasury to buy items but less items were bought (and entered in the 
register) 
15) fictitious construction (buildings reported as constructed, but which are in fact non-existent) 
16) expenditures shown incurred on materials of quality X but purchased on lesser quality 
17) double charge of expenditure in cash book 
18) appointment of teaching staff during vacations and pay for vacation drawn from the Treasury 
violating the financial rules 
19) payment of TA/DA while journey performed was not proved from the relevant record 
20) payment to contractors for work already done and accounted for 
21) excess payment on account of pay, house rent and travelling allowance 
22) amounts drawn but not accounted for in the cash book nor payment being established 
23) less recovery of penalties imposed on contractors 
24) amounts advanced to LGRD project managers but amount not shown as received or expended 
25) irregular payments to project leader without sanctioned estimates and recording the measurement 
on the Measurement Book in respect of the construction of a building 
26) release of money as per cash book of the Assistant Director LGRD, in favour of various project 
managers and Assistant Engineers for development projects but insufficient amounts were entered 
in the cash books of these project managers and Assistant Engineers 
27) advances paid through project managers to project leaders without work progressing 
28) loss of monies due to non-completion of projects by the project leaders, although these are bound 
by the govt to return the whole amount received in case of failure to complete the project 
29) bank balances in official accounts found less than the bank balances shown in the cash books of the 
project managers 
30) goods despatched to another depot but not received there 
31) bank guarantees extended beyond one year's currency unauthorizedly from the National Bank of 
Pakistan by a departmental Director 
32) advances refundable upon completion of work but due to non-execution of work never spent and 
never recovered 
33) damage/shortage of goods in depot 
34) non-acceptance of tender rates and award of contract to other than lowest bidder without putting 
the reasons for this on record 
35) loss of money on interest paid on un-utilised loan 
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4.7 Conclusions 
The planning process in AJK has technocratic ideals and pretensions but is conducted with 
incrementalist practices in a very fluid, 'soft' environment. P&DD's control mechanisms are 
not applied sufficiently to force planning and implementation in a direction leading to less 
malfunctions and waste of resources. The Five Year Plan is a technically weak document 
written by and for the bureaucracy, but ignored by all parties including the line departments 
the moment it is issued. P&DD's approval and clearing house functions in terms of project 
proposals are compromised by political and departmental pressures calling for the approval 
of pet projects, and by practices such as the 'anticipatory approval' and the 'conditional 
approval'. The low political support for the Five Year Plan, meanwhile, gives P&DD 
insufficient authority to reject new project proposals on the basis of their incompatibility with 
Plan. Far too many projects are approved and this leads to a huge budgetary overcommitment 
and delays in implementation as well as low quality of output. The preparation of the Annual 
Development Programme does not follow the sectoral distribution of funds as laid down in 
the Five Year Plan. It is used as a 'bidding' document for the Federal Government, and full 
of budgetary strategies such as padding and 'the camel's nose'. The Annual Plans of 
Operation for projects that P&DD has to approve are similarly not used as a serious 
instrument for control and monitoring. The practice of programme management, with 
concomitant shifting of budgets from one project to another over the year, is so strong, that 
P&DD sees the APOs as fding items, perhaps only to be retrieved from archives if serious 
malpractices have occurred. Of all the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that P&DD can 
avail, only the Review Meetings under chairmanship of the Prime Minister are pursued with 
some seriousness. The functions of these Review Meetings are however partly ritual, they 
brief the Prime Minister more than that they serve as coordination and conflict resolution 
mechanisms. There are insufficient of these meetings anyway, and they are of too short 
duration given the hundreds of projects, too make a serious dent in the implementation 
process. The project progress reports are meanwhile based on self-reporting by line 
departments, and this has limitations. On the other hand, it may be assumed that P&DD feels 
uncomfortable with serious counterchecking of progress for instance by field visits, because 
of its own compromised role as approver of badly designed projects in a context of budgetary 
overcommitment, and on the other hand due to its weak position in the organisational 
environment. 
P&DD is stuck in the middle between politicians and other departments. While excluding 
certain important stakeholders in the planning process, it is supposed to smoothly function 
in consonance with the rest of the bureaucracy in order to conduct and coordinate central 
planning. Yet, as a funding agency, the P&DD is also in a structurally different position from 
line departments. To ensure proper planning, it has to coax the departments. To ensure 
proper implementation, it has to be critical of these departments. Both parties engage in 
organismic behaviour, looking for their survival and expansion. The line departments may 
come up with plans and projects outside the Five Year Plan and consume funds intended for 
other purposes and projects. The P&DD on the other hand has a stake in legitimising its 
(ambiguous) statutory functions. It is interested in approving projects to prove that it cares 
for development, and may be institutionally blind to the contingencies that (1) there is not 
enough money to implement these projects (but that is regarded the business of the 
Federation) and (2) that resources are not available to sustain these projects after completion 
(but that is regarded the business of the Finance Department). Thus, there are limits to the 
role of P&DD as a custodian of development in AJK. 
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P&DD is clearly often in a fix as to the formal position it should take, advisor or decider, 
bargainer among many other parties, or supervisor of all parties. That is why most of its 
control mechanisms are not used to the full extent. In the present age where a larger body 
of politicians has joined the fight for access to the resources of the state, this may be even 
more the case. 
In the following chapter, the effects of the planning style upon the quality of information 
gathered through the progress reporting procedures are analysed. 
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CHAPTER 5. MONITORING THROUGH PROGRESS REPORTS IN AZAD 
KASHMIR 
Even if not all quarterly reviews announced are actually held, at the end of every quarter 
there are frantic activities in AJK's line departments to come up with that symbol of their 
discipline and efficiency: ane^WcdUued bundle of p r o j ^ p r ^ r e s s reports. In some 
departments, the project direcfSremiveTov^^ are no full-
fledged project directors. Then it is the p^njjggjjfficer in the headquarter who has to write 
the reports; the boring work may even beTeft to the draftsman or ajslerk. But in all cases, 
the papers have to pass througha numterofStations wltMiTanysirigle department and gather 
the relevant signatoeToTconcuIrS^ dispatched. The routing is 
usually from the Secretary's office, then to the Planning and Development Department, copy 
to a great number of other destinations. 
This chapter concentrates on the nature of the old project reporting ^f^>.,.oj3g|a|ingjn. 
AJK up to the beginning of the 1990s, i.e. the system that was "being followed before the 
introduction of a new monitoring system in 1992-93. Most of the data and experiences relate 
to the financial year 1990-91. The first quarter will be concentrated on, since this was the 
only quarter for which the rev^£ptociss was completed. Particularly mejnfluence of thep 
j-eportfcjmiatshall be assessed and its suitability for coping with the large variety of projects ) 
m'ffieADP. technical drawbacks of the data submitted will be investigated, as well as the 
consequences of strategic behaviour of departments for the quality of the reports submitted. 
This will provide an impression of the kind of 'objectivity' that these reports convey, and 
their consequent utility for the P&DD and the Quarterly Review Body. The format of the 
reports shall be introduced first in this chapter, and some technical shortcomings identified. 
The variety of projects to be covered by the system will be the subject of section 5.2. The 
timeliness of report submission by the line agencies will be investigated in section 5.3. Then 
in three sections, the quality of financial reporting, physical progress reporting, and problem 
reporting of the system will be analysed. Section 5.7 will discuss the use that the P&DD and 
the Review Body made of these reports. In a concluding section, the question is addressed 
what a department such as P&DD in AJK might need from a reporting system. 
While the present chapter thus has a focus on the quality of information harvested by an 
imperfect but internally evolved reporting system, the chapter hereafter focuses on newly 
introduced reporting systems which ask better questions. Only when such systems are also 
taken into account, can it be gauged to what extent, in the organisational environment of AJK 
and Pakistan, better questions lead to serious improvements in information content. 
5.1 A first look at the report format 
This study of reporting practices cannot start without showing the format of the progress 
report in AJK. Table 5.1 does this, while also reflecting samples of actual reports given by 
projects in all of the sectors of the Annual Development Programme in year 1990-91.' These 
samples themselves will be discussed in later sections. 
1 In order to meet the criterion of being concise and unbiased, the first project report in the bundle of each 
sector is shown. 
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Table 5.1 Sample of contents of Quarterly Review Reports 1st quarter 1990-91, for different sectors in M L (Rs in Million) 
M E N T M P EXPEND. PERC. TARGETS SET FOR TEE YEAR 1990-91 PHYSICAL TARGETS ACHIEVED ALLOC. INCURRED OTILI- DÜRING FIRST QUARTER of tie scheue 90-91 7-9/90 SATION 
Farm Mechanization 5.097 0.142 2.7. 1) land will be purchased for the constr.of Agri.Eng.Dnit Office Rawalk 2) tent and choldaries and implements will be purchased 3) 4 tractors and threshers will be purchased with accessories 4) one transporter loader and one jeep to be purchased 
5) tool kits and spare parts for 7 bulldozers to be purchased 6) field machinery to be operated for 10300 hrs 
1) tender has been called for 
purchase of field machinery 
ANIMAL HUSBANDRY Expansion & Improve- 2.875 ment of Govt. Poultry Complexes S Extension 
Improvement of Cattle 1.207 Breed by A.I in AJK 
0.150 5.0% 
0.100 8.0% 
1) 75. construction work of poultry complexes would be completed 2) 100. constr. work of boundary wall with complex at R'kot to be completed 
1) 100% constr. works to be completed 2) Liquid Nitrogen, Semen 5 Medicine to be purchased 
Reforestation of 20.465 Blanks 
TOURISM 
Promotion of Tourism 0.650 in Azad Kashmir 
Establishment of 1.516 Industrial Estate at Rawalakot (rev.) 
4.055 20.0% 1) sowing 804 acres 2) planting 8730 acres 3) maintenance planting 2650 acres 4) road side planting 5) fencing 6) construction of inspection path 7) constr. of cattle ponds 12 Nos. 
8) S.C. works 9) diversion channels 10) const./repair of office building 
0.000 0.0% I) Remaining constr. work of youth 
hostels to be completed 
2) remaining constr. work of anglers 
huts to be completed 
3) stock will be purchased for youth 
hostels and anglers huts 
0.005 0.0% Completion of remaining construction work of internal and approach roads 
1) construction work of boun-dary wall: 75% work completed 
2) tender floated for construction of complex 
1) Liq. nitrogen,semen purchased 2) Tender floated for A.I centres at Bagh and work order is issued 
420 acres 3105 acres 623 acres 
50% work compl youth hostel at Chot.S rem.work will be compl. 90% and 50% work completed, remaining work is in progress 
constr. work is in progress 
continued. 
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Table 5.1 (tatinued) Sample of contents of Quarterly Review Reports 1st quarter 1990-91, for different sectors in AJK. 
Constr. of Addl. Rooms (3 rooms each) with 23 Old Middle Schools of Poonch District 
HEALTH 
Opening of 19 Dispens-
aries in District 
Muzaffarabad 
0.01 
1.708 0.100 6.0* 
Impr./Dpgradation of 2.' Existing Hosp/Dispen-saries in Poonch 
1) buildings of 23 Middle Schools (3 rooms each) have been constructed 2) land will be acquired with boys middle school Garala 
KOTE TRALA. Completion/constr. of staff quarter, disp. building i boundary wall SENA DAMIN/BANAMOLA. Constr./completion of staff quarter 
LESffi Completion of boundary walls 
1) -
2) Acquisition of land case is under process 
works not yet started by PWD 
works incomplete and stopped since long. At Baramula, work is stopped due to border firing work is still incomplete 
CM.BASE: 4 412 bedded wards work of first floor completed upto lentel level. Staff 
Kheri Irrigation Scheme 12. i 
0.100 5.0% C.E. BASE: completion of 4 6 12 I ward, H & F type quarters OTHER WORKS: Const, of B/Ball at Sessor, Ghaziabad, Thub, Rehra, Rangla, Sahilan, quarters not started, remaining dispensaries at ftaigla, Abbas OTHER WORKS: work at Shazibad, CMH RAHALAKOT: Completion of senior Rehra completed, other works staff accommodation, other renovations not yet started. CMH RAHALAKOT: work completed except sewerage 
0.000 0.0% 93% 
ELECTRICm 
Electrification of 149.407 0.000 0.0% High Transmission line = 292 km HT Line 10 km 
Rural Areas in AJK (Antic, appr. Low Transmission line = 426 km LT line 20 km 
Phase III accorded on Transfoners = 344 Nos. Transformers 112 Nos. 
23-10-90) S/C43900 Nos. S/Connections 1990 Nos. 
Establishment of 10.662 0.000 0.0% 35% Letter of intent for the award 1600 E Eydel Power of supply contract (Power house Station at Kathai electr. and mech. machinery 
and equipment) has been issued and agreement is not signed yet 
TRANSPORT & COWNICATIONS 
Improvement of Existing 5.000 0.108 2% 10% 0.20% Single Lane Metalled Road to Double Lane Metalled Road (..) (Rev.) 
PHYSICAL PLANNING AND HOUSING (MDA) Renovation and Rehab- 3.900 0.000 0% 25% ilitation Existing Sewerage System Mirpur 
Source: Quarterly Review Reports 1st quarter 1990-91, Government of AJK (reflected also in Henderson i Kolkma 1992, pp 148-149). 
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The format in use in 1990-91, called Quarterly Review Report, was a simplification of the 
format originally used by the Planning Commission and consequently had a width of only six 
substantive columns. As can be seen, the name of the scheme, its ADP allocation, the 
expenditure incurred during the year, the utilisation of the allocation, the physical targets for 
the year, and the achievements, were all that the form asked for. How little this was, in fact, 
is borne out by a comparison with a format as evolved by the P&DD in North West Frontier 
Province. This progress report was much more elaborate and contained 22 substantive 
columns. In addition to the information also incorporated in the AJK system, it asked for 
dates of approval, total cost of the scheme, total expenditures so far, releases, excesses and 
possible surrenders (of funds), and also information on targets for the scheme as a whole, 
previous years' achievements and, importantly, information on bottlenecks and suggestions 
for improvements. In NWFP, contrary to AJK, each line department also had to complete 
a number of annexures on schemes under approval, under revision, due for completion, a 
listing of key targets and their progress (e.g. kilometres of road constructed in a district). In 
that sense, the monitoring system in AJK differed in one aspect from most other systems in 
Pakistan: it largely missed out on the function of providing the bureaucracy and government 
with a quarterly encyclopedia, a compendium wherein the overall status as well as progress 
of a project could be ascertained, in case of a query. The smaller size of AJK's programme 
and the greater ease with which sectors could be overseen by section officers in P&DD has 
been mentioned as one excuse for this. 
Deficiencies of the format 
It is clear from the table that only a very limited analysis of the progress of a scheme can be 
made from such reports. Although a more detailed discussion of issues of financial and 
physical progress shall be made in sections 5.4 and 5.5, the main technical problems with the 
Quarterly Review Report format in AJK are summarised here as follows (see also Wilson et 
al. 1992): 
1) Approval, start and completion dates (intended / revised) were not given. Thus, it was 
not clear from the report itself whether and how much the scheme was already 
delayed and when the project was most likely be completed. 
2) Some financial data were missing such as the cost of the scheme, its overall 
expenditure to date, and the releases made by the Finance Department. Also it was 
not clear from the table whether the scheme was foreign aided. The absence of a 
financial releases statement was very serious and made it impossible to judge whether 
a delay was caused by lack of funds or other factors. 
3) The limited information on physical progress did not allow proper insight into the 
overall achievements of the project so far against the overall targets. Many projects 
had not even specified physical targets time-wise in their PC-1; the required bar charts 
were only seldom submitted. Only the targets for the year 1990-91 were given, and 
subsequently the achievements. Since these targets presented only a slice in a project 
life often over ten years, they may have confused more than that they clarified, as is 
clear from the table. 
4) There was no space for a proper discussion of scheme-specific problems that the 
project staff might wish to bring to the notice of either the senior management within 
their department, or the Review body. Thus, a major purpose of the monitoring 
system (and usually stressed even by the P&DD itself) was theoretically lost with this 
omission. 
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As it stood at the time of study, the form relied on the Review body already being 
intimately acquainted with the basics of the schemes, which is an altogether unrealistic 
expectation. Even the P&DD officers in charge of sections with larger portfolios of projects, 
although in possession of the project files, cannot have known every scheme in detail. This 
applies especially to the officers who were in P&DD on deputation, who might have been 
posted only recently. As discussed, they headed four out of the six substantive sections. At 
any rate, other parties in the Review, not in possession of all the relevant files, must have 
known much less. 
Ultimately the actual reasons for the reduction of the progress format to such a limited one 
can only be conjectured. One reason sometimes mentioned was that the relevant columns in 
previous versions of the format were never filled up properly (e.g. the bottlenecks column). 
So why bother presenting such large formats which for the larger part would remain unused? 
Another reason may have been that P&DD felt that systemic reasons (such as lack of funds) 
were generally known and need not be reported. The subconscious desire to 'wish away' 
problems, a tendency within rational comprehensive planning practices (see section 1.3), may 
be another. Whatever the reasons, it has to be mentioned that the P&D Department's senior 
management itself had apparently become dissatisfied with the format and information 
provided, since it agreed with an officer of the United Nations Department of Technical 
Cooperation for Development (UNDTCD) to overhaul the system on the promise of technical 
assistance as well as the development of a computerised system. 
5.2 The variety of projects included 
One of the principles of the monitoring routine in AJK was that there was only one quarterly 
report format, which was to be used by all projects in the ADP (cf. Table 5.1). Whether the 
project was large or small, of blueprint type or unique, construction oriented or 'soft', 
agricultural or hydro-electric, it was to report on the same fixed format. It is then not 
surprising that this resulted in the very disparate responses that can be observed in the table. 
Large and important projects sometimes paid more attention to the reporting of their progress 
than small projects, but by no means always. Mega-projects such as Rural Electrification of 
AJK were often reported on less than one page (cf. Table 5.1 on page 155), while much 
smaller projects such as the opening of a few dispensaries in a district cumulatively covered 
a larger number of pages because there were many more of such projects and the planning 
section of the Health department was more interested in filling out the details. Sectors which 
felt that they needed a lot of exposure were sometimes over-reporting to a ludicrous extent, 
such as the Azad Kashmir Minerals Development Corporation and its small projects (not 
reflected in the table for reasons of brevity). For an impression of the variety of projects 
being undertaken in the Annual Development Programme, Table Al. 1 in Annex 1 (page 287) 
contains a list of all projects that fell in the sample for the file study. 
Variety of ADP subsectors and categories of projects 
Another way of looking at issues of scope and variety of projects in the ADP is by grouping 
these by sectors and subsectors. In Table 5.2 on the next page, the projects are grouped by 
sub-sector, and details are included on the average project cost and the main project 
orientation, i.e. whether construction or something else. 
As can be seen, there were eleven sectors and as many as 54 sub-sectors and categories of 
projects. Of the 479 projects in the ADP, only some 82 (17 percent) were not entirely 
oriented at construction of buildings or structures. 83 percent of all projects was therefore 
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entirely construction-oriented, and a further seven percent was partially construction oriented. 
In budgetary terms, the proportion was even higher: 94 percent of the ADP budget went to 
projects dealing entirely or partly with construction. This underlines the nature of the 
development programme, which is mainly capital expenditure for physical infrastructure. 
Such construction- oriented projects were nevertheless of dissimilar nature, and varied from 
roads, bridges and airports to schools, hospitals, offices, government officer residences, 
government guest houses, site and service projects for public housing or industrial estates; 
depots, jails, irrigation channels, electricity grids, sewerage, drainage, latrine construction, 
parks, tubewells, potable water supply systems, and hydro-electricity (hydel) stations. 
The projects referred to here as mixed added furniture or equipment to the building, and 
occasionally performed activities like training for which salaries and materials then needed 
to be funded on temporary basis. Occasionally, they concerned agriculture and forestry 
oriented projects which also built feeder roads, offices and 'godowns', such as the Integrated 
Hill Farming Development Project. 
Most of the projects not related to construction were in the sectors of agriculture, industry, 
minerals, and health. Examples here were projects in reforestation, seed or fertilizer 
distribution, on-station and on-farm agricultural research, fruit plant or forest nurseries, 
poultry extension, training in animal husbandry and scholarships, watershed management, 
cold water fish culture, silk seed production, wood seasoning plants, geological surveys of 
mineral resources, immunisation of children, and health education. Blueprints for the 
activities of such projects did (and do) usually not exist and therefore they required a very 
specialised kind of expertise for their preparation as well as subsequent progress reporting. 
Another feature of the project portfolio was that some projects were in fact set up as 
programmes in the sense that they had multiple outputs at multiple locations, whereas others 
were the more classical single-output projects at single locations. That both types were found 
side by side has to do with the definition of a project in AJK and Pakistan, which is nothing 
more than that what is approved by an Administrative Approval of the Government and 
entered as a single budget line in the ADP. As such, a project could comprise a feasibility 
study or the levelling of a few school playgrounds, with a cost of only Rs 0.100 Million. On 
the other hand, some projects grouped so many activities that they had better be called 
programme projects. The largest in the ADP of 1990-91 in terms of budget are listed in Table 
5.3. 
Table 5.3 Large 'Programme Projects' in the ADP 1990-91, AJK. 
'Programme' project Cost 
(RsM) 
ADP 
Alloc. 
Integrated Hill Farming Development Project 411.996 90.000 
Reforestation of Blanks 123.516 20.465 
Primary Education Development & Expansion Project 108.873 40.000 
Electrification of Rural Areas in AK Phase III 704.075 151.408 
Rural Water Supply, Hygiene, & Sanitation Programme 902.178 16.500 
With over 30 percent of the total ADP allocation tied up in these five megaprojects alone, 
it can be imagined that their monitoring by Review bodies might have benefitted from a 
different, or additional, reporting format. 
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Table 5.2 Sectors and projects in the AJK Annual Development Programme of 
1990-91. 
SECTOR Costs No. Average Construction 
Sub-sector i ncludi ng of Cost Orientation: 
(project category) Foreign Proj- per (Nos. projects) 
Loans ects Project 
Rs. in M Rs. in M Yes No Mix 
AGRICULTURE 1005.524 36 27.931 7 19 10 
Crop Husbandry 165.103 12 13.759 1 8 3 
Animal Husbandry 111.297 10 11.130 1 4 5 
Forestry 293.418 7 41.917 6 1 
Tourism 23.710 6 3.952 5 1 
Int. Hill Farming Dev Pr 411.996 1 411.996 1 
INDUSTRY & MINERALS 328.753 33 9.962 13 13 8 
Industries 210.809 22 9.582 12 4 7 
Govt. Printing Press 5.454 1 5.454 1 
1 AKMIDC 112.490 10 11.249 9 
EDUCATION 1328.421 82 16.200 64 5 13 
Primary Educ. 108.873 1 108.873 1 
Middle Schools 365.818 23 15.905 20 3 
1 High Schools 417.636 29 14.401 26 2 
College Educ. 224.733 18 12.485 10 8 
Teachers Training 42.726 3 14.242 3 
Techn. Education 82.940 3 27.647 3 
Sports Stadiums 34.000 3 11.333 3 
Secondary Board 3.995 1 3.995 1 
Polytechnic Ins t i tu te 47.700 1 1 
HEALTH 977.497 41 23.841 35 6 
(Dispensari es) 55.116 5 11.023 5 
(MCH Centres) 35.767 2 17.884 2 
(Basic Health Units) 85.417 5 17.083 5 
(Dental Clinics) 4.515 1 4.515 1 
(Rural Health Centres) 129.440 6 21.573 6 
(Hospitals) 476.427 9 52.936 9 
(Hosp/Dispensaries) 64.405 3 21.468 3 
(Paramed. Inst i tutes) 66.182 1 66.182 1 
(Health Programmes) 41.524 6 6.921 5 
(T.B. Sanatoria) 9.910 2 4.955 2 1 
(Store Depot) 8.794 1 8.794 1 
WATER 154.404 5 30.881 5 
POWER 3982.013 10 398.201 10 
(Rural Electrification) 1504.975 2 752.488 2 
(Other Electrification) 5.105 1 5.105 1 
(Hydel Schemes) 2471.933 7 353.133 7 
continued... 
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Table 5.2 (cont.d) Sectors and projects in the AJK ADP of 1990-91 
SECTOR Costs No. Average Construction 
Sub-sector including of Cost Orientation 
(project category) Foreign Proj- per (Nos. projects) 
Loans ects Project 
No Mix Rs. in M Rs. in M Yes 
TRANSPORT & COMMUNIC. 1960.197 179 10.951 176 3 
Double Lane Roads 291.309 10 29.131 10 
Major Roads 437.967 30 14.599 28 2 
Frontier Works Org. 230.000 1 230.000 1 
Link Roads 581.538 99 5.874 99 
Fairweather Roads 87.735 4 21.934 4 
Bridges 283.240 25 11.330 24 1 
Ai morts 33.333 2 16.667 2 
CDO schemes 15.075 8 1.884 8 
PHYS. PLANNING & HOUSING 806.058 60 13.434 58 2 2 
Publ. Health Engineering 272.636 12 22.720 12 
Government housing 372.122 35 10.632 33 2 
Public Housing 88.235 4 22.059 4 
CDO schemes 7.600 4 1.900 4 
MDA schemes 57.175 4 14.294 4 
LGRD Offices 8.290 1 8.290 1 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 857.577 12 71.465 10 
(Special Programs) 729.013 2 364.507 
10 
2 
(Block Allocations) 128.564 10 12.856 
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT 
Planning & Devt. Deptt. 17.607 2 8.804 2 
SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT PR. 451.584 17 26.564 17 
PWD Muzaffarabad 39.042 2 19.521 2 
Devt. Authority Muzaff. 71.433 4 17.858 4 
Depressed Valleys Progr. 216.381 7 30.912 7 
Tourism 15.900 1 15.900 1 
Refugees Rehabilitation 20.000 1 20.000 1 
Education 76.500 1 76.500 1 
PWD 12.328 1 12.328 1 
Total ADP+SDP Commitments 11869.635 479 24.780 395 49 33 
ADP/SDP Alloc. 1990-91 1031.579 479 2.154 
Total excl.Neelum V.Hydel 9568.635 478 20.018 
ADP/SDP Alloc. 1990-91 1030.579 478 2.156 
* The sub-sectors in brackets do not appear officially in the ADP, but the projects can be grouped as such. The number of projects in the ADP included around 25 projects that had already been completed in the previous year. 
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Project rationale 
Meanwhile, the rationale for the decision as to whether to write a PC-1 for a single-output 
activity, or whether to cover a number of such activities under a programme budget, was (and 
is) not always straightforward. Although an attempt was made as far back as 1959 at defining 
the distinction between developmental and recurrent expenditures2, no criteria for defining 
the proper size and scope of projects were ever set in Pakistan. The Rural Electrification 
project, for instance, forms the umbrella under which all the diverse grid stations and 
high/low transmission line networks and house connections in AJK are hidden. Obviously 
such a wide scope gives the Electricity Department a great deal of freedom in deciding which 
activity to pursue where and when. Separating all these activities out into single projects with 
their own budgets would hold the department accountable to finishing all these projects within 
their cost and time frame. For all these projects, PC-Is would have to be written and 
approved. Monitoring by an outside party would be potentially much more damaging than 
in a situation where only the grand totals of High Tension and Low Tension transmission 
lines have to be reported to Review Meetings. In that case, the outside party cannot do a 
sample check. 
In deciding on other cases, such as with the Rural Water Supply, Hygiene and Sanitation 
Programme which covered some 500 villages in AJK, other factors may have played a role: 
first of all, a programme project offers the attractive prospect of then meeting eligibility 
criteria for World Bank loan support. Programme approaches are popular with the major 
donor organisations; individual 'piecemeal' village water supply projects such as undertaken 
in NWFP are seen as drops in the ocean. Secondly, individual village projects run the risk 
of being appropriated or contested by Legislative Assembly members or Union Councils. 
Since the AJK Government and its central departments do not trust local level decision-
making on projects, they prefer to keep the decision power to themselves, which is easier to 
accomplish when the project is of a size justifying a Project Manager at the level of a 
Secretary. A programme project supported by the World Bank offers even more opportunities 
for maintaining decision power within the administrative realm, since an alliance can be built 
with World Bank staff. 
In other cases, the argumentation runs against the constitution of programme projects and 
then the preference is with piecemeal small schemes. Of all 454 projects in the ADP of 1990-
91, 177 or over one thirds were roads and bridges with the Public Works Department, 
receiving a little over a fifth of the ADP allocation. It is not immediately clear why for 
example the 99 link road construction projects in AJK were not put in a district link road 
programme - much of the work was 'improvement' or (renewed) metalling/blacktopping 
anyway. An approach such as with the Rural Electrification project would seem very suitable 
here, particularly because a flexible approach is required to counter the recurring landslides, 
road sinking problems, and land acquisition problems. One reason mentioned in favour of the 
small project approach was that these were the most favoured pet projects of politicians. Road 
construction programmes have not been very attractive for donor funding, whereas an 
additional advantage for the formulation of many small projects is that the substantial fringe 
benefits derived from the many contracts with local contractors can be evenly spread across 
the many Executive Engineers and their staff. With centrally purchased cables, poles and 
transformers there is much less opportunity for an even spreading of the 'rents'. 
1 Reproduced on pp 473/475 in paper F.M. 1, Federal Planning Commission, Projects Wing, 1991 and 
discussed in more detail in section 7.3 of this study. 
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A curious organisation of projects in a sectoral portfolio was found in the education sector. 
Here, most school projects grouped their activities on a district-wide basis, but they did not 
constitute 'full' programme projects in the sense of producing multiple finished outputs. For 
instance, there were district programmes into construction of new schools, programmes to 
build additional classrooms to existing schools, to buy land for new schools in various places, 
to build boundary walls around girls schools, to reconstruct schools, to buy furniture for 
schools, etc. Some of these projects were run by District Education Officers and others by 
Executive Engineers of the PWD. As such the creation of a single school might be the 
product of a variety of projects and officers each completing a component (one for furniture, 
one for the boundary wall, one for textbooks); the 'integration' of activities at the school 
level might therefore be much more difficult to achieve than that associated with the more 
'integrated' programme projects. The effect of programme management upon the constitution 
of the Education Department's projects is self-evident.3 
Criteria of efficiency and effectiveness did not always determine the nature, optimal size 
and coverage of an individual ADP project. Expediency and strategic behaviour of 
departments were also important determinants, especially in those cases where it was difficult 
to marry a project structure with process- or programme-oriented management by 
departments. And whatever the project modality selected, the ease of monitoring for the 
Review Meeting appeared to be the least of all considerations. 
Differences in funding sources 
There were also differences in funding arrangements of the projects. First of all, the ADP 
included the sector Special Development Programme, which was granted to AJK from the 
Federation in 1988 'over and above the normal ADP' after the Zia period. The SDP was not 
a programme in the real sense of the word, with a group of connected activities and one 
major objective, but rather a heterogeneous group of unrelated projects in roads, parks, 
schools, refugee rehabilitation and the like. In 1990-91, the SDP grant was no longer 
earmarked, but had to be financed from the overall development grant to AJK. Thus, little 
reason had remained for reporting the projects differently or separately from the other sectors 
in the ADP. Although the individual SDP projects could easily have been placed in their 
substantive sectors, the P&DD preferred to account for them in order to convey the 
impression that this 'sector' initiated by the Federal Government needed special consideration, 
i.e. funds over and above the normal ADP grant. For this reason, it also received separate 
attention in the working paper and the Review Meeting, in the (vain) hope that the federal 
Planning Commission would feel responsible for its future. 
Other than the SDP, there were three special categories which were different from the AJK 
Government funded projects and as such could be argued to merit separate reporting formats: 
projects which were at least partly self-financing, a few small projects which received a 
federal contribution, and thirdly, foreign aided projects. The self-financing projects (five in 
all) were public housing schemes where development costs were to be recovered by the 
proceeds of plot sales. Eight other projects received a limited amount of support from federal 
ministries such as a project setting up women industrial schools which received support from 
the Women Division. Of the 13 foreign aided projects, ten received technical assistance based 
on grants, while a further three were supported by a concessional loan, from either the World 
3 Dunsire's (1978, pp. 150-151) worry about control by a bureaucracy comes to mind here: bureaucracies tend 
to cut up decisions in so many aspects each handled by different subordinate offices and persons that the general 
picture with each of them has disappeared and control as a whole is more difficult. Monitoring of decisions 
(projects) will be affected by this as well. 
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Bank, the OPEC, or the IFAD. The exact amounts of foreign assistance were often not 
reported properly in the ADP book, and neither the nature of the assistance: grant, technical 
assistance or loan. Although the UNDTCD project put emphasis on introducing systematic 
distinctions in the ADP and the monitoring databases, the P&DD remained sloppy in its 
registrations. The inclination to underestimate the support from other than federal sources in 
the published ADP was an obvious reason for this4. The P&DD could then argue that in 
contrast with the Provinces, AJK did not get much foreign aid and would have to be 
supported with more funds from the federal government. Obviously, the monitoring of such 
categories of schemes suffered because of these strategic reasons. 
'Sponsoring' and 'implementing' departments 
Another major difference between projects, largely ignored by the old review report format, 
was whether the 'sponsoring department', i.e. the department submitting the PC-1 was the 
same as the department implementing the (bulk of the) project subsequently. As we have 
seen, many projects involved a substantial amount of construction, and if it concerned civil 
works then they were usually supervised by the Public Works Department. PWD, apart from 
covering the Transport & Communication sector and most of the Physical Planning & 
Housing sectors, also took care of the construction of works in projects of the Agriculture 
Department, Animal Husbandry Department, Forestry Department, Industries Department, 
Education Department (middle and high schools, and colleges), and the Health Department. 
Other departments involved in physical infrastructure were the Electricity Department, the 
Hydro-electric Board, and some authorities such as the Mirpur Development Authority and 
the Development Authority Muzaffarabad. Local Government Department had its own 
engineering wing, while many of the primary schools were directly built by local councils, 
under supervision of engineering staff of the Education Department. A remarkable feature of 
the Public Works Department was that with all the works that it did for other departments, 
it did not independently report the physical progress to these departments or to the P&DD. 
The only thing it did (but erratically) was to send the counterpart departments a monthly 
listing of the expenditures incurred. The sponsoring departments had (and have) to monitor 
the works of the PWD. 
Unidimensional approach 
All these special categories of projects had to report in the same format just like the regular 
projects and the impression is therefore that AJK (no different, by the way, from the more 
elaborate formats in Pakistan) held a rather unidimensional view of the projects in the ADP. 
If the differences in size, funding, scope and organisation of projects were recognised at all, 
then it was remarked that the format was open enough for the departments to enter all 
information that they liked, and use as much space as needed. A diversification of the report 
formats, in order to make sure that crucial information specific to certain types of projects 
was submitted, was not favoured because this would complicate the administrative and 
logistical procedures. Too many different forms would have to be distributed to too many 
different parties. But another reason is perhaps even more pertinent: The P&DD was wont 
to believing that all projects have, and should have, similar targets and achievements and that 
reality can be summarised in a straightforward way. In such a conception, the idea that 
4 There was an instruction by the Economic Affairs Division of the Finance Ministry that, contrary to the 
Provinces, foreign aid was part of the ADP in AJK and should not be seen as an additionality. Therefore, the 
reflection of foreign aid in the ADP was considered risky, especially in cases when it was not totally confirmed. 
163 
projects may have short term and long term targets, and may be diverse in terms of input, 
output, effect and impact targets, did not fit very well. 
5.3 The response from the line departments 
As was argued in chapter 1, a defining characteristic of any monitoring system is the 
regularity and speed of submission of its reports. In AJK, as in Pakistan, the last date of 
submission of quarterly progress reports is usually the 15th of the month after the quarter to 
be reviewed; the Review itself is ideally held at the end of the month (FPC 1991). In practice 
this deadline was usually not met. 
The following account of the process in the first quarter of 1990-91 gives one illustration 
of this. Only five out of the sixteen departments met the deadline of the 15th of October5. 
The other eleven departments missed the deadline by a few days, upto almost three weeks6. 
One department (Local Government Department), even did not report at all, although a few 
financial figures were verbally communicated to the relevant P&DD Section Chief for 
inclusion in the working paper. 
The delay in submission was viewed as a problem by P&DD, because on the 28th of 
October it sent out a reminder telex, asking for the submission of the information within two 
days positively. However, by that time, the date of the Review Meeting could still not be 
announced due to unavailability of the Prime Minister. As is also clear from Table 4.2 in the 
previous chapter (page 127), the first quarter Review Meeting was held exceptionally late in 
1990-91, on the 26th of December - almost at the end of the second quarter - probably for 
reasons of political problems in Pakistan after the dismissal of the Benazir Bhutto 
Government. However, in the other years that the author stayed in AJK, the first quarter 
Review Meeting was also late: the 19th of November in 1992, the 9th of December in 1991. 
In 1993, the first quarter meeting was not held at all. It was therefore not the first, nor the 
last time that the preparation of the working paper must have been a relaxed affair for the 
P&DD, and there was in fact even time on the 27th November for a letter asking for 
explanations as to why the utilisation of the allocation during the first quarter had been so 
low. On the 9th December, finally, a letter could be sent out announcing the Review 
Meeting, and annexing the working paper that P&DD had by then prepared. 
The period between closing of the quarter and submission of the reports was not very 
different in other years or for different quarters and it can be concluded that it takes 
departments two to five weeks to come up with the information. This fairly long period 
would normally deprive the P&DD of the possibility of a proper analysis of the information, 
but thanks to the inordinate delays in holding the Reviews that were noted, this is still 
possible. In the next sections (particularly section 5.7), it will be studied what kind of 
analysis the P&DD performed. Of course, a major effect of the delaying of the Review 
Meetings must be reduced effectiveness. 
5 Animal Husbandry Department (13-10), the Development Authority Muzaffarabad (14-10), Forestry and 
Tourism Departments (15-10) and Hydel Board (15-10). 
6 Agriculture department submitted on the 16th, the Integrated Hill Farming Development Project (which has 
its own offices the size of a department by itself) on the 17th, AKMIDC on the 22nd, Education department 
on the 23rd, Water on the 25th, Industries Department on the 29th, and some of the largest departments 
submitted last: Electricity and Public Works Departments on 30th October and Health Department even on the 
3rd November. 
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Can the system be speeded up? 
The question may be raised whether the submission time can be speeded up so that, like for 
instance in NWFP, initial sectoral review meetings within the P&DD take place at the end 
of the month to first sift the main issues and a more official Quarterly Review takes place 
later under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. This two stage review process might 
significantly improve the usefulness of the monitoring exercise as a whole and make it less 
dependent upon the availability of the Prime Minister7. To answer this question, the situation 
inside the departments should be taken into account. First of all, as a rule of thumb (as also 
confirmed by observations in the Provinces of Pakistan), it seems that the financial closing 
of a quarter takes around ten days. In that period the departmental budget officers and 
accountants check all accounts and consolidate these. The figures are entered into the 
quarterly reports, which may take another few days. The physical progress information, like 
the financial information, has to refer, technically, to the situation at the end of the last day 
of the last month of the quarter under review, and can then be entered in these ten days by 
other officers, dealing with the projects. Both lines of information would therefore be able 
to come together within the Planning Cells of the line departments, and be consolidated (i.e. 
checked and collated) and then sent off to the P&DD in its capacity as secretariat for the 
Review Meetings. 
The main problem is that before the information can formally be dispatched, it has to be 
seen and signed by the head of the department, which takes time. Especially in those cases 
where physical information needs to come from the field, it is first the district or division 
head which signs and then, after collation at headquarters, the head of the department. In this 
process, usually a week or so passes. If these steps could be skipped and the reports are sent 
to the Review Body and to the departmental heads simultaneously, a significant speeding up 
of the flow of the information could be achieved. This would also be in line with the spirit 
of the monitoring process in AJK: basic information should come from the lower reaches, and 
be factual. Officers supervising at higher levels should not have much substantive to add, nor 
to hide. But this does not seem possible in the hierarchical structure of departments in AJK: 
information to be submitted to a level chaired by the PM has to be approved by the Secretary 
himself, even if his signature is a formality and if the information is sometimes later 
disowned by these same Secretaries in the Review Meetings. This is another occasion where 
it can be concluded that strategic, departmental rationality overrides the instrumental 
rationality to dispatch the information as soon as possible. 
Systemic problems 
There were also other problems within the departments hampering the speed of the flow of 
information to the Review Meeting. From a review of the departmental structures it became 
clear that many Planning Cells complained about the lack of staff and in particular the 
complete absence of positions with the designation of monitoring officer. This relegated their 
work to within the ambit of their own offices; none of these officers was ever sent into the 
field. The progress information that they had to consolidate came to them on paper and was 
at best verified with the field officers on the phone. Since the other tasks of the planning 
officers - writing blueprint-type PC-Is and collecting statistics - often also did not bring them 
outside their offices, there was usually a motivation problem. Feeling marginalised from 
positions of decision-making and with most planning officers lacking first hand experiences 
7 For instance, for the third quarter in 1990-91, all information was gathered and even a working paper was 
written by the P&DD. But due to unavailability of the PM a Review Meeting was not held. 
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with project management (especially in grades 16 and 17), their lack of enthusiasm led to 
dry, uninspiring quarterly reports as well as a sometimes inexplicably late submission of these 
reports to the P&D Department. Table 5.4 shows that the highest grade officers in Planning 
Cells were usually of grade 18 (Assistant Director or Deputy Director). These would 
normally have more field experience and be more easily allowed to visit the field. But still, 
they would not be senior enough to measure up to the Superintending Engineers or Directors 
posts that in many departments ruled the field formations. Such grade 18 staff in the Planning 
Cells were also transferred frequently; some officers considered being placed in a Planning 
Cell a punishment. Sometimes this view was correct, for instance if an officer in the field 
was considered to have been involved in an irregularity or in exposing an irregularity. This 
did not increase these officers' commitment to the work. On the other hand, many of the 
grade 17 and 16 staff did not make promotions in more than ten or twenty years. Their 
economics or statistics degrees were deemed to make them unsuitable for promotion to 
technical posts in many departments. 
Size of Planning Cells in line departments 
From the size of the Planning Cells in relation to the number of projects per planner and the 
size of the ADP allocation per planner, it would appear that there were discrepancies so some 
of them could have done with more staff. Not too much should be made of such a 
comparison since the large variety of projects in the different departments may require 
completely differently structured planning cells. But after also studying patterns of submission 
of information to the P&DD in 1991-92, it does seem that departments with absent or small 
planning cells such as PWD, Electricity, and Health, were usually late with their information. 
Expanding the size of their Planning Cell (and creating it in the PWD) could then improve 
the speed with which the information would be collated and forwarded. 
Table 5.4 Staffing situation in the Planning Cells of the AJK line agencies in 1990-91 
(BPS > 16). 
Grade: 
Department 
Agriculture 1 
Education 
LG&RD 
Electr ici ty 
Forestry 
Industries 
Mirpur Devnt. 
AKMIDC2 
Animal Husbandry 
Health 
Devnt. Auth/ Muz.d3 
Public Works 
Tourism 
Auth. y 3 
16 17 18 total Projects ADP allocation 
per planner per planner 
2 4 1 7 1.7 Rs 5.3 M 
3 2 1 6 12.8 Rs 17.9 M 
2 1 2 5 2.6 Rs 23.8 M 
2 1 3 4.0 Rs 65.0 M 
1 1 1 3 3.3 Rs 16.7 M 
2 1 3 7.7 Rs 8.7 M 
1 1 3 3.0 Rs 3.0 M 
1 1 2 4.5 Rs 5.0 M 
1 1 2 5.0 Rs 7.0 M 
1 1 2 19.0 RS 36.0 M 
2 2 3.0 Rs 4.0 M 
(no desi gnated Planning Cell) 
(no designated Planning Cell) 
1: The Grade 18 is a Soil Scientist working in planning on part time basis; 2: Includes 2 vacancies for a Manager Planning (18) and an Asst. Manager Planning (16); 
3: The Planning Cells of the Authorities include the tasks of town planning and PC-1 preparation. 
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The real question is why these improvements had not already been made. The answer may 
have been provided already: since the Planning Cells were viewed as offices where 'routine' 
information from field formations is mostly collated, and their function often seen as 'post 
boxes', there was little incentive for line departments to expand these dusty cubicles into fully 
fledged dusty places. It was the P&DD, not the parent department of the planning cell, which 
was most interested in the timely submission of the information8. The notion that these 
offices could play a role in counterchecking the information from the field for their own 
senior management certainly had not taken root in the line departments. The 'self-evaluating 
organization', as ironically labeled by Wildavsky (1972), was also a contradiction in terms 
in AJK. The perception of a department with functional division of tasks without duplication 
remained stronger than the internal distrust or dialogue-orientedness required for the creation 
of some 'functional redundancy' (cf. Caiden & Wildavsky 1974). 
5.4 Monitoring of financial progress 
The information in the quarterly review reports as used up to the early 1990s fell into three 
broad categories: financial progress, physical progress, and problem reporting. Of these three, 
without any doubt it was financial information that was most relied on for the Review 
Meetings. This was monitoring par excellance: all those hundreds of disparate projects 
reduced to their simple financial essences, their progress exactly quantified and made 
comparable under a single denominator: the Pakistani Rupee (in Millions of). As shall be 
seen, other information would often be discarded, due to the problems with generating 
adequate summaries of physical progress and the inescapable subjectivity involved in 
reporting problems. Financial progress was then taken as the best approximation of physical 
progress, while lack of expenditures was held the best indicator of problems. Such 
simplifications, attractive though they may appear, yet have a lot of pitfalls as shall be 
discussed below. 
Financial utilisation as indicator of physical progress 
The first and most obvious reason why financial progress is a weak indicator of physical 
progress is that certain works, which may not carry a high cost, may yet be of crucial 
importance to the timely completion of the scheme. An example of this is the tendering 
process and contract award which does not involve any significant cost to the project budget. 
The acquisition of land before construction works start is another. Such activities are liable 
to large unforseen delays. After these hitches are taken, a project can usually go much faster 
than would appear on the basis of the amount of expenditures incurred already. 
A second reason is of an entirely different nature: a 100 percent utilisation of the funds 
may not be equal to a completion of the project. As was concluded in the previous chapter, 
44 percent of all projects need to undergo a financial revision (which is invariably upward). 
Other projects are not revised but may use the option to utilise a 15 percent 'cost excess', 
meaning mat almost one sixth more than the approved cost can be spent without the project 
needing to go through a formal re-approval process. When these cases are also taken into 
8 For this reason they occasionally launched the idea to bring these planning cells in the line departments under 
the direct control of the P&DD - an idea that was never realised. 
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account then it can be safely concluded that around half of all projects are not adequately 
budgeted and therefore financial progress may not match physical progress. 
A third reason is that even in a project where there is no revision or cost excess and where 
the works can be more easily expressed in financial terms, physical progress may not be 
commensurate with financial progress. Physical progress may have been booked, while 
payments lag behind. The reverse may also be the case. In projects where a lot of purchases 
need to be made, upfront payment of a substantial amount is usually required, so that for 
instance the purchase of all the pipes needed for a water supply project does not mean that 
a substantial amount of work has been done on the ground, or that the pipes have even 
arrived on the site. But the more frequent case is that of a payment of work done by a 
contractor. Only after a certain portion of the work has been completed and signed for by the 
supervisor, the contractor is supposed to be paid his instalment. A substantial portion of work 
may therefore be completed before the payment is registered in the accounts. This is the more 
so because disagreements between the contractor and the supervising Drawing and Disbursing 
Officer (DDO) frequently occur, so that payments are not immediately made. In an ADP full 
of construction, this would then lead to the conclusion that the amount of physical progress 
made is generally larger than the financial progress reported at any time, but this is not so. 
A fourth reason for the difficulty in interpreting the financial progress prevents the 
application of such a rule of thumb. At year's end, in June, when the risk of unused and 
therefore lapsing funds looms, departments may illicitly pre-pay contractors for works not yet 
completed. This ensures that all funds available are utilised and that there is also no break in 
activities due to the passing over to a new financial year with new annual budgets and 
required clearances for these projects. It also increases options for underhand deals with 
contractors, which is a benefit to the engineers involved, while it can yet be defended with 
reference to the need for fast completion of the project and full utilisation of the funds 
available9. 
A fifth reason applies only to the Local Government & Rural Development Department 
(which is allocated ten percent of the ADP mostly through lump sums) and a few semi-
autonomous agencies in AJK. The Azad Kashmir Minerals Development Corporation, the 
Mirpur Development Authority and the Development Authority Muzaffarabad are allowed to 
put the allocations in separate accounts which are non-lapseable. (This applies in fact to all 
authorities and corporations in Pakistan.) When the funds are transferred to these accounts, 
the AG office registers these as expenditure although, in actual fact, the funds transferred 
have not yet been spent. The Local Government and Rural Development Department 
functions to some extent as a funding agency to the around 3000 very small projects of the 
local government tier. As such, it administers the block allocations received from the 
development budget and passes these on to its project directors in the councils and 
committees. Once these funds are transferred, they are deemed spent by the Accountant 
General, although the actual spending by the project directors at local level then still has to 
take place. 
A sixth reason is that the method of registration of expenditures may vary between 
departments and even between projects, thereby complicating the comparison of expenditures 
incurred. There should be no differences, because, in principle, all expenditures made by 
departments are to be registered only when they actually occur, i.e. when cheques have been 
9 Other options may also exist to prevent having to surrender funds. Chaturvedi (1988, p. 76) for instance found 
evidence in India that at the end of the year an irrigation department used to deposit unspent money with the 
Revenue Department for future compensation payments. The money was deposited for proposals that were still 
being made for requisition of land. Whether this was also done in AJK was not checked by this author. 
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pre-audited by departmental or AG accountants10. The accounting system in Pakistan is based 
on cash flows, not commitments (Account Code, Vol. I Article 21). But in order to inflate 
the utilisation rate of projects and thereby diminish the chances of being cut by the Finance 
Department, a line department may include in the expenditure statements bills that have been 
sent to the Accountant General's Office for pre-audit but which have not yet been stamped 
and signed there. The Education department even reports utilisation rates for projects which 
are always either 0, 25 , 50, 75 or 100 percent, obviously referring to the releases made to 
projects implemented by the PWD, and therefore having nothing to do with real expenditures 
and physical progress. The reporting system that many departments operated for Review 
Meetings therefore had as much to do with commitments as with actual cash flows. Although 
this is in violation of the regulations, departments may have strategic reasons to use such a 
system because, as was seen, particularly by the fourth quarter of the year hard decisions 
must be taken by the P&DD about the reappropriation of funds between 'fast' and 'slow' 
moving sectors and projects. Departments which have not demonstrated that they have spent 
a substantial portion of their allocation by then, may have their allocation cut and 
reappropriated to other sectors with a demonstrated higher utilisation rate. In 1990-91, the 
cutback was rather limited (3.5 percent) but in other years it is known to have risen to at least 
ten percent. A cutback is particularly unwelcome if a substantial number of bills happen to 
be pending with the Accountant General's Office. 
A last reason for the poor match between financial and physical progress is perhaps plain 
poor accounting by agencies or late reporting of consolidated accounts from the field to head 
offices. 
Discrepancies with figures from the Accountant General 
The combined effects of the technical problems, mistakes and strategic behaviour patterns 
become clear from a comparison of departmental figures with those from the Accountant 
General, which keeps the account of verified expenditures. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 demonstrate 
that mistakes are frequently made, but that the overall bias is towards exaggeration of the 
expenditures incurred. In the first quarter of 1990-91 the departments reported 14.8 percent 
more expenditures than the AG, in the third the difference was 3.5 percent11. In the first 
quarter of 1991-92, the difference was even 24 percent. The discrepancies are remarkable 
since, as noted, the AG should normally have a more up to date and therefore higher 
expenditure registration. The discrepancy between what the line department and the AG 
records for individual projects is even larger. As can be observed from Table 5.6, both 
overestimates and underestimates of expenditures are given by departments; with the average 
being an overestimate. The reason mentioned before, cheques yet to be stamped as approved 
by the AG, explain most of the overestimates. Underestimates of line departments are harder 
to explain. Plain mistakes may have been made; perhaps certain expenditures which the AG 
registered in the present quarter, were entered in the books of the line department at the end 
of the preceding quarter. As there is a registration of expenditure before the cheque goes to 
the AG office, as well as after it has come back (as consolidated expenditure), the registration 
1 0 There may be temporary discrepancies between the two systems because of a time lag factor, that is, the 
accounts are received first in the agency, certified, passed to the AG for pre-audit, authorisation for expenditure, 
and preparation of a cheque drawn on the National Bank of Pakistan. The accounts and cheque are then returned 
to the agency for payment, at which point the agency enters the payment into its own ledger. 
1 1 The discrepancy decreases over the year given that for instance in the third quarter, the accounts for the first 
and second quarter will have been sorted between the agency and the AG, so that these are compatible. 
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in the books from the period before the AG pre-audit must then have been reported, in an 
attempt to beef up the overall expenditure figure. 
Mistakes are not only made with expenditures. For 31 percent of all projects, there was 
a difference between what the ADP and what the AG recorded as the total project cost as per 
PC-1; a similar proportion of projects also had a different ADP allocation in the AG record 
and Quarterly Review Report. With all the drawbacks connected with departmental reporting 
of costs, allocations and expenditures it is unfortunate that the consolidated quarterly accounts 
prepared by the Accountant General's Office did not play a larger role in the monitoring 
process. One of the reasons is that such consolidated accounts were usually prepared too late 
for this; a month easily lapsed. But if the AG Office is to be believed, the accounts could be, 
and are to be, prepared within two weeks after the closing of a quarter. A partial solution to 
the problem of the discrepancies would be that the departments submit two sets of expenditure 
figures: one verified set of actual expenditures based on cash flows, and in principle identical 
to the set of figures maintained by the AG office. The other would then be a set of figures 
based on payments including the commitments made (i.e. pending bills). The reason why the 
Government in AJK did not wish to get involved in a commitment-based expenditure 
registration can be imagined: commitments can easily be manipulated. The suggestion is, 
however, not to replace the cash-flow registration system, but to use it side by side with a 
commitment-based system. 
Table 5.5 Comparison of expenditures registered by 
Agriculture Department/IHFDP, AJK 1990-91, by project 
AG-office and by 
projects Agr Dept 
7-9/90 
1st QRR 
AG Off. 
7-9/90 
Exp.St. 
Diff. 
with 
AG 
Office 
Revised 
estimate 
ADP90-91 
(6/91) 
(Rs in Millions) 
AG end Diff. 
of year with 
accounts AG 
(11/91) Off. 
Farm Mech Organisation 
Cereal crops improvement 
Proc.& dis t r ib . inputs 
Strengthening IATI 
Disease free potato seed 
Input godowns in AK 
Certified vegetable seed 
Fruit plant nurseries 
Agric support services 
Total 
IHFDP 
0.142 0.173 -18.0? 
0.120 0.129 -6.7% 
0.539 0.633 -14.9% 
0.500 0.220 126.9% 
0.119 0.118 1.1% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.014 -100.0% 
0.0% 
1.420 1.287 10.3% 
6.928 6.928 0.0% 
5.497 
1.320 
5.330 
2.810 
0.583 
1.270 
1.055 
1.698 
0.437 
5.574 
1.486 
5.165 
2.655 
0.704 
0.861 
1.055 
1.697 
0.442 
20.000 19.639 
85. 81.995 
-1.4% 
-11.2% 
3.2% 
5.8% 
-17.2% 
47.5% 
0.0% 
0.1% 
-1.1% 
1.8% 
3.7% 
Note: QRR: Quarterly Review Report; Exp.St.: Expenditure Statement 
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Table 5.6 Comparison of expenditures registered by AG-office and line 
departments, AJK 1st and 3rd quarter 1990-91, by sector. 
Rs in Millions 
Name of Sector 1st Quarter 1990 -91 Upto 3rd Quarter 1990-91 
AG Deptts. Diff. AG Deptts. Diff. 
Agriculture 1.287 1.420 10 3% 7.411 11.270 52.1% 
Animal husbandry 1.794 1.650 -8 0% 5.853 6.500 11.0% 
Forestry 6.690 6.697 0 1% 32.045 32.052 0.0% 
IHFDP 6.928 6.928 0 0% 43.189 43.189 0.0% 
Industry 0.830 1.535 85 0% 7.047 11.384 61.6% 
AKMIDC 0.000 0.075 100 0% 0.150 0.701 367.3% 
Water 0.000 0.000 0 0% 9.000 9.000 0.0% 
Power 0.088 0.100 13 7% 105.713 98.109 -7.2% 
Education 13.504 18.365 36 0% 63.704 66.062 3.7% 
Health 8.291 8.501 2 5% 30.250 38.346 26.8% 
T&C 14.485 14.852 2 5% 122.251 122.754 0.4% 
PPH 3.149 3.217 2 21 37.705 37.069 -1.7% 
Local Govt. 0.000 0.000 0 0% 68.800 46.886 -31.9% 
P&D 0.024 0.021 -12 2% 0.123 0.134 9.0% 
SDP 1.405 3.450 145 5% 24.836 54.490 119.4% 
total 58.475 66.811 14 3% 558.079 577.905 3.6% 
Note: A M I D C is a corporation and therefore their own registration of expenditures may legitimately be different from the AG's which records the funds transferred from the exchequer to the account of the corporation. 
Financial utilisation as a guide for reappropriations 
In summary, the expenditures registered for a project often did not reflect the true 
expenditures and financial commitments made at that point, whereas the financial utilisation 
rates were poor indicators of physical progress. In fact, the question may be raised whether, 
with all the drawbacks mentioned, it is necessary at all to report financial progress. P&DD 
would frown at such a question, because although it would readily admit that expenditures 
are poor indicators of physical progress, it would yet argue that they are needed for purposes 
of reappropriations between and within sectors. There is, of course, something to say for this 
argument. Reappropriations are usually necessary over the course of a year for the following 
reasons: (1) the threat of funds lapsing at the end of the year because certain sectors or 
projects are unable to spend their allocations - leading to a shifting of funds from slow 
moving sectors and projects to fast moving sectors and projects; (2) the occurrence of a 
centrally imposed cut on all development grants which needs to be accommodated by slashing 
the budgets of the sectors; (3) the need to solve the problem of the 'operational shortfall'. 
The latter reason needs some elaboration. 
The operational shortfall is an amount added on to the ADP grant provided by the federal 
government, varying between Rs 10 and 100 million. Although, in actual fact, not available, 
it is distributed amongst the sectoral allocations as though it were. Since the ADP's sectoral 
allocations are legal ceilings to expenditures - until further notice - the operational shortfall 
serves as an incentive to departments to spend more and therefore also faster. Towards the 
fourth quarter of the year the P&DD checks which departments have spent a relatively large 
part of their annual allocations, and which have not. The latters' allocations are then cut back 
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to a level that is in line with the 'net' ADP grant as provided by the Federation in the first 
place. This rather odd strategy is resorted to because of the experience with an overall annual 
utilisation rate of the ADP of between 90 and 95 percent; using the strategy of the shortfall, 
the utilisation rate can be improved to 95-100 percent. An additional consequence of the 
operational shortfall is that it inflates the ADP when it is first presented and gives the 
impression that more is spent on development than actually is the case. In leaner years, when 
less grant is provided, the operational shortfall can inflate the ADP to a level nominally larger 
than the previous year's, which carries a political benefit. The Government can then show 
that it has not slashed the development budget. For instance, in the year 1991-92 the shortfall 
was Rs 95 million over an actual budget of Rs 1142 million; the year before it was Rs 42 
million over a budget of Rs 1108 million. Whereas the actual budget growth was only Rs 34 
million, the higher operational shortfall made it look like the budget had grown by Rs 76 
million. The new government could then give the impression to the public that it was more 
committed to development than the previous government12. 
Financial monitoring is therefore justified by the P&DD also for the sake of 
reappropriations, which are required for the optimal utilisation of the development funds 
granted each year by the Federal Government. The need for financial monitoring by P&DD 
for this reason cannot be denied, but at the same time attention needs to be drawn to a few 
factors why not too much should be expected from this instrument in the conditions under 
which it is to be applied. When the actual spending patterns over the year are reviewed, it 
appears that relatively little is spent upto the third quarter, so that there is little basis on 
which to predict the likely expenditures in the fourth quarter. Figure 5.1 and Table 5.7 show 
the quarterly spending patterns which demonstrate similarity across the consecutive years of 
1988-89, 1989-90 and 1990-91. 
Table 5.7 ADP spending patterns across the years of 1988-89 to 1990-91, AJK 
(percentages) 
Qtr 1 Ot.r ? Qtr 3 Otr 4 
1988-89 8.0 25.5 22.7 43.8 
1989-90 12.4 20.6 15.3 51.7 
1990-91 5.7 31.3 16.7 46.2 
Average 8.7 25.8 18.2 47.3 
St.Dev. 2.8 4.4 3.2 3.3 
First and fourth quarter expenditure patterns 
Two features stand out: First, the low expenditures in the first quarter of the year (around 
10 percent) and secondly, the very high recorded expenditure in the fourth quarter of the year 
(40-50 percent). Unfortunately it is difficult to find a satisfactory explanation for the low 
spending patterns in the first quarter. Part of the explanation could be a slow start of newly 
approved projects particularly at the beginning of a financial year. The possibilities of lengthy 
1 2 In some years, the operational shortfall would be lower and the foreign loan amounts expected much higher, 
which had a similar effect of inflating the ADP; in other years, the size of the foreign loans expected would 
be downplayed and the operational shortfall increased. 
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land acquisition, tendering and contract award leading to delays have already been mentioned. 
But since every year no more than ten to fifteen percent of all projects is new in the ADP, 
and since these are by no means all approved in the first quarter, there have to be additional 
reasons. Slow release of funds by the Finance Department may be a factor but in AJK it was 
not such a bottleneck as seen in parts of Pakistan. (This situation has, however, changed in 
more recent years.) Lackluster performance particularly in the hot summer but in fact in the 
winter (third quarter) as well may be a more serious reason, to be converted in more activity 
only when in the last months the prospect of the lapse of substantial funds begins to rise. This 
is what many officers in P&DD believe to be the case, and the main reason why even the 
Prime Minister traditionally, in every Review Meeting, exhorts his officers to speed up the 
works. Lack of commitment to development is then blamed for the low spending patterns 
upto the end of the third quarter. 
The carrying over of activities to the new financial year (June-September) which are pre-
paid from the budget of the last financial year may be another important reason. This is also 
supported by the fact that in the second and third quarter, the average expenditure comes 
more closely to the required 25 percent (see Table 5.7). (The third quarter which runs from 
January to March has usually slightly lower expenditures than the second, due to the effects 
of the winter season: snow and cold on mountain tops and plateaus impeding construction and 
in lower areas heavy rains causing landslides. See Figure 5.2 for an impression of 
temperature and rainfall variations in AJK.) The conclusion therefore seems warranted that 
the patterns of expenditures in the first and fourth quarters are interlinked by a programme 
management focusing on avoiding the lapse of funds. 
Whatever the reasons, at the start of the fourth quarter, almost half of the annual budget 
is formally still to be spent; and usually a quarter in the last month. If reappropriations are 
necessary at the start of the fourth quarter, then these cannot be aided very much by the 
173 
expenditure patterns as recorded by the quarterly reports. As can be seen also from Table 5.8, 
most departments are then yet to spend the major part of their budget. Reappropriations do 
take place, but decisions on these are taken less on the basis of data provided by the 
monitoring system, than continuous bargaining between P&DD (ACS) and the heads of the 
individual line departments. These heads have to somehow demonstrate that they can spend 
their full allocation and do this by referring to all the activities which are underway, although 
perhaps not adequately reflected by risen expenditures as yet. 
Table 5.8 4th quarter expenditures as perc. of total expenditure by sector. 
AJK. 
(percentages) 
Name of Sector 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 Average Standard 
Deviation 
Agriculture 34.4 44.7 62.3 47.1 11.5 
Animal Husbandry 50.7 35.2 51.0 45.6 7.3 
Forestry 34.1 34.4 33.9 34.1 0.2 
IHFDP 39.5 41.8 47.3 42.8 3.3 
Industries/Printing 47.6 39.8 66.6 51.3 11.3 
AKMIDC 52.5 60.8 93.8 69.0 17.8 
Water 46.0 99.1 30.8 58.6 29.3 
Power 44.7 42.9 40.7 42.8 1.7 
Education 46.0 54.8 38.8 46.5 6.5 
Health 30.5 28.0 48.4 35.7 9.1 
Transport & Communie. 34.6 64.0 49.0 49.2 12.0 
Ph. Planning & Housing 36.7 61.5 59.0 52.4 11.1 
Local Government 27.1 18.2 17.1 20.8 4.5 
Planning and Devt. 56.4 39.4 53.2 49.7 7.4 
Special Devt. Progr. 100.0 100.0 71.5 90.5 13.5 
Total 43.8 51.7 46.2 47.2 3.3 
Note: AKMIDC and Local Government Department (for the block allocations) get non-lapseable funds and therefore do not feel the heat of the closing year with its possibility of lapsing funds. Source: Accountant General's Office, Azad Kashmir 
The concentration of work and the making of payments in the fourth quarter therefore does 
not appear to be an entirely deliberate strategy of line departments to avoid showing their 
cards until the very end. After all, with the perspective of cuts and reappropriations in the 
last quarter, it would be a better strategy to play it safe and spend the entire allocation in the 
first three quarters. Departments could then even take it easy in the fourth quarter or 
concentrate on bargaining for additional funds or a higher allocation the next year. They 
could then also focus on writing PC-Is for the new year. Such a strategy is somehow 
impossible; as can be concluded from Table 5.8, none of the departments manages this. 
Lethargy in the summer months, in combination with the completion of already paid for 
activities left over from last year, and a difficult winter season, lead to an almost unavoidable 
high workload towards the end of the year13. The prospect of losing the unspent allocation 
1 3 However, in some of the Provinces in Pakistan, the same pattern was witnessed, so that the 'winter factor' 
cannot be taken too seriously. 
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on the 30th of June does the rest: excess purchases are made, and occasionally a contractor 
may be paid out for works not yet completed. If the shifting of funds between slow and fast 
moving projects by departments, irrespective of their Annual Plans of Operations, is added 
to this story (as discussed in section 4.4), then it can be concluded that the monitoring of 
financial progress of projects in the first three quarters is not very helpful to the kind of 
control pursued by P&DD and the Government. Neither is financial monitoring helpful after 
the closing of the 4th quarter from the perspective of reappropriations: the year has by then 
passed by. A monthly monitoring system in the last three months of the year would seem a 
better option if the P&DD does not wish to be dependent on the promises of line department 
heads only. 
In fact, after the UNDTCD project closed, a monthly financial monitoring system was 
imposed for a while by the then Special Advisor (Development) to the PM (he had been ACS 
before). This system was abandoned again after about a year. It can therefore be assumed that 
although the line departments claimed that it was very laborious to report every month, their 
organismic behaviour (see chapter 1) must also have played a role. The poor predictive value 
of expenditure statements towards the end of the year must have led them to prefer to rely 
on individual contacts and negotiations with the P&DD, Finance Departments and the 
Government. 
The role played by the AG 
A sometimes heard observation is that the Accountant General's Office is at least partially 
responsible for the accumulation of claims on the exchequer towards the end of the year. The 
AG would deliberately delay the honouring of some of the claims, in order to itself skim off 
some of the margins. - A natural tendency to leave the more difficult cases to the end of the 
year may also be of importance. Towards the end of the year, departments have their backs 
against the wall and are more accommodating; the AG's Office may feel the pressure of 
otherwise lapsing funds. Also, it is then a better time to judge what has the real priority with 
the departments, whereas disputed cases can be settled one way or the other. Although there 
may be some truth in this, it is not deemed an important factor, since the departments that 
work independently of the Accountant General's Office, the Electricity, Forestry and Public 
Works Department, also accumulate payments in the fourth quarter (cf. Table 5.8 on page 
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174). Whether the delays are deliberate or not, the accumulation of payments in the last 
month and days of the year is widely acknowledged to lead to irresponsible expenditures. 
Monitoring on the basis of accounts classifications 
The classification connected with the public accounts system in Pakistan is designed to 
contribute to improved financial monitoring of sectors and departments, and to enable a more 
integrated analysis of development and recurrent expenditure patterns. In 1980 the public 
accounts classification was greatly improved, and each expenditure incurred (and revenue 
received) was henceforth to be classified twice, once in functional terms, and once in object 
terms (Auditor General Pakistan 1988)14. Also, it was to be registered whether the 
expenditure was one of capital or recurrent account. The resulting matrix of information 
would give a precise overview of how much the public sector had spent on the various sectors 
and in which categories (salaries, purchases, etc.). The use of historical data would enable 
the establishment of detailed expenditure trends. 
But several factors have made such monitoring of public accounts a complicated affair and 
in practice P&DD is seen to pay no attention to the Finance and Appropriation Accounts as 
published by the Auditor General. First of all, the public accounts are published at least a 
year after the closing of the financial year to which they refer. Secondly, the functional 
classification has been greatly compromised by the rule that the department incurring the 
expenditure would be paramount in determining the sector (Article 30, Account code Vol. 
I). Thus, expenditure by the Public Works Department on school construction is classified 
as Community Services (because all PWD is in Community Services), although all other 
expenditure on education (by the Education Department) is classified as Social Services. This 
does not improve the transparency of educational expenditure developments. Thirdly, due to 
the complexity of the system, errors in the classification of expenditures are frequently made 
by accountants and budget officers; inconsistencies are encountered also between Provinces 
and areas. Fourthly, expenditures can be classified in great detail for many functions and 
objects, but for others there is no detailed head available. For instance, in the object of 
'purchase of durable goods' transport, machinery & equipment, furniture & fixtures and 
livestock are distinct detailed heads. But a very important durable good such as land is 
lumped together with many other items under the head 'others'. The result is that land 
expenditures cannot be separated out later, for purposes of analysis. Fifthly, the accounts are 
still purely based on cash flows and do not include departmental accruals. Sixthly, in practice, 
the comparison of the accounts is made difficult by the approval of the government budget 
by the Assembly in several grants. This is the case in the Provinces. This leads to the cutting 
up of some functional classes into various grants, thus complicating economic analysis. The 
result is also that the accounts are not prepared for individual projects (in AJK this was done, 
albeit with delays). 
1 4 Major functions in the expenditure classification are: General Adnnnistration (code 00000), Defence (10000), 
Law and Order (20000), Community Services (i.e. works public health municipal services, telev.) (30000); 
Social Services (i.e. education health pop. planning PPH, sports) (40000), Economic Services (agriculture 
irrigation fuel industries T&C land reclamation) (50000); Subsidies (food agriculture POL exports others) 
(60000); Debt Servicing Investible Funds and Grants (70000); Unallocable (state trading, expenditure on for. 
experts, foreign assistance) (80000). These functions are further subdivided into minor and detailed heads. 
Major objects (also subdivided in minor and detailed heads) are : Establishment charges (00000) (pay and 
allowances); Purchase of Durable Goods (10000) (includes land); Pre-investment project analysis (20000); 
Construction of works (30000); Repairs and maintenance of durable goods and works (40000); Commodities 
& services (50000); 60000 Transfer Payments; Investments (70000); Loans and repayments (80000); and 
Miscellaneous expenditure (90000). 
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The function-cum-objeet accounts classification is also applied to the recurrent budget 
books as issued by the Finance Department. But here the problems of wrong categorisation 
of intended expenditures were observed to be even larger, whereas a practice of including 
large lump sum allocations outside the approved public accounts classification was also in 
evidence. 
The overall conclusion of this section is: even 'dry' financial monitoring is hampered, for 
both technical and strategic reasons. Organismic behaviour of departments plays an important 
part even in the financial realm although this is generally regarded as technical and objective. 
The programme management conducted by departments, in which funds are shifted from 
project to projects like pawns on a chessboard, does not suit project-based monitoring and 
reporting as pursued by P&DD. 
5.5 Monitoring of physical progress 
The P&DD devoted only two columns in the format of the Quarterly Review Report to the 
registration of physical progress: one to record the particular physical targets for the year and 
the other for the progress made from the beginning of the year up to the end of the quarter 
under review. Targets for the project as a whole were not presented, neither a column where 
the progress made upto the end of the previous year could be reflected, as is done in other 
systems in Pakistan. From the fact that such columns had not been included, it can be derived 
that for P&DD the essence of physical monitoring lay in the evaluation of project activities 
during the most recent time slice. The P&DD hoped that the neutral and dispassionate 
reporting of the simple truth would give it an opportunity to 'catch' defaulting departments 
'unaware'. Unfortunately, even if departments had been robot-like this would not have been 
very well possible given the format adopted. 
Format problems 
To begin with, there was a methodological fallacy: the annual targets and quarterly progress 
were of a different time scale; quarterly progress would be more effectively compared to 
quarterly targets. Without a quarterly specification of the targets, it cannot be concluded for 
instance whether if something is not done in the first quarter, there is a delay or not. And in 
a second quarter, it would not be clear whether the achievement reported was actually already 
made in the first quarter. P&DD would then have to consult the previous quarter's report, 
a laborious routine. 
A related problem was the absence of a column which recorded the cumulative progress 
made in the year separately from the progress achieved in any particular quarter. Concerning 
the first quarter there was no problem, and this cumulative progress column could then be 
deleted, but for all later quarters there was a lacuna. Without consulting the reports from the 
previous quarter, it was then not possible to judge whether the progress booked was made in 
the last quarter or not. So the best solution would have been to include targets for each 
quarter, as well as an extra column for the registration of cumulative progress. 
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The absence of a column recording last year's progress, lastly, made it impossible to assess 
from the report whether the present year's targets added much to what the project had already 
achieved13. 
The lack of all these columns in the report format leads to the conclusion that P&DD's 
system was deficient with respect to its objective of comparing achievements with targets. The 
exaggerated pursuit of conciseness was probably the main reason for the excessive reduction 
in numbers of columns. A positivist belief that simplification of complexities will lead to a 
more transparent picture must have contributed to this. But there are limitations to the 
correspondence between conciseness and requisite variety; when these are exceeded, the 
picture will disintegrate into something incoherent. The actual commitment to detailed 
monitoring by P&DD can therefore also be questioned. It looks as if P&DD was after the 
absolute detail by asking for a few details but it failed to ask a sufficient number to be able 
to put an intelligible picture together. But let us see what was the quality of the information 
submitted before expanding on such conclusions. 
Large differences between departments in the reporting of physical progress 
When looking once more at the cases shown already in Table 5.1 in section 5.1 of this 
chapter, which represent samples of progress reports submitted for the main sectors' projects, 
it can be observed that there was a large variation in the nature of the reporting between the 
departments. Broadly the variation coincided with the types of department. It can be argued 
that there are three: 
(1) Departments which did not have many project involving civil works, such as 
Agriculture Department and Forestry Department. 
(2) Departments which sponsored projects involving civil works, but which were 
implemented by another department, usually the Public Works Department, or in some cases 
the Local Government & Rural Development Department. The Departments of Education, 
Health, Tourism, Animal Husbandry and Industries were examples of this. In such an 
arrangement, it is in AJK the responsibility of the sponsoring, not the implementing, 
departments to report the progress of their projects to the government. 
(3) Departments which both sponsored and implemented civil works projects: Electricity 
Department, Hydro-electric Board, the Mirpur and Muzaffarabad Development Authorities, 
and the Public Works Department, with its Water (irrigation) Wing, Road Divisions and 
Buildings Divisions. 
Whereas the first two categories did make an effort to present an image of the physical 
progress, the Public Works Department in the third category, responsible for sponsoring and 
implementing about half of all projects in the ADP, reported in terms of percentages only. 
On closer scrutiny, these percentages did not represent physical targets and achievements but 
showed financial targets and expenditures. For instance, if the annual physical target of a 
roads project was reflected as 35 percent then this meant that in that year the allocation made 
in the ADP was equal to 35 percent of the project cost. The other major department in the 
third category, the Electricity department gave some more detail, but if it is considered that 
the Rural Electrification Project was the biggest in the ADP in terms of its allocation - it 
alone covered 15 percent of the ADP - then the report was still very meagre with only four 
items of information. In comparison, a similarly large project like the Integrated Hill Farming 
Development Project reported some four pages and 47 separate items of information. 
1 5 But this could be done through a perusal of the Annual Plan, where such achievements and targets would be 
reflected (but this was often not published before the end of the first quarter). 
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The reason for the underreporting by Electricity and Public Works Department must be that 
from the perspective of these departments this was best suited to the actual management of 
their programmes. Although the integrative Rural Electrification Programme project was 
organised quite differently from the link road programme which is subdivided into 99 
independent small road construction projects, in actual fact the two operated in much the 
same way. Wherever progress could be booked fast or the need was highest, the funds were 
channeled. If land acquisition problems or land slides obstructed works in one place, then 
activities were speeded up in another. If a local member of the Legislative Assembly managed 
to convince the Chief Engineer that the completion of one road in his constituency deserved 
more attention than others, then funds were channeled to that road and taken from other 
projects which would then run into (further) delays. If a contractor made trouble in one place, 
another contractor in another place was provided more funds to complete the work faster. 
Giving fixed targets in terms of kilometers per project would hold the department more to 
achieving these, whereas in the capricious conditions of AJK this would hamper the 
department ultimately in fulfilling one of its primary objectives, namely constructing as much 
length of road wherever, and absorbing as large a part of the funds it could get. For the 
Electricity Department's projects such a strategy meant that the department was perhaps 
willing to report how many kilometers of HT and LT lines had been constructed in total, but 
was not complicating its own life by putting in writing where, in which district, in which 
villages, the progress was to be made, and when. -Such details must, however, have been 
known to the department, otherwise the aggregate could not have been derived (unless it was 
a very rough estimate). In this sense, departmental strategies to run a programme in the most 
convenient way can run counter to the requirement to state annual targets in advance and then 
report detailed physical progress. Detailed physical progress reporting might also point to 
cases where, in fact, with very few funds a lot of progress was booked, leading to 
embarrassing questions as to whether contractors were perhaps pre-paid or were to be paid 
with funds from another financial year16. 
Departments collaborating with the Public Works Department 
Departments which sponsored civil works projects implemented by the Public Works 
Department understandably had entirely different motives for reporting in the way that they 
did. They might also have been interested in shifting funds around to those projects which 
could absorb quickly and to divert from those which for one reason or other could not. But 
since their experience had taught them to keep a close watch on the commitment by the PWD 
(also called Public Worn Department) to their projects, they needed to be somewhat more 
vigilant. Also the rapporteurs needed to inform their own Secretaries of the progress made 
by the PWD. One would therefore expect that such reports contained more frank and critical 
detail. 
This did, however, not happen by definition. Once more, it turned out that telling the truth 
was not a straightforward affair. The maintenance of good interdepartmental relations was the 
main reason for this. Extreme caution was hampering frankness even more if the officer 
1 6 The well-entrenched Development Authorities in the cities of Muzaffarabad and Mirpur could afford to report 
less, since they already had enough political support for their projects. They tended to run their civil works 
oriented projects in the same way as the PWD: shifting funds from one building site to another, following the 
route of least resistance, and thereby ensuring the quickest absorption of funds as well as overall progress. 
An agency like the in 1990 created Hydro-electric Board needed to devote more effort to the description of its 
progress, given the size of the average hydro-electricity project, the special funding arrangements and the 
political interest. 
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reporting, who was usually of medium or low rank, was not sure whether his Secretary 
wished to make a public issue out of the lack of progress in some projects. 
In a monitoring system where every report was to be copied 45 times and distributed to 
as many different parties, the sponsoring departments were usually in a fix as to how critical 
to be of the Public Works Department. Since the PWD had many projects of its own, in 
addition to the portfolio of projects it had to complete for other departments, many were 
afraid that too much criticism might alienate the PWD and lead to even slower progress. 
Many complaints were heard by this writer about the PWD, and concrete examples abounded, 
but almost nothing was put down in a progress report. Only in the case of the Health 
Department, where in 1990-91 a bureaucratic battle was fought against a perceived lack of 
performance by PWD, critical observations could be read from the reports. The criticism was 
mainly due to the circumstance that the Education department had been allowed to create its 
own engineering wing within the department, taking care of the construction of all primary 
and middle school projects. Inspired by this, the Health department had launched a campaign 
to get permission for the creation of a similar engineering wing within its department, a 
proposal which would be granted a year or so later ftut which has not been implemented to 
this day). The quarterly review report had a place in this campaign and that is why in this 
exceptional case, progress statements could be read such as: 'works not started by PWD', or 
'work are still incomplete'. The tone of the statements as well as the explanations given for 
non-progress, were quite conspicuous in a reporting system where the key seemed to be to 
avoid putting anything controversial on paper, and to fight out the inter-departmental conflicts 
mostly through other means and channels. 
Departments with projects not involving construction 
Departments with mostly non-construction projects, such as of Agriculture, the Minerals 
Corporation (AKMIDC), and the Hill Farming Project (IHFDP) were widely regarded as 
white elephants, and therefore specially interested in demonstrating that, in spite of public and 
bureaucratic distrust, they were capable of delivering progress with their projects. They 
would certainly not present problems when not specifically asked to report these. The 
Forestry Department did not have a bad name since it was regarded as the only department 
capable of generating substantial revenues for the State (from the sale of lumber). But due 
to the large size of most of its projects and the large foreign aid components it was yet 
obliged to report in narrative terms. Apart from these reasons, it was perhaps felt that 
reporting in terms of financial percentages would do no justice to the complexities of these 
projects. 
No reasons given for slow progress 
Another observation is that while a lot of ambiguous information was presented, the reasons 
for apparendy slow progress were usually not elaborated at all. Typically bureaucratic views 
about the need for displaying only factual and neutral information in monitoring reports, free 
of anything reeking of value judgments, will have had an effect here. Two projects (reported 
in Table 5.1) are singled out below to demonstrate this: a project in Education Department, 
and the Rural Electrification project. 
The project presented for the Education department - implemented by the engineering wing 
of the department itself - shows that all construction for 23 Middle Schools in Poonch had 
been completed, but that one case of land acquisition was still under process. What this meant 
was not clear, given the fact that land cases could be under process for years on end. It may 
be too speculative in an official report to estimate when the court case is likely to be solved, 
but a statement as to what stage the case had reached would have been helpful. An interesting 
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particular would also be whether in the other 22 school projects the bills had been finalised 
with the contractors, the inevitable disputes settled, and the building formally accepted and 
taken over by the Education department. A subsequent question would then be whether the 
schools had started to go into operation. Here, one notes that the Education department did 
not deem it fit to report this to the P&DD, whereas it has to be said that the P&DD also did 
not force the departments to report on this. This then is a good example of a 'problem of 
focus' of the monitoring system, such as indicated in the first chapter. Whereas the utilisation 
of assets created should in theory be one of the essential points to be monitored, issues 
pertaining to the recurrent budget (staff and materials to be paid) were not viewed as relevant 
to the quarterly review or the P&DD. (Section 7.2 deals with such problems at greater 
length.) 
The other case, the Electrification of Rural Areas in AJK Phase III project, has been 
discussed above - comparatively few items of progress were reported for a project of such 
an extensive nature. The department might have given more detail for instance in terms of 
district-wise progress, villages 'electrified', transformer substations completed, etc. The 
problem with this was that it would have also required district and village-wise targets and 
the department evidently did not wish to specify this in advance. Reasons for low progress 
with HT and LT lines and with service connections were not given - something surprising for 
a summer season where work should have progressed fast. The achievement of any progress 
at all was surprising given that a first anticipatory approval to the project was granted only 
after the quarter was completed. This pointed to a programme management by a department 
of such influence that it seemed in no way hindered or suspended by any project approval 
process. An image of the progress by no means emerges from the report; a finding which is 
all the more odd since there were so many issues connected with this project, such as for 
instance line losses and distribution of metre boxes. - But it has to be admitted that, strictly 
speaking, most of these were out of focus: concerned with the recurrent budget more than 
with the public investment budget. 
Further case studies to show that a lack of progress is usually not explained properly have 
been entered in Box 5.1. 
The conclusion is: when the report format is open and no progress has been made with the 
project, most departments do not volunteer explanations, except in those cases where another 
department is involved and can be blamed. And even then, only in the case when it concerns 
a department with which there is a more general problem of coordination than concerning one 
particular project. So, in a situation with massive overcommitment of the ADP, underfunding 
of all projects, problems with contractors and land acquisition, and where therefore most of 
the problems can be blamed on force majeure, departments still do not wish to draw attention 
to themselves by volunteering that they have made little progress. Little progress is what is 
to be expected anyway, given the fund trickle. Stating this explicitly might carry the 
implication that small progress is booked even in comparison to the already anticipated slow 
progress. Non-response is generally the preferred way to obfuscate lack of progress; when 
specifically questioned about this non-response, this can then be presented as an oversight. 
And this would be a general experience with the reporting routines: blatant lies would not be 
discovered. If bad news was to be hidden, it had better be done through non-response or non-
committal statements. 
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Box 5.1 Ambiguities in physical progress reported for projects included in Table 5.1 
The Farm Mechanisation Organisation project was supposed to purchase some field machinery and also land. 
It was reported that a tender had been called for the field machinery but normally, tendering could have 
been concluded by a contract award within three months. Why not more had been done is not clear, neither 
explained. Neither was explained what the status was of the purchase of land, and some tents and 
implements. Similarly, the projects in the Animal Husbandry sector did not explain why the stage of floating 
of tenders for construction works had not been passed. 
In the Reforestation of Blanks project, the construction of twelve cattle ponds was a target where no 
progress had been apparently booked for no reason at all. 
The Tourism project reflected in table 5.1 presents a good example of considerable construction work 
having been completed, while no expenditures had been booked as yet. Or was this progress already booked 
in a previous year? Another interesting observation, seen also a lot with the reporting of civil works by 
Education department, is that "50% of the work is completed". How the physical progress is translated in 
a percentage is not clear. Although the PWD has undertaken attempts at assigning percentages of completion 
to the plinth and roof levels of buildings, in actual practice this area is problem ridden and therefore never 
used by the PWD itself. How to translate progress into one percentage if for instance one of the two 
buildings of unequal size is at plinth level, ¿íe other at roof level? How to assign percentages to long or 
short approach roads, electricity provision in buildings, water connections, sewerage, renovations of 
buildings and the like? How to describe all of this in a relatively small amount of space? What is seen in 
practice is that the departments using percentages of physical progress record exaggeratedly fast progress 
in the initial stages, but that the last straws break the camel's back: progress gets stuck at 95 percent and 
then all further progress later on then has to be measured in diminutive additional percentages. 
The Industrial Estate project, which prepared a ground for industries, presents the classic case of 
noncommittal reporting: like with most of its other projects, it was stated reassuringly that "work is in 
progress'. What this progress was, was not reported. What has happened is that the reporting officer has 
phoned the relevant engineer in the PWD who was not willing to state much more than that. 
The Opening of 19 Dispensaries in District Myzaffarabad project in the Health sector was the first of many 
cases in the Health sector where space was used to complain about the lack of progress with projects due 
to PWD. It should be noted that the department, contrary to the reporting by Electricity Department or 
PWD, specified the places not only where work was being done but also where work was not being done. 
Almost in all other reports, this was not specified: lack of progress is seldom volunteered. As mentioned 
before, the most likely reason is the building of a case against PWD and the propagation of the creation of 
an own engineering wing. 
The Kheri Irrigation Scheme was being implemented under the responsibility of the Water wing of the 
PWD, and therefore followed the system of reporting only financial progress in percentages as a proxy to 
physical progress. The internal problems which the more than ten years overdue project was facing, were 
not deemed fit for reporting. The project would ultimately be assigned to the Agriculture Department for 
implementation after a snap decision by the PM in a Review Meeting. 
5.6 Monitoring of problems in projects 
A third, often stated, purpose of the quarterly review reports was to resolve problems of 
individual projects. So far this study has discussed mainly the AJK Quarterly Review Meeting 
as a mechanism for the resolution of problems, but prior to the reaching of such a stage there 
are of course many other avenues. They range from internal meetings within a department 
to special coordination meetings between departments, to direct contacts between a head of 
department and a minister or other politicians, to the submission of a 'summary' (brief) by 
a Secretary directly to the Prime Minister. In terms of intra-departmental options, the 
frequent informal contacts and meetings between staff at various levels and locations must be 
held the most important means of exchange of information as well as problem-resolution, but 
occasionally, more formal mechanisms, such as monthly meetings, were employed. For 
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instance, meetings were held in the PWD between Executive Engineers and the Chief 
Engineer. Such meetings were usually prepared without advance documentation or 
standardized reports, and did not carry a fixed agenda. But they served as important briefing 
and problem resolving mechanisms. The importance of meetings and verbal contacts was high 
also because except for the LG&RDD none of the departments had an internal system for the 
formal reporting of project progress to their chiefs". 
The quarterly review reporting system, as supervised by the P&DD, was therefore often 
claimed to serve the dual function of informing both the heads of the department and the 
review body at large. This was even seen as a matter of efficiency, and in line with the 
philosophy of the bureaucracy at large, which holds that there need be no secrets amongst 
collaborating departments and that objective reporting of problems would itself point to 
solutions whether internal or external to the department. However, having already argued that 
departments function in an arena of struggle with other departments and other institutional 
stakeholders, there is reason to believe that they have secrets and employ strategies, and that 
this also influenced their reporting of problems. Even within departments, officers often 
avoided to put down their problems in progress reports. As corroborated by many Secretaries, 
the reports for the Quarterly Review Meetings did not serve an important function for 
problem resolution within the departments18. 
Typical problem statements 
To investigate this in more detail, a few typical problem statements will be reviewed as they 
appeared in the first quarterly review reports of the year 1990-91. The registration of a 
statement as indicative of a problem is of course, to some extent, subjective. A problem is 
equated with any reported difficulty in a project. For instance, if a report mentions 'land not 
acquired' then this points in this definition to a problem, whereas 'land acquisition under 
process', which may be technically another description of the same situation, does not. (The 
second statement may in many cases even hide a problem, especially if the statement 
reappears again and again in the quarterly reports.) The distinction is of relevance especially 
since, contrary to the format in some other areas in Pakistan, in AJK there was no separate 
column for the reporting of problems. 
A clear example of a stated problem is a project in the Animal Husbandry department, 
where it was stated under column 6 (a case not mentioned in Table 5.1): "Proposal for 
creation of staff not cleared from Finance Department hence poultry centres could not be 
opened". Other examples can be found in the reports of the Education Department. They 
were mostly about land: "constructional work not yet started due to non-availability of land", 
"constructional work not yet started due to dispute of land", "work could not be started with 
[X], due to stay order against land", or about contractors performance: "work stopped, 
tenders are being called again for the remaining constructional work of the building". They 
were also sometimes more vague, reflecting an implicit criticism of the PWD: "work not yet 
started with high school Trarkhel". As noted before, Health department presented the most 
explicit cases of problem reporting: "works not yet started by PWD" (italics added), "works 
incomplete and stopped since long", "work is stopped due to border firing", "works not yet 
1 7 The LG&RDD served as a review forum for all kinds of activities undertaken by the local and district 
councils, as funded by the Annual Development Programme. As such it issued its own forms to its project 
managers. After receiving the information, it was compiled and aggregated for purposes of the Review Meeting. 
1 8 One Secretary Works once confided that he would like to have progress reports where the problems and 
decision points for his consideration would be having "tittle blinking lights'. But the fear of retribution for such 
openness from the side of his staff was so large that such reporting did not sufficiently take place. 
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started due to land dispute", "work incomplete and stopped for the last four years", or: "work 
is near to completion but stopped". 
When these problems are reviewed in detail, the conclusion of the previous section must 
be reiterated that they always concerned matters which the reporting department felt was 
beyond its competence and which could be seen as external to the department. The transfer 
of staff to the recurrent ('normal') budget (an issue in perhaps 10 percent of all projects) was 
seen as the responsibility of the Finance Department. The acquisition of land was seen as the 
responsibility of the Revenue Department. The problems with contractors were seen as the 
responsibility of the PWD. The PWD accepted this responsibility to some extent, if only by 
default: it was the only department that did not volunteer the reporting of contractor 
problems. Special reasons such as border firings resulting in delays were also seen as force 
majeure and did not reflect negatively on the department. Internal problems, e.g. lack of 
assignment of project staff, which could be resolved by the Secretary of the department, were 
not reported either - thereby negating the stated function of review reports for the internal 
resolution of problems. 
Responsibility for errors or a problem which had arisen either in project preparation (wrong 
estimates, drawings, non-involvement of the target group, etc.) or execution (laxity, etc.) was 
never assumed. Departments were too concerned about their status in Review Meetings. In 
fact, only the Animal Husbandry, Education and Health Departments reported problems at 
all. Many other departments ridden with problems preferred to report nothing, rather than to 
put things on paper. For instance, in the Water sector, not a single project had incurred 
expenditures, but explanations were not offered, let alone a problem mentioned. 
A questionable representation of problems 
From the discussion in the previous chapters, it is clear that it is highly unlikely that so many 
projects did not have any problems but this shall be explored in more depth in the next 
chapter. The issue of formulation of problems is of crucial importance to our thesis about the 
difference between fact and observation and how monitoring systems should be designed. A 
sliding scale can be observed between 'land dispute', 'land not acquired', 'land acquisition 
under process', and lastly: no reporting at all, and therefore leaving it in the dark (or to a 
verbal statement in the Review Meeting) as to whether any progress is made. All of the 
statements can be descriptions of one and the same situation. The question is then what the 
statement should 'objectively' be. What is simple basic reporting in this respect? The example 
of the construction of the 23 school buildings has already been mentioned. When all schools 
were already completed whereas for one school land was yet to be acquired, then this points 
usually to a problem. 
Another case of hidden problems can be derived from the following frequently reported 
statement: "98% work completed with high school Leepa". Experience teaches that here, 
problems with contractors as to final bills usually prevent the speedy hand over of the school. 
With only seven percent of all projects reporting anything even hinting at a problem, and 
most of these problems reported by one vindictive department only (Health Department), the 
monitoring system in 1990-91 can be said to have functioned as a highly questionable 
representation of the general problems in the field. If every department had reported one or 
two particularly severe cases, then this would have perhaps been at least 'workable' for a 
review meeting. But most departments reported no problem at all, whereas one or two 
reported many. 
The P&DD had experience with this small catch of problems in the nets of its report 
columns, because some two weeks after the request for quarterly reports it decided to send 
a special letter to the Secretaries of the departments, asking urgently to submit statements 
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with respect to general and project-specific problems, so that these could be taken into 
account in the Review Meeting15. This led to only one response, from the Public Works 
Department. On an otherwise blank sheet of paper it cryptically listed the following 
bottlenecks: 
1) shortage of funds in the sectors Transport & Communication and Phys. Planning and Housing; 
2) delay in land acquisition; 
3) shortage of vehicles; 
4) non-existence of building division Bagh; and 
5) non-receipt of government sanction for execution of departmental works. 
As is clear from the above list, the problems were related to departmental programmes and 
not projects. 
5.7 Use made of the quarterly reports 
Now that the merits and demerits of the old 'open' reporting system have been discussed, it 
is of interest to explore what use P&DD and the review meeting made of the reports. The 
first quarter review of the year 1990-91 is again taken as a case study. P&DD prepared a 
working paper for the Review Meeting20, and following the preference for 'hard' financial 
data, a summary table on sectoral allocations and expenditures was assigned an important 
place in this. The table, when it was made, demonstrated a very low utilisation rate of 6.7 
percent as compared to the previous year's 16.5 percent. For the sake of a clear picture of 
the Review it is reproduced on the next page as Table 5.9. 
Correspondence with tine departments before the Review meeting 
Due to the late date of the Review Meeting, the P&DD decided there was time to send a 
letter to the main underachievers. The Secretaries of respectively LGR&DD, Power, Works, 
Industries, Agriculture and Health Services, all got an identical stenciled letter (dd. 27-11-
90), where the low utilisation rate (below 12 percent), entered by hand, was compared with 
a better rate the year before, and the following concern was expressed: 
"It is apprehended that at this pace of progress it will not be possible to fully utilize the allocation for 
1990-91. Consequently the ADP would be adversely affected." 
The following was requested: 
"The above stated position calls for your immediate personal intervention so as to retrieve the situation. 
It is further requested that a copy of steps taken to overcome this low state of progress may also please 
be supplied to this office. Matter may please be treated as most urgent." 
And the letter was signed by a grade-18 officer. 
1 9 It could do this because of the delays in the Review Meetings. In other quarters, this practice was not 
repeated. 
2 0 In the constellation in AJK, the working paper is prepared by the section Inspection and Evaluation as headed 
by the Director General's staff; in other P&DDs in Pakistan, the Coordination Section as headed by the Chief 
Economist may also be charged with such an activity. 
185 
Table 5.9 Sector-wise Financial Utilisation ending 1st Quarter 1990-91 in 
respect of Annual Development Programme (Rs in Million), AJK 
No. Name of the Sector ADP 
Allo-
cation 
for 
90-91 
Expend. 
from 
1-7-90 
to 
30-9-90 
Perc. 
Util-
isation 
during 
1st Qrt. 
Expend, 
during 
corresp. 
peri od 
89-90 
Perc. 
Util-
isation 
corresp. 
period 
1. AGRICULTURE 
Crop Husbandry 
IHFDP 
Animal Husbandry 
Forestry 
Tourism 
175.000 
22.000 
90.000 
13.000 
45.160 
3.840 
16.695 
1.420 
6.928 
1.650 
6.283 
0.414 
9.5X 
6.4X 
8.OX 
13. OX 
14. OX 
10.7X 
28.200 
3.661 
16.227 
2.043 
¡6.269 
16.3X 
17. OX 
17. OX 
20. OX 
14. OX 
2. INDUSTRIES & MINERALS 
Industries Deptt. 
AKMIDC 
33.000 
25.000 
8.000 
1.610 
1.535 
0.075 
4.9X 
6.IX 
0.9X 
2.655 
1.664 
0.991 
8.OX 
8.OX 
8.OX 
3. EDUCATION 124.421 18.365 14.7% 13.983 13.3% 
4. HEALTH 75.000 8.501 11.3X 19.249 26.4X 
5. WATER 14.000 - - - -
6. POWER 200.000 0.100 0.1X 13.650 7.OX 
7. TRANSPORT & COMMUNIC. 
P.W.D. 
C.D.O. 
245.000 14.852 
14.852 
6.OX 
6.OX 
39.754 17.2% 
8. PHYS. PLANNING & HOUSING 95.000 
P.W.D. 
C.D.O. 
M.D.A. 
3.217 
3.217 
4.OX 
4.OX 
19.198 21.8X 
9. LOCAL GOVERNMENT 92.000 - - 17.073 18. OX 
10. PLANNING & DEVT. 1.000 0.021 2. IX 0.100 10. OX 
GROSS TOTAL 1054.421 63.362 6.OX 153.862 
15.4X 
DEDUCTIONS: 
'OPEC Fund Loan (-) 30.000 
Export Quota fund (-) 4.421 
Exp. Operat.Shortfall (-) 77.892 
Net Total 942.108 63.361 6.7X 153.862 16.5X 
Source: Working Paper 1st Quarterly Review 1990-91, P&DD 
Note: The Special Development Programme was reflected on a separate table . 
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As a measure of the authority at this level may count that only the Secretaries Agriculture, 
Industries and Health cared to send a reply to the P&DD: two Secretaries of sectors which 
were regarded by many as ineffectual, and a third of a sector which, as we have seen, wished 
to play out a conflict with PWD. The Secretaries of Local Government and Power, for 
instance, with almost zero utilisations, did not explain these "most urgent" matters at all. 
The Secretary Agriculture (in charge of crop and animal husbandry, forestry, tourism and 
the IHFDP) gave as main reason for the low utilisation rate, that, in his view, the Accountant 
General had released the funds too late (letter dd. 8-12-90). The budget was approved only 
in the second week of September and during the first two months, permission was granted 
to incur expenditures on salaries only. Thus, the Secretary reported a problem which was 
completely ignored in all the reports sent previously, and under his signature. 
The Secretary Industries made it known through the Deputy Director Planning of the 
AKMIDC (letter dd. 13-12-90) that one important project had not yet been approved by the 
Cabinet Development Committee, while another could not spend because counterpart funds 
from a donor organisation had not yet arrived. The letter furthermore assured the P&DD that: 
"The expenditure on on-going schemes is proportionate to provisions of approved scheme. As soon as 
the funds are released the committed would be booked". 
Again, all of the problems mentioned had not been reported before in the quarterly reports; 
possible problems of the Industries department were not mentioned at all. 
Only the Director Health Services gave an explanation (in letter dd. 24-12-90, two days 
before the Review) that was already evident from his quarterly reports as well: 
"during this financial year, almost all the on-going works are stopped by the contractors. Similarly, 
during the 2nd quarter, the utilization of the funds for financial progress as well as physical progress 
is expected to be on the lower side, because the contractors of the projects, throughout Azad Kashmir, 
are not taking up the constructional works. The reason why they are not taking up their constructional 
works, is not known to the Health Department officially. It is, therefore, requested that PWD may 
kindly be directed to setde the problems and take up the constructional progress as early as possible." 
It is of note here that the Director wrote that he did not know the problems of contractors 
officially. PWD had not communicated to him on paper what the problems were and, weary 
of further confrontation, he requested the P&DD to resolve the matter for him. Thus, the 
department revealed a very serious problem that must have affected many more sectors in the 
ADP, but which was reported by no one else. 
P&DD's working paper 
Partly due to the late response, nothing of this made an appearance in the working paper 
(issued 9 December), so that the Review body did not benefit from the explanations given for 
the low utilisations. The working paper put as agenda points (1) a review of the ADP, (2) 
a review of the SDP, (3) approval of new schemes, (4) compliance with directives passed 
during the review meeting held before, and (5) financial requirements of ongoing programmes 
in the 7th Plan against the FYP provisions. 
Concerning the first agenda item, it was pointed out that "on a pro-rata basis" the 
utilisation in the first quarter should be 25 percent, but that this figure was never achieved 
"because of different kinds of preliminaries involved in the start of projects". A utilisation 
of 15 percent was considered desirable, and the 6.7 percent achieved in the first quarter was 
therefore very low. Concerning the SDP it was stated that the utilisation of funds was even 
lower, at 2.6 percent, so that there was reason for even more concern. In annexures, the 
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financial performance of each sector was reviewed in one or two paragraphs, with always the 
same conclusion that: "the overall utilization position is not satisfactory. The department 
should gear up the activities to improve this position". In some sectors there was also a listing 
of the ADP numbers of those projects with zero utilisation rates, but much was not made of 
this. Since a number of these in fact concerned not yet approved projects, it was stated that 
the department should also expedite the submission of PC-I forms of unapproved schemes 
included in the ADP "so that the amount allocated against these projects is utilised". Only 
with the Physical Planning and Housing sector, a large number of schemes were listed with 
their full titles, to put on record their "close to satisfactory" position in two cases, and 
unsatisfactory progress on another 33 cases, such as the Improvement and Uplifting of the 
Prime Minister's House, and other government buildings of direct interest to the participants 
of the Review Meeting. A further discussion of individual schemes, apart from the IHFDP -
and that only by virtue of it being a sub-sector in its own right - was not conducted, neither 
financial nor physical. 
The approval of new schemes was treated as a short item in the working paper, where it 
was summarised for the PM that in the past half year, 63 new schemes and 5 revised schemes 
were approved or cleared by the AKDWP. Another item that had little to do with the 
quarterly review reports as such was the financial requirement of ongoing programmes in the 
Seventh Five Year Plan, and how these were already too high given the lower than envisaged 
grants from the federal government. 
If the attention in the working paper for the compliance with past directives is added to 
this, then it appears that the quarterly review reports had hardly been used by the P&DD for 
the working paper. No table other than the financial summary was prepared, and this table 
was prepared on the basis of the separate submission of a sectoral and subsectoral expenditure 
figure by each line department, usually by way of telephonic contact. 
The finding of a very limited use of the quarterly reports is corroborated by an analysis of 
working papers prepared for other quarterly reviews. In the four years that this author was 
in AJK, important issues were put in the working papers and on the agenda, such as the 
maintenance of completed development projects, the transfer of staff from the development 
budget to the recurrent budget, the ploughing back of surrenders of the previous ADP, the 
scope for accommodating new projects in the ADP, the creation of planning cells in line 
departments, et cetera. But common to all of these issues was that although they had to do 
with experiences with the progress of the ADP, they were not based on a systematic analysis 
of the quarterly review reports. And since they were not researched in any other way either, 
they remained based on the personal impressions of the senior staff of the P&DD. For 
instance, an issue such as the implementation capacity of line departments, which would be 
researchable through the review reports, was only put on the agenda on the basis of P&DD's 
impression that "this problem is assuming larger proportions over the years". A quantification 
of delays or overcommitments and other problems in various departments was not attempted. 
Consequently, the agenda item received only five lines of text in the working paper, while 
"corrective measures" were not proposed. These were to be "discussed in the meeting". In 
such a case it is not surprising that the minutes of the meeting with regard to this point read 
that the meeting 
"took notice of the constraints and shortcoming in the implementation capacity of executing agencies" 
and that these agencies "were issued strict instructions to gear up their implementation capacity to 
absorb allocated funds in an efficient manner". 
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Discussions in Review Meetings 
Witness their minutes (issued dd 14-2-91), the discussions in the Review Meeting also did not 
refer much to any quarterly report specifically. As already explained in the previous chapter, 
the reviews have an agenda, but are conducted very loosely. Only five individual projects 
were discussed during the Review meeting: the rural electricity project, a poultry project, two 
road projects and a bridge project. None of these was highlighted in the working paper, 
whereas their quarterly review reports had not indicated a problem. 
Regarding the low recorded expenditure in the Rural Electrification project, the Chief 
Engineer explained that, in fact, including the advances paid for procurement of material, the 
utilization was not 0.05 percent but came to 56 percent! As such he employed a technique 
noted frequently in the course of meetings: the reports made by subordinate staff were 
disowned if the need arose, and different, more 'recent' or 'correct' figures were presented 
on the spot, and by a higher authority. The Chairman, however, observed that purchase and 
dumping of materials did not constitute progress. He wanted to see the progress reported in 
terms of numbers of connections made and consumers provided with electricity. That the 
Electricity Department had at least partly complied with that directive already, because the 
progress report had given a (very low) number of service connections provided, was not 
noticed by him, nor any other party in the Review. 
The discussion on the transfer of staff in the poultry project took place not on the basis of 
the identification of a problem in the progress report, but through a specific intervention by 
the Director Animal Husbandry, perhaps resenting that this problem was not picked up by 
P&DD. 
In the other three cases, the problem had not even been indicated in the review reports, but 
their discussion took place because the PM raised them on the basis of his own observations 
while on tour in AJK. 
Even the Health department's many problems with PWD were not discussed in any detail. 
When the Health sector came under discussion, the head of the department submitted that his 
major problems were land acquisition and delays in designing work of buildings (i.e. 
dissatisfactory performance by PWD). But the lack of supervision by PWD personnel of its 
projects was not yet deemed a topic fit for discussion with the PM. It would take another year 
before the problem between Health and Public Works Department was discussed head on and 
a decision was taken regarding the creation of an engineering wing in the Health Department. 
In more general terms, the Review Meeting did take into account some issues which were 
also raised in the quarterly review reports. For instance, a committee was instituted to write 
a report about delays in the acquisition of land. To speed up the utilisation of funds, ministers 
were directed to hold monthly meetings with sectoral heads, while various secretaries were 
urged by the PM to "personally look into the matter". 
In other cases, issues which had been hidden from view in the reports and in the letters 
concerning slow progress came out anyway. For instance, the Minister for Public Works was 
made to explain that the slow financial progress in the roads and bridges sector was due to 
contractor strikes in three districts. A for the department threatening decision was then taken 
by the PM: that ways and means would have to be explored for the allotment of major works 
to another (federal) organisation, instead of the PWD. Also, in an apparent attempt to 
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improve monitoring of road construction at the district level, the PM ordered that the defunct 
district development committees would have to be revived21. 
To be fair, some issues raised in the working paper were addressed in the meeting, 
although not always in the way that P&DD had hoped for. For instance, the PM shared 
P&DD's concern about the overcommitment of the ADP vis-á-vis the 7th Five Year Plan, 
but observed that: 
"present governments need to be accommodated to meet the need based demands of the public". 
Lastiy, a number of issues were discussed and snap decisions taken in the meeting which 
were raised neither in the working paper nor in the quarterly reports. For a proper impression 
of the nature of the Review Meeting these items are outlined below: 
A promise by the PM of Pakistan made to the PM of AJK personally, to provide additional funds to 
AJK; 
Stepped up efforts announced by the PM to eradicate corruption in AJK and due rewards for honest 
and hard working officials; 
A request by the PM for a 'summary' with respect to increased investment in the tourism sector and 
the reform of the existing institutional setup to achieve this; 
A problem of cooperation between an AJK department and a federal counterpart (not raised in the 
quarterly reports); 
The constitution of a committee to improve the functioning of a few corporations (not raised in the 
quarterly reports), amongst other things through privatisation 
The advertisement of a chairman of a board; 
The expansion of the PM's Inspection Team; 
The constitution of a committee for the allotment of evacuee land to Kashmiri refugees; 
The preparation of a report concerning the reorganisation of departments; 
The instruction that departments were to conduct a thorough survey of dilapidated assets before 
preparing new schemes, so that issues of maintenance of completed schemes were addressed more 
properly. 
Quarterly reports in Review Meetings 
From this review it is clear once more that the quarterly review reports played a subordinate 
role as a source of information for both the working paper and the Review Meeting itself. 
Since no one has claimed that these reports should be the sole basis for the Reviews, there 
is perhaps no cause for serious concern. Nevertheless, one has the uneasy feeling of a missed 
chance: the reporting of progress could have been a better basis for improving implementation 
of projects. One of the reasons for not using the reports for proper analysis was the limited 
substantive content of the reports. The ideal of an objective source of information, a mirror 
of the actual status of all projects in the ADP, was not achieved. The P&DD and the line 
departments were all aware of this. Consequently, the Review Meetings were filled with 
management issues which were only indirectly based on the quarterly review reports and 
many of which would have better been discussed at different times and after a better 
preparation. 
2 1 A number of ministers were even appointed chairmen on the spot by the PM, but the committees (actually 
intended for LGRDD projects) would not convene due to the fall of the government a few months later. The 
later government would not revive them. 
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5.8 What P&DD needs from a project reporting system 
Another level of analysis is to pose the question what P&DD and the Review Body need from 
a project reporting system. This is a difficult question. As was argued in a previous chapter, 
P&DD's institutional roles are ambiguous. It approves the projects and then monitors their 
implementation by other departments. If P&DD would become only an advisory and or 
'monitoring' department, or if it would set up a highly autonomous wing with the purpose 
of monitoring and evaluation only (cf. Peck & Rubin 1983, p.699), then its roles could be 
confined to that of (1) a controller for the Government as to the implementation of the ADP, 
(2) a coordinator and troubleshooter as to inter-departmental problems and (3) an adviser as 
to future investments. In that case a reporting system such as in AJK would, in the view of 
this author, benefit from the reporting of as much information by line departments and as 
many problems as possible, with due observance of the limitations imposed by time and 
logistics. The P&DD would not only have to use this information for serious analysis but also 
for counterchecking by its own programme of site visits and evaluations. To facilitate these 
functions, the line departments' reports would have to address questions laid out along the 
dimensions of time, space, cost, target-achievement correspondence problems, and quality: 
1) Is progress made on time, i.e. in accordance with the time targets of the project? (E.g. 
is the building being built on time, and as fast as it was supposed to be built?) 
2) Is the progress being booked in the location(s) specified? (E.g. is the building being 
built on the spot that was intended for it?) 
3) Is the progress being made against the costs that were specified (E.g. are the costs not 
going to be higher than foreseen?) 
4) Is the achievement in correspondence with the substantive target(s)? (E. g. is everything 
being built that was supposed to be built and in the way it was supposed to be built?) 
5) Are problems, bottlenecks or decision-points for higher authorities sufficiently reflected 
in the report? 
6) Is the achievement of the quality that was specified? (E.g. are the building materials 
of the required quality? Is the training course of the required standard?). 
If the old (and abandoned) reporting system in AJK is evaluated for its completeness in terms 
of these dimensions, then the following observations can be made. 
The time dimension 
The system in AJK did not properly enable an assessment whether the progress booked was 
on time. Too few columns were reserved for this, and there was also a fallacy, in that 
quarterly progress was to be compared with annual targets. In this dimension, a change in the 
format could easily have improved the system. 
The spatial dimension 
The format in AJK was also not specific and systematic about the location(s) of the activities 
of the project. It was up to the line department to incorporate a statement as to the location 
of the project or not. However, here the nature of the project was of considerable importance 
to the ease with which location(s) could be entered into a format. For multi-location projects, 
such as the Rural Electrification project, it would not have been easy to incorporate the 
required level of detail within a concise format and certainly not if the same format was to 
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be used by any type of project and in any department. This points to a conclusion that for the 
running of an effective monitoring system, a definition and régularisation of the criteria for 
designing single-location projects or multiple-location projects would have been of help. 
The cost dimension 
The dimension of cost was perhaps better addressed in the AJK monitoring format, but as was 
noted in section 5.3, an expansion of the number of columns would have made the assessment 
much easier to make, while on the other hand problems remained with line departments not 
reporting the proper type of expenditures. For an improvement of the system along this 
dimension it would be necessary to improve the working of the Accountant General's Office 
as well as departmental accountants and budget officers. 
Point of reference for outputs 
The correspondence between the type of output provided by the project with what was 
intended can only established if all inputs, activities, and outputs of the projects are listed in 
the format and meticulously compared with the achievements made so far. It would seem that 
there were too few columns for this, but a more pertinent comment to make is that there were 
no guidelines as to the kind of detail that was required. For certain activities there would also 
be a problem of operationalisation, such as the strengthening of a department by a 
management information system, or awareness raising concerning gender issues with officers 
of a department. The variety of projects seems to defy the possibility of adequate 
standardisation. It is here that improvements would have been much more difficult to achieve 
if they had to rely on a change in format and training or instructions that go with it. 
Problem registration 
Problems, bottlenecks and decision-points for higher authorities were not covered by a special 
column in the report. They would need to be specially addressed in a system for two 
purposes. One is at the operational level: reflecting the problems is the first step at resolving 
them in the context of each individual project. No system can do without it, if only for 
purposes of accountability: without a specific question asked, the Review Body can never 
claim that problems were consciously withheld from it. The second is at the tactical or 
strategic level: a regular and standardised aggregate analysis of the problems experienced 
enables the P&DD and the Review Body to assess their overall importance and the changes 
therein over time. This in turn may lead to improved understanding of the relative potentials 
of different sectors and implementation capacity of departments. For an increase in 
comparability of problems across sectors it would be necessary to add a list of possible 
problems to each progress report format, of which the relevant categories can be ticked. As 
is done in NWFP, the various heads of departments might be asked to annex a general 
statement as to the problems encountered. The monitoring process might then also start to 
provide the ammunition for diagnostic studies or special evaluations conducted by P&DD or 
the line departments themselves. 
The quality dimension 
Most difficult would be a technical improvement in the format in order to capture adequately 
whether the progress made was of the required quality. It was not covered by the system 
discussed and would be difficult to incorporate in any other. Quality issues of projects are the 
subjects par excellance to be addressed by rapporteurs outside the implementing departments. 
For projects involving works produced by engineers, they need not be specified in the report: 
construction standards are usually worked out in commonly or legally agreed specifications 
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and it is assumed that any construction done has met with these. The implementors would 
therefore have no need to report on their own work in this sense. The same holds true for 
quality standards in some other sectors, such as health, which are generally accepted. For 
many other sectors and projects, however, this is different, and quality aspects involved 
should then be laid down as well as possible in the project documents. The monitoring reports 
should then probably specifically address whether the intended quality standard could be met 
or not. 
Multiple formats and annexes 
In a practical sense, the progress report should enable reading without requiring recourse to 
other sources for some basic information such as the cost of the scheme. This means more 
columns than in the old system. As is clear from section 5.2, there should be a better 
accommodation of information particular to the sector of the project, as could easily be done 
through separate annexures to a more general format. As a matter of fact, separate PC-1 
formats for the major sectors of the development programme already existed for a long time, 
so why not extend this kind of specification to the progress reports as well? The larger 
schemes (e.g. above Rs 100 million) could also have done with additional annexes, or at least 
separate instructions, enforcing more detailed reporting. Lastly, schemes involving 
construction and implementation by other departments may also merit special indicators to 
be attached through a separate form. 
The potential of improvements in report format 
The conclusion from the discussion of the old system is that improvements in the report 
format seemed possible and could be expected to lead to a serious increase in data available, 
even if no other stakeholders and observers would be involved in the monitoring process. 
Such improvements were tried and implemented in AJK, with the help of the UNDTCD 
project. Important to the success of the new system was a little more attention from all 
participants and proper enforcement. That time as such was not as scarce a commodity as was 
originally assumed, and often claimed, has been illustrated by the case study of the Review 
Meeting preparation process in AJK in this chapter. 
It was clear, meanwhile, that the functioning of any monitoring system would benefit also 
from improvements in the preparation of the PC-1 document. These would relate to more 
measurable targets, more itemised cost breakdowns, bar charts for activities, etc. that can be 
referred to directly in the reporting system. Lastly, the improvement in the approval 
procedure would be good for the monitoring system: no PC-Is should be approved that do 
not meet minimum standards of specification along the dimensions of time, space, cost, and 
quality. 
The more fundamental limitations 
However, the world should not be expected of these technical improvements since there are 
still a number of more fundamental problems that might not be addressed seriously in this 
way. These relate to the needs of departments to present a positive picture of their project, 
to hide certain problems or to play out others. In short their organismic behaviour, which 
causes (unavoidable) one-sided views as well as differences between what the department 
observes and what it reports in whatever format chosen. Examples of such behaviour were 
already given in this chapter. To mitigate its effects, P&DD's counterchecking would be 
required as already indicated, but it would also be necessary to involve other stakeholders in 
the monitoring process, and to improve the functioning of some stakeholders already 
involved. There were also indications that a more programme-oriented monitoring system 
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might be able to overcome certain strategic problems connected with project monitoring. For 
this, in fact, a reorganisation of the development programme approach would be necessary. 
Also, because of the subjectivity involved, there are probably irresolvable issues connected 
with the description of problems and quality aspects of projects. Lastly, there remains an 
inherent problem with format-oriented improvements to the system: they tend towards 
increasing the size and complexity of the forms. This is in line with Ashby's Law discussed 
in section 1.6, which implies that an increase in the complexity of models will increase their 
correspondence with reality. However, with monitoring the need for conciseness is 
fundamental, and there is therefore a danger that increased complexity of the monitoring 
system, while solving certain problems, will lead to other problems. These matters shall be 
elaborated in the next chapters when, inter alia, the merits and demerits of a technically 
improved and expanded system of monitoring is evaluated. 
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CHAPTER 6. FORMATS AND STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES IN REPORTING 
SYSTEMS 
We have now looked in detail at the 'old' progress reporting in AJK. This system ground to 
a halt at the end of the year 1991-92 when a new system was introduced with the help of a 
project in which the author of the present study participated. The experiences gained and the 
data collected provide an excellent opportunity to investigate the effects of changes in report 
format on the nature of the information generated. Specific attention shall be devoted to 
assessing perspectivistic issues, such as the impact of idiosyncrasies of rapporteurs, and the 
influence of the purpose of the report on its content (in this case whether it is intended for 
a run-of-the-mill review or for the approval of a project revision). This is done to show how 
extensively reports with supposedly 'basic' information, vary in their information content 
when the purpose for which, or the staff by whom the reports are written, is changed. 
Since the new reporting system introduced by the project did not rely on more diversified 
information flows than the old system (in spite of some efforts made in this direction), effects 
of such changes could not be checked through an analysis of the new system. Neither could 
it be studied how large the difference would be between project progress reports sent to two 
different categories of stakeholders. For these reasons, two sections are included in this 
chapter that approach these issues by using data from different systems or situations. Before 
the new monitoring system is reviewed, a federal reporting system is described that was 
checking the progress of projects in AJK in 1990-91. This will point to the importance of the 
audience of the reports to the information content and, because it had a quite different format, 
also to the importance of this factor. However, the influence of the audience of the report 
will become more clear when the experiences with the new reporting system in AJK have 
been analysed. After such a comparison, a study of the Social Action Programme in Pakistan 
will be utilised to highlight the often completely different perspectives of the main 
stakeholders and observers, and how they affect the picture that emerges from (in this case) 
a survey. In the last section of this chapter, a case study of the UNDTCD project provides 
an illustration of the effects of the uneven participation of stakeholders in a monitoring 
system. 
Thus, this chapter has a different focus from the previous, which looked mainly at the 
drawbacks of financial, physical and problem reporting in 'open' formats. The present chapter 
concentrates on the influences of different perspectives upon the kind of reporting taking 
place. As such it checks the consequences for reporting from (1) different formats structuring 
information, (2) different observers / stakeholders, (3) purposes of the reports, and (4) 
audiences of the reports. All of this will point to the conclusion that project monitoring has 
very little in common with 'bookkeeping' (except creative bookkeeping). 
A principal question is: can improved report formats with better questions and more space 
for detail do away with the perspectivistic and strategic biases such as already identified in 
the previous chapter? 
6.1 Reporting to the Federal Government 
This section checks the influences on report content from a combination of an expanded 
format (as compared with the Quarterly Review Report) and a different audience. 
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As was described in section 2.7, the monitoring of summational development programmes 
by the federal government has always been a checkered affair in Pakistan, in spite of the 
nature of monitoring which calls for regularity and standardisation. It usually expanded in 
times of dictatorship, and withered in times of democracy, such as in the 1990s. In 1990-91, 
the Projects Wing of the Planning Commission sent out forms to AJK, called PC-IIIs, on 
which for every project in the ADP a report had to be given about the progress in the first 
half year. In retrospect it proved to be one of the last times the Federal Government went to 
such lengths to keep a check on the subnational programmes. A year later they would send 
out forms only for projects of a size above Rs 50 million. Still later, this practice would be 
abandoned as well: even though only few projects would reply, the capacity of the Projects 
Wing of the Federal Planning Commission to analyse the material was so weak that nothing 
much could be gained from the exercise. In 1991-92, a request made for a half year statement 
on all projects by the federal Kashmir Affairs Division was flady rejected by the P&DD, and 
what is even more significant, this was accepted by that division. Thus, the monitoring of 
projects by the federation in the 1990s has not been a regular, nor very standardised affair, 
and it is called monitoring here only because of its intent, and because it is called that way 
by the Projects Wing itself. 
Federal forms and response by AJK 
The sending of the federal form to AJK in early January 1991 coincided with some political 
upheaval in AJK and also came in the wake of a very late first quarter review, at the end of 
December. For these reasons, the second quarter Review was abandoned. This proved to be 
an advantage as well as a disadvantage: for this study it would have been better if the results 
of the federal monitoring exercise could have been compared to that of the AJK exercise for 
the same quarter. In that case the effect of different forms and of different audiences of the 
exercise could have been assessed more precisely. On the other hand, the cancellation of a 
second quarter round of monitoring must have led to better results (due to more time being 
available for it) in terms of the federal monitoring exercise. 
Nevertheless, it turned out that even after repeated reminders issued by the P&DD, only 
86 of the potential 454 reports were returned for onward transmission to the Federal 
Government. Before turning to format and information submitted, a few initial observations 
are in order. First of all, little relevance must have been attached to the reporting to federal 
agencies. The non-reporting departments must have felt fairly confident that a non-response 
would not affect their survival. Perhaps the statement should be reversed: only those 
departments with more to expect or to fear from the federal government bothered to reply. 
Not the Public Works Department or the Education department, for instance, with many small 
projects and hardly any that might conceivably be (co)funded by the federal government or 
a donor organisation. The departments of Agriculture, Forestry, Health, Electricity had 
replied, and had done a relatively good job, as will be seen. All of these departments 
traditionally relied on special federal and donor funds. 
Secondly, it is of significance that the P&DD at no point in time considered to utilise the 
information gathered for its own purposes. Already in the forwarding letter, the impression 
was conveyed to the line agencies that the information was only intended for 'onward 
transmission' to the federal government. Thus, it may be stated that it missed an in principle 
excellent opportunity to kill two birds with one stone. The impression arises that P&DD 
1 The PC-m was later replaced by (grueling) PM-I, PM-II and PM-IU forms. A copy can be found in the FPC 
Manual (1991, p.611 ff). 
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bureaucratically and perfunctorily performed as a post box and had little real interest in 
monitoring other bureaucratic actors if there was no Review Meeting chaired by the PM in 
the offing. 
Differences with the AJK report format 
There are two main features which distinguish the federal monitoring format from the AJK 
format. The first is that the progress is to be given item-wise as per PC-1, and the second is 
that a problem statement is to be given by ticking one or more categories from a list of 
difficulties. Table 6.1 reflects the upper portion of the format, with one example. Table 6.2 
shows the lower portion and for each sector examples are copied of replies given in the 
second quarter of financial year 1990-91. The list from which relevant problems can be ticked 
is reflected in Table 6.3 and was put on a separate page in the report forms. 
Table 6.1 Upper portion of federal PC-III format, 1990-91; with example. 
Progress report for the quarter ending: 31-12-90 
1. Code number of project To be supplied by the 
Planning Commission 
2. Name of the project: I m p r . / U p g r a d a t i o n of 
Existing Hosp/Disp in 
District Poonch 
3. Financial s ta tus : 
a. Total approved project cost: 
b. Expenditure upto end of last year: 
c. ADP allocation for current year: 
d. Funds released to the project during 
current quarter for the year 
e. Expenditure upto end of prev. quarter: 
f. Expenditure during current quarter: 
22.278 
13.854 
2.000 
0.500 
14.029 
0.323 
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Table 6.2 Sample reports on PC-HI progress report format: physical targets and 
progress, second quarter 1990-91. 
Item of work Total cost Physical work Physical work Physical target Physical work Physical work by item involved item upto end of for the current during the upto end qtr as (Rs in H) wise last year year current quarter 4 of annual trgt 
Project: Improvement of Cattle Breed by Artificial Insemination in Azad Kashmir 6 A.I. Centres Construction work 15% constr. 
at M'abad, of A.I. Centre work of AI 
Garhi Dupatta, Bagh would be centres 
Kotli, Khuirat completed. completed I! lot and Bagh have been Liquid nitrogen Liq. Nitrogen, 
established Semen & Medicines Semen purchased would be purchased for A.I Centres. 
A.I Services have been provided to 
farmers population 
2 Pick ups purchas ed Project: Mineral Exploration & Evaluation in AJK in Collaboration with UNDP 
Salary & Uages 4.368 3.250 64 1 264 5 4 74 4 
Machinery i Eq. 0.492 0.215 42 4 57 4 2 1 54 1 Other expenses 2.650 1.000 20 4 62 4 1 * 38 4 Consumable store 0.220 0.150 2 i i 3 i l 101 611 
Total 7.730 4.615 56 4 40 4 5 4 60 4 
Project: fifroveaent/upgradation of M s t ing Hospitals/Dispensaries in District Poonch 
Constr. Works 19.906 100 4 60 4 20 4 5 4 404 Land Compensation 1.500 100 4 804 20 4 - -
Furniture 0.277 1004 - - - -Equipment 0.510 100 4 80 4 20 4 - -
Intercom 0.085 1001 50 4 - - -
Project: Reforest ation of B lanks in Azad ïashmir 
Administration 17.847 Sowing: 3000 acre 927 acre 804 acre 237 acre 657 acre Field works 98.259 Planting: 57000 acre 17157 acre 8730 acre 2414 acre 5519 acre Buildings 2.080 Maint. Plant. 15023a 4119 acre 2650 acre 1229 acre 1852 acre Vehicles inch Road Side Planting: 20 km - - -
running charges Fencing: 20 000 mtr - - - -
and repair 2.860 Constr. of inspec-
Machinery i tion path: 10 km - - -field equip. 1.285 Constr. of cattle Misc. & Conting. 1.185 ponds: 20 Nos. 12 Nos. - -Prot. & Maint, of old plantation area: 276973 acre 276973 acre 276973 acre 276973 acre 276973 acre 
Soil ConsJorks: 3.865 M.cft 
Diversion Channel: 1 km 
Note: "-• indications imply that these columns were not filled in by the rapporteur. 
198 
Table 6.2 continued 
Item of work Total cost Physical work Physical work Physical target Physical work Physical work 
by item involved item upto end of for the current during the upto end qtr as (Rs in M) wise last year year current quarter 4 of annual trgt 
Project: Electrification of Rural Areas in ffl Phase-Ill Prelim, works 0.100 - - 25 4 - -
Land 2.667 8.5 acres - 2 acres - -Civil Storks 18.624 63800 sft 1650 sft 280 sft 280 sft -Service Connect. 93.512 77259 Hos. 24575 NOS. 17000 Nos. 3010 Nos. 5000 1 Village Electrif.: 
a) 11 KV lines 144.594 1189 km 79 km complete 250 km 85 km 95 km 491 km p/erected 
b) 0.4 0 lines 231.787 1959 km 138 km complete 426 km 145 km 165 km 1067 km p/erected 
c) Transformers 69.409 1619 Nos. 419 Nos. 344 Nos. 49 Nos. 161 Nos Express Feeders 32.110 193 km 4 km 42 km 10 km 10 km 
Renov. fc Augment.: 
a) 11 i 0.4 KV 26.609 397 km 16 km 86 km 20 km 20 km b) Transformers 7.228 295 Nos. 29 Nos. 66 Nos. 15 No. 15 Nos. Contingencies 
Bflmin EfiftfT £ 
31.334 - - - - -
nuuuii. Hiiyy. K Supervis.Charges 46.601 - - - - -
Project: Rural Hater Supply, Sanitation and H] fgiene Education Programme 
Land 10.427 1 4 0.2 4 - -Civil Bork 180.244 16 4 6.3 H • -Equipment 433.408 38 4 27.2 h - -Prof.Services 160.233 14 4 55.2 Si 0.4 4 0.7 
Contingencies 347.137 31 4 11.1 % - -
Project: Establisha ent of Inc iustrial Estate at Kotli (revised) 
Purchase of land 6.500 94 kanals Land purchased -
Devt. of plots 0.100 land levelling, - -
survey, contour 
mapping etc. Constt. Works 0.531 1]Office bldg All constr. work -2)Chowkidar hut completed 3)Main gate 
4) Fencing estate Fencing completed 
Hater Supply 2.600 Hater supply Boring tubewell & Compl. of remain-incl. tubewell network completed ing work Sewerage System 0.500 Laying of sew. System is started Completion 
Electricity 0.650 Electr. incl. Electr. supply Installation of 
ET/LT lines and incl. HT/LT lines street lights 
street lights completed Internal Roads 0.550 Constr. roads Constr. completed -Constt rest house 0.176 2 room rest hse. Rest house completed Pay of staff 0.369 Pay, allowances 67 \ recurr. exp. Recurr. expdt. 
allow. & conting. contingencies 4 has been expedited 
purch. of furn. Furniture purchased 
The work is in progress The work is near completion 
Staff is being paid regularly 
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Table 6.3 Part three of PC-HI format, federal government 1990-91. 
Bottlenecks, hindering progress (tick those applicable): 
1. Delay in release of funds 
2. Release of funds inadequate 
3. Non-availability of foreign exchange component 
4. Admin, dif f icul t ies due to shortage/transfer of staff 
5. Foreign experts not assigned 
6. Workers str ikes 
7. Non-selection of s i t e 
8. Delay in preparation of detailed plans and estimates 
9. Delay in acquisition of land 
10. Delay in designings of architects 
11. Tenders for works not received 
12. Approval of work tenders delayed 
13. Delay by contractor in s tar t ing work 
14. Contractor abandoned the work 
15. Machinery not available locally 
16. Delay in procurement of machinery 
17. Difficulties in procurement of materials 
18. Delay due to floods/rains. 
19. Other bottlenecks: 
Inter-departmental delays 
Delay in water connection 
Delay in e lect r ic connection 
Delay in gas connection 
Lack of popular participation at community levels 
Lack of interest and in i t i a t i ve by community leaders 
Lack of locally mobilized funds 
OTHER DELAYS 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATUS 
a) Has there been any change in the scope or design of project? Y/N 
b) Is the PC-1 form under revision? Y/N 
c) Indicate whether there were changes in senior management position Y/N 
The PC-III format allowed for the registration of many more details than the Quarterly 
Review Report. When looking at tables 6.1 and 6.2, the conclusion is that it also registered 
more detail in practice, at least for those cases where a report was prepared. It could be 
calculated that the average number of targets listed was 5.5; the old format came to only 2.1. 
The greater detail did not in every case lead to a more meaningful description, but all in all, 
the PC-III format produced better reports. This conclusion is reinforced when it is taken into 
account that most projects that reported had taken the trouble to tick one or more of the 
problem categories listed in the third part of the format. A significant 76 percent of all 
reports had indicated one or more problems. 
As was corroborated in interviews with officers of the responding departments, the 
experience was that the federal government, being more removed from the day-to-day 
management of projects in AJK, posed less of a threat, and that the advantage of being seen 
to conduct diligent reporting outweighed the risk of repercussions for exhibiting too many 
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problems. However, whether the greater detail and greater openness was due to the fact that 
the recipient of the report was different from the usual, and not to the different format, 
cannot be answered definitively at this stage; this can be more properly assessed after 
studying the results of the new format for the AJK quarterly review, which is done in the 
next two sections. As mentioned, the greater detail and openness themselves were features 
only of the reports that were returned. Good responses by some departments have therefore 
paradoxically gone side by side with a complete non-response from others. Once again, the 
benefits of greater detail due to more elaborate forms have to be weighed against the purpose 
of the exercise as perceived by the line departments and the likelihood of consequent non-
response by some of these. 
The following section establishes, after discussing the strategic reasons involved in the 
introduction of a new reporting system by and for AJK itself, whether a greatly improved 
reporting format led to better reports. 
6.2 Monitoring with a new reporting system in AJK 
The identification report of the UNDTCD implemented project 'Development Planning in 
AJK', written in 1989 and endorsed by the P&DD, stated that the effectiveness of the then 
existing planning system in carrying out essential planning functions was limited, and that this 
was especially the case in the area of monitoring and evaluation. Although the funds 
utilisation rate of the Annual Development Programme was at 98 per cent judged to be very 
good, the P&DD had stressed that major discrepancies existed between the level of funds 
utilisation and the associated physical implementation of projects. Field inspection of projects 
necessary for physical monitoring was seen by the UNDTCD representative as "spasmodic" 
and limited by such factors as transport constraints, work load of staff as well as their 
technical capabilities. These factors, in addition to all planning procedures being manually 
executed, required that the productivity of professional staff be upgraded. An overhaul of the 
system was seen by the report as necessary, requiring amongst other things the creation of 
an M&E unit within P&D, training of staff in modern methods and techniques, equipment 
such as 'microprocessors', and new procedures and systems. 
Who wanted a new system? 
If, in retrospect, it is analysed who was behind the request for a new and computerised 
monitoring system, then the P&DD senior management in the persons of the ACS and Joint 
Chief Economist stand out. It is obvious that they were concerned with the higher ambitions 
connected with monitoring, such as identifying typical problems in sectors and districts, and 
the implementation capacities of departments, to which the old system gave no answers. In 
the opinion of the author it can be questioned whether other staff of the P&DD were as 
enthusiastic about introducing a new monitoring system. Their ambitions in terms of 
monitoring were certainly lower. Perhaps the then existing monitoring system was not so 
detailed and there was not enough time to analyse the reports, but there was enough to talk 
about in the Reviews anyway. 
Certainly, the line departments under scrutiny had mixed feelings. As corroborated by a 
special study into monitoring practices and requirements within all sixteen line departments 
in AJK involved in the ADP (UNDTCD, March 1991), their planning staff was, without 
exception, fairly content with the then existing system. If complaints were heard about it, 
they concerned the lack of planning staff for inspections in the field or collation of the 
reports, or the lack of office equipment such as computers. 
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The overall impression of at least this author was that at that time, in AJK, where 
computers were virtually absent yet much heard about, much was expected of these magical 
devices. For P&DD they would facilitate the compilation of the ADP book, always a disaster 
of continually changing figures requiring night work to complete against the deadline of 30th 
June. Computers were also thought capable of somehow bringing order to the mess of the 
Quarterly Review Reports submitted, and lift the quality of the information without a serious 
increase in effort. They were of course seen as prestigious; working with these 
'microprocessors' was thought to set an example of efficiency for the indolent line 
departments. They were viewed as scientific and therefore hopefully able to revive the 
diminished prestige and moral authority of the P&DD. Because of the innovative and perhaps 
indefinite nature of a project in monitoring, it was preferred that technical assistance was 
provided and that parts of the new system would be financed through grant funds from the 
United Nations. 
UNDTCD Project 'Development Planning in AJK' 
The project took off in the beginning of 1990 and was funded by the UNDP for a period of 
three years, a period later extended to four and a half year through a project revision. It 
consisted of a foreign recruited Chief Technical Adviser, an Associate Expert and a Pakistani 
systems analyst/programmer. There were also short term consultants involved, notably an 
engineer, a systems analyst and regional planner. The project budget totalled around US$ 1 
Million and also had a sizeable contribution (Rs 3.7 M) from the ADP of AJK. This 
contribution paid for office contingencies and the full time involvement of government staff, 
such as a Programme Officer, a Computer Operator, a secretary (under the designation 
"Stenographer"), a driver and three peons. The project managed to establish, over a period 
of four years, a computerised ADP budgeting and monitoring system, based on a newly 
created M&E unit with a computer cell and four standalone personal computers (with 286 and 
386 generation microprocessors), associated specially developed, menu-driven software 
written in dBASE 4.0, a comprehensive set of new forms and formats, a series of manuals 
and system documentation, as well as a core staff trained in maintaining and expanding the 
system. A large training programme, training all those involved in filling out the Annual 
Plans of Operation (APOs) and Quarterly Monitoring Reports (QMRs) had also been 
completed. In 1992, the new computer system was installed and for most of the 500 to 600 
projects in the ADP, reports were henceforth sent to the P&DD computer cell, entered in the 
computer, analysed and an annex with results included in the working paper for the Quarterly 
Review Meeting. Thus, the project succeeded in replacing the old review reporting system 
with a new and integrated management information system covering the main activities of the 
P&DD. In mid-1994 when the project closed, the system was taken over by the Government, 
and it continued to function (by and large) until the time of writing this study. 
The new monitoring system 
The main parameters of the new monitoring system were as follows. In its basics, the system 
followed the UN's own project formulation and evaluation methodology. Its principal 
concepts of inputs, activities and outputs had been derived from the guidelines developed by 
the United Nation's own ACC Task Force in 1976. In its further design, the system adapted 
to the planning conventions and ambitions in AJK. The system linked project progress 
reporting to the ADP preparation process, PC-1 databases, project work plans, and analytical 
output reports. To make sure that the new system was maintained, new roles, responsibilities 
and task descriptions for P&DD's staff were formulated, while new staff (both computer and 
monitoring related) were recommended. Emphasis was laid on the adherence to newly laid 
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down time tables, on which the new system was depending for its success. A description of 
the inputs to and outputs of the system is given in Box 6.1. 
Box 6.1 Inputs and outputs of the management information system in AJK 
The inputs to the system rely on a number of forms, covering the Annual Development Programme, the 
Annual Plan of Operations, the Quarterly Monitoring Report for Approved Schemes, and the Quarterly 
Monitoring Report for Unapproved Schemes. The information of these forms is put into computer databases 
by the computer section in P&DD (with help of section staff). From these databases, a number of reports 
is prepared, first the draft ADP book which is prepared for the federal government, in February. This draft 
also contains for each project a rolling budget statement for the next three years. At the end of June, the 
final ADP is prepared, in its well-known format (see Table 4.2 on page 127). Subsequently, APOs are 
generated from the ADP database, and distributed amongst the line departments for completion of the annual 
targets with respect to inputs, outputs and activities. The APOs are to break the ADP allocation of the 
project down into specific budget lines as per the PC-1 budget statement, and also to provide other essential 
work plan components. The returned APOs are entered in the computer by the P&DD computer section after 
their scrutiny by technical sections, and then, in September, they form the basis for the generation of the 
quarterly monitoring reports (QMRs) by the computer. These forms contain the annual targets as previously 
entered in the APOs; the quarterly progress booked by the line agencies is then required to be entered in 
the appropriate columns. When the QMRs are returned to the P&DD, they are checked by the substantive 
sections, and then entered in the computer databases. When this is also completed, a number of analytical 
reports is produced, which are sent to the Section Chiefs for information and comments; other tables are 
included as annexes in the Working Paper for the Quarterly Review Meeting. Since many APOs are 
amended/revised over the year, these are required to be sent to the P&DD. In this way, the targets as 
registered by the system are continually updated, and feed into the monitoring process. Every three months, 
following the time table of the monitoring process, new QMRs are printed and sent to the line departments, 
until the next ADP is approved and a new financial year cycle is started. 
Within the new system, the APO and the QMR were most conspicuously changed from 
their previous formats. The Annual Plan of Operations was completely re-written for the 
purposes of the monitoring system. Apart from specifying budgetary inputs, intended project 
outputs (physical, non-physical, and other), and the activities to be conducted by the 
department, it came to record the names and signatures of those responsible for completing, 
verifying and approving the form. The previous lack of accountability, where APOs could 
not always be traced back to their authors within departments, was thereby removed. A 
sample of an APO is shown in Table 6.4 on page 207. 
The Quarterly Monitoring Report pre-printed the APO targets in terms of budget inputs, 
project outputs, and departmental activities, while progress statements were expected to be 
made in the same terms. The frequent divergence between targets in APOs and Quarterly 
Review Reports was thereby prevented. To make up for the lack of systematic problem 
identification in the previous format, the QMR included a list of reasons for low fund 
utilisation, reasons for delays in inputs, and suggestions for better output results, that could 
be ticked. The report form also asked a number of other detailed questions, such as for 
instance whether site visits had been made to the project, and the exact location(s) of the 
project. A sample of the QMR will be shown later, in Table 6.7. For each budgetary input, 
as well as project output, a statement was required as to its status, i.e. whether it was on 
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schedule, ahead of schedule, delayed, finished, or canceled. Thus, it was left to the 
department completing the form to answer whether there were delays or not2. 
The new questions led to an expansion in the size of the progress report. The QMR became 
a report form of minimally two pages length, and further expandable depending on the actual 
number of inputs, outputs and activities of the project. As such it replaced a system where 
usually three or four projects were fitted on a single page. Thus, the new monitoring system 
used more paper than the previous system. But it also offered a large increase in detail, 
specification of targets and achievements (in terms of inputs, outputs and activities), linkage 
with governmental account code classifications, and statements as to the nature of the progress 
as well as problems/bottlenecks encountered. From being relatively open, the format became 
much more closed. The computer processing which underlaid the system ensured, in 
principle, a higher quality of information, speedy and aggregate analysis, and therefore a 
better utilisation. 
The new monitoring system meanwhile did not break with the habit of comparing the 
quarterly achievements with the ADP and APO targets, rather than with the original PC-1 
targets (and their associated time table). Although some officers had expressed a desire that 
the progress was to be compared with the overall targets, the ACS (Dev.) decided that the 
targets for the year remained paramount in the new system. If the PC-1 target was to 
complete the project in a given year, but the ADP laid down that, due to lack of funds, only 
50 percent was to be spent on the project, then the APO would specify that only 50 percent 
of the work was to be completed at the end of the year. However, the relationship between 
PC-1 targets and achievements was not broken. Once per year, when the APO was returned 
by the line departments, the overall achievements made up to the end of the previous year 
could be compared with the expected achievements as per the PC-13. 
Limitations of the new system 
Before proceeding with a discussion of its performance, it is useful to consider some of the 
main limitations of the system: 
1) The system did not contain separate sub-systems or annexures for projects in different 
sectors or of otherwise different categories. As desired by the P&DD, the format was 
to remain standardised for all. The main advantages were seen as ease of 
administration and also the opportunity for comparing progress between sectors. The 
vast opportunities for increase in number of inputs, outputs and activities, were 
supposed to somewhat obviate the lack of other categories of specification. 
2) The new system meant a technical improvement in formats and processing, but did 
not expand the number of data sources. Although the respondents could be identified 
better than in the previous system, the new system was still relying on line 
departments reporting on their own performance. New sources of information in the 
computer system, such as releases made by the Finance Department, and expenditures 
recorded by the Accountant General were not incorporated4, neither site visit reports 
by the P&DD itself. Neither was a separate reporting system by Local Government, 
2 Since the P&DD's senior management had indicated that the direct monitoring of the PC-l's time-bound 
targets would be futile, a more "objective' system based on actual dates comparing the PC-l's time table with 
the progress recorded by the QMR was not pursued. It will be reviewed later whether the departments cared 
or dared to answer such value laden questions as to their own performance. 
3 This is visible in column B6 (Status) of the APO. 
4 At the end of the project, this was however included in the design. 
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contractors, beneficiaries or other stakeholders set up. The P&DD was of the view 
that this would 'dissipate' the computerisation effort, also given the small size of the 
UNDTCD project and its short duration. 
3) The new system did not overcome the conceptual impossibility of the old system to 
properly compare quarterly progress, as recorded by the progress reports, with an 
annual target set in the APO. Whether 'zero' progress recorded in quarter 1 was 
worrisome given some annual target, could not be checked. Imaginary quarterly 
targets at the rate of 25 percent of the annual targets had to be employed, just like 
with the old system. The ACS (Dev.) decided that in the volatile planning and 
implementation conditions of AJK, this kind of detailed target setting was futile. 
4) The new system, which required much more detail, meant at least initially more work 
for the line departments. Computerisation in the line departments, as was to be 
undertaken by the project for this reason, was later canceled by the P&DD. The pre-
printing of some information in the columns compensated probably only partly for the 
increase in paperwork. 
Thus, already in the design, the P&DD's contribution (but also intrinsic reasons of 
conciseness) worked against a system allowing for the recording of the highest level of detail. 
The success of the Annual Plan of Operations 
In the next section, much of the performance of the new system will be discussed while 
comparing it with its predecessor and also the federal PC-III. In the remainder of the present 
section some main features of the new APO and QMR will be reviewed. 
The new Annual Plan of Operations proved to be a success from the point of view of 
compliance, rapid return as well as - certainly on first sight - the detail of its budget lines. 
In 1993-94, some 81 percent of all projects in the ADP (with an allocation above zero) 
submitted APOs, and this number has remained high also after the project closed in 1994.5 
Another striking feature of the new system was that the overwhelming majority of the APOs 
sent to P&DD (94 percent) was submitted already in July, at the very start of the financial 
year, which was in the spirit of the APO philosophy, but a practice not adhered to before, 
as was described in section 4.4. 
The reasons for the higher return of the APO are difficult to pin down, particularly because 
the new APO required much more information than its predecessor. Was it the appealing 
format of the APO, or the impression that something would be done with that information, 
whereas before the experience had been that the information would be archived without any 
perusal? The APO had always been a document required for the Account General's Office 
to start project payments over the year. Copies of APOs were sent for concurrence to the 
P&DD, but since this was seen as a formality, it was not always done. The novel idea of 
computerisation within P&DD might well have scared the departments into a greater measure 
of compliance, even more so than in the case of the progress reports: the APO is a document 
authorising payments, the progress report only recounts. Problems can be sorted out also 
verbally in the Review Meeting; for the APO there is no such option. In the years after the 
closure of the project, high returns of APOs have remained, mainly - as is said - due to 
pressures from the P&D's ACS in the context of a budget crunch. The APO means an 
additional brake on all too rapid spending. 
5 A hundred percent return would remain difficult to achieve, given that there were always projects in the ADP 
that would not be approved over the year, or which would have token allocations. 
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But was the APO, apart from giving more detail, also completed in a way more 
understandable to the reader? Here a less positive image has to be conveyed. It is instructive 
to look at at least one example. Table 6.4 shows the APO of a project in the Industries sector 
that was also used as an example in the earlier sections on the old format and the federal 
format. When evaluating the information content in sections B, C and D, it is clear that many 
question marks remain6. The rapporteur has either not properly understood the intention of 
various sections, or has been quite careless. 
A general experience with the new system was that whereas a certain precision was still 
achieved in the section on budget inputs, information on project outputs and departmental 
activities which was not properly laid down in the PC-1, would remain sloppily formulated7. 
In the example mentioned, not even the staff of the department completing, verifying and 
approving the APO, had been filled in. In such a case, officially, the AG Office should ask 
for proper completion and, in the meantime, not allow expenditures to take place. However, 
if a signature of the secretary of the department had appeared on the accompanying letter, 
then often the project was still seen to be able to incur expenditures. In this sense, the 
enforcement of the forms by both P&DD and the AG Office remained less than ideal. As will 
be seen, this led to poorer than necessary quality of many returns. 
6 The APO of the industrial project, for instance, did not go into the possible problem of lack of funds for land 
purchase; neither, as we shall see, the QMR. The scheme target was to purchase 127 kanals of land, but in fact 
only a hundred kanals were acquired, against which the whole budget for the 127 kanals was spent. Since there 
was no planned target for acquiring the remaining kanals during the year, it looks as though these would also 
not be purchased in future. It might then also not have been possible to mark the originally intended 54 
industrial plots. The implications are by no means clear. 
Other examples of sloppy and perfunctory completion concern the lack of (proper) quantities given in column 
B3, the lack of status indications in B6, and the lack of information as to payments made to contractors, and 
departmental activities. 
7 E.g. the cost of land or electricity charges can in no way be seen as outputs of the industrial estate scheme. 
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Table 6.4 Sample of Annual Plan of Operations, AJK 1993-94 
SHOAL PLAN OF OPERATION (APO) PROJECT INFORM. MANAGEMENT DATABASE Please complete the items below using the attached users guide:- Year:1993-94 Date Issued: 22/08/93 
A. Characteristics of the Project: 1. Project Name: ESTABLISHMENT OF INDUSTRIAL ESTATE AT RABALAKOT (REVISED) 
2. ADP Proj. No. IND-3 3. Sector: Industries/Minerals 4. Sub-Sector: Industries 5. Approved Cost: 9.618M. 6. ALLOCATION FOR CDRR.YEAR: 0.630 M. (incl. FEC: O.000M. i FA Comp.:0.000M.) 
B. PCI or revised PCI Project Inputs (Appr.Quantity i Amounts): | Progress upto 6/93 | APO Planned Inputs 
Bl. BUDGET INPUT DESCRIPTION: Acc- B2. B3. B4. B5. B6. St B7. B8. Sex ount Unit Quantity Cost Quantity Exp. at Quantity Alloc. 
No. Code Meas Rs in M. Rs in M. us 
4* 
Rs in M. 
l Cost of land 19000 KANA 127.0 2.300 100.0 2.300 2 Marking of plots. 34000 NO 54.0 0.020 5.0 0.001 
3 Construction of Chowkidar Hut. 34300 CFT 0.0 0.042 100.0 0.043 4 Construction of office building. 34100 NO 0.0 0.270 100.0 0.256 5 Construction of Main Gate. 34400 NO 1.0 0.060 27.0 0.066 6 Fencing of Estate Area. 34400 NO 0.0 0.075 79.0 0.088 7 
8 
Hater supply net work incl.provision of O/H-Approach roads 34900 31200 NO MILE 0.0 0.0 
1.350 
1.835 
71.3 100.0 
1.062 
1.835 9.0 0.340 
9 Internal roadB. 31200 MILE 0.0 1.200 69.0 0.828 De 8.0 0.117 
10 Provision of rain water system 53200 PERC 0.0 0.400 100.0 0.446 De 0.0 0.071 11 Purchase of furniture. 0 PERC 0.0 0.020 100.0 0.020 12 Prov.of Elect.HT/LT lines,transformers & S.- 34900 NO 0.0 1.786 100.0 1.787 13 Pay of staff including allowances. 1000 NC 0.0 0.186 100.0 0.255 38.0 0.080 14 TA/DA 51100 NC 0.0 0.024 50.0 0.019 8.0 0.005 
15 Stationery,printing of forms and stamps 55000 NC 0.0 0.006 100.0 0.011 33.0 0.005 16 Other contingencies. 50000 NC 0.0 0.018 100.0 0.029 17.0 0.005 17 Telephone installation and rent. 58400 NO 0.0 0.012 18 Electric.charges. 53000 NC 0.0 0.014 0.0 0.002 21.0 0.007 
B9 Total 0.0 9.618 0.0 8.895 0.0 0.630 BIO Total Contract Cost 0.0 7.058 B U Non-Contract Cost 0.0 2.560 
** (Compare with PCl-phasing) Enter: A=Ahead of Schedule; S=0n Schedule; D=Delayed; F=Finished/Compl.; C=Canceled 
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Table 6.4 continued... page 2 of APO 
C. PCI Targets (Project Outputs): Targets(Outputs) Achievements üpto 6/93 
APO Targets (Outputs) 
Cl. DESCRIPTION C2. unit of Meas-urement C3. Ho./Quantity C4JO./ÖU. |Stat C5. NO./Quantity 
1. PHYSICAL TARGETS (Outputs): Cost of land Marking of plots Construction of chowkidar hut. Construction of office building Construction of main gate Fencing of areaHater Supply Network Hater supply net work overhead tank Approach roads Internal roads 
2. NON-PHYSICAL TARGETS (Outputs): Provision of rain water system Purchase of furniture 
Provision of electricity HT/LT Lines transformer Street lights Pay of staff and allowances Stationery, forms and stamps Telephone installation and rent 
C.1.3. PRINTED/OTHER COMMUNICATION MATERIALS(Targets): 1. Electricity charges 
M A 193.0 100.0 0.0 
NO 54.0 5.0 0.0 NO 1.0 100.0 0.0 
NO 1.0 100.0 0.0 NO 1.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
n n 
71.0 
i n n n 
9.0 
n fi U.U 0.0 1UU.U 69.0 
U.U 
8.0 
0.0 
0.0 
100.0 100.0 
12.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
100.0 
100.0 
0.0 38.0 
0.0 50.0 
n n 
8.0 
n n U.U 
0.0 
U.U 
100.0 
U.U 
0.0 0.0 21.0 
D. APO Activities to be done by the Department in 1993-94: D2.START D ../../.. ../../.. ../../.. 
D3.END DATE ../../.. ../../.. ../../.. 
E. Completion/Verification/Approval: 
1 NAME 1 DESIGNATION | TELEPHONE | DATE | SIGNATURES 
Form Completed by: Form Verified by: Form Approved by: 
0 0 0 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
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Targets changing during the year 
The case reflected in Table 6.4 may be regarded as a bad example of the APO returns, but 
in fact in many of the sectors studied, mistakes and omissions were found, jeopardizing the 
utility of the forms for analysis by the computer. To this must be added the negative 
influence of a practice that was allowed to grow into a habit in the course of the 
implementation of the system. Some line departments entered new annual targets in the 
appropriate columns of the QMR in the third quarter, without having previously submitted 
a revised APO for approval by the P&DD. The QMR provided an opportunity to do this, 
since the format included a few columns displaying information obtained from the APO, 
which were then changed by the line department. The practice ensured that the computer 
system would always keep track of the latest revisions to the APO, even if no revised APO 
was submitted. But in practice it meant also that these targets started to move across the year. 
A large project delay building up towards the end of the year could in this way be made to 
disappear, simply by changing the targets in the QMR to more modest levels. Although the 
computer system could still keep track of the changes, in practice there was insufficient time 
to check their legitimacy. Even this would not have been a serious problem if the computer 
could still do the calculation of meaningful aggregates of for instance 'total number of 
kilometres of road constructed': some kilometres not done in one project facing a cutback 
could then have been compensated for by additional kilometres of road constructed in another 
project receiving more funds. But the often confusing units of measurement used by different 
rapporteurs in the QMRs did not always allow such calculations, while project monitoring by 
the P&DD became very fluid at the same time. This experience pointed - again - to the 
finding that the shifting of funds among projects by departments and the frequent changes in 
workplans obviated the possibility of a serious analysis of the progress of many individual 
schemes as well as some departmental programmes as a whole. New formats and associated 
computer processing could not turn the obfuscating effects of organismic behaviour and 
programme management around. 
Lax attitude by the P&DD 
The experience with the APOs pointed - once more - to the mixed objectives and stakes of 
the P&D Department. At the end of the day it seemed not sufficiendy convinced that the 
system needed the overhaul that it had expressed earlier as the reason for the request for the 
UNDTCD project. Or at least it lacked the guts to pull such an overhaul off in the fickle 
institutional environment. It remained afraid that this would lead the department into areas 
threatening to its own survival. Over the period that the author was present in AJK, the 
Monitoring and Evaluation Section, coordinating the review process and the new monitoring 
system, was headed by two successive officers of senior rank (BPS 19). The first was an 
official out of P&DD's own ranks, his successor a deputationist from the PWD. Both officers 
demonstrated a distinct aversion to 'rock the boat' by a too critical stance and too much 
independent counterchecking. Indeed, their main attitude towards the UNDTCD project staff 
was to express appreciation for the difficult position of the P&DD and the line departments. 
Time-tables, new procedures and job responsibilities were all allowed to slip. While the 
intention had been that senior P&DD staff such as Section Chiefs would themselves be 
involved in the checking of reports and running of the management information system, in 
practice this duty was delegated to junior staff who did not have first hand experience with 
the projects and were not encouraged to go to the field. They lacked interest in the reports 
for this reason, claimed that they were 'full of lies' anyway, and passed them on to the 
Computer Section without serious scrutiny, and in express violation of the procedural 
agreements made. A gradual reduction of errors, omissions and inconsistencies in the reports 
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as a result of conscientious checking was thus not achieved. In some sections, there would 
have been insufficient staff available for this anyway, and the agreed new staff was not 
appointed. In the Computer Section, only few of the required new staff to run the system and 
analyse the results were appointed, and invariably after a lot of struggle. They would be 
transferred fairly quickly or were absorbed by the private sector. P&DD was not always 
(fully) to blame for this. But the result was that the potential of the new system was not fully 
realised. 
It might be argued that some of the problems encountered were due to lack of experience 
with the system in 1993-94. Line agencies may have given less than optimal attention to 
filling in the APOs also because they did not see the information of the previous year 
analysed in detail. Analysis of the APO information would remain weak up till the end of the 
UNDTCD project due to the finding that, in spite of professions to the contrary, there was 
a lack of interest by the P&DD. On the other hand, due to the presence of the UNDTCD 
project which had the backing of the ACS, there was a momentum in favour of the system, 
whereas training exercises must have been still fresh in the minds of the staff of the line 
agencies. All in all, the author does not think that the response of the line departments 
deviated much from the 'normal' situation. 
The main features of the response as to the APO are summarised in Table 6.5 on the next 
page: The average number of budget inputs entered into the APO was 15.2, varying from 5.9 
in the Health sector to 64.1 in the Agriculture sector. Quite obviously, the departments felt 
fairly comfortable with replicating the budget lines of the PC-1 document as inputs in the 
APO. In terms of outputs, which were much less systematically entered in the PC-1, the 
response was much less detailed: an average of 7.3 outputs were given, varying from 31 in 
the Agriculture sector to 2.8 in the Water sector. Clearly, departments were least familiar 
with, and interested in, offering information as to their own activities over the year. Only 2.2 
percent of all APO's included details on the intended activity schedule. This also meant that 
one objective of the system, namely to provide the line departments with better instruments 
for planning and monitoring their own work, was not realised. The new APO, in spite of its 
ambitions in this respect, was not seen as an internal tool, but mainly as an external reporting 
system.8 If the features of the often inadequate definition of budget inputs and project outputs 
are added to this picture, then it can be concluded that it has remained difficult for the P&DD 
to understand and get a grip on the project workplans of the departments. 
8 The conclusion that the departments were less interested in providing a transparent picture is corroborated by 
further analysis of the computer data. It was calculated that of the 6470 inputs (budget lines) entered for the 
projects in die database, 1779 had zero quantities and units of measurement which were 'NC (not countable). 
This implies that some 27 percent of all budget lines did not have adequate quantification, rendering them of 
limited value as monitoring instruments. Similarly, when the annual allocation was compared to the aggregate 
of the breakup, in 38 percent of all projects there was a difference, pointing to sloppy accounting in APOs. 
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Table 6.5 Statistics on submission of Annual Plans of Operation by sector in 1993-94, 
AJK. 
Sec- Projects New Perc. Perc. APOs Perc. APOs Av.inputs APO with Av.outp. APO with Av.actts. 
tor ADP >0 unappr. returned with alloc* per APO outputs per APO activ.s per APO 
AGE 43 9 20.9% 83.74 100.04 64.1 67.44 31.1 14.04 16.0 EDÜ 66 1 1.54 50.04 30.34 6.5 78.84 3.4 0.04 RIA 29 0.04 89.74 42.34 5.9 82.84 7.0 0.04 IND 23 4 17.44 87.04 100.04 21.5 69.64 10.9 13.04 11.0 LRD 9 1 11.14 100.04 100.04 6.4 77.84 6.6 0.04 POW 7 1 14.34 100.04 100.04 16.0 100.04 5.9 28.64 4.0 PPH 70 8 11.44 87.14 100.04 8.7 75.74 5.8 1.44 4.0 RID 4 2 50.04 75.04 100.04 7.7 0.04 0.04 SDP 13 0.04 92.34 100.34 10.8 76.94 6.7 0.04 SWD 3 1 33.34 0.04 0.04 0.04 TiC 265 25 9.44 85.34 99.64 9.8 75.54 5.3 0.04 WAT 5 2 40.04 80.04 100.04 4.8 80.04 2.8 0.04 
Total 537 54 10.14 81.44 91.14 14.1 74.94 7.3 2.24 11.8 
Source: Govt, of AJK, PSDD, coiputer databases ADP>0 = ADP allocation greater than 0; unappr. = unapproved and new; av. = average number; actts. = activities * Percentage of all APOs returned that had budget lines above Rs 0 M, i.e. on which expenditure was intended. 
Table 6.6 Statistics on submission of Quarterly Monitoring Reports by sector in 
1993-94, AJK. 
Sec- Projects New Perc. Perc. QMRs QMR inputs Av.inputs QMR with Av.outp.s QMR with 
tor ADP >0 proj. new returned* available** per APO outputs per APO** activ.s 
AGR 43 9 20.94 56.64 62.84 32.7 46.54 14.9 7.04 EDU 66 1 0.54 95.54 95.54 5.9 92.44 3.6 0.04 
HEA 29 0.04 93.14 93.14 6.7 86.24 6.6 0.04 IND 23 4 17.44 81.24 87.04 22.2 60.94 11.7 13.04 LRD 9 1 11.14 96.34 100.04 6.4 88.94 7.6 0.04 POW 7 1 14.34 95.24 85.74 16.0 100.04 5.9 0.04 PPE 70 8 11.44 84.84 87.14 8.5 70.04 5.6 0.04 
R&D 4 2 50.04 58.34 75.04 7.7 0.04 0.04 SDP 13 0.04 69.24 84.64 10.6 76.94 6.3 0.04 SWD 3 1 33.34 33.34 0.04 0.04 0.04 
TiC 265 25 9.44 83.34 87.14 10.5 72.84 5.1 0.04 WAT 5 2 40.04 73.34 80.04 4.8 20.04 2.0 .04 
Total 537 54 10.14 82.74 81.64 11.2 72.34 5.9 1.14 
Source: Govt, of AJK, PSDD, computer databases * The total number of returns in 1993-94 divided by 3 (quarters) and converted into a percentage. ** availability in at least one of the three quarter reports 
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Experiences with the Quarterly Monitoring Reports 
The Quarterly Monitoring Reports reflected in many ways the APOs in terms of compliance, 
detail, and quality of information. Table 6.6 on the previous page summarises some main 
features of the reports received in 1993-94. The overall compliance was around 83 percent, 
which is reasonably high, especially in comparison with a similarly demanding format such 
as the PC-III. It can be seen also that the compliance has risen with time, so that perhaps a 
conclusion is warranted that the unfamiliarity with the form in the beginning was responsible 
for the slightly lower response than with the Quarterly Review Reports. To put the figure in 
its proper context, it has to be understood that some ten percent of the projects were new in 
the ADP, and may not have been started by even the third quarter although an allocation had 
been made available to them. Also for some projects which were under revision, a report was 
not sent in, due to the misunderstanding that such projects were 'lying with P&DD' and 
therefore did not require one to be submitted. In again other cases, there was no QMR for 
a project which had not yet incurred any expenditure. In such cases the rapporteur may have 
been thinking that it would be useless to send a blank report. Since such projects generally 
do not spend because of a problem, not submitting a report on this is, however, quite serious. 
The level of detail of the returns was less than that of the APOs, with averages of 11.2 
budget inputs, 5.9 project outputs, and 8.0 departmental activities (the latter over only 1.1 
percent of all the quarterly monitoring reports sent to P&DD). The main reason for this was 
that for a number of large, foreign aided projects in the agriculture sector, no quarterly report 
was sent due to special problems of these projects. In fact, some of these projects were 
looking at other ways of improving their internal reporting systems, and this led to confusion 
as far as the format required for the review meeting. In the other sectors, as can be witnessed 
from comparing tables 6.5 and 6.6, the number of inputs in the QMRs was approximately 
as large as in the APOs. The lack of reporting for such problem ridden projects in the 
agriculture sector, however, does point to a weakness of the system: for complex, foreign 
aided projects, the highly standardised system was ill-equipped. 
Strategic answers 
Table 6.7 on the next page shows a sample of a quarterly monitoring report. For purposes 
of comparison the same project is taken that was discussed earlier: the establishment of an 
industrial estate. Clearly, the example points to the very dissatisfactory situation that many 
columns had not been filled in properly. Where the columns were completed, one can be 
satisfied with the fact that at least the expenditures seem to be specified to the required 
level9. But from the fact that subsequently all these budget inputs were deemed to be on 
schedule, suspicion arises that strategically biased answers may have been given. For 
instance, on approach roads and internal roads no expenditure was incurred, but there is no 
indication that they were on schedule or delayed. Neither can this matter be cleared up from 
the section on outputs, where no marking was given at all to the two items. Only bottleneck 
number 8 (in B9) was marked: tendering of contract/subcontract not completed. However, 
whether this referred to works on the water supply network or the roads is not clear. The 
activity section was not filled in at all; in the APO this was also not the case. Neither was 
the section on site visits. 
9 This was corroborated by comparing the quarterly expenditure figure with the aggregate of its breakup across 
budget inputs; in the third quarter of 1993-94, only in 4 percent of the projects, there were differences. 
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Table 6.7 Format and sample printout of a quarterly monitoring report, 1st quarter 
1993-94, AJK 
AJK QUARTERLY MONITORING OF 0U-GOM5/NEW PROJECTS — PHI PROJECT MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM — LINE AGENCIES unique Ref. Number of Project: IND-3 YEAR: 1993-94 PROGRESS UPTO (END) QUARTER: 3 
Project Name: ESTABLISHMENT OF INDUSTRIAL ESTATE AT RAHALAKOT (REVISED) Sponsoring Agency: Industries Department, AJK Date printed: 27/04/94 
Al. FINANCIAL INF0RMATI0N(In Million Rupees): 
1. Total Approved Cost of Project 9.618 2. (Rev.) Allocation for current year 0.630 3. Funds released up to Quarter-3 0.630 
4. Expenditure up to Quarter-3 0.153 
A2. IF APPLICABLE TICK REASON(s) FOR M FOND UTILISATION 
1. Delay in funds release by AG 3. Heather 5. Difficulties with Contract 7. Internal Project Problems 
XI. Others (specify) 
2. Delay in project inputs 4. Lack of Access to Prj.Area 6. Diffic.s with Contractor 
8. Difficulties of acq. land 
B. Project Inputs (as per APO): (Rs in Millions) Progr. upto Qtr-3 Input Status Ei id Qu. 
B2. B3. Phys. B4.Plan- B5. Phys. B6. Exp. B7.1 B7.2 B8.1 B8.2 
Bl. DESCRIPTION Unit Quantity ned APO Quantity of each on Com- Del- Canc-Meas Planned Expend. Achieved Item Sehe plet ayed elled 
l.Cost of land KAMA 
2.Marking of plots. NO 
3.Construction of Chowkidar Hut. CFT 4.Construction of office building. NO 5.Construction of Main Gate. NO 6.Fencing of Estate Area. NO 
7.Hater supply net work incl.provision of 0/H H.T. NO 9.0 0.340 0.100 Yes 
8.Approach roads MILE 9.Internal roads. MILE 8.0 0.117 10.Provision of rain water system PERC 0.071 11.Purchase of furniture. PERC 
12.Prov.of Elect.ET/LT lines,transformers k S.Lights NO 13.Pay of staff including allowances. NC 38.0 0.080 0.039 Yes 14.TA/DA NC 8.0 0.005 0.005 Yes 
15.Stationery,printing of forms and stamps NC 33.0 0.005 0.004 Yes 
16.Other contingencies. NC 17.0 0.005 0.005 Yes n.Telephone installation and rent. NO 18. Electric. charges. NC 21.0 0.007 Yes 
B9. REASONS FOR DELAYS IN INPUTS (TICK REASON(s)): (no 1. Tendering Procedure for Equipment 2. 3. Unavailability of appropriate material 4. 5. Power Cuts 6. 7. Strikes of Staff Y 8. 
9. Current costs of equipment / materials / works 10. exceeds Planned Costs (Cost Escal.) 11. 12. Foreign Experts not Assigned 13. 14. Heather or Accessibility 15. 16. Lack of Public Participation at Community Level 17. 18. Finalisation of Accounts not Completed XI. 
c is no reason/delay) Delays in Staff Recruitment Unavailability of appropriate Machinery/Equipment Delay in Land Acquisition Tendering of Contract/Sub-Contract not Completed Admin.difficulties due to shortage/transfer of personnel Changes in Senior Management 
Problems with Contractors Problems of Installation of Hater, Gas, Electricity Lack of Locally Mobilized Funds Others (Specify) 
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Table 6.7 (Qmt.d) Formt and sample printout of a quarterly monitoring report 
C. ANNEAL PROJECT TARGETS (OUTPUTS, AS PER APO) APO Ach-ievements upto QTR-3 
C3. STATUS UPTO END QUARTER-3 
Unit 
Of Meas. No./Qty C3.1 Contin.g 
C3.2 
Completed 
C3.3 
Canceled | C2.No.Qty 
Cl.l PHYSICAL TARGETS (Outputs): 1. Cost of land 2. Barking of plots 3. Construction of chowkidar tat. 4. Construction of office building 5. Construction of main gate 6. Fencing of area 7. Bater supply net work overhead tank 8. Approach roads 9. Internal roads C1.2 NON-PBYSICAL TARGETS (Outputs): 1. Provision of rain water system 2. Purchase of furniture 3. Provision of electricity HT/LT Lines transformer 4. Street lights 5. Pay of staff and allowances 6. Stationery,forms and stamps 7. Telephone installation and rent C1.3 PRÊTED/OTBER COMMUNICATION MATERIAL: 
KAMA NO NO NO NO 
9.0 
8.0 
12.0 0.0 0.0 38.0 8.0 0.0 
Yes 
Yes Yes 
C4. SUGGESTIONS FOR BETTER OUTPUT RESULTS (TICK SUGGESTIONS): (no tick is no suggestion) I. Introduction of Penalty Clauses in Contracts 2. Enforcement of Existing Penalty Clauses 3. Improved Pre-aualification of contractors/consultants 4. More efficient tendering proc. for equip, purchase 5. Access to a bigger range of suppliers 6. Better Mon. 5 Updating of Scheduled rates of const. 7. Need of better bills of quantities 8. Need of more account to be taken of inflation 9. Less restrictive recruitment rules for specialized staff 10. Improvement in Land Acquisition procedure II. More encouragement of public participation XI. 
Dl. PROJECT ACTIVITIES OF TEE DEPARTMENT DURING CURRENT YEAR: D2. STATUS D2.1 Comp-leted Y/N 
OF ACTIVT D2.2 Cane elled Y/N 
TES DJ Dl UPTO END QUARTER 3 (tick) D3. If Appl.Give Reason to Cancel (l=No longer relev.; 2=input probl.) 
X. LIST ALTERATIONS UP TO QUARTER-3 
(Options == Reasons for Canceling Activities: l=No longer relevant; 2=Input probl.; 3=0ther problems) 
| 1. EAS THIS PROJECT BEEN COMPLETED IN QUARTER-3? No 2. IS PCI OF THIS PROJECT UNDER REVISION? 
F. Name of Officer who FILLED IN this form 
G 1. Name of Off. who VERIFIED this inf.: 
3. Date Verified / / Verified by Officer Report 
3862 Date Completed 11/04/94 2. Tel. No.: Verif.not by Site Visit 
5. Site Visits to the Project: 
a. Name of Officer b. Desigi lation Officer c. Date of d. Place(s) Visited e.Insp.RepI f. Date of 1 Site Visit issued Y/N|lnspec. Report| 
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The overall lack of consistent detailed reporting does not mean that there have been no 
sincere markings of the status of the budget inputs or the outputs in the reports. For instance, 
it can be assumed that if a department reported a delay, there was usually a real delay in 
absolute terms (i.e. in comparison with the APO or PC-1 phasing). The question is rather: 
if a delay was NOT mentioned, while no expenditure had been incurred, was there then an 
unreported and consciously withheld delay? This may well have been the case. 
Systematic bias 
On the other hand it is likely that the rate at which information was withheld is approximately 
the same in each quarter. The bias would then be systematic and the trends could still be 
analysed meaningfully. For instance, if from an analysis of the 'input' section of the format 
(see Table 6.8) it appeared that some 16 percent of all QMRs had marked one or more budget 
inputs as being delayed in the first quarter, and 5 percent in the second, and 2 percent in the 
third quarter, this might well indicate a significant trend. It might be a sign that budgetary 
problems for projects were highest in the early part of the financial year when overall releases 
were lowest. Only when releases by the Finance Department were starting to accumulate (at 
the usual rate of 25 percent of the ADP budget in each quarter), the reporting of the delays 
encountered diminished. From this, a recommendation is conceivable that a higher proportion 
of the overall releases made in the beginning of the year, would lead to a better performance 
of the projects. 
Table 6.8 Status of budget inputs and project outputs in 3 quarters of 1993-94, AJK. 
Number % not marked % on schedule % delayed completed 
INPUTS 
Quarter 1 1992 71.9% 12.6% 15.5% 0.0% 
Quarter 2 1992 76.3% 18.5% 5.3% 0.0% 
Quarter 3 1992 75.7% 22.4% 2.0% 0.0% 
OUTPUTS 
Quarter 1 2073 69.3% 29.0% 1.5% 0.2% 
Quarter 2 2073 87.8% 9.6% 0.5% 2.1% 
Quarter 3 2073 87.7% 10.8% 0.8% 0.8% 
Source: Project databases, , Computer Centre, P&D Department, AJK 
Gaps and pretended misunderstandings 
But the most obvious conclusion from the lack of precision in terms of units of measurement, 
status markings and outputs, activities and site visits must be that there was a problem which 
went far beyond the lack of understanding or experience with the system. Departments 
seemed to consciously or subconsciously keep a low profile by pretending to misunderstand 
the forms and not properly filling out the information that was required of them. Usually, 
when confronted with the errors made, a request was made for more training. Implicidy then 
the blame for the mistakes and omissions was laid elsewhere. As mentioned, most of the staff 
responsible for the forms had been recendy trained in the system between 1991 and 1993. 
One of the first reactions to the introduction of the system, made by an agency head to the 
chief technical adviser of the project was: 'Ah, so you have come to check on us, eh?' But 
it soon transpired that the check could be evaded by not completing the forms properly. A 
sound analysis of the status of inputs or outputs can only begin when all inputs are listed, 
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outputs properly selected, the units of measurements determined and quantities assigned. In 
many cases, either one or the other of these elements were missing. 
As said before, in some cases the report instrument was used to play out an issue, in many 
cases it was not. Rather than committing the department to being 'on schedule' or 'delayed' 
with their inputs or outputs, the rapporteur preferred to keep the columns blank, thus giving 
the impression not to be able to adequately choose the proper answer or having no time or 
data to fill it in. For instance, it is very likely that delays in outputs vis-a-vis the workplans 
were highest in the last part of the financial year10. In the beginning of the year, it is hard 
to imagine that a department would report that it was already behind on its annual target. This 
would be more likely to be confessed towards the end of the year. Yet this was not supported 
by data from the reporting system. It may well be that departments were even more on the 
defensive in the last quarters of the year, when the prospect of financial reappropriations 
between departments and other punishments loomed. This is also corroborated by the pattern 
of problem reporting: fewest problems were reported towards the end of the financial year, 
and this is so even when the effect of less problems with releases was discounted. (The 
evidence on this is given in Annex A2.5.) Fortunately, a supposed lack of training could not 
easily be held responsible for not ticking the proper categories of bottlenecks, although some 
were yet claimed to be confusing. A more extensive analysis of problem reporting will be 
made in the next section. 
Computer analysis 
The real benefits of the new reporting system can only be reaped if there are no serious gaps 
in the information provided by the departments and an analysis of aggregates can be 
performed by the computer. If some projects do not submit reports then the totals calculated 
by the computers will not reflect the aggregate position. If certain special categories of 
projects do not report, there will be a systematic bias which will render even the averages 
suspect. Then there will be a situation of 'garbage in garbage out'. It is perhaps going too 
far to accuse departments of actively sabotaging the system, but vague apprehensions about 
the computer analysis may well have affected in subtle ways the quality of information 
submitted. 
On the other hand, sometimes computer analysis did yield valid findings but which the 
P&DD subsequently deemed too controversial and vulnerable to misunderstandings to 
disseminate. When the project allocations and expenditures were aggregated at the level of 
political constituencies, there were such large differences that they were not deemed fit to 
make public in a Review meeting. Of importance to this decision was also that, in the view 
of the P&DD, it would require too much time to explain the findings properly. The summary 
generated by the monitoring system was then obviously regarded as too concise to give an 
appropriate reflection of reality. 
The old reporting system was cursory partly on the assumption that the directly concerned 
could understand the kind of shorthand practiced, even when much of the basic information 
had been left out. Computer analysis was not intended, and aggregation only in financial 
terms. Even in the ADP much data had been left out. Leaving out or fudging such data would 
have the added advantage that the general public would be kept in the dark as to the 
This is contrary to the situation with financial releases; these are least of what they are supposed to be in the 
beginning of the year, and are gradually building to the amount of the project's overall allocation at the end 
of the year. Outputs to be produced over the year can theoretically not be (seriously) delayed in the beginning 
but, if at all, only called delayed at the end of the year. 
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seriousness of the delays", whereas the professional reader with the project fdes available 
to him could keep his expertise to himself, just like in the old system; his superiors would 
have to rely on him, not the system. 
However, leaving out details of such significance in an elaborate closed format geared to 
computer processing greatly limited the potential for project comparison. Most of the tables 
annexed to the working paper for the Review Meeting were difficult to interpret, and 
therefore sometimes perceived as disappointing. Thus, although the information content of 
individual reports improved as compared to the old reporting system, the intended cross-
project aggregation and programme analysis remained difficult to realise in practice. 
After the UNDTCD project closed 
In the years after the UNDTCD project closed (August 1994), the ADP and APO systems 
continued to function well, but reporting for quarterly reviews remained of uneven quality. 
Recommendations left behind to focus on standardising output indicators on a sub-sector basis 
were not followed up; reporting on project outputs remained difficult to aggregate. The ACS 
who had so heavily influenced the nature of the system introduced was appointed Special 
Advisor Development to the Prime Minister, and from this position decided to try out yet 
another system; this time a new monthly financial monitoring system. Apparently he was not 
satisfied with the results of his own computerised monitoring system. His new system was, 
however, already abandoned after a year, and then it was relied again on the QMRs. Few 
Review Meetings were held anyway: from 1994-95 through 1996-97, only mid-term review 
meetings took place. The quest for the ideal monitoring system continues, however, because 
with the start of a new UN funded project in the P&DD there are currently plans to review 
the quarterly review reporting system and to perhaps concentrate further on financial 
information (!!). It is hoped that the experiences with the systems tried out earlier lead to a 
more serious consideration of the necessary changes in the institutional context. 
The next section compares the three formats discussed so far: QRR (cf. Table 5.1, page 155), 
PC-III (cf. Tables 6.1 to 6.3, pp. 197-200), and QMR (cf. Table 6.7, p.213) in respect of 
problem reporting. The focus is on the articulation of project problems in the context of 
different audiences on the one hand, and differences in (open and closed) report formats on 
the other. 
6.3 Problem reporting in three progress reporting systems 
The differences in the quantity and quality of problem reporting between the three systems 
have not yet been discussed in this chapter. For reasons of readability, the detailed 
comparison is transferred to Annex 2 (p.287 ff.); only the conclusions are presented here. 
Large differences were observed. When the sample was adjusted to only those cases for 
which there were reports in all three systems, then the following patterns emerged. In the old 
format of the QRR, around 28 percent of the projects reported observations that could be 
1 1 But nevertheless, the lack of progress with projects at the village level would usually be a major reason for 
discontent with sitting governments at election times. 
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interpreted as problems12. The federal system (PC-III) reported many more problems: in 77 
percent of the reports one or more bottlenecks were mentioned. The new AJK reporting 
system came to proportions between 21 and 64 percent in the various quarters, with an 
average of 41 percent. The likelihood that the differences in the marking of problems were 
due to differences 'on the ground' was analysed and deemed remote. As reasons for the 
differences are given instead: (1) the multiple choice format of the PC-III and the QMR, 
which was noticed to lead to a change of response strategy by the departments, and (2) the 
different audience of the reports: federal government versus AJK government. The 'closing' 
of the format in the PC-III and QMR led to most departments ticking one or two of the listed 
problems, for fear that not doing so might lead to sanctions for those cases where problems 
were obviously besetting the projects. A preference was given nevertheless to those problems 
that could be laid at the doorstep of other stakeholders in the process. The option to pretend 
not to understand the format, such as in the case of the input and output sections of the 
forms, was not invoked as much perhaps because of the more straightforward nature of the 
problems listed. It was seen as difficult to maintain that the rapporteur did not know that the 
category 'problem with contractors' needed to be ticked if the contractors had abandoned the 
work. 
The much more frequent ticking of listed problems when the audience was the Federal 
Government was related to the perception that the Federal Government was further removed 
from project management. This was already discussed in section 6.1. By 1981, most 
departments had the experience with a Federal Government not intervening at the project 
level after its scrutiny of the PC-III - usually, nothing was heard anymore after its 
submission. More frank reporting of problems would then not lead to repercussions such as 
feared for by the AJK Government or to open warfare with other departments in review 
meetings. The lack of direct involvement of the Federal Government would also explain the 
unlikely combination of high incidence of problem reporting for those agencies which 
returned a PC-III on the one hand, and the complete non-response given by many other 
agencies on the other. This author believes that practically all projects suffer one problem or 
the other, and most of them even experience severe problems. He is reminded for instance 
of the exclamation of one of his trusted key informants, a senior field-based engineer, that 
he would like to 'put all politicians against the wall and shoot them' for their scheming in his 
projects, their deals with contractors and land owners. In such conditions, it remains 
surprising how littie of this, and how much divested of despair, the great bulk of progress 
reports are. 
What the various stakeholders want 
The differences in the reporting of problems in the three systems are large enough to defy the 
supposition that the main determinant for reporting problems is 'that there is an objective 
problem or not'. It seems that with the right questions and with the right audience any project 
can be made to report a problem or to hide a problem. 
Whilst this may be so, it begs the question what is the purpose of the monitoring exercise. 
If it is only to discuss the problems that departments wish to discuss in front of the Prime 
Minister, then the open QRR format will be sufficient. This is what most of the departments 
want, and most of the lower staff in P&DD as well (it is easy to manage). 
This is more than the 7 percent that was reported for the ADP as a whole in the previous chapter, due to the 
fact that the sample included Health department, which reported most problems, and excluded other departments 
that did not report a single one. For purposes of comparison, the sample had to be based on those (86) cases 
that also submitted a PC-III, and among those were the Health department's projects. 
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If the purpose is (also) that the P&DD and other departments are enabled to analyse the 
overall progress and problems with the programme, then a picture of this will have to arise 
from the reports; in order to do this, a broad range of problems will have to be ticked to 
check whether a certain problem is of relevance to a project or not. This is what Section 
Chiefs in P&DD want. 
If the purpose goes even further to include the analysis of implementation capacities of 
departments and the need for allocation of resources and even the reappropriation of already 
allocated funds between departments, then it will also be imperative that meaningful 
information is gathered concerning the relative efficiency of these departments. The latter is 
what at least the higher management in P&DD wishes (and this was the reason for the 
UNDTCD project). For this it is necessary that there is a specific effort to include a number 
of questions that shed light on the internal functioning of the departments. In the new 
monitoring system, two such questions were included. It is of interest to see how they were 
addressed by the line departments. One is part of the list of reasons for low fund utilisation 
in section A: "internal project problems", and the other is in the list of reasons for delays in 
inputs in section B: "current costs of equipment / materials / works exceed planned costs (cost 
escal.)". 
Reporting on internal problems of departments 
With regard to the internal project problems (cf. Annex 2 table A2.5), the number of projects 
confessing this to be a problem lies between 5.6 and 12.1 percent of all projects, with an 
average of 8.2 percent. This average is not as low as would have been expected if every 
project would be assumed, as was done before, to hide any problems that might reflect 
negatively upon its internal efficiency. In this sense this finding corroborates the positive 
influence of the closed format on the reporting of problems. Again, it has to be conceded that 
technical improvements such as changing the format from a relatively open to a closed format 
can have more significant effects upon revealing even internal problems than could have been 
assumed from the discussion on organisational biases in chapter 1 of this study. The reason 
for this must lie in the possibility that hiding certain problems from sight would become more 
difficult with a closed format, based on anxiety that not reporting something when asked a 
direct question might have repercussions. This argument should, however, not be extended 
too far. After a close scrutiny of the cases which had reported internal problems, it turns out 
that many of these problems were in fact still 'external', to do with for instance delay in 
government decisions, or other departments not cooperating to the extent desired. The word 
internal has therefore been interpreted by some rapporteurs to mean internal to the 
bureaucracy as a whole, rather than internal to the projects. 
Secondly, the results of the ticking of the problem "current costs exceed planning" speak 
against the hypothesis of a serious increase in frankness with which a lack of efficiency is 
reported. Although as was found in chapter 4, some 45 percent of all projects needed a 
serious (upward) cost revision, less than one percent of all projects reported that there was 
a cost escalation, i.e. that the current costs of the equipment, materials or works were higher 
than the costs originally planned by the department. This point shall return in section 6.5 
when the predictive value of QMRs is discussed with respect to the need for project revisions. 
The conclusion is that the progress reports submitted did not enable a serious gauging of 
the implementation capacities of line departments. 
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6.4 Influences of idiosyncrasies of rapporteurs 
So far, the emphasis of the discussion has been on departmental (organisational) perspectives 
on the reports but in chapter 1 the hypothesis was also advanced that there may be a distinct 
influence of the individual rapporteur on the nature of the information supplied. As can be 
witnessed from Figure 6.1, there was considerable variation in the number of rapporteurs in 
the departments. Within some departments like Education and Health and the Road Divisions 
of Public Works Department, the progress reports were written by one or two 'progress 
officers' or draftsmen; in others like Agriculture and Forestry Department they were mostly 
written by project directors; in again others there was a mix of secretariat officers and project 
staff. For the years studied, the number of rapporteurs offering the around 450 Quarterly 
Monitoring Reports varied from 52 to 70 per quarter. This meant that the average rapporteur 
had to produce some 7 QMRs, which looks like a reasonable target, but the differences 
between departments and sectors were large. Whereas rapporteurs in the departments of the 
agriculture sector produced on average one or two reports, the two progress officers of the 
Education departments had to each do more than 55 per quarter. 
Naturally, having to produce such large quantities of reports within a few days will have 
an effect upon their content, even quite apart from the effect of the idiosyncrasies that a 
rapporteur may have anyway. Theoretically speaking, it would be better for the transparency 
and comparability of progress reports if the departments would all follow the same system. 
Either all project directors write their own reports and submit them, or all reports are written 
by the planning sections in their secretariats. The current mix has the disadvantage that the 
reader - and what to speak of the computer - cannot always assess whether a report is written 
by somebody close to or far removed from the project, or whether the rapporteur in question 
is prone to overstating or understating. There are too many rapporteurs to keep track of their 
idiosyncrasies and they are too unevenly spread amongst departments for their individual 
peculiarities to properly average out in computer analysis. 
The problem is compounded by the fact that even in such departments as Education and 
Health, where all reports are written and compiled by just a few officers, rapporteurs may 
be changed between one quarter and the other. The practice of frequent transfers in certain 
categories of especially senior officers is due to this. In the two years studied for which 
returns were entered in the computers, some 149 different rapporteurs were registered, when 
the average number of rapporteurs per quarter was 63. Continuity in reporting style between 
quarters was therefore lacking for many projects, something to which the frequent transfers 
of staff in AJK will have contributed. For instance, in 1993-94, one third of all projects / 
departments submitted reports written by rapporteurs different from those in the previous or 
succeeding quarter. 
Influences of rapporteurs on problem reporting in the road sector 
The databases created by the new monitoring system can be used to check the influence of 
these rapporteurs on the information supplied. Again, in order to be concise, the details of 
the analysis are not discussed here, but in Annex 3. The sector of road construction projects 
was studied in detail, in order to keep as low as possible the influence of variation in projects 
and their problems, while at the same time allowing a statistical analysis due to the large 
number of road projects in the ADP (over 200). Road projects are amongst the most highly 
standardised of all projects in the ADP, and therefore the number of budgetary inputs and 
project outputs listed in the QMRs by different rapporteurs, did not vary greatly. 
Nevertheless, at least one major rapporteur amongst ten was observed who deviated 
significantly from the others by including much more detail. 
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A similar pattern was observed for the reporting of problems. At least one rapporteur 
reported an unlikely small number of problems for his projects, compared to all others. The 
consistency as to the main problems reported by the various rapporteurs was fairly high (all 
reporting similarly frequent problems with contractors, land, and late financial releases), but 
there seemed to be much less consistency in terms of the other listed problems. These were 
more rapporteur-clustered. Hobby horses and pet subjects (some stressing the weather as a 
problem, others the 'lack of public participation'), rather than really experienced, exceptional 
problems, seemed to be in evidence. 
The conclusion from the analysis in Annex 3 is that differences in reporting style due to 
idiosyncrasies of different rapporteurs do affect the consistency with which project details, 
as well as problems, are reported. Training might be able to bring more consistency in 
reporting styles, but because of transfers of staff and other reasons, peculiarities of individual 
rapporteurs can be assumed to always play a maverick role, particularly affecting computer 
analysis of the data. Meanwhile, it does seem that a certain conformity to the organisational 
objectives and image keeps some kind of check on the definition of the 'main problems 
hindering the department', as much as the 'objective situation of the project'. Organisational 
esprit de corps thus imposes some uniformity in the image of the department's work vis-a-vis 
the outside world, and particularly when this work is of fairly standard nature (e.g. the Roads 
Department more than the Agriculture Department). 
The following section looks at the situation when the audience for which a report is intended 
remains the same, but the purpose of the report changes. 
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6.5 Monitoring of project revisions in AJK 
A last check on the 'biases' in reporting for quarterly review meetings conducted by this 
study involves the selection of those projects which are at a certain time proposed for 
revision, to compare the problems marked in their quarterly monitoring reports (QMRs) with 
those reported in the revised PC-Is and in minutes of (preparatory) meetings of the 
Development Working Party. This is possible since the PC-1 contains a specific item called 
'reasons for revision' which needs to be completed in case a revision of the project is 
proposed. Since the author had access to files which contained the minutes of both 
Development Working Party meetings and preparatory meetings for these DWPs, the 
problems could also be compared with those minuted. If the problems reported through the 
three sources would broadly match, then the departments could be held to report if not 
honestly then, at least, consistently, and the quarterly monitoring system would have good 
predictive value in terms of revisions. If the problems in the various sources would not 
match, then this could be taken to be an indication that departments employed strategies while 
describing their problems and the most important factor explaining the picture that arose from 
the report would then be the purpose of the report itself, rather than some objective 'status' 
of the project. The general purposes of QMRs and revised project documents are of course 
very different: the QMRs report progress to Review Meetings, the revised PC-Is ask an 
approval body for increased funding and sometimes a change in activities. Yet if both are to 
report on problems in their projects around the same time, then there should at least be a high 
correlation. In this section all projects which were discussed in the (pre-) DWP meetings that 
took place in 1992-93 are studied with the following questions in mind: 
1) Was the proposed revision announced timely and properly in the QMR13? 
2) Were the problems indicated in the QMR matching the problems reported in the 
revision proposal and those discussed in the (pre-) DWP meeting? 
In all, 25 project revisions were discussed in the (pre-) DWP meetings, 22 of which turned 
out to have also submitted QMRs just before the submission of a revised PC-1 for these 
meetings. It was found that only 12 of these 22 cases announced revisions properly in the 
QMRs. On the other hand, there were also some cases where in QMRs revisions were already 
announced, whilst these were not yet submitted to the P&DD. Consistency in reporting of 
revisions remained hard to achieve14. 
Problems in revised PC-Is, in minutes of meetings, and in QMRs 
The second question was checked through the item in the PC-1 format which asks for 
'reasons for revision'. The reasons given there were compared with records of DWP-meetings 
and with the Quarterly Monitoring Reports. The most important reasons were categorised and 
are listed in Table 6.9 on the next page. A typical reason would read: 
"Due to slow progress of civil work by contractors and insufficient ADP allocation, scheme could not 
be completed within proposed period; as a result constructional cost increased 2-3 times". 
This implied an answer to question E2: Is PC-1 of this project under revision? Yes/No (whether in your dept. 
only or officially). 
1 4 In fact, a substantial 35 cases were found where the PC-1 was indicated to be under revision, whereas no such 
case was actually on the agenda of a (pre-) DWP meeting in that whole year. Such cases were apparently still 
under preparation within the department, and were yet already reported to the Review Meeting. 
222 
This would then be coded by the author as 5: delay in release of funds, 6: problem with 
contractor, and 3: cost escalation problem. If more buildings, or vehicles, or equipment were 
required than originally planned, then this would be categorised as a change of scope of the 
project (code 1). If detailed design of a work completed after project approval would lead to 
a considerably changed cost estimate of the project and the project would therefore be 
proposed to be revised, then this would be classified as a detailed design problem (code 2); 
if even after detailed design and after considerable construction the amount of work to 
complete the original target was yet underestimated then this would be regarded as a wrong 
design problem (code 9) by the author (the departments would of course not indicate it as 
such). 
Table 6.9 Projects proposed for revision in 1992-93, with problems reported in 
minutes of (pre)DWPs, revised PC-Is and Quarterly Monitoring Reports, AJK. 
Project (pre)DWP PC-1 OMR Match QMR Marked as 
code meeting revision with PC-l/DWP under rev.? 
AGR-4 1+10 1+3+5 
AGR-27 3 3+9+12 
HEA-20 1+2+3 1+3+4+5+7 
HEA-21 1+3+4 1+3+5+6 
IND-5 4 3+4 
IND-12 12 3+10+12 
IND-19 1+3 2+9 
IND-29 10 1 
PPH-2 1+12 1+3+9 
PPH-7 1 1+2+4+9 
PPH-16 1 1+2+3 
PPH-80 1 1+3 
R&D-2 10+12 1 
T&C-10 2 
T&C-13 2+6 12 
T&C-46 1+9+12 9 
T&C-53 9+12 3+4+9 
T&C-56 1+9 4+9 
T&C-124 4 4+9 
T&C-130 1+9 1+4+9 
T&C-154 6 2+4 
T&C-139 1+12 1+9 
Total 22 projects 36 53 
- 0 X Yes 
8 0 X Yes 
5 1 X No 
5 1 X No 
- 0 X Yes 
6 0 X No 
6 0 X Yes 
5 0 X Yes 
- 0 X No 
4+6+8+12 1 X No 
- 1 X Yes 
1 1 X Yes 
_ 0 X No 
5+6 0 X Yes 
6+8 1 X No 
8 0 X No 
8 0 X Yes 
4+8 1 X Yes 
_ 0 X No 
_ 0 X Yes 
4+6+8+12 2 X No 
4+6+11+12 1 X Yes 
27 10 X Yes : 12x 
Problem codes: 
I) change of scope of project 
3) Cost escalation problem 
5) Delay in release of funds 
7) Problem with deptt. coordination 
9) Wrong design problem 
II) public participation problem 
Source: f i l e study, AJK 
2) Detailed design problem 
4) Land acquisition problem 
6) Problem with contract(or) 
8) Weather/calamity/access problem 
10) Staffing problem 
12) other type of problem 
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The results for the 25 projects which according to the DWP minutes were under revision 
in 1992-93 are also summarised in Figure 6.2. Of all projects which sent a quarterly report 
before the (pre-) DWP meeting took place, thirteen projects (59 percent) reported no 
problems or different problems than in the PC-1 or minutes of the meeting. Given that three 
additional projects did not return a QMR, in total 17 out of 25 projects (68 percent) showed 
major discrepancies between problems given in PC-Is or DWPs and QMRs! 
Problems reported In OMRs, revised PC-1s and Core-3 DWPS, 1992-93 
•for 22 p r o j e c t s under r e v i s i o n 
F i g u r e 6.2 
Meanwhile, it is understandable that some problems reported in QMRs were different in 
nature from those reported in PC-Is. For instance, a delay in the release of funds, or bad 
weather, could be a temporary problem experienced in the beginning, but not towards the 
submission of a revised PC-1. But all the serious problems which were eventually mentioned 
in the revised PC-1 were supposed to be reported truthfully in the QMR, and normally long 
before the PC-1 revision was sent to P&D. The correlation therefore had to be high but this 
was not the case. Counting all problems reported by the three systems, the correlation 
between QMR and PC-l/DWP problems was small: of the 116 problems reported by the 
three sources together, only 10 problems mentioned in QMRs were also discussed later on 
in revised PC-Is or minutes of approval forum meetings. This means that only 17 percent of 
all problems were mentioned both in a QMR and in a PC-1 or meeting! 
Understandably, the correlation between problems discussed in DWP meetings (as per their 
minutes) and those reflected in revised PC-Is was much higher: since the subject of the DWP 
is the revised PC-1, 43 percent of the problems mentioned in the PC-1 are also in the 
minutes. Conversely, of all problems discussed in (pre) DWP meetings, 53 percent is also 
discussed in the PC-Is. Perhaps as striking is the high number of problems that the DWP 
broached which were not discussed in PC-Is. This may be indicative of the biases that also 
played a role in the reporting in revised PC-1. It is very important to select those problems 
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as reasons for revisions that do not jeopardise a positive decision by the DWP. But since the 
DWP consisted of members of various departments, important problems that were not 
discussed either in QMRs and PC-Is might yet have surfaced in the discussion15. 
Popular problems in different reporting systems 
It is interesting to zoom in on the type of problems which were popular in the various 
reporting systems. In Box 6.2 this is done. It turns out that each reporting system different 
problems are favourite. 
Bearing in mind that there were only 22 observations and that this affects the statistical 
validity of the calculations, four problem variables yet scored correlations between PC-1 and 
DWP meetings with a significance level of 90 percent or higher. In contrast, there was only 
one out of the twelve problems reported by a QMR that correlated strongly with a PC-1, and 
one in a DWP meeting16. 
6.6 Variation in perceptions by different stakeholders in the Social Action 
Programme 
The circumstances under which the author was employed in AJK were not such that 
information could be collected with respect to stakeholders other than government 
departments and individual rapporteurs in them. The available material allowed the analysis 
of the influence of the report formats, individual rapporteurs within departments, different 
government audiences and different purposes of reporting. But progress reports written about 
the projects by different categories of stakeholders related to those projects (for instance 
beneficiaries) could not be collected and therefore not compared systematically. This section 
therefore intends to study the influence of stakeholder perspectives on the information by 
taking material from another source. An annual survey called the SAPP Field Review will be 
used in which the views of two and often three major stakeholders were recorded in sufficient 
numbers to allow comparisons. The survey was conducted for the first time in 1996, and 
covered both Pakistan and AJK. Since the number of observations in AJK was for some 
1 3 Some problems are also simply not suitable for putting down on paper. As can be seen from figure 6.2, 
special problems were particularly popular in DWP meetings: often they concerned politicians asking for a 
change in a project (the road to run a different route, the office building or government paid residence to be 
more luxurious) or a donor agency asking for changes. Sometimes the P&DD would be blamed for cutting down 
on the project's original budget proposal, which would then be the cause of serious problems later on. Some 
projects could be rendered almost ineffective without the vehicles originally included in the proposal, but which 
were cut out by a pinchpenny P&DD. Although the minutes of the meetings yet mentioned some of these in 
couched terms, it is certain that even these minutes would not reflect the complete discussion in those cases 
where the position of the relevant P&DD was at stake. 
1 6 The actual correlation factors (Pearson's R) are shown below. 
'Significant' correlations at 90% level between problem variables, N=22: 
DWP with PC-1: 
Change of scope of project: .4545 at P= .017 
Cost escalation problem: .2797 at P= . 104 
Land acquisition problem: .2973 at P = . 090 
Wrong design problem: .2797 at P= . 104 
DWP with QMR: 
Problem with contract(or): .4629 at P=.015 
PC-1 with QMR: 
Delay in release of funds: .4995 at P=.009 
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Box 6.2 Popular problems in different reporting systems in AJK 
Problems due to a wrong scope of the project were hardly ever discussed in QMRs but were the most 
popular reasons for revisions. They invariably surfaced unannounced by any previous QMR, together with 
the revised PC-1. Since they were sometimes controversial and used to conceal other problems, they were 
also often discussed in DWP meetings: the correlation was high in that case. Detailed design problems were 
also not discussed in QMRs although they troubled many projects that immediately afterward proposed a 
revision. Wrong desipn problems were more frequently mentioned in PC-1 revisions. They were not labeled 
as such, but would be more euphemistically specified as "increased quantities of work as per requirement 
of the site" (problem code 9). This, however, usually meant that not enough site investigation had been done 
prior to the implementation of the works. A very popular reason for project revisions was also cost 
R i f f f l 1 a t i " i ; this was hardly ever a reason for concern in the QMR. 
Land acquisition problems have been popular scapegoats in all three reporting mechanisms, but mostly 
so in revised PC-Is. This may be due to the fact that land acquisition was a problem mostly in the beginning 
of a project; at the time of project revision, it may be underreported in QMRs whereas it remained an 
important reason for a cost revision. 
Contractors, fairly popular scapegoats in QMRs, are almost completely absent as troublemakers in revised 
PC-Is and are also not so often the subject of serious discussion by DWPs. This is on first sight odd, 
because the low quality of contractors was often referred to as one of the main reasons why project 
implementation is such a precarious affair (next to politicians and the budget crunch). But it becomes less 
peculiar if it is taken into account that most departments needed to continue with the same contractor after 
the revision was approved. Even if the contractor was to be different in a next phase, it would not be wise 
to make too much out of the failure by contractors in PC-Is. 
Weather ^alamitiRs and cumbersome access to projects (border firing, rain-damaged roads, snowbound 
areas) were similarly often stated in QMRs to cause low progress but seldom referred to in PC-Is. It seems 
that this reason functioned more as a relatively harmless excuse in the QMR than as a circumstance serious 
enough to cause PC-1 revisions. Or perhaps the party proposing the revision was afraid to give weight to 
this factor to prevent that this would then be used as a reason for not extending the project into a next phase. 
The funds releases made to the project through the AG over the year were a relatively popular reason for 
delays given in the QMR of especially the first quarter. Too small allocations in ADPs in comparison to the 
PC-1 phasing were mentioned in PC-1 revisions as a reason for cost escalation and other problems, but 
striking in this case is that such problems were not reflected in the minutes of meetings. Since the P&DD 
staff chaired the (pre-) DWP meetings and authored its minutes, it can be presumed that such problems were 
systematically under-discussed or at least underreported in the minutes. 
Problems with staff were understandably not mentioned in QMRs and hardly in PC-1 revisions, since they 
were generally deemed to be intra-departmental affairs, to be resolved without the help of other departments. 
An exception might be a project such as a vocational training institute financed from the development 
budget, which needed to be extended because the Finance Department did not wish to transfer the staff to 
the recurrent (permanent) budget. As can be seen from figure 6.2, staffing problems that the DWP hears 
about through the grapevine can yet be important points of discussion. 
Lastly, the lack of conrriinftrimi between line departments was almost never discussed in any of the 
reporting systems, although in discussions with the author and witness the findings with the PC-Ill this 
reason surfaced much more. Lack of coordination is anathema in a bureaucracy supposedly functioning 
harmoniously, and therefore and revealed only in case of open warfare between departments. But the lack 
of coordination did sometimes appear in other guises, such as "land acquisition problem', pointing to a 
problem with the Revenue Department. The official reporting of interdepartmental problems did not seem 
to be the preferred route of improving coordination; other avenues, such as unofficial contacts between 
department heads, or if necessary, meetings chaired by the ACS or the PM, were regarded as more 
appropriate. 
categories of stakeholders too small, the results of the survey as aggregated for the country 
as a whole shall be analysed. The Social Action Programme is a donor induced endeavour 
226 
of the Government of Pakistan to provide for a structural increase in funds for, as well as 
policy reforms in, the sectors of primary education, primary health care, rural water supply 
and sanitation, and population planning. Due to the size of these sectors, around 20 percent 
of all government expenditures outside the spheres of defence and debt service in Pakistan 
falls under the SAP. It is therefore a major initiative that still often captures the headlines of 
newspapers and that is known even at the village level. 
Design and methodology of the SAPP Field Review 
The SAPP Field Review was undertaken by a Multi-Donor Support Unit (MSU) two years 
into the first phase of SAP and recorded facts and views through questionnaire based 
interviews with a few major categories of stakeholders in the programme. Because in some 
instances the research team could contribute itself through firsthand observation, such findings 
could be compared with the views of the stakeholders. This brought the number of different 
categories of observers to four. 
Before presenting the findings of relevance to the theses of this study, it is instructive to 
discuss the design and methodology of this comprehensive review. It was to both record the 
situation in the social sectors in 1996 and the progress made with the SAP objectives in the 
two years since it had started. The review had representation of all divisions of Pakistan, plus 
the federally administered areas and AJK. Two districts were randomly selected from each 
division and within each district, one tehsil was selected. Thus, 60 of the 103 districts were 
visited, and a comprehensive questionnaire survey was held at three levels: that of district line 
departments, service facilities, and communities. At the level of the district departments, the 
highest officers were interviewed: District Education Officers (DEOs), District Health 
Officers (DHOs), Executive Engineers (XENs) of the Public Health Engineering Department, 
and District Population Welfare Officers (DPWOs). At the second level, head-teachers of 
primary schools, medical officers of the Basic Health Units (BHUs) and Family Welfare 
Centers and caretakers of water supply schemes were interviewed. At the third level, in every 
village where facilities were surveyed, group interviews with villagers were also held in the 
vicinity, on the basis of questionnaires. It was therefore a comprehensive study with a very 
large sample. 
This section shall focus on the primary education and primary health sectors, wherein in 
total 1850 communities were covered, 847 primary schools, 446 basic health units, 81 DEOs, 
and 60 DHOs. This is done for the following reasons: the two sectors are the largest in terms 
of budget and staff, include most observations, and also cover most of the questions which 
were answered by more than one stakeholder, rendering them most suitable for the purposes 
identified here. Of the around 400 questions asked, 105 were addressed to more than one 
party and therefore interesting. They were all closed questions, with multiple choice 
categories ranging from "very satisfied" with something, to "dissatisfied" and / or seeing an 
"improvement" or "decline" in the service provided. Since this research is particularly 
concerned with the reporting of statements indicative of problematic situations, only the 
proportion of answers representing dissatisfaction and decline have been copied in Table 6.10 
below. An interesting and by now well known pattern strikes the eye. 
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Table 6.10 Dissatisfactions regarding situations and improvements, as communicated by three categories of stakeholders in the sectors of primary education and primary health care, SAPP Field Review 1996. 
Ser. Stakeholder: District Facility Commun- Highest value 
No. Subject and view held : Officers(t) Heads*(4) ities (%) as % of lowest 
EDUCATION la Dissatisfied with regularity of teacher attendance 19.7 3.8 13.4 518% 
lb and sees no improvement in last 2 years 18.4 17.0 25.3 149% 
2 Dissatisfied with frequency of supervisory visits 7.5 18.5 n.a 247% 3a Dissatisfied with frequency of teacher transfers 14.8 13.7 81.4 594% 3b and sees no improvement in last 2 years 35.8 39.3 40.4 113% 
4a Dissatisfied with number of female teachers 28.0 52.4 n.a 187% 
280% 4b and sees no improvement in last 2 years 17.4 48.8 n.a 5a Staff strength poor 20.9 49.6 28.6 237% 
5b and sees no improvement in last 2 years 46.8 61.1 n.a 131% 
6 Teacher posts vacant for over 2 years: 444% 6a More than 10 percent for male teachers 3.2 14.2 n.a. 6b More than 10 percent for female teachers 1.6 17.5 n.a. 1094% 
7 Dissatisfied with in-service teacher training 27.1 0.0 n.a. ***** 8 Dissatisfied with refresher training 27.1 53.0 n.a. 196% 9a Dissatisfied with quantity/availab. of textbooks 24.6 12.6 20.0 195% 
9b Dissatisfied with timely availability of textbooks 32.1 32.8 25.0 131% 10a Dissatisfied with improv. in quantity of supplies 34.5 59.4 n.a. 172% 
10b Dissatisfied with improv. in timely av. of supplies 38.2 61.8 n.a. 162% 
lia Dissatisfied with allocation for repairs/maint. 46.9 88.3 n.a. 188% 239% lib and sees no improvement in last 2 years 38.5 92.0 n.a. 
12a Dissatisfied with timely release of maint, funds 39.5 76.4 n.a. 193% 12b and sees no improvement in last 2 years 44.4 81.5 n.a. 184% 
13a Dissatisfied with release/receipt of salaries 3.7 12.3 n.a. 332% 13b and sees no improvements in release of salaries 8.6 28.1 n.a. 327% 14a Parent-teacher committees have been set up 83.9 40.9 22.1 380% 14b Committee involved in maintenance s repairs 30.8 10.8 16.1 191% 
HEALTH 15a Dissatisfied with staff attendance at BHD n.a. 13.4 28.4 212% 15b and sees no improvement in last 2 years n.a. 24.7 42.9 174% 
16a Dissatisfied with doctor attendance 21.7 n.a. 28.4 131% 16b and sees no improvement in last 2 years 18.4 n.a. 5.4 341% 
17 Staff transfers situation is poor 31.6 20.3 0.0 ***** 18a Dissatisfied with quantity of medicines 30.0 36.3 n.a. 121% 
18b and sees no improvement in last 2 years 26.6 66.9 n.a. 252% 
19a Dissatisfied with stock of essential medicines 25.0 48.8 62.9 252% 19b and sees no improvement in last 2 years 28.3 55.8 43.8 197% 
20a Dissatisfied with allocation for R&N buildings 53.3 57.6 n.a. 108% 169% 20b and sees no improvement in last 2 years 36.7 62.2 n.a. 
21a Dissatisfied with timely release of funds for R&D 45.0 58.8 n.a. 131% 21b and sees no improvement in last 2 years 36.6 61.8 n.a. 169% 
22a Dissatisfied with training in family planning 26.6 18.7 n.a. 142% 22b and sees no improvement in last 2 years 31.6 27.0 n.a. 117% 23a Poor use of the health facility 6.7 n.a. 51.1 763% 23b and sees no improvement in last 2 years 41.6 28.5 60.7 213% 
24a Poor stock of contraceptives 43.3 29.7 n.a. 146% 
24b and sees no improvement in last 2 years 45.0 36.2 n.a. 124% 25a Dissatisfied with frequency of supervisory visits 0.0 15.2 n.a. ****** 
25b and sees no improvement in last 2 years 6.6 40.6 n.a. 615% 
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Note: All cases have been taken and displayed which have comparable information and which do not have a significant non-response, n.a.: not asked to this category of stakeholders 
* Facility heads: Head teachers in primary schools, Medical officers in health facilities. Source: SAPP Field Review, Draft National Report. HSU August 1996. 
Discrepancies 
The main, inevitable, observation is the wide discrepancies in the views regarding social 
service delivery and the improvements therein in the last years, amongst the three categories 
of stakeholders interviewed. This is the case even amongst the district heads and the facility 
heads which belong to the same department, so what to speak of the communities at the 
receiving end. There seems to be hardly any subject which is not seriously contested amongst 
at least two of the three stakeholders. Overall, the average of the highest value as a 
proportion of the lowest value is a staggering 265 percent (and this excludes the three cases 
where the proportion could not be calculated because the lowest value was 0 percent). Of the 
46 subjects, 34 had values which differed more than 50 percent. The reverse side of this 
implies that only in 12 cases, the difference between the highest dissatisfaction value (level) 
and the lowest was less than 50 percent. 
A second conclusion when looking in more detail at the subjects presented is that the 
discrepancies are highly systematic in the manner already discussed on many previous 
occasions in this study. Whenever the stakeholder has to express a satisfaction level 
concerning his/her own performance, it is very high. Satisfaction levels are often much lower 
when concerning issues not directly under the responsibility of the stakeholder. For instance, 
the head teachers are generally much more happy with teacher attendance than the district 
education officers or the communities: this is largely their responsibility (la). The District 
Education Officers, when asked, are quite happy with the frequency of their supervisory visits 
to schools; head teachers much less (2). Both head teachers and DEOs see relatively few 
problems with the in Pakistan endemic teacher transfers amongst villages and districts (most 
teachers do not like to be posted in villages, or in villages very far from their home); 
communities which bear the brunt of these frequent transfers have understandably much more 
difficulty with this (3a). A highly contested issue is also the constitution of parent-teacher 
committees in the schools (14a): the DEOs who know full well how important this issue is 
to the SAP, generally claim that these committees exist on the ground. But when 
counterchecked against first the view of the head-teachers and then the surrounding 
communities, this claim becomes highly spurious, with the result that the extent to which 
parent-teacher committees have been established has become completely unclear after the 
survey. Sometimes the need to paint a negative picture of the lack of powers held by 
stakeholders, conflicted with a rival need to paint a positive image of their own effectiveness: 
whereas around 52 percent of the DEOs felt that the educational supplies given to the district 
were insufficient (cf. annex PE-47 of SAPP Field Review report), 65 percent of them yet 
expressed that during their tenure the situation had improved - a view not at all corroborated 
by the head teachers (10a and 10b). 
Such systematic discrepancies are not confined to the education sector alone; they also 
occur in the sector of primary health care and to a similar degree. The doctors in charge are 
much more favourably inclined towards the improvements in staff attendance at their BHUs 
than the surrounding communities (15b); they also see greater improvements in the use of the 
facility in the last two years (since their own stationing at the facility) than either their district 
health officers or the communities (23b); conversely they hold a much more serious view than 
the District Health Officers towards the lack of allocations for Repair and Maintenance (20a), 
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their timely release (21a), the medicines available (18a, 19a), and such things as the frequency 
of supervisory visits (25a). The DHOs, as is shown by their score on variable 25a, are not 
in the least unhappy with the frequency of their own visits. 
A consensus was occasionally achieved regarding the seriousness of certain issues, but 
mostly these were in areas where there were no clear responsibilities for the stakeholders 
concerned. Since the allocations for maintenance and repairs are determined largely outside 
even the Education department, by the Finance Department, many DEOs and DHOs felt free 
to criticise their insufficiency (Nos. 11, 12, 20, 21); since textbooks and educational and also 
many medical supplies are purchased centrally, their insufficiency and untimely arrival may 
also have given rise to more criticism from district heads (Nos. 9, 10, 18, 19). But even 
here, as with budgetary issues, there were small differences between District Officers and 
facility heads. Since the DOs were closer to departmental heads they expressed less 
dissatisfaction than facility heads such as head teachers and medical officers. 
Does the truth lie midway? 
The dictum that the 'truth lies midway' may not always be true, and different observers from 
the ones discussed may come to conclusions lying even outside the range of views expressed 
by the stakeholders discussed here. This was evident from a comparison with some 
observations made by the survey team itself. In spite of the satisfaction expressed by DEOs 
and head-teachers regarding teacher attendance, 19 percent of the head-teachers were found 
not present at the time of the visit by the survey team, and overall, in 25 percent of all girls 
schools, less than 75 percent of teaching staff was present. Similarly, the attendance of staff 
in health facilities was found to be less convincing than the medical officers and even 
communities had pictured it. The research team concluded: 
"The satisfaction expressed by all the key players with respect to staff attendance did not conform to 
the situation of staff attendance at the time that the survey of the BHUs/RHCs was conducted. It was 
discovered that a large number of key personnel were not present on duty. Overall, in 32 % of the 
facilities the Male Medical Officer (MMO) was not on duty. Furthermore, in all BHUs in FANA and 
75 % of the surveyed facilities in AJK, MMOs were not present at the time of the survey. [...) 
Absenteeism was higher among Female Medical Officers" (1996, p.73-74). 
This points to a conclusion that even communities have become so used to the absence of 
Medical Officers that they have developed a blindness or at least a tolerance for this. 
Whether the universal satisfaction expressed by for instance head-teachers as to their 
students' performance (96 percent satisfied) and doctors' observations that a number of key 
health indicators have improved cannot be taken at face value; it may be true or it may be 
false. If the health findings are compared with those of SAP's Pakistan Integrated Household 
Survey 1995-96 (2nd January 1997), then these generally corroborate the doctors' perception 
(and perhaps health facility statistics). But a Student Teacher Mathematics Test Results 1997 
report, conducted by MSU and provincial departments, concluded that the mathematical 
abilities of primary school students had gone down in 1997 as compared to 1995. Only 37 
percent of the students were able to answer all questions correctly, as against 45.6 percent 
for the same test given to students in 1995. Since the test included 5262 class 5 students in 
four provinces, there is a high likelihood that the findings are significant in statistical terms. 
Optimism bias and the effects of habituation 
The impression of a certain very general 'optimism' bias emanating from the survey results 
has stuck at least with the author of the present study. Although not perhaps evident from the 
presentation in the table which concentrated on dissatisfaction, the overall satisfaction levels 
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with the various aspects of the social sector service delivery were quite high. When the 
responses to all judgmental questions are aggregated, then it is found that around one third 
expressed dissatisfaction; a finding which also conveys that some two thirds expressed some 
form of satisfaction. (The cup can be one thirds empty and two thirds full.) This result was 
applicable both to situation judgments and the improvement judgments: 61 percent of all 
respondents saw 'moderate' or 'substantial' improvement over the short period of SAP's 
existence (a period in which, as is widely acknowledged, not much had come off the ground 
in SAP); an even higher 68 percent reported a satisfactory situation. These results are all the 
more striking when it is realised that they apply not only to major bureaucratic stakeholders 
in the programme, such as the district and facility heads, but also the communities at the 
receiving end. For the sectors of education and health, 32.2 percent of the District Officers 
expressed dissatisfaction, 37.6 percent of the facility heads, and 38.6 percent of the 
communities. 
Reasons why the SAP was so positively assessed even by the communities are difficult to 
pinpoint. Can it really be that the SAP is a success, or that the situation in the social sectors 
is not as acute as one is made to believe by the documents about SAP and the rhetoric 
expressed in politics and media? The Government may have painted an abysmal picture of 
the social sectors in order to become eligible for more funds from donors, and the donors 
themselves may have exaggerated for similar reasons. Certainly, the effects of SAP in the 
initial two years, particularly outside the sphere of construction, were viewed as very small 
and disappointing by the donor agencies, as reflected in the many mission aide-memoires. 
On the other hand, certain well-known methodological problems with the design of the 
questionnaires may have biased the appreciations expressed. In a natural impulse to please 
the enumerators, or simply to appear more perceptive of improvements that may or may not 
have occurred, more positive and constructive answers may have been given even by the 
relatively dissatisfied communities. Particularly with a high profile programme such as the 
SAP, a "social desirability effect" (Segers 1977, p.225) may have played an important role. 
It may be a safe strategy and even bring benefits if a healthy dose of optimism and a 
generally constructive attitude is expressed regarding SAP17. 
Another plausible reason is the effect of habituation referred to earlier. Particularly in the 
sector of primary health, the basic government funded health facilities have already been 
'written off a long time ago and the populace largely bypasses these small clinics, to directly 
consult local healers, private doctors, and higher level facilities such as rural health centres 
and hospitals. In the primary education sector, many private schools have been started due 
to dissatisfaction with the quality of the fee-free government schools. 
What is certain is that a far more acute picture of the state of social services is usually 
painted by representatives from international donor agencies (for instance in the Staff 
Appraisal Report for the SAPP). Such representatives themselves can be assumed to be 
similarly predisposed in at least two ways. First they have been influenced by the situation 
which they are most used to, which is usually the - much better - state of social services in 
their home countries. What is viewed as unacceptable by the foreign expert, such as the usual 
1 7 The SAPP Field Review report itself mentioned such effects here and there, for instance in their statement: 
"DEOs may have exaggerated the role of parent-teacher committees to illustrate a positive outcome of the SAPP 
policies initiated by the Government" (MSU 1996, p.40). The effects are also corroborated by the finding that 
the district officers, which are closer to the policy reform side of SAP, were less dissatisfied than the facility 
heads. In the education sector, 32 percent of all responses given by DEOs as to the expected improvements was 
that of dissatisfaction; for head-teachers who were further removed from the SAP rhetoric it was 53 (and for 
communities 37). 
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absence of furniture in schools, where children at best sit on jute mats, may be perfecdy 
acceptable to local communities and government officials alike. The ubiquitous absence of 
books and their poor quality may not even be noticed. Secondly, these representatives are 
often experts in their field, which may have made them more critical, or may have raised 
their aspirations as to positive change. Their opinions in the 'wicked' fields of health, 
education, and population planning, may be completely at odds with those held by staff 
employed in substantive government departments of developing countries. 
The discounting of systematic stakeholder biases 
In spite of all the evidence of perspectivistic biases, there is yet some 'hope' left. If biases 
due to stakeholder positions are systematic, they can be to some extent 'discounted'. The 
limiting condition is that a sufficient number of observers/rapporteurs must be available to 
generalise the findings. The larger their number, the greater is the probability that biases due 
to personal idiosyncrasies (i.e. not dependent on the status of observers as stakeholders) are 
eliminated and that the average arrived at reflects the main view of the stakeholders 
concerned. Views of a particular stakeholder group in one geographical area can then be 
compared with those of their colleagues in other areas; the views can also be compared over 
time. In the SAPP Field Review, enough observers were consulted to allow serious 
comparisons to be made between the four provinces of Pakistan18. It then turned out that the 
situation in NWFP was somewhat better than that in the other provinces; a finding which 
merits further study and from which possibly some lessons can be learned. 
6.7 Evidence from the UNDTCD project 
In this last substantive section of the chapter, a discussion of the project in which the author 
participated is intended to show the effects of insufficient involvement of the main 
stakeholders in a monitoring mechanism. 
The case study shows first of all that donor agencies such as UNDP and UNDTCD can 
also be in some respects vestiges of a classical planning style. Their lack of utilisation of 
reporting mechanisms built on the separate recording of views of the main stakeholders in 
their projects is witness to this. The implementing agency UNDTCD used to have its own 
reporting mechanism separate from that of the funding agency, ensuring that its headquarter 
in New York would always be aware and to some extent in control of developments in its 
own projects in the field. The projects needed to submit a half-yearly progress report, for 
which there existed a fixed format. After necessary changes and clearance the report would 
be submitted to what the UN always refers as the 'Government' (as represented by the 
counterpart organisation) and the funding agency (in this case the UNDP). It would then 
serve, amongst other things, as an input to the Tripartite Project Review meeting (TPR), held 
In that case there might yet be a cultural bias playing on the registered satisfaction levels and thereby 
clouding the comparability of the data. For instance, there might be an effect of the tribal and egalitarian culture 
in NWFP (and to a smaller degree Balochistan) versus the more biraderi and hierarchical cultures of Punjab and 
Sind, upon the satisfaction levels expressed. If so, this effect must also be discounted in order to correctly 
interpret the patterns found. However, when the data of the SAPP Field Review were analysed in these terms, 
firm conclusions could not be drawn, due to the possible effect of intervening variables such as different policies 
in the four provinces, and the differences in situation on the ground, which were unknown to the author. The 
admission that firm conclusions cannot be drawn from the SAPP Field Review in this respect, does, however, 
not in principle deny the possibility of an effect due to cultural characteristics. 
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annually amongst (1) project staff and UNDTCD (these two parties count as one in the 
meeting), (2) the government counterpart, and (3) UNDP. The TPR would assess the 
progress of the project, and concentrate on resolving problems in the presence of all relevant 
decision-makers. However, the practice of a separate report to the UNDTCD HQ was 
dispensed with just before the project at hand started in 1990, to be replaced by a system in 
which the UNDTCD project staff would submit a report with a different format directly and 
exclusively to the UNDP country headquarter in Islamabad. This report was called the Project 
Performance Evaluation Report (PPER) and is still being used by the UNDP. From the name 
itself it is clear that UNDP sees this report as an evaluation, but in accordance with the 
definitions used in this study, emphasizing regularity and standardisation, it shall be treated 
as a monitoring report. The PPER is an annually submitted report format of considerable 
elaboration, and specifically geared to the Tripartite Project Review. It is completed by the 
CTA of the project. Because it has to be checked and co-signed by the counterpart director", 
when submitted to the UNDP country office the report has already passed the level of the 
Government. UNDP then forwards the report to the headquarter of UNDTCD in New York, 
and sends an invitation along for a representative to attend the TPR. The reason for this 
change in procedure is probably that UNDTCD is being represented everywhere in the field 
by the UNDP country office, so that one report for the UNDTCD headquarters and another 
for UNDP was felt to be a duplication. UNDTCD represented at field level by UNDP 
country offices was itself a consequence of its status as a department functioning under the 
direct responsibility of the UN Secretariat; a situation very different from many other 
organisations in the UN family, such as the FAO and WHO, which have more autonomy. 
By cutting short the lengthy road of obtaining concurrence from the UNDTCD HQ, the 
reports could be prepared much more close to the date of the annual TPR. 
Two inferences can be drawn of relevance to the theme of this study. The first is that, even 
at the end of the 1980s, the UN still believed that progress reports for funding and for 
implementing agencies could have the same content without needing to fear for a down-sizing 
of the issues sensitive to one or the other party. A second conclusion is that the UN 
apparendy also believed that the requirement of co-signing of a report written by the CTA 
of the project by the counterpart would not lead either to problems or a loss of delicate 
information. It is clear that it is still the philosophy of the UN that basic information is 
unbiased and uncontroversial, and that reports can therefore be written in such a way that 
they reflect the views of all stakeholders equally, while still yielding the essential information 
on which to base decisions. 
Project Performance Evaluation Reports submitted 
In the course of the project's life, three PPERs were submitted in preparation of Tripartite 
Project Reviews while for the last TPR a Terminal Report was written in the format of the 
UNDTCD. There was a lot of harmony between the project and the counterparts, and this 
was expressed in the reports in the many observations of satisfactory progress. The UNDP 
country office in fact held the project as one of its success stories, to be shown to other 
projects as a model. However, even in this case, all PPERs made mention of a few 
implementation problems as observed by the CTA which either the counterpart or the 
UNDTCD headquarter did not agree to (in their written down form) or would have put in 
different words. Whilst differences in perspectives between different parties in a project 
would be natural to expect in any project, the countersigning procedure made these 
" The first versions of the PPERs had to be jointly written by counterpart director and chief technical adviser. 
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would be natural to expect in any project, the countersigning procedure made these 
differences issues of unnecessary friction. Due precisely to the inevitability of at least some 
differences in views, the logic of the countersigning procedure put at risk what the procedure 
probably was intended to ensure in the first place: that consensus and harmony be reached 
between project staff and counterpart. 
The format of the PPER, meanwhile, made it all the more difficult to withhold views on 
which there might be disagreement. It asked specifically whether certain progress on outputs 
was considered satisfactory or not, and if it was not, the reasons had to be elaborated on 
additional forms, and the party responsible for the problem had to be marked from a list of 
possible parties already specified (e.g. international experts or government staff). Thus, if 
there was disagreement, such forms were bound to expose it. 
The CTA for instance reported that there was no progress on the recommendations made 
by a project consultant concerning the preparation of the Eighth Five Year Plan, and marked 
the Government as responsible for this situation. The counterpart director objected to this 
view and did not want to countersign the report. Another time a delay in a certain output was 
attributed to the absence of a few counterpart staff; the counterparts holding that they had 
appointed replacements and that the delay was not serious. One time the Government 
(meaning the P&DD as counterpart) was held responsible for delays due to slow progress 
with the appointment of computer staff; in the view of P&DD less staff was required than 
the CTA and they themselves had considered necessary in an earlier stage of the project. It 
was also once reported that one of the two officers in a section in P&DD had not participated 
in (the training for) a certain annual report output, and that thereby, in case of transfers, the 
sustainability of the new skills was undermined. The government counterpart categorically 
denied that there would be transfers in this section20. And then it was once stated that the 
Government and a project expert were not working closely together and that the Government 
had not followed up on the outputs produced by this expert. The counterpart disagreed and 
argued that there had been enough collaboration with the expert; full time cooperation 
between the expert and his immediate counterpart was not required. Whilst anybody who has 
been involved in project management will recognise the issues discussed as being of fairly 
typical nature, this author is of the view that it would have been better if each party had been 
asked to independently report on such issues in the project. The parties would then at least 
have had the satisfaction that their explanations for certain issues had been put on record. 
Dissent in competing reports 
In all fairness, it can be argued that the countersigning logic of the PPERs may also have 
some perverse utility: it may in practice lead to certain problems being under-reported or 
even covered up. If all stakeholders are allowed to write down their views unrestrictedly, this 
could in certain projects lead to a Pandora's box being opened, something which might in the 
end lead to conflict and project closures: obvious manifestations of dissent between the UN 
and host countries. Nevertheless, it is argued here that the exposure of the differing views 
on progress with projects in reports each originating from a different source is preferred to 
their downplaying in countersigned, joint reports, in the interest of a fragile consensus and 
the ideology of harmonious cooperation as held by the UN2 1. If certain projects are contested 
He proved to be wrong; after the project, the trained staff member was transferred to the field. 
2 1 And not only the UN. The procedure for the writing of half-yearly progress reports to the Dutch Embassy 
in Pakistan, for instance, also requires that a consensus be reached between project staff and government 
counterparts, before the report is dispatched (Royal Netherlands Embassy 1996, p.28). 
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to such an extent that they run the risk of being terminated, then perhaps they better be 
terminated indeed. In practice, a certain self-censorship will probably be applied, in order to 
preserve a working relationship between project staff and counterparts. This will be especially 
the case when both parties know that their reports will be the basis of a review meeting. 
There was no requirement of concurrence from the side of the Government for the 
Terminal Report of the project, but by that time the counterpart director had perhaps 
understood from the experience with the PPERs that he was to agree with the views 
expressed. He was in agreement with many things but again in disagreement with a few 
points raised. He laid down some objections in an internal memo which was however also 
communicated to the project; a prospective new counterpart director meanwhile also gave his 
comments22. The memo of the counterpart took issue with certain observations made in the 
Terminal Report regarding the political expediency as seen by government directives and/or 
political insistence on PC-Is at the line agency level, and regarding the threat to 'OSD' 
P&DD officers (put officers on .special duty, i.e. on compulsory leave). Although at other 
times these subjects would be freely discussed with him, the counterpart apparently did not 
want to see these written down in an official report. Of one of the substantive 
recommendations made in the report, namely that the posts of Programmer and Computer 
Operator should be made permanent before the end of the project (a sustainability issue), it 
was declared that this was the internal problem of the department and that it had been sorted 
out; and that therefore the recommendation was to be deleted from the report23. It was 
meanwhile revealing that the new counterpart director agreed with some of exactly those 
statements in the Terminal Report with which his colleague had taken offence (while himself 
disagreeing with a few other points). 
Strategic factors 
The aversion displayed by the counterparts to discuss the P&DD's problems in official reports 
was perhaps partly due to a general reluctance to point fingers at individuals or organisations, 
which in the 'collective' culture of Pakistan may be greater than in the more individualist 
cultures of the foreign project staff (cf. Hofstede 1990). But there was also another perhaps 
more serious reason. The project was viewed as a showcase by AJK's Prime Minister as well 
as the United Nations Resident Representative who were at the time on particularly good 
terms with each other. When the ResRep was in AJK he would often end up meeting with 
the PM. The project was seen as important for the general relationship between P&DD and 
UNDP and was seen by the former as a key to opening doors to other assistance as well. The 
assistance from the UN system was valued because foreign assistance generally came only 
from multinational organisations; bilateral donors would usually not fund projects in this 
politically disputed territory. Any blot on the reputation of the project or department or 
conflicts that could in any way affect the relation between AJK and the UN, were not to be 
set down in writing lightly. Perhaps exactly because the project was regarded as such a 
success, the mere mentioning of a few implementation problems was already seen to be 
detracting from this image. 
2 2 They were received late and could not be given due attention before the Review. 
2 3 Again, this was in fact to remain a serious problem after the closure of the project. 
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Bypassing of another stakeholder 
Secondly, the new procedure whereby another distinct stakeholder, namely UNDTCD 
headquarter, was bypassed led to frictions with the programme officer and probably the 
finance and personnel divisions at that end. The fact that the format of the PPER asked the 
CTA to attribute certain delays in inputs evidently within the purview of the UNDTCD 
headquarter, may have contributed to this. Thus, big demonstrable delays with regard to the 
selection and appointment of expert staff as per agreed workplans could not be attributed to 
anything else but the UNDTCD headquarters, as well as the very late selection of a university 
for an officer to be trained in computer science on the basis of a fellowship. Because of the 
introduction of the PPER and the abandonment of the older progress reports, UNDTCD 
headquarter had no opportunity to censor or tone down such obvious observations; neither 
was it probably familiar with acting as a stakeholder separate from their project staff, vis-a-
vis the Tripartite Reviews. The UNDP country office meanwhile did not invite the UNDTCD 
officer to the Tripartite Reviews anymore after the first Review, considering that there was 
insufficient benefit from his presence, and thereby contributed significantly to the problem. 
Impressions created by supposedly neutral progress reports 
It is not implied here that problems and negative judgments should not have been spelled out 
in the reports, on the contrary. The point is that both in the case of the Government 
counterpart and the parent organisation of the project, the reports conveyed the suggestion 
that they were fully endorsed by these stakeholders (the counterpart by co-signing and 
UNDTCD HQ by being equated with the project staff). Whereas most of the issues on which 
there was embarrassment from one side or the other were fairly straightforward: delays with 
inputs as against agreed timetables, etc., and could not be contested easily, the reflex of those 
responsible must have been to then either leave them out or to explain them with more 
emphasis on 'force majeure'. It was perhaps exactly the indisputability of these problems, in 
combination with the report format asking for explicit attribution of cause (i.e. blame) which 
caused embarrassment. (So much for the objectiveness of basic information in monitoring 
systems.) 
The precoded and multiple choice format contributed further to this. It was dressing up in 
neutral expression not only the delays, but also the attribution of blame. As mentioned, the 
spelling out of the issues might have been used more productively if the system was built in 
such a way that all parties would have been required to lay down their own versions in 
separate reports. This would of course have led to an increase in paperwork, but some reports 
could have been confined to less aspects than others. The inevitably greater emphasis on 
expressing mitigating circumstances for delays and other problems might have lengthened the 
reports, thus compromising the conciseness ideal in monitoring, but they would also have 
deepened the understanding of the project as viewed by each participant. Now the extenuating 
circumstances had to be discussed in the Tripartite Review, putting the counterpart in an 
difficult position because it could easily be claimed that it had countersigned the report. The 
time-bound Reviews themselves could meanwhile usually only partly do justice to the shades 
of views held by the counterparts; they viewed these meetings as ritualistic, and certainly 
there was an impulse not to spoil the meeting by nitpicking. The good working relationship 
of project staff with the government counterparts could be maintained until the end of the 
project, in spite of some frictions here and there: they were satisfied enough with the project 
to let minor issues which could not be completely denied anyway, stand in the way. But the 
relationship between project staff and UNDP on the one hand, and certain UNDTCD 
headquarter staff on the other, deteriorated to the point that the latter organisation eventually 
failed to respond to any substantive query made. 
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6.8 Conclusions 
This chapter has suggested and provided information to support the view that the nature of 
information supplied in progress reports is influenced significantly by the format of the 
report, its intended audience, its specific purpose, and the stakeholder position of the 
rapporteur or department. 
The format of the report proved to be a strong determinant, and there were differences in 
descriptions of progress particularly if reports with an open format were compared to reports 
with a closed format. With 'closed' formats and based on 'multiple choice' answer categories, 
the fear of repercussions due to non-reporting of an undesirable state of affairs which is 
discovered often proved to win it of the fear that when exposing this state, there would be 
repercussions; the only escape would be to claim that the format was not understood. This 
is, in some way, a falsification of the earlier expressed assumption that format changes (i.e. 
technical changes) alone cannot make a serious difference to the quality of reporting systems. 
Carefully designed formats, such as provided for by the new system of monitoring discussed 
in this chapter, can obviously make a difference, but it is maintained here that a different 
organisation of the monitoring system is equally important. The decision to convert a 
progress report with an open format to one with a closed format depends on what the 
principal purpose of the report is to its principal audience. 
The intended audience of the report similarly influenced the picture painted of projects and 
their progress. From our example it seemed to be the case that an audience further removed 
from the day to day management of the projects will receive reports wherein slightly different 
problems and generally more problems overall are stressed. At least, that is, for the cases in 
which reports are returned at all. 
The purpose of the report, whether to recount progress to a project review body, or to 
apply for more funds to a project approval body in order to complete a project, seemed to 
be of decisive influence on the nature of information supplied. All of this points to the fact 
that progress reports are not submitted in a vacuum and can therefore not be labeled 
'objective*, however 'basic' the data may be. Rather, they have objectives and are therefore 
subjective, the subjectivity lying in the stress on certain dimensions/sides of the project and 
not others. This is brought out also by the SAP survey discussed in this chapter. From this 
it became abundantiy clear how large the differences are in perceptions and viewpoints on the 
same issues, if asked from different categories of stakeholders. Although there is also some 
effect discernible from the idiosyncrasies of the individual rapporteur within the same 
category of stakeholders, this effect seems, from the evidence presented here, to be of smaller 
importance than the effect of the influence of their organisational esprit de corps (cf. March 
& Olson's theories on organisations indoctrinating their staff with the organisation's 
objectives, discussed in chapter 1.7) . In a sense, then, the relevance of a sociology of 
monitoring rather than a psychology of monitoring is thereby confirmed. 
The differences between perceptions in accordance with the stakeholder position of the 
observer are inevitable to a large degree, yet a distinction should be made between the effects 
of these observational positions and the deliberate misrepresentation of affairs by observers 
for strategic reasons. It is understandable that an engineer constructing a hospital will see a 
different building from a doctor or a patient: he wears different spectacles. But if he remains 
silent on the cracks in his building, then strategic, self-serving considerations are at work. 
The distinction between occupational blindness and feigned blindness is however gradual, as 
with white lies. In the last chapter, this point will be picked up. We shall now close off this 
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chapter on stakeholder perspectives, and turn to some other perspectives that influence the 
reporting of information. 
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CHAPTER 7. WICKED ISSUES, CONCISENESS, AND FOCUS IN REPORTING 
SYSTEMS 
This chapter addresses two propositions that can be derived from the discussion in the first 
chapter: 
1) There is an inherent problem with all project monitoring systems, in that it is hard to 
summarise progress and problems with projects, even if strict guidelines are given and all 
stakeholders are invited to give their version of the progress made. Reality cannot easily be 
summarised, even if viewed from the perspective of only one stakeholder. There are 'benign' 
and 'wicked' problem areas, and there is also an inherent conflict between conciseness and 
requisite variety (completeness), leading to arbitrary choices as to statements made. 
2) Problems of focus of the monitoring system are unavoidable as long as the system's 
objective is to keep a check on the implementation of development policy but its focus is 
limited to the capital investment programme. 
What these two propositions have in common is that they do not strictly deal with the 
influences of stakeholder perspectives on the nature of information yielded by reporting 
systems. Yet they are, as is contended in this chapter, to do with perspectives rather than 
truths in some way. 
Before setting off, it has to be warned that hard proof for their validity cannot be offered. 
This is because the propositions concern 'wicked' issues, a notion which shall be explained 
below. Therefore the approach of argumentative analysis, using illustrations from the situation 
in Pakistan and AJK, will be continued. 
7.1 Wicked issues and their effects on conciseness in reporting systems 
The previous chapter included a section (6.7) in which a UNDTCD project was discussed to 
highlight that certain problems can either be exacerbated or suppressed by reporting systems 
which, through the requirement of joint signatures, stress harmony between structurally 
opposed counterparts. 
When the issues on which there was disagreement are reviewed once again, many look like 
'wicked'. Wicked in the sense of Friedmann (1987, p. 166, after Rittel & Webber1) are those 
issues that are inextricably tied up with values and ideologies and cannot be resolved 
definitively. Social issues and public policy issues can be classified as such; most technical 
issues are 'benign', i.e. they can be defined in such a way that they can be resolved2. A 
1 See for a similar approach Johnston & Clark (1982, p.23-28) who refer to 'messy problems': rural 
development efforts would be classic examples. 
2 Some of the characteristics of wicked problems are summarised by Friedmann (p. 166): 1) There is no 
definitive formulation of a wicked problem; 2) wicked problems have no stopping rule; 3) there is no immediate 
and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem; 4) wicked problems do not have an enumerable and 
exhaustively describable set of potential solutions, nor is there a well-known set of permissible operations that 
may be incorporated into the plan; 5) every wicked problem can be considered a symptom of another problem; 
(continued...) 
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social issue like how to best educate people is not resolvable in spite of all the research done 
in this field: what one considers the best education depends on one's starting positions and 
basic philosophies of education3. Projects and programmes can be bedevilled by wicked 
issues, either because of their objectives or because of the nature of their problems. The 
extent to which projects pursuing institutional improvements through training, departmental 
reorganisation, new methods and procedures and an information system, can be called a 
success, depends often on their specificity. It has to be made very clear what exactly is 
pursued, otherwise the results will always be contested. Such projects need very explicit 
conceptual definitions, as well as clearly defined desired end states, for monitoring (and 
evaluation) to have meaning. However, exactiy because of these projects' highly contestable 
(political, subjective) nature, such definitions and end states are not always elaborated 
(Rondinelli 1993, p.79). This will be the case when differences in interpretation by the 
different stakeholders are already expected, or when these stakeholders belong to different 
cultures. The very words planning, monitoring, and evaluation may be completely differently 
understood by the main counterparts in the project, and therefore also the desired end states. 
One is reminded here of Dunsire's (1973) book on public administration, which identified at 
least 15 valid interpretations. When the project formulator has an inkling of possibly differing 
interpretations of key concepts and has left the end states correspondingly vague and open in 
the project document, then these differences may come to surface in the monitoring system, 
for example when certain problems reported by one party are not considered as such by the 
other (and vice versa). 
The wicked nature of such projects therefore often leads to strategic behaviour at the 
project formulation stage which then increases the wickedness of their objectives even further. 
Institutional projects are especially wicked 
Whereas desired end states of projects are often ultimately contested among various 
stakeholders, they can often not even be defined precisely by one party on its own if it 
wanted to. An important (and legitimate) reason for this is the necessarily explorative and 
open-ended character of many institutional projects. In the case of the UNDTCD project, 
broad improvements in management, coordination, information, planning, monitoring and 
evaluation were pursued and it is implicit in the project document that it would use various 
approaches and see on which front most advancements could be made (see next section). 
Monitoring is then affected by the inevitable lack of precisely formulated targets. This 
argument applies in fact to all programmatic projects (also technical ones, such as for instance 
the project 'Rural Electrification in AJK', i.e. projects where the end state is not defined in 
precisely measurable terms, or where if it is, it is tacitly understood by all parties that there 
may be great variation in their actual achievements. 
In a similar vein, a number of relatively independent objectives and targets may be 
juxtaposed which are internally not weighed: if disappointing progress is booked on one 
2(...continued) 
6) the existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways. The choice 
of explanation determines the nature of the problem resolution. 
3 An example of this was described in a report to UNDP/Government of Pakistan on the effectiveness of foreign 
aid. Radically different policies were allegedly pursued by ADB, Government of Pakistan and the World Bank 
concerning vocational training at secondary level. "In such a situation, it is hard for GOP planners to know 
which way to go, and they may ultimately be influenced by the personalities and style of visiting missions as 
much as by the technical content of analysis" (International Development Centre 1990, p. 5.21). 
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dimension of the project, then it might be argued that better progress is made on another, 
regarded as much more important (without the project document having specified this)4. 
Clear things and vague things, clear concepts and vague concepts 
An ultimate reason for not being able to define objectives is that the concepts constituting 
them have what Wittgenstein (quoted in De Pater 1984, p. 21) calls "verschwommenen 
Rändern" (blotty edges) and may only become clear by their use in certain 'language games'. 
Language games are forms of behaviour (or areas in reality) bound by sets of rules and in 
which certain words and concepts are employed which have 'family resemblance'. Since some 
words may be used in different language games, while the language games themselves are 
adjusted continually and imperceptibly through their use by different people, there is always 
a possibility of confusion. According to constructivist theory, concepts have subject sides, and 
object sides (cf. Misdorp & Hendriks 1982, p.56). When concepts used to describe a certain 
type of project undertaken previously by UNDTCD are applied to a new situation such as 
AJK, it may be that the 'fit' is not perfect. The confusion will be enlarged when different 
stakeholders all using the same concepts in slightly different language games all have a direct 
influence on project formulation. In AJK, this happened several times with the UNDTCD 
project, when a document originally written by the UNDTCD project officer was revised 
unilaterally by a project officer of UNDP in Islamabad, and was later again adjusted and 
specified through workplans and a revised project document by project staff and the 
government counterpart. 
Certain language games and the concepts within them are more clearly delineated than 
others. This means that the consensus regarding the meaning of these concepts is greater. 
Within an epistemological literature where for instance postmodernists and phenomenologists 
disclaim that language is a reflection of reality at all, many less radical theorists adhere to a 
view whereby words, terms and concepts are regarded as of variable abstraction and thus of 
variable reflectiveness in empirical reality. De Pater (1984, p.23) speaks of a continuum of 
concepts in this sense, going from concrete (observational) objects to theoretical constructs, 
from single-criterion concepts to multiple-criterion concepts (Putnam), or from sensitizing 
concepts to definitive concepts (Blumer). Attempts (e.g. by logical positivists) at reducing the 
vagueness of certain concepts, as would be possible by their definition and operationalisation 
for certain purposes in project documents, is seen as arbitrary and of limited value (e.g. by 
phenomenologists), since the implicit meanings of certain concepts (i.e. the parts not captured 
by the definition) may yet constitute essential dimensions3. The parallel can be made with the 
description of words in a dictionary. Some words have, like physical objects, more sides to 
them, more dimensions - so they require a more lengthy description in a dictionary than other 
words. But even then, when looking up the word, one is often not satisfied. No matter, for 
example, how well a monitoring system may be circumscribed in a project document, the 
evaluation of its success will partly depend on feelings as to the residual meanings of words 
and the multiple meanings of events. Differences of perceptions regarding these residual 
4 See Riddell (1987, ch. 15) for a more extensive discussion of the difficulties inherent in aid project 
evaluations, such as with the weighing of objectives, qualitative assessments, the calculations of rates of return, 
evaluator biases. 
5 Misdorp & Hendriks (1982, p. 103) speak of prescriptive and linguistic definitions of concepts. The former 
prescribe syntactic or semantic rules for the use of these concepts; the definitions are intended to eliminate 
multi-interpretability. Linguistic views hold that definitions are empirical generalisations and should not 
prescribe the use of concepts. The purpose of training in monitoring would then be to turn the use of the normal 
'linguistic' concepts (indicators) into 'prescriptive' concepts, a hazardous though necessary task. 
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implications (while at a more basic levels all is seemingly well) will then often be the source 
of implicit or explicit discontent by different stakeholders in the project. 
The relevance of epistemology to project monitoring 
All of these arguments may seem more relevant to a discussion on the problems with 
evaluation but they are here considered to be also very relevant to monitoring, for three main 
reasons. 
The first is that project or programme monitoring systems are intended for measuring 
progress and for the identification of problems if there is a lack of it. Problems, it is 
contended here, are always wicked. They are inherently subjective, at best inter-subjective. 
Even in technical projects where the end state can be narrowly circumscribed and where 
problems can be defined as negative variations between what is and what should be achieved, 
a meaningful problem statement must always include an estimate of how serious the variation 
is in relation to the possibility of eliminating it in the (near) future. For instance, if the award 
of a tender has not taken place at a certain date and this is supposed to be reported in a 
reporting system, there will be less of a 'real' problem when the tender award takes place the 
next day. Since everything to do with the future is based on conjecture and therefore prone 
to subjective judgments, all problem statements should be seen as (inter)subjective and 
therefore wicked. In essence, a monitoring system focusing on problems asks the stakeholders 
at every interval for a broad assessment as to whether the project is progressing in consonance 
not only with its targets but also with its overall objectives, and if it is not, for an assessment 
as to what are the impediments. A monitoring system asking for problem statements therefore 
always asks for value based subjective assessments. 
The second reason why a discussion of conceptual issues has importance for monitoring 
is that the main concepts used within monitoring systems themselves (objectives, 
achievements, problems) are functioning in hierarchies or tree structures, which are 
sometimes difficult to disentangle and which may be tangled up in different ways by the 
various stakeholders involved. As is also stressed in approaches of monitoring using the 
Objective Oriented Project Planning methodology, problems are generally linked with other 
problems at the same or different levels in problem trees; the same can be said of objectives. 
For instance, the problem with a project identified by one as a defaulting contractor, could 
be identified by another as a problem of lack of supervision from the side of a site engineer, 
and by again another a problem of delayed release of funds to pay the contractor's bills. An 
outsider may even think that the problem is ultimately caused by departmental strategies 
which are based on the shifting of funds around from project to project. All four problem 
formulations are to some extent valid but one problem may have caused the other, or perhaps 
they may all have applied and reinforced each other. Whether an observer will choose to 
define a problem 'low' in the tree of problems, or 'high', is then a matter of his own or his 
organisation's ideology and specific interests, as was seen in section 6.4 of the previous 
chapter. It carries benefits for departmental rapporteurs to label a problem as one of 
contractors rather than the strategic shifting around of funds by the organisation itself. 
Ultimately, there are also elements of chance involved in the definition of problems, although 
the element of randomness of replies could to some extent be reduced through training 
programmes. Of course, these training programmes, when conducted by the departments 
themselves, will force the logic of the organisation upon the rapporteurs in order to increase 
its consistency in the face of external scrutiny. 
A special situation obtains when the main problems encountered by organisations in the 
management of their projects are systemic and not contingent. This was the case with many 
of the problems in AJK. In such cases, the rapporteur will experience special reluctance in 
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reporting a general problem (i.e. encountered by most projects) in the specific context of one 
project, especially when open reporting formats are used. If all projects in AJK are troubled 
by insufficient fund releases as compared to their workplans, then the ticking of such a 
problem in the context of one project might raise the impression that there is a far worse 
situation than 'normally', or that the rapporteur wishes to raise it in a Review meeting. When 
the reporting format is closed (through multiple pre-classified answer categories) then there 
will be a greater likelihood that such problems will be ticked, although there will remain an 
aura of randomness hanging around the particular problem ticked, because of its usual 
entanglement with a tree of related problems. 
Whether, on the other hand, a rapporteur (or a department) will choose to focus his 
reporting on inputs, activities, outputs, targets, outcomes, objectives, effects, or whatever 
part of the objectives tree he identifies the purpose of the project mostly with, is similarly a 
matter of his organisation's or personal preferences. Some of the objectives may even have 
been left unstated in a project document; reporting only on the stated outcomes, effects or 
objectives may then produce partly irrelevant progress statements. For roads, clear standards 
might be worth developing and a consensus reached, but for many other more unique projects 
this might not be humanly feasible. All of the aspects mentioned may be related within a 
hierarchy of some kind, but the rapporteur may yet, for reasons of conciseness or his own 
theories, choose only a few of the available parameters for his report. 
The third reason for the wickedness of project monitoring systems is that some of these 
may ask the rapporteur to make his value judgments explicit. A monitoring system such as 
based on the UNDP's PPER specifically asks for expressions of satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
even before arriving at the problem definition stage. This can be seen from the format of the 
PPER report, an example of which is shown below in Table 7.1. It asks for a statement on 
the progress with all the outputs, and then also for an indication as to whether the progress 
is considered as satisfactory or not. Since many of UNDP's projects are of social and 
institutional nature, and target-achievement comparisons cannot always be made easily, there 
is a sound logic in stressing the point of satisfaction. But, as said, this makes the monitoring 
exercise much more explicitly value-based and subjective than many would like to see as 
typifying the monitoring process. 
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Table 7.1 Sample of a format used in a UNDP Project Performance Evaluation 
Report, with entries made in the context of a UNDTCD project, AJK. 
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
I I I . EVALUATION OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE - OUTPUTS 
(Questions 1-4 should be completed for each output, using a separate sheet for 
each output.) 
Output number: 3 .3 . 
1. Repeat output (as stated in la tes t approved project document/revision): 
Report analysing project management in selected development sector. 
Scheduled completion date as in Actual or expected 
original signed project document: completion date: 
12/1991 6/1992 
2.a Describe the present status of the output: 
Work completed on most of this output except that the policy papers 
were not prepared in full and the drafts have not been discussed. Some 
of the work which would normally go into the policy papers was included 
in other report outputs (position papers). 
2.b This status i s 0 Satisfactory 8 Unsatisfactory 
Please explain. 
DTCD recruitment delayed appointment of the expert. Government did not 
work closely with the expert. The outputs of the expert are not being 
followed up. 
3. If the status of the output is unsatisfactory. 
A. What factors are causing i t ? Check as appropriate and provide comments 
under questions 3B and C on the next page, 
(i) Operational factors: 
(a) International inputs: Quality Quantity Timelines 
Expertise 0 0 0 
Training 0 0 0 
Equipment 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 0 
(b) National inputs: 
Government staff 0 0 0 
Trainees 0 0 0 
Equipment 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 0 
(c) Technical problems: 0 
(d) Management problems: 8 Govt. & Expert not able to work 
together 
( i i ) External factors: (a) Insti tutional 0 (b) Political 0 
(c) Sociocultural 0 (d) Economic 0 
(e) Other 0 
B. Explain item(s) checked in 3.A, including how production of the output 
i s affected. 
Some outputs prepared were not discussed sufficiently and follow-up did 
not take place. 
C. What effect does th i s unsatisfactory status have on the achievement of 
the immediate objective? 
The reports exist but more participation in follow-up has been lost. 
4. If produced, to what extent, and by whom is the output being used? 
P&D, line agencies, regional planning consultants, donors and visiting 
consultants. 
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7.2 Wicked objectives in a UN project 
A broad illustration of how wicked objectives can affect monitoring is given by the UNDTCD 
project already described. Its immediate objectives are reflected in Box 7.1. 
Box 7.1 Objectives of a UNDTCD project 
1. The establishment of a management information system in the AJK P&D Department which will enable 
the Government to exert greater control over development expenditure and activities through monitoring and 
evaluation. 
2. The formation of a cadre of five trained staff in the P&DD to operate, maintain and further streamline 
the monitoring and evaluation system and an additional cadre of five professional staff capable of using the 
systems for ADP preparation, project monitoring and sectoral database preparation and maintenance. 
3. The preparation of a preliminary regional strategy for development, policy papers for key development 
sectors and related, required sector data bases to ensure a more appropriate context for project management. 
4. The utilisation of the computerised systems and associated documentation as a pilot study with potential 
for use in other P&DDs of Pakistan, at federal level and perhaps at National Institutes of Public 
Administration. 
The four objectives were not explicitly weighed although it can be understood from the 
project document as a whole that the first two objectives were regarded more important than 
the latter two. The last objective which was added to the original objectives at the time of a 
project revision, was of relatively minor importance to the counterpart organisation. It served 
mainly as a justification for the UNDP office in Islamabad to extend and re-budget the project 
vis-a-vis a UN headquarter in New York intent on downsizing its programme due to lack of 
funds. As per standard procedure in UN funded projects, the four objectives were 
operationalised into outputs, with associated activities and inputs also specified. In terms of 
outputs, the project document listed two to four per objective and twelve in all. Roughly they 
can be summarised as a number of technical reports, workshops, input forms and report 
output formats, purchased and installed computers, customised software, electronic databases, 
training materials, training courses, and system manuals. The completion of the outputs was 
also time-tabled, through bar charts. 
If a hard look is taken at the objectives and even at the outputs then it will be clear that 
an exceedingly high specificity is required to accomplish unambiguous progress reporting in 
the course of project implementation. Many of the concepts used have blotty edges and are 
connected with word fields and language games not necessarily shared by every stakeholder. 
Consequently they can give rise to different perceptions. "Establishment of a management 
information system" for instance may give rise to questions on the exact nature and size of 
the system; specification of this beforehand was difficult particularly since the MIS was seen 
as materialising in the course of its implementation. Nevertheless, as was noted by the author, 
many officers in P&DD had understood it to be a comprehensive system covering all aspects 
of projects, whereas for the project staff it was a set of computerised databases covering only 
particular aspects of projects. This led to some disappointment when the (limited) coverage 
of the databases became more clear. The "greater control over development expenditure and 
activities through monitoring and evaluation" can perhaps be operationalised into a higher 
245 
financial utilisation rate of the ADP allocation. In any other more residual terms, defining 
the progress will be more wicked. The objective of the MIS allowing "greater control over 
M&E activities" is similarly difficult to measure. It could be plausibly established whether 
monitoring data is used in any evaluation, but other relationships are difficult to substantiate. 
At any rate, many in the P&DD hoped that the system would enable them to catch the line 
departments out; the project staff was of the view that the system was not intended to 'police' 
the departments but to learn from analysing aggregated data. 
The second major objective speaks of a "monitoring and evaluation system" instead of a 
management information system, giving rise to the perception that these two terms are 
perhaps interchangeable within the language game of the writer of the project document. 
From the activities described under this heading it is, however, apparent that they are not. 
But yet, the project's image with the various stakeholders concerned was influenced by the 
fact that the two were often used simultaneously and interchangeably. Some government 
officers would remain critical until the end of the project that more was not done to establish 
site visiting procedures and capacities. A reason for the confusion was also that the objective 
of establishing systems for physical monitoring (field inspections of strategic projects, etc.) 
figured more prominentiy in the first drafts of the project document than later on. 
The actual amount of "training" and what is considered to be sufficient to keep the system 
going after project closure is again something which is hard to quantify and assess. The 
"preparation of a regional strategy, policy papers, required sector databases" are all difficult 
to put down comprehensively: in terms of quantity they might be defined (reports of a certain 
number of pages), but in terms of quality there is no similar criterion imaginable. At a more 
mundane level, a confusion even arose, when the counterpart organisation, seeing the project 
as a group of 'consultants' working for them, desired that it drafted a complete Five Year 
Plan, while the project staff understood the objective as one of laying down procedures and 
methods for the preparation of strategies, producing an outline as well as a couple of sectoral 
strategy papers and policy papers as examples. 
The last objective of the project: the "utilisation of the MIS and the project's experiences 
as a pilot study" is similarly wicked: hard criteria for utilisation do not exist and even if 
defined in the project document, they may always carry a ring of arbitrariness. In any case, 
monitoring systems are hard put to unequivocally summarise the progress made in these 
terms. 
Presentation of progress 
Partly as a consequence of the (often necessarily) wicked objectives, the PPERs included 
'debatable' progress statements some of which may even have been regarded as 'beside the 
point' at least by the P&DD. There certainly was sometimes an air of randomness in the 
replies. In some of the statements carrying the status of being "satisfactory", certain 
observations could have just as well led to the status category of "unsatisfactory" being 
marked. For instance, in one case a departmental reorganisation report recommending, 
amongst other things, the recruitment of additional staff, was well received by government, 
and therefore the status of the output was marked as "satisfactory". But it was also observed 
that "economic constraints have not permitted the appointment of as many staff as would have 
been hoped for". If the staff was really necessary, it could be argued that this would have 
offset their economic cost. 
In fact, the status of many fairly general outputs pursued could have mustered stories of 
far greater length, and with every sentence added, the flavour of satisfaction generated by the 
answer itself would shift. In this sense, conciseness in narrative description works different 
from, for instance, the process of size reduction in photography. In photography, 
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miniaturisation of complex images, such as a portrait, to the size of a passport photo can to 
a large extent be achieved without having to lose serious detail, and while retaining its main 
features. In narrative description, progressively short summaries will have to lose feature by 
feature, dimension by dimension, quantum by quantum6. The photo of a face can be reduced 
in size more harmlessly than its description in words; specifying only that a person is bald 
conveys a completely different image than when it is reported that a person is bald but also 
has a big nose and a moustache. If in Table 7.1 we look at the status description in 2a and 
the explanation given for the designation "unsatisfactory" in 2b, then this consists of a 
number of very condensed statements which may be to some extent elaborated in question 3 
but yet, they seem to raise more questions than they lay to rest. First of all, why were the 
three policy papers not written in full, and why were position papers written at all (these were 
not part of any other intended output)? How much was the delay in recruitment by UNDTCD 
and to what extent did it affect the work of the expert? What was the reason for the 
government counterpart not working together with the expert? Was there no other counterpart 
available or was there no other audience possible for the expert's outputs? Such issues will 
then have to be (and were) discussed during the Tripartite Reviews, but that is not the point 
here. The point is that in monitoring reports for 'wicked projects', many statements require 
a critical mass before they go from the stage of 'raising more questions than they answer' to 
becoming understandable to even the most favourably oriented stakeholder (not taking into 
account 'ominous silence' or strategically vague / confusing statements, in order to hide 
something). 
Ashby's Law 
The case study makes clear that Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety (1956, p.211) holds much 
relevance for monitoring, and can be paraphrased as: the likelihood of an understandable 
progress statement will rise with the number of information bits (details) given. Here we have 
ventured from the field of wicked problems into the issue of the maximum conciseness of 
reports. 
The case study also shows that especially for the more complex projects (such as foreign 
aided projects), monitoring reports cannot be a substitute for review meetings with all 
relevant parties present. Such review meetings are an essential prerequisite as a follow-up to 
these reports, especially when there is but one principal rapporteur to these meetings. This, 
at least, is well understood by the UN system where a PPER is written with the explicit 
purpose of the annual review meeting. But not all donor agencies necessarily subscribe to this 
system. For instance, in the Netherlands Embassy in Pakistan, a monitoring system was 
recently instituted for the Dutch-supported projects, in which half-yearly project progress 
reports were largely seen as separate affairs from (much less frequently convened) official 
project review meetings (Royal Netherlands Embassy 1996). 
Weighing of objectives 
The institutional or socially oriented, open-ended, programmatic projects have a tendency for 
giving rise to unexpected opportunities for activities, and yielding unexpected results. In the 
project discussed here, the contacts and coordination efforts undertaken to make the 
monitoring system as compatible as possible with other systems in P&D Departments in 
Pakistan, grew into an activity deemed of major importance by at least UNDTCD and 
6 Thus, after all, it is adhered to a quantum mechanical theory of monitoring rather than a relativity theory of 
monitoring (as announced in chapter 1)! 
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UNDP. In the so-called full phase of the project (i.e. after the preparatory assistance phase), 
coordinated development of monitoring systems and standards across the country had grown 
into a major objective in its own right. The need for accommodation of such unforeseen 
objectives, targets and also results in a reporting system, however, conflicted with the 
simultaneous need for standardisation and conciseness. The eventuality of achieving success 
with an unforseen activity and having trouble with a foreseen one, leads to particularly 
difficult (and therefore random, person-dependent) choices as to the articulation of the 
problems of a project. The project did well in terms of initiating a discussion on monitoring 
systems in Pakistan, but less in terms of regional plan preparation for AJK. Is the latter less 
of a problem now that there is an added benefit in an area originally unforseen, and should 
it therefore receive less emphasis in a report? 
The wickedness of foreign aided projects 
Fortunately for the monitoring system in AJK, there were only a handful of similarly 
'wicked' projects in the ADP, so that there were few problems arising from that situation. 
From that perspective, the reporting system did not need the elaboration achieved for the 
PPER. However, since a considerable number of foreign funded projects deals with wicked 
objectives, the problem is much more serious for that category and such projects would be 
done more justice with elaborate systems. Such projects have the added complication that the 
main stakeholders often do not play each other's language game. Where there are steering 
groups or review bodies involving stakeholders from different backgrounds, systems relying 
on very concise reporting will not do. All stakeholders should be able to report their own 
version of the general status of the projects on a number of aspects. There are no shortcuts 
to progress (reporting) there. As there are absolute limits to conciseness there are also 
absolute limitations to the conciseness of reporting systems. The PPER, stretching the limit 
and calling itself performance evaluation, was for a relatively simple project as discussed here 
(costing below 1 million dollars) on average 65 pages long, of which 34 contained main text. 
Compromises on the conciseness requirement in monitoring 
The above discussion will have led to one main conclusion: especially for institutional and 
programme projects, meaningful reporting can only be ensured if there is a compromise on 
the conciseness ideal. Since problems were defined as inherentiy wicked, the same applies 
to at least the problem description part of the reporting for construction projects. Given the 
(inter-) subjective nature of problem reporting, it follows that (if a consensual theory of truth 
is adhered to) the more text is used to describe these, the higher is the probability that these 
will be understood in their proper context by the reader. 
7.3 Problems due to limited focus of monitoring 
Attention is drawn finally to the possibility that the focus (subject) of monitoring itself limits 
the comprehensibility of reports submitted and their utility for analysing progress of 
government development activities. As mentioned in chapter 1, this was raised by Valadez 
& Bamberger (1994, pp.27-28) as one of the four main problem areas in the current 
approaches to monitoring. Valadez & Bamberger refer in this context to the, in their view, 
inordinate bias of most central monitoring and evaluation agencies and their monitoring 
systems towards project implementation issues. They argue that: 
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"few studies are conducted to determine how programs operate, how they are sustained, or whether 
they are able to produce their intended impacts. Thus, although a great deal of information is collected 
on whether programs are implemented on time and within their budgets, litde is known about whether 
the massive social and economic development programs actually achieve their intended objectives and 
produce the benefits for which they were designed". 
This is of course only a bias insofar as the view is held that monitoring systems should not 
be confined to project implementation but serve larger objectives such as keeping a check on 
the outputs and impacts of projects and, ultimately, the development of the country itself (as 
pursued by government). A focus on implementation as such could well be justified in its 
own right, particularly since many theorists and practitioners are convinced that a principal 
bottleneck in terms of development lies in messy and faulty implementation of government 
funded projects. Another possible criticism could be that the issues raised are more suitable 
for assessment through specific evaluation exercises and that monitoring should not be 
lumbered with them. 
But there is a lot to be said for the argument that monitoring systems, at least as desired 
by departments such as P&DD in AJK, should cover also the aspects mentioned above by 
Valadez & Bamberger. If not enabling assessments as to development issues directly, then 
they could at least provide a specific evaluation in this respect with some of the basic data 
(for instance in the context of the five year plan preparation and reviews). The P&DD's Rules 
of Business make clear in point 1 that the main objective of the department is "planning 
including policy and development"; another important objective is economic research. The 
Federal Planning Commission's main objective (la) is the "preparation of a comprehensive 
national plan for the economic and social development of the country", while it is also 
responsible for such things as the "continuous evaluation of the economic situation and 
coordination of economic policies", the "identification of regions, sectors and sub-sectors 
lacking adequate portfolio of projects", and the "organisation of research in various sectors 
of the economy to improve the database and information as well as to provide analytical 
studies which will help economic decision-making" (P&D Division 1991, p. 10). As argued 
in chapter 1, the P&DD's are thus seen in theory as task forces charged with promoting and 
coordinating the development of the country; such departments would logically be expected 
to be employing a monitoring system taking into account all activities of the government that 
are pertinent in this respect. 
Do the monitoring systems as reviewed here for Pakistan and AJK meet this requirement? 
The old systems certainly not; they are even limited from the perspective of implementation 
itself. As argued in the previous chapters, they do not take into account all its relevant aspects 
and seem to be concerned more with giving the impression that they are checking than that 
they are really checking. The new system in AJK includes such aspects more systematically 
and also covers the intended outputs better. But this system is also constrained by being 
confined to the ADP budgeting process: as soon as the projects are implemented, these 
disappear from the ADP and cannot any longer be monitored by the P&DD's system. The 
preliminary conclusion must be that such systems have a limited perspective if the object is 
to monitor the progress with government development policy. For a monitoring system to 
become a better instrument in this respect it is necessary to either change the nature of the 
development programme itself, or to expand the system's focus and let it cover also the other 
programmes of the government (under the recurrent budget). 
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Development programmes as capital investment programmes 
There are broadly two views of what public sector development programmes such as running 
in Pakistan (and in many other developing countries) should constitute: they are either capital 
investment programmes or they are 'real' development programmes. By the latter is meant 
a mix of capital investment, economic incentive policies and human resource development 
programmes (Todaro 1985). Whilst the general consensus nowadays is that much more is 
required than capital investment to achieve development, the view that capital investment is 
the principal engine of development is still held at least implicitly by many planning agencies 
in developing countries. This can be to a large extent explained by the persisting influence 
of prevailing economic theory in the 1950s and early 1960s, when many of the planning 
agencies and procedures were instituted, and when the budgets were separated. Ideas of 
'shortcuts to progress' have proved too seductive to abandon completely. They are based on 
two main strands of economic theory, which were influential in those years: linear stages of 
economic growth theory, and neoclassical structural change models (Todaro 1985, pp.62-78). 
The former was expressed most clearly by W.W. Rostov and held that one of the 
necessities for a 'take-off' of the economy is the mobilisation of domestic and foreign savings 
in order to generate sufficient investment to accelerate economic growth. Also supported by 
the in those years famous Harrod-Domar model, it was posited that the more an economy is 
able to save - and invest - the greater will be the growth of the GNP7. The 'trick' of 
economic growth would then be simply to increase the proportion of national income saved, 
and mobilise internal and external loans and grants for the purpose (see also Riddell 1987, 
p.86 ff). Development budget would have to create new capital stock; recurrent budget would 
have to maintain and operate it. Since the return on the capital investment was supposed to 
be higher than the cost, loans obtained for this purpose would be generally profitable and 
therefore self-financing8. 
The neoclassical structural change models (W-A. Lewis, Fei and Ranis) came to similar 
conclusions regarding the prime importance of capital investments, in which the government 
was to take the lead. Labour, as another important production factor, was considered much 
less of a constraint in many developing countries9. 
Criticisms of capital investment as main route to development 
The criticisms of these models have been strong from the middle of the 1960s onward. The 
linear stages model came under attack because capital investment was argued to be, albeit a 
7 The Harrod-Domar Growth Model was based on the assumption that every economy must save a certain 
proportion of its national income if only to replace worn out capital goods. In order to grow, however, new 
investments representing net additions to the capital stock were deemed crucial. The crux of Harrod-Domar 
model is that the rate of growth of GNP is determined jointly by the national savings ratio and the national 
capital/output ratio; the growth rate of national income will be direcdy or 'positively' related to the savings 
ratio Todaro (q> tit., p.65). 
8 Due to this reason, in many developing countries, the size of the development budget became roughly 
equivalent to internal and external loans, plus foreign aid. The model also provided a rationale for massive 
financial and technical assistance from rich to poor countries. 
' The basis of Lewis' theory is that the modern urban sector of the economy is the only one capable of 
generating growth, and that feeding this sector with capital investment will speed up this process. The 
traditional rural subsistence sector will supply the modern sector with cheap labour, which is assumed can be 
withdrawn without any loss of (agricultural) output. Since urban wages are assumed to be constant, the supply 
curve of rural labour is considered to be perfectly elastic. The profits then mostly depend on the size of the 
capital stock and are therefore assumed to be reinvested in more capital stock. Modern sector growth and 
employment expansion is thus assumed to continue proportionate to the rate of capital investment and until all 
surplus rural labour is absorbed in the new industrial sector. 
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necessary but not sufficient condition, for economic growth. Other necessary conditions 
identified were for instance a well-integrated commodity and money market, highly developed 
transport facilities, well-trained and educated manpower, the motivation to succeed, and an 
efficient government bureaucracy. At a more fundamental level, it was argued by some that 
developing countries have a peripheral and dependent position in a complex international 
system in which even the best development strategies can be thwarted by external forces 
beyond the countries' control. In this view it can not be argued that development is merely 
a matter of removing obstacles and supplying the missing components such as capital, foreign 
exchange, skills and management. Lewis' dual-sector model, on the other hand, was 
inappropriate on similar counts10. 
Many have come to believe that a set of interrelated changes in the economic (and social) 
structure of a country is necessary for the transition from a traditional to a modern system. 
The UNDP study (1991, p. 109) points out particularly the need for human resources 
development and technological change, in addition to capital resources development. The 
'New Institutional Economics' points to the importance of stable political institutions, well 
settled property rights and legal environment for development (North 1989; Nabli & Nugent 
1989; Stanton 1995). 
A monitoring system focusing on development issues 
If it can be agreed that the monitoring system needed by P&DD in accordance with its role 
as 'task force development' is to monitor progress with development as influenced by 
government policy, then the modern insights indicated above would require it to take into 
account jointly the effects of the development and recurrent budgets. The latter have 
important consequences for human resources development and tie up substantial amounts of 
money. For instance, education alone swallows up almost 30 percent of the recurrent budget 
in AJK, a proportion equivalent to more than half of the development budget. Also there are 
direct and indirect effects of recurrent expenditure on development, even on capital 
investment itself. For instance, the construction of roads through the development budget is 
also dependent upon the expenditure on road maintenance through the recurrent budget. The 
monitoring of one budget by one system would be defensible only when the other budget 
would also be monitored as far as developmental aspects are concerned, and when the two 
monitoring systems would be sufficiently linked to enable a bird's eye view of development 
to see the inter-relationships. In Pakistan, as in many other developing countries, the 
recurrent budget has no general monitoring system, let alone one that is geared to 
developmental aspects11. Departments may have internal monitoring systems, but the 
information yielded is not used for comparing development in one sector with that of another. 
It does not involve main stakeholders with regularity and in a systematic way. This deficiency 
is all the more serious since there is little countervailing power and monitoring outside the 
public sector either. The ADP meanwhile has a system which is only associated with 
development monitoring in the sense of the economic theories of the 1950s, discussed above. 
It failed to take into account that profits can be reinvested in more sophisticated labour-saving capital 
equipment (so that economies would remain 'dual'). It failed to take into account that many profits would be 
lifted out of the countries where they originated. It also wrongly assumed that a general labour surplus existed 
in the rural agricultural sector; this surplus may be an only regional and seasonal feature; urban labour surpluses 
are more likely. Also, the assumption that urban wages would remain constant at a low level has proved false; 
there has been an almost universal tendency for modern sector wages to rise rapidly even where substantial open 
employment exists. 
1 1 This is one of the reasons why, in the nineties, the World Bank has promoted its Public Expenditure Reviews. 
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The new theories indicated above do not seem to have made a major impact on the 
departments as yet. Can it be held that what is being monitored is a capital investment 
programme of the kind discussed above, so that if development is not monitored then at least 
all capital investment in the public sector of relevance to economic growth? 
Is the AJK monitoring system including all capital investment? 
For an answer to this question it is necessary to look at the theory and at the practice. The 
practice of the ADP indicates, as has been shown, that there is a focus on construction of the 
order of around 90 percent of the budget. This means that at least there is a large association 
with capital investment. But the next question is whether the ADP is supposed to include all 
capital investment that takes place and whether it is supposed to be capital investment in the 
sense intended by economic theory, namely investment in new and productive capital stock. 
This requires us first to look at government policy. The rules as to which expenditures are 
to be assigned to the development budget and which to the recurrent budget are mainly laid 
down in a letter dating back as far as 1959. It was written in the context of the preparation 
of the second development plan, but deemed relevant enough to be reprinted in the important 
Manual for Development Projects, issued by the Federal Planning Commission in 1991 and 
distributed to all government departments in Pakistan (Annexure-X, pp. 473-475). The letter 
says: 
"The concept of a workable definition of development expenditure should take into account the 
following basic considerations viz-viz the Development Programme: -
i) that it should be designed to keep intact, to enlarge and to improve the physical resources of 
the country; 
ii) that it should improve the knowledge, skill and productivity of the people; and 
iii) that it should encourage efficiency with which available resources are used." 
It is immediately clear that such a definition includes any (government) expenditure that 
operates, maintains or replaces existing capital stock, and therefore does not meet the 
criterion of exclusively creating new, economically productive, stock. In fact most of 
government's expenditures could be covered by the definition, even the country's military 
expenditures. These basic considerations can therefore hardly serve as a guide for the 
determination of which budget to use for a given expenditure. But the letter goes on to 
specify by sector which types of expenditures are to be seen as developmental. For instance, 
it is said: 
"in respect of agriculture and industry, all such items of expenditure will be included as result in the 
replacement or expansion of existing capacity or in the creation of new capacity. For instance, in 
agriculture, expenditure on the replacement or expansion of existing capacity or creation of new 
capacity in respect of anti-locust schemes and plant protection measures, expenditure on popularization 
and distribution of fertilizers, expenditures on agricultural extension workers related to specific Plan 
schemes, net subsidies on fertilizers, expenditure on agricultural extension workers related to specific 
Plan schemes, all expenditures on village-AID, expenditure on agricultural research and 
experimentation related to specific Plan schemes, fresh development loans to the agriculturalists, etc. 
etc. will all be treated as developmental." 
This sort of specification - "etc. etc." - hardly comes nearer to a workable definition of 
development expenditure. First of all, the replacement of existing capacity is only one 
subjective step away from the proper maintenance and operation of capacity. Is the 
replacement of a bolt a capital or recurrent expenditure? And what about blackboards, hand 
pumps, operating tables? Development is perhaps, but economic growth is certainly not 
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helped by such expenditure12. And where is the specification of the expenditures which 
should be assigned to the recurrent budget? 
Secondly, some items mentioned do not create or even maintain capital stock, such as 
fertilizers or research and experimentation. The replacement of the term capital stock 
sometimes by physical resources and sometimes by "capacity" is also a divergence from the 
spirit of the original economic theory from which the distinction between capital and recurrent 
was derived and blurs the concept of investment (already itself replaced by "development 
expenditure"). 
Thirdly, the description refers to expenditure on work "related to specific Plan schemes" 
which is to be regarded as developmental. This is of course a regression ad infinitum because 
the principal issue is what should be budgeted as development schemes, and what as regular 
recurrent expenditures. 
Misty guidance from planning rules 
In the appendix to the letter, a further attempt is made to segregate the then existing accounts 
classification (the list of major and minor heads of central and provincial disbursements) into 
the two categories of expenditure. From this classification, the rationale for why certain 
categories are designated as development expenditures does not become clearer either; an 
explanation is not given. In 1979, the classification was superseded by the 'Chart of 
Classification of Federal and Provincial Governments Receipts and Disbursements' which is 
different and much more detailed. However, a new attempt at assigning the two categories 
of expenditure to the hundreds of functions in this chart was not made. In all, the conclusion 
must be that the distinctions made in the letter are misty if not elusive. 
Even a supposition that in practice whatever expenditure is regarded by government as 
temporary at a certain time is assigned to the development budget, and whatever can be 
regarded as permanent expenditure to the recurrent budget cannot entirely be corroborated: 
there are too many exceptions: certain programmes such as seed distribution, scholarships, 
malaria control, training are almost permanently in the ADP as 'serial projects'. The 
composition of the ADPs both at federal, provincial and AJK levels also demonstrates very 
clearly that there are many expenditures which are little to do with either (socio-) economic 
investments or new creation of capital stock. The ADP in AJK for 1990-91 includes sub-
sectors such as government housing in which substantial numbers of government offices are 
built, as well as prime ministerial palaces and residences for government officers. Also 
memorial buildings, jails and court buildings, are built under this sector. In other sectors, 
such as transport and communication, there are so many projects which 'improve', 
'rehabilitate', or 'recondition' roads that it is unclear what is the proportion of really new 
roads being created. When the number of similar projects is compared with that in the ADP 
of 1996-97, it is clear that the number of road reconditioning and rehabilitation projects is 
rising through time, a finding pointing to an increased pollution of the ADP with 
maintenance/repair oriented activities. 
Perhaps no example highlights the increasing arbitrariness of the distinction between 
development and recurrent budgets better than the measure, taken during the Sixth Five Year 
Plan period, to treat the provincial recurring expenditure on education over and above the 
1982-83 level as developmental, in order to help the executing agencies "to implement the 
development programme at a faster speed" (Seventh Five Year Plan 1988-93, p.254). 
1 2 According to Lacey (1989, p.23), the IMF excludes from capital expenditures only defense but includes office 
furniture and equipment, as well as police stations, courts and prisons. The IMF therefore distinguishes between 
capital expenditures and development expenditure. 
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Follow the Federal Government's instructions 
The federal government recognizes the problems with the classification of expenditures 
because in their explanatory letter a final paragraph is added which runs as follows: 
"It should be clarified that the distinction between development and non-development expenditures, as 
made above, is in order to specify what particular expenditures will be included in the Second Plan and 
does not necessarily reflect on the development or non-development character of various activities. 
Similarly, the concept of development expenditure should be kept separate from the question of 
financing. In the last analysis, recurring expenditure on education staff may be as important as non-
recurring expenditure on education buildings and the Planning Commission will take into account as 
well as insist on an adequate provision for the former in the normal expenditure of the education 
department irrespective of its exclusion from the concept of 'Plan expenditure'." 
In other words, the rationale for what is development expenditure is whatever the federal 
government has deemed fit to put in the (Five Year) Plan13. In this the government of 
Pakistan is not very different from other governments in the world, according to Caiden & 
Wildavsky (1974, p.92). After their extensive survey of poor countries in the various 
continents, they agree with Waterston's earlier conclusion: "... capital expenditures may be 
nondevelopmental, and current expenditures may be developmental.." In many countries "any 
capital expenditure is classified as developmental and the rest are not" (ibid., p.94; see also 
Agarwala 1983, pp.24-26). They add, cynically: "The technique of separating ordinary and 
capital expenditures, like planning, helps poor countries expand beyond the narrow confines 
of the possible. What is a capital expenditure? The safest rule to follow is that capital 
expenditures are whatever are called by that name. [..] Capital budgeting [...] is a method 
for avoiding the appearance of deficit spending by giving the amount borrowed in any year 
a name that suggests it is an investment" (ibid., p.89).1 4 They therefore point to a conclusion 
reached many times in this study: strategic and departmental reasons play a significant role 
in the constitution of the ADP and Five Year Plans. When a politician, a Finance 
Department, a Planning Department, or a line department cannot get its intended activity 
financed through one budget, it may try another with more luck. It is thereby gready helped 
by the fact that the two budgets are managed by different departments with different interests. 
Donor agencies have also contributed to the confusion, by their pressuring for the reliance 
on capital investment projects and their aversion to funding (programmes in) recurrent 
budgets. The outcome of these strategies is an ADP which is an end product of multiple 
objectives and (departmental and political) stakeholders, representing an amalgam of capital 
investment, one-time expenditure, and economic investment. As such it biases the perspective 
whether on development, growth, capital investment, or simply project implementation. With 
the monitoring system not yielding proper information, the conduct of specialised evaluation 
exercises would then become necessary. But paradoxically these evaluations would be 
constrained as well, due to the absence of historical information obtained through monitoring. 
1 3 Ahmed & Amjad (1984, pp.270-271) in their discussion of resource allocation in Pakistan also conclude that 
"This concept of development expenditure creates a number of loopholes. The construction of buildings and 
roads may not always be related to development purposes. [...] The tendency to associate development with only 
capital spending and to neglect maintenance, staffing, and operation of these facilities is not very rational." 
1 4 Indeed, the size of the development budget in Pakistan is roughly proportionate to the amount of annual 
public debt service (cf Malik et at. 1994, pp.384 and 386). 
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Composition of the recurrent budget 
Not only is the composition of the development budget to some extent arbitrary and 
increasingly so, the same holds true for the recurrent budget. For example, the recurrent 
budget in AJK included capital investments such as the construction of mosques and other 
buildings - other mosques were in the ADP. In NWFP, there were for instance several large 
lump sums in the recurrent budget for Education from which, as was corroborated by some 
Finance department officers (but never officially acknowledged), the construction of schools 
was paid (amongst other things). These lump sums were typically and mysteriously called 
"Augmentation and Strengthening of Educational Institutions", or "Government Directives" 
and together ran into the hundreds of millions of rupees; as such they were rather enigmatic 
single budget lines in a budget book running hundreds of pages of extremely detailed budget 
lines for each sector usually specifying small amounts of money (in the thousands of rupees). 
The background for the inclusion of such budget lines, outside the official classification as 
used by the Accountant General, was usually strategic15. First of all they allowed the 
Finance Department to shift funds around easily from destination to destination, without the 
need for formal reappropriation authorisation (a practice resorted to by many countries, as 
was noted by the multi-country study on financial management undertaken by UNDTCD 
1991). Secondly they solved the problem of the budgeting for discretionary decisions made 
by Chief Ministers: whenever the Chief Minister had promised something during a field tour 
which turned out not to have been budgeted in advance, it could be financed from the lump 
sum allocation made somewhere in the Demand for Grants volume of the specific sector. In 
the case of the Social Action Programme, discussed earlier, it offered also a way of 
hoodwinking the donor organisations. If these had laid down conditionalities that no more 
schools would be built except those on an agreed list and from an agreed budget, then other 
schools - promised by the Chief Minister to constituencies as a reward for loyalty or for any 
other reason - could still be financed from such a 'slush fund'. Ultimately, long after the final 
expenditure would have been made, the AG would definitively classify these as construction 
in the primary education sector. But then it would be usually too late for the donors to notice; 
the fact that the match between AG and FD accounts (consolidated expenditure as against 
"revised estimates", and using different classifications) is so notoriously difficult to make also 
contributed to this. 
Summing-up 
To sum up, there are at least five reasons why the monitoring of the ADP offers a limited 
perspective on the progress of development as pursued by government policy: 
1) capital investment is not the only engine of growth or development 
2) not all capital investment is in the ADP 
3) not all capital expenditure in the ADP is investment in added capacity 
4) not all that is in the ADP is capital investment or expenditure 
5) much expenditure that is in the recurrent budget may lead to human resources 
development, and to a lesser extent create capital stock as well. But this is not covered 
by the (ADP) monitoring system. 
1 5 The financial rules state that "lumpsum provision should not be proposed [by departments] except in the most 
exceptional circumstances which should be recorded" (Ali 1995, p.43). However, if the Finance Department 
itself stretches the rules... 
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And, to address the initial contention that the focus of monitoring itself limits the 
comprehensibility of reports submitted, the following reasons which have been elaborated in 
previous chapters and which were mentioned by Valadez & Bamberger (1994, pp.27-28), can 
be added: 
6) The monitoring system for the ADP has a focus on (budgetary) inputs rather than 
outputs. This has several reasons: ease of analysis because financial inputs can be 
aggregated easily and physical outputs cannot; the emphasis of P&DD on financial 
management, reappropriations and so forth; technical reasons: most project outputs 
are realised after the project is closed down - the building constructed - and then there 
is no easy means to include these in the monitoring system. The project is not in the 
ADP anymore, while the project setup is abandoned, the project director and staff 
transferred. Departments that have taken over the assets, staff, and systems, often 
have completely different ways for managing and accounting for these. The well-
intended forms developed by the Planning Commission for the completion of a project 
(the PC-4) and the following of its results afterwards (the PC-5), are for the most part 
boycotted by line departments, as was seen in chapter 4. The result is that outputs 
identified in the monitoring system are not monitored. 
7) Due to the paramount importance of the ADP (rather than the Five Year Plan), which 
in itself is a consequence of budgetary uncertainty beyond the one year period, the 
time horizon of monitoring is very limited. The spending of tiny annual allocations 
for projects is monitored and the requirements of conciseness are such that short term 
implementation targets are being focused on rather than the general project objectives 
themselves. The breaking up of progress into tiny packets of information leads to 
sometimes incomprehensible statements, as was shown in the previous chapter. 
What is the solution? What can be done with the budgets and what should be done with the 
monitoring system? This shall be one of the subjects of the last chapter. It is concluded here 
with a case study of the muddy waters that a monitoring system can end up in when it is to 
deal with something more akin to a genuine development programme. 
7.4 The SAP in Pakistan as a case study 
The Social Action Programme offers an illustration of the variety of issues requiring 
monitoring in programmes that are more integrally geared to development. The SAP has been 
introduced in section 6.6 for a specific purpose but shall be re-introduced here in somewhat 
more general terms. It was a nation-wide programme running from 1993-94 until 1995-96, 
a period later extended to 1996-97. A second phase was under preparation at the time of 
writing this study. The SAP covered the sectors of primary education, basic health, (rural) 
water supply and sanitation, and population planning. These four sectors were deemed of the 
greatest importance to the development of human resources, an area in which Pakistan was 
perceived as lagging behind (International Development Centre 1990 p.xii; UNDP 1991; 8th 
Five Year Plan, p.67). 
Innovative about SAP was its explicit recognition of the insufficiency of approaches 
concentrating on capital investment (i.e. construction of buildings) and its consequent 
inclusion of recurrent budgets and wider policy issues. Almost two thirds of the expenditures 
in the SAP were on the side of recurrent budgets, and one thirds on the side of capital 
budgets. Through a serious boost in the expenditures in the four sectors, combined with both 
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intrasectoral and cross-sectoral policy reforms, the programme was supposed to overcome the 
lag, while at the same time the direction of efforts made so far was to be changed and their 
efficiency and effectiveness improved. 
The SAP was supported by the World Bank, the ADB, the Netherlands Government, and 
at a later stage also British ODA (now DFID) and other organisations. These donors had 
instituted an incentive mechanism to reward provincial governments for special efforts in 
terms of the priority given to the SAP. It was based on the principle of reimbursements of 
a fixed part of all expenditures made in the sectors by concessional loans (to the value of US$ 
300 million) and (to a smaller extent) grants, while good performance was awarded by higher 
reimbursement ratios offered for the next year. The principle ensured that a great deal of 
attention was given to the SAP by the federal and various provincial governments. Thus, the 
SAP became managed by a much larger than the normal (limited) number of decision-makers. 
In line with its innovative character, the SAP had an extra-ordinary organisation. Special 
coordination bodies were created outside the normal government management and review 
processes. SAP cells were created in all the departments concerned. Donors were given ample 
chance to influence policy decisions through supervision missions and other coordination and 
negotiation platforms. New methods were developed and forms designed for accounting 
purposes as well as reporting of monthly and quarterly progress. A number of special surveys 
were planned to provide baseline data as well as determine the impact of SAP. Annual 
operational plans were to be prepared by all provinces and areas separate from the normal 
budgetary plans, converting the capital and current budgets into one integrated budget. In all, 
the programme was set to make a radical break with the much more isolated attacks on 
development problems in the past. 
Complexity of SAP 
After the SAP's start, it gradually became clear that the aspects of the SAP that needed 
management and reform were even of a greater variety than originally foreseen. Many of 
these were first discussed in an unstructured fashion but then became objects of regular 
interest and eventually issues deemed suitable for monitoring exercises. This was stimulated 
by the large number of stakeholders in the SAP at that level, each calling for their own issues 
to be addressed. Apart from Finance Department, Planning Department and line agencies, 
also District Development Advisory Councils (in NWFP), SAP Boards, district and local 
councils, many donors agencies, NGOs and consultants and contractors proved intent on 
following the management issues with regularity. An impression of the enormous variety of 
issues is given in Box 7.2, which presents a listing of some of the main issues figuring on 
the agenda of the various supervision missions organised by the donor agencies. It can be 
concluded that the monitoring of policies is a completely different and more complex affair 
from the performance monitoring of piecemeal investment projects. 
Reporting system for the SAP 
Originally, there were two report forms on which the progress with all of these things was 
to be reported by agencies. One was the annual Policy Matrices/Implementation Plan. This 
was a format of two columns, in which the policy actions undertaken and to be undertaken 
were to be recorded for each provincial department (later the format was expanded to seven 
columns). The document was mainly intended as a mechanism whereby the SAP donors could 
check the implementation of the policy agreements reached in the Annual Operational Plans 
and supervision mission negotiations. 
The other mechanism was the Monitoring Indicators Proforma. This proforma contained 
a number of indicators on financial and physical progress for each of the SAP sectors. 
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Box 7.2 Monitoring issues in the Social Action Programme 
General budgetary issues: 
the size of annual increases as per agreements with donors and government commitments; 
the proper specification of the budgets in terms of areas and items; 
the timeliness and proper specification of Statements of Expenditure for reimbursement by donor 
agencies; and 
procurement according to specified criteria. 
Specific recurrent budget issues: 
the budgetary focus on the four SAP sectors in the recurrent budget; 
the appointment of certain staff such as learning coordinators; 
specific agreed increases in allocation for non-salary items; and 
timely releases of the allocations and timely utilisations. 
Specific development budget issues (on the agenda of supervision missions): 
the budgetary focus on the four SAP sectors in die ADP; 
the continued focus on rural areas in the ADP; 
the focus on funds for reconstruction and (major) repairs rather than new construction; 
a focus on (re-)construction of facilities for girls and female teachers; 
new avenues for funding of school construction through private sector and community involvement; 
and 
site selection for new schools and water supply systems on the basis of agreed criteria. 
Policy (reform) issues: 
decentralisation in decision making from federal to provincial, from provincial to district, from 
provincial to special committees and boards, from district officers to facility heads, and from 
facility heads to community committees; 
the role of NGOs in service delivery, implementation, monitoring and evaluation; 
user charges and community management of facilities/water supply systems; 
the introduction of Village Health Workers, learning Coordinators; 
recruitment, appointment, promotion, transfers of key staff (including evidence of nepotism and 
patronage in this) 
relaxation or tightening of criteria for recruitment, appointment, promotion and transfers; 
changes in conditions of service; 
transportation issues, particularly for female staff; 
development, implementation and sustainability of information systems; 
reorganisation of obsolete government department structures; 
mechanisms for the 'supervision' of Public Works Department activities; 
support to private sector initiatives through the creation of foundations; 
involvement of SAP boards and district development advisory committees in site selection and other 
things (federal and provincial members of the parliaments); and 
the organisation of 'vertical' preventive programmes (immunization, malaria, health education and 
HTV/AIDS): federal or provincial, and whether through special programmes or as part of the 
regular structure. 
Indicators were for instance the number of boys enrolled in school, the number of Village 
Education Committees created, and the percentage of total teachers transferred during the 
school year (male/female). The implementing departments were to report for all these 
indicators the baseline situation, the targets for the year, and the achievements booked. The 
proforma was to be completed quarterly, in preparation of the SAP quarterly coordination 
meetings, and sent to the SAPP (MSU). 
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Both mechanisms were regarded as not working effectively. The Implementation Plans left 
it to the line departments to enter the targets, but because they were continually changing as 
a result of the negotiations, they were in the view of the donors often not correctly, or 
comprehensively filled in. The system of one department updating the implementation plans 
was perceived as ineffective. The discussions in the meetings with the donors were often also 
too unstructured to pay much attention to the plans. Increasingly they became the subject of 
assistance by MSU experts, but much difference to their quality and the way they were 
adhered to this did not make. 
The Monitoring Indicators proforma was used even less. The figures in it were regarded 
as highly questionable even by the departments entering them, and for many indicators no 
figures at all were presented. Strategic reasons played a role in the lack of progress statements 
submitted, but there were many technical problems at a lower level. A main problem with 
the Monitoring Indicators Proforma was that it asked for departmental and provincial 
aggregates, which could not be given due to the fact that the underlying recording and 
reporting systems in the various SAP related departments were badly suited to generating such 
aggregates. They were also understaffed and underequipped. In most cases, they were old and 
unadapted to the new and greatly expanded activities of departments, although in some cases 
there had been already ongoing efforts at introduction of new information systems, such as 
the Education Management Information System and the Health Management Information 
System. But these systems, for which data was to be entered at the school and dispensary 
level, were too ambitious and alien to settle in the conditions of deteriorating morale and 
competence at the local level in Pakistan. The departments simply could not deliver the 
information in time and in an unequivocal fashion. Even in the cases where the information 
could have been collected by using the old system, for instance the total number of doctors 
employed in a district, usually less than half of all field stations submitted their subtotals in 
time; the rest did not, or submitted with large delays. The specific SAP cell in the 
departments could then not consolidate the progress on a provincial level and put it in the 
proforma. 
Substitution of regular reporting systems by surveys 
Unfortunately, a revised recording system at intra-departmental level and geared to the new 
needs was not introduced by the SAPP. This would have been a huge undertaking anyway, 
because each department has, in fact, a large number of smaller and larger stock keeping, 
filing, register, archiving and accounting systems, all of which require modification to more 
adequately assess aspects of human resource development in the SAP. After a few years of 
report submissions in which many of the columns were receiving the notorious "N.A." 
markings, meaning that information was Not Available, both the implementation plans and 
the proformas were largely abandoned as monitoring instruments. This then led to a number 
of survey instruments being focused on. This escape route was supposed to kill two birds with 
one stone: to substitute for the lack of information coming from the departments, as well as 
to check these same departments through 'impartial' observations in the field. The SAPP Field 
Review 1996 was the most important, or at least most comprehensive of these surveys (see 
section 6.7). Due to the lack of information all round, it was lumbered with hundreds of 
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issues all deemed of crucial importance to the SAP16. When the report appeared, it contained 
too many findings to be digested by the decision-makers all at once. It was not concise 
enough. The few departments that did look at the findings, questioned these, which was not 
surprising given that the survey hardly made use of the regular departmental recording 
systems (however outdated and ineffective these in practice had become). For these reasons, 
the report was largely ignored. 
Attempts at creation of new reporting systems 
The reliance on survey instruments did not prevent the main stakeholders in the SAP from 
engaging in various attempts at designing new monitoring formats and systems. A number 
of independent foreign consultants in the SAP were invited to make proposals, and a local 
company was also commissioned to come up with a new system. Apart from this, workshops 
were organised and technical working groups created to develop new indicators and systems. 
All of this led to many competing forms and systems, but little agreement. When looking at 
these new systems, it is fair to say that they did not seem to cope better with the huge variety 
of issues than the existing ones. Most of them asked many more questions and had more 
indicators, but had not taken the trouble to redesign the many different report formats and 
systems existing at local and district levels. The new forms still relied on the planning cells 
of the provincial departments to somehow come up with aggregates. The difficulties inherent 
in developing new systems were obviously underestimated. Even at the start of the second 
phase of the SAP project, there was little agreement on the adoption of new monitoring 
systems. 
Lack of monitoring as a bottleneck within SAP 
The lack of well-functioning monitoring systems within departments was ultimately regarded 
as one of the main botdenecks of SAP. The Social Policy and Development Centre (1997, 
p. 101-102) in its major review of the SAP stated in its principal conclusions: 
"SAP lacked essential sector information and rational planning on which its projects could be 
prioritized and executed. Indeed, the only available sector specific information is held by the respective 
line departments and that too is fragmented, incomplete, and often unreliable. [...] Most important of 
all, SAP also lacked effective monitoring and evaluation systems. Information on what was going on 
in the field was unreliable and kept disaggregated and unavailable within the line departments. Even 
communities were difficult to access, their responses often guarded for fear of repercussions. Baseline 
data was inconsistent and incorporated too small a sample. Evaluations were carried out by the 
government itself with the result that failures were underreported and successes overstated." 
Conclusions 
The experience with the monitoring of the more truly development oriented SAP leads to a 
number of general observations: 
1 6 Some of these have already been shown in table 6.10 in the last chapter. For instance for the primary 
education sector, they concerned the following issues: availability and quality of basic infrastructure in schools; 
teacher attendance; teacher transfers; teacher strength and student teacher ratios; availability of female teachers; 
teacher selection and training; availability of educational supplies and materials; availability and quality of text 
books; budgetary allocation for Repair & Maintenance and utilisation of these funds; enrollment; level of 
enrollment of girls; student performance; administrative and financial powers of DEOs; administrative and 
financial powers of head teachers; involvement of DEOs in preparation of budgets (decentralisation); and the 
role of parent-teacher committees in school environment. 
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1) The monitoring of a development oriented programme is inherendy difficult due to the 
much larger number of issues to be covered in comparison with a more traditional capital 
investment programme. Many policy issues were of a 'wicked' nature, and did not lend 
themselves to quantification and standardisation. The SAP perhaps combined too many 
sectoral programmes not closely linked enough in terms of implementation requirements - a 
subsectoral programme would have been more feasible. In such a situation, it becomes all the 
more necessary that there are multiple monitoring mechanisms to address such issues and 
cater to the many stakeholders present. Single, 'wide-angled' systems, such as sometimes 
proposed, are less appropriate, not only for reasons of the multidimensionality of complex 
programmes, but also because of the need for conciseness. 
2) The innovative SAP was grafted upon an underlying bureaucratic structure which remained 
the same. The departments remained bastions of old-fashioned practices and did not have the 
flexibility required to change to a more responsive and proactive style of working. This was 
to a large extent due to the fact that the departments were tied to bureaucratic rules and 
systems which applied to the entire public sector. SAP was a big programme, but. not big 
enough to turn the whole bureaucracy with its uniform rules and practices around. Systemic 
changes are difficult to carry through anywhere in the world, and require massive political 
support. Support for New Public Management ideas was not sufficiently available in the 
fickle political circumstances of Pakistan, in spite of the commitments made to the contrary. 
One of the (lesser) consequences was that it was almost impossible to introduce new 
monitoring systems. 
3) The underlying recording systems in line departments, often at local and district level, 
needed to be overhauled if new development oriented reporting systems were to have a 
chance of success. Unfortunately, this also required an overhaul of the organisation of these 
departments themselves. 
4) In two out of the four substantive departments, the SAP was only a part of the 
departmental programme. In the Education department, only the primary education sub-sector 
was under the SAP, and in the Health Department, only primary health. These two subsectors 
were by far the largest within SAP itself, but it was difficult to carry out systemic change in 
the Health and Education departments because the rest of the departments was not formally 
under it. It might have created different rules and regulations for SAP staff and non-SAP 
staff, which in the last instance was considered inappropriate. Similarly, it was also more 
difficult to introduce new monitoring systems for only a part of the activities of these 
departments. 
5) Monitoring is all the more difficult if the budget of the programme comes from two 
different sources. The writing of special operational plans with integrated budgets could 
hardly be expected to make much difference, when the distinction between capital and 
recurrent budgets in the main government accounts continued unchanged. Although 
coordination bodies had been created in which both Finance Department and P&DD were 
represented, the management of the SAP as a whole became convoluted. Line departments 
and donor agencies had to negotiate with two different funding departments in each Province 
and area. Commitments made by the P&DDs (as main donor counterparts and responsible for 
overall coordination) regarding recurrent budget issues were often not honoured by the 
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Finance Departments controlling these budgets". The provincial SAP coordinators appointed 
(in the P&DDs) did not have final authority in budgetary issues. The difficulties were further 
aggravated due to the lack of commitment from the side of the Finance Departments and line 
agencies to true reform. The reform agenda of the SAP was endorsed in abstract terms at a 
high political level, but its details were not supported by the departments in toto. (The real 
political commitment to SAP could also be questioned.) The idea that SAP was an instrument 
to gather resources mostly from international donors was much more alive than the idea that 
SAP was a reform programme, changing the old practices of the departments. With both open 
and secret agendas being adhered to by FD, P&DD and line departments, the assumption that 
there was one set of government targets to be monitored proved to be false. If there had been 
only one government department funding the SAP, then there would at least not have been 
a dispute regarding the (secret) objectives of the Finance Department (to spend as little as 
possible to decrease the deficit), and the P&DD (to spend as much as possible to achieve the 
SAP targets). Monitoring systems would have also benefitted from such clarity. 
6) Monitoring systems from the top down cannot be substitutes when there are no proper 
channels for generating and filtering feedback from the local level upwards. The low level 
of organisation of communities in Pakistan, itself to an important degree a consequence of 
the lack of local government, is the reason for this lack of feedback. If local councils 
(throughout SAP largely dissolved or expired) would be reconstituted through new elections 
and made effective by more powers, more (professional) staff and more funds, then there is 
every likelihood that they would themselves keep a check on the progress of the SAP within 
their municipalities, and report on problems and opportunities to the district and provincial 
governments. This is also a better solution than, as presently argued for strongly in the SAP 
(e.g. by SPDC) that there should be 'independent' third party monitoring of the SAP, 
meaning monitoring by a local contracted firm or NGO. This option could be useful, but 
cannot replace the option given above, if only for reason that as soon as an outside 
organisation is paid to do monitoring, it will itself become a stakeholder, delivering perhaps 
useful information, but not necessarily from the same angle as that what would have been 
given by the local councils. 
At present, the political representatives, as members of committees like the District Social 
Action Boards, can not be regarded as a good substitute for the channeling of feedback from 
the village level. They are not sufficiently familiar with all the village microcosms in their 
constituencies, and generally are involved in very strong clientelistic behaviour. More 
importantly, the SAP boards (and DDACs in NWFP) are of such a nature that their chairmen 
can push through their own interests. Since the SAP boards are chaired by often unelected 
nominees from the federal government (at the time of the SAP mosdy of PPP complexion), 
there are further biases. 
The bureaucratic déconcentration as sought after by SAP - transferring powers from the 
centres to district officers - can neither be a substitute for real devolution. As the SAPP Field 
Review established, increased powers of District Education Officers and District Health 
Officers (grade 18 level) led to reports of increasing interference in the administration from 
the side of political representatives at this level (cf. MSU 1996, p.ix). 
1 7 In fact, since the 1991 National Finance Committee award, the powers of provincial Finance Departments 
vis-a-vis P&DDs have grown significantly. This is due to the decision to gradually phase out the earmarked 
federal development grants to the Provinces, a process which was completed in 1997-98. 
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7) It is clear that surveys cannot substitute for departmental monitoring, if only for reasons 
of the required slow but regular digestion of information in order to carry maximum effect 
(and there are more reasons). The regular monitoring of the issues through departmental 
systems, with occasional counterchecking from other sides, would have produced a much 
more digestible flow of information. 
7.S Conclusions 
This chapter has endeavoured to bring out that there are other particular biases than those 
related to stakeholders and observers, which influence the nature of the information produced 
by any given progress reporting system. There may be gaps and incomprehensibilities in the 
information when the actual contents of budgets or programmes themselves are at variance 
with their own official objectives. There may be technical reasons why monitoring systems 
overemphasise certain issues to the neglect of others (e.g. inputs versus outputs). Monitoring 
systems may also yield incomprehensible data if the time frame of what is monitored is too 
limited, such as in the case of the ADP. There may be furthermore distinct effects when 
issues are to be monitored that are wicked in nature, i.e. issues which cannot be definitively 
circumscribed. The more complex and wicked an issue, the higher the chance that the 
information will be biased by the requirement of conciseness in monitoring systems. 
Unfortunately, the arena of public policy is ridden with such issues. It is also claimed that, 
in so far as monitoring systems are geared to the identification (and then resolution) of 
implementation problems, they will be of necessity troubled by the dilemma of how to most 
adequately capture problems as encountered in the field. Organisational logic puts a serious 
filter on their reporting. This is even so for construction-oriented projects. 
This concludes the main body of this study. We shall turn now to the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This study started off by asking the questions to what extent, and under what conditions, 
monitoring systems can be effective instruments for the management of development 
programmes, such as implemented in Pakistan. Previous experience indicated that the 
prevailing government development programmes are problem-ridden, not only in Pakistan but 
in South Asia as a whole. Previous experience also showed that the government monitoring 
systems for these programmes do not work well. 
After tracing the prevailing government policy paradigm in Pakistan and its meander 
through time, much attention was devoted to analysing the planning and monitoring systems 
in terms of their setting and appropriateness within the wider societal and bureaucratic 
context. The study pursued two interconnected lines of argument. The first was to relate the 
experiences with planning and public investment to this paradigm. The second was to link the 
experiences with the monitoring sub-system to this paradigm. A variety of sources and 
methods, such as literature study, study of dossiers, interviewing, quantitative analysis of 
computer databases, and participant observation, were used to expand on a number of 
perspectives and propositions. This analysis can now be condensed into 'conclusions', and 
extended into implications both for theory and for planning and monitoring practice. 
8.1 Conclusions as to the planning context in Pakistan 
1. Positivist attitudes, norms of dispassionate government organisations and bureaucrats, and 
ideals of rational comprehensive planning underlie the planning procedures in Pakistan. 
Positivism, as a world view, sees strict divisions between social facts and political values. In 
the public domain, positivism tends to separate (political) government from (technical) 
administration, and favour functional and hierarchical management patterns. As with the 
norms of neutral organisations and dispassionate bureaucrats, positivist attitudes in the 
bureaucracy in Pakistan were argued to have originated in the colonial past, and to have 
remained of importance because of the continuation of many colonial rules, procedures and 
organisational structures in post-colonial times. 
The pursuance of rational comprehensive planning (RCP) by the Government of Pakistan 
reached its peak in the 1960s but remained important until the end of the 1980s. In this study, 
it was related to the world-wide establishment of such a planning paradigm in the 1950s, 
which gave new legitimacy to the tasks of the bureaucracy after a compromised colonial past. 
In addition, it offered an excuse to some exponents of the military bureaucracy for 
undemocratic but 'technocratic' government in the higher interest of development. With RCP, 
even values are to some extent objectified, factualised: values can be scientifically ranked and 
weighed. RCP is based on a view whereby the application of technical expertise is the main 
source for public sector decision-making, and, in combination with capital investment, the 
main route to national development. The hidden dimensions of RCP reinforce hierarchical 
lines of control within the public sector. 
In the last decade particularly, there has been a general disillusionment by the public and 
its politicians with the bureaucracy and its claim on technocratic decision-making. This was 
also the decade of the re-establishment of more democratic government and greater 
interference with the administration of the development programme from the side of public 
representatives (including defeated candidates of the ruling parties). However, the planning 
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procedures established in the heyday of RCP are mostly still in use, and this study argues that 
RCP is still pursued by the bureaucracy in Pakistan. 
2. Rational comprehensive planning is a difficult proposition in the context of Pakistan and 
even more so in the present age of democratic government. 
Contrary to views still widely held within the bureaucracy of Pakistan, this study argued that 
the assumptions underlying RCP are questionable (see chapter 1). In addition, for RCP to 
have a measure of success, not only considerable knowledge of society is required and a 
highly qualified, professional bureaucracy, but also a high measure of societal consensus 
regarding ends and means, and strong enforcement systems. These conditions were not met 
in Pakistan, whereas the following factors also set limitations: 
1) Pakistan's regional, social, ethnic, and administrative diversity and discord. 
2) A number of idiosyncrasies stemming from Pakistan's particular history (young 
nationhood, relations with India) and, also due to the primordial kinship loyalties in 
the country, the lack of identification with the common good; a large influence on 
politics from the side of 'feudals' (see chapter 2 for a full account of these factors). 
3) Pakistan's ultimate ambiguity as to its publicly professed developmentalism, given the 
defacto priority given to the country's defence needs and to public sector employment 
creation as an end in itself. 
4) Low levels of literacy and education, which have had an effect on the quality of 
particularly the lower and middle segments of the bureaucracy. 
5) Dearth of financial resources and significant budgetary uncertainties which reduce the 
potential for medium and long term planning. 
6) Government organisations acting as organisms struggling for survival and expansion, 
with unclear mandates, and insufficiently checked due to presumptions of their being 
functional and dispassionate (too much criticism is deemed to undermine the rational 
planning ideology). 
7) Lack of a stable constitutional basis and legal frameworks, also due to the unresolved 
relationship between religion and state, with consequent problematic role definitions 
between legislature, judiciary, civil servants and the military. Amongst its 
consequences are also weakly developed laws and practices relating to property rights, 
contract enforcement, building controls and spatial planning. 
8) Recent interference in the administrative realm by a large body of elected 
representatives (members of the various legislative assemblies) and 'party workers'. 
Some of these factors would have been less problematic for the efficiency and effectiveness 
of th«: public sector if another type of 'planning' had been relied on, namely disjointed 
increraentalist planning. However, conditions 4 and 7 mentioned are not conducive to this 
plann ng either, whereas three other conditions extant in Pakistan also set limits: 
1) The absence of a developed civic society with articulated interests as represented by 
professionalised organisations outside the public domain, such as political parties, 
business associations, professional bodies (e.g. Law Society, Engineering Council, 
etc.), labour unions and other voluntary organisations (cf. Putnam 1992, Fox 1996). 
Pakistan's press, though sensitive to political issues, seems not investigative enough 
to sufficiently check the government and administration. Although Pakistan is diverse, 
it is not pluralistic; its public decision-making is lopsided. 
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2) Virtual absence of local government and administration at district and municipal 
levels, able to - if necessary - counteract the central government and central 
administration, and provide better public services at local levels. 
3) The persistence of the positivist, as well as strategic, view of the bureaucracy that a 
reduction of stakeholders in public administration simplifies and 'technifies' planning 
and implementation. 
A dramatic improvement in literacy levels and the creation of a more pluralist society with 
more professionalised civil associations are the most difficult changes to bring about, although 
if the government had started focusing on these many years ago, the benefits might have been 
reaped by this time1. The other conditions, viz. a better constitutional and legal framework, 
more potent local government and a different government style, are more easy, or at least 
more quickly to fulfil even at the present stage; they only require massive amounts of 
political will. 
As these conditions stand now, they have produced a combination of a centralist and 
bureaucratic public sector, with haphazard incrementalist practices dominated by a few 
stakeholders. These stakeholders legitimate the exclusion of other major interest groups from 
power on the basis of the superiority of their rational, technocratic decision-making which 
would make the involvement of these groups unnecessary. But in fact, due to disagreements 
amongst these stakeholders, and also organismic strategies within the bureaucracy, current 
decision-making is often far from either rational or democratic/responsive. It is not claimed 
here that disjointed incrementalism (and current offshoots such as the New Public 
Management) is 'the' solution to Pakistan's problems of governance, but it may offer a 
somewhat more realistic framework for decision-making than that of central planning. This 
of course demands adequate (mandatory) involvement of stakeholders so far neglected, and 
a strategy to support organisations and strengthen their professionalism. 
The current paradigm shift in Pakistan, which is marked by democracy, changing ideas on 
functions of the government, privatisation, repeal of the 8th Constitutional Amendment, and 
greater autonomy for the judiciary, may ultimately have its effect on bureaucratic practices 
as well. This might then present another route to new public management and planning styles, 
so that the current 'bad fit' is adjusted. Whether the current confusion in Pakistan as to the 
direction of government policy and organisation of the public sector will lead to real 
improvements or to chaos and a relapse into more autocratic or 'technical' government 
remains to be seen. 
3. Funding and implementing agencies have to be regarded as organisms and stakeholders 
rather than as impartial servants of government. 
This study uncovered the hidden organismic dimensions in departmental behaviour and 
concluded that strategic behaviour is particularly evident with respect to the ADP and its 
constituent development projects. The ADP is a main arena for the struggle for access to 
resources by public organisations. In an environment of extreme resource scarcity and 
budgetary uncertainties, projects are seen as necessary for survival, expansion and the 
creation of 'organisational slack'. In a disjointed decision-making process, such competition 
for resources is expected to lead to improved projects. From the side of the central agencies 
1 Instead it went the other way: it tried to first create the infrastructure and productive capacity, to focus only 
later on education, human resources, and NGOs. Business associations, as claimed by Kochanek (1983, p.310), 
were actively opposed by the Government. Compared to for instance the UK system (on which it claims to be 
based), there are as yet almost no professional organisations and institutes in the related subject fields. 
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such as P&DD, there would be a better handling of strategic behaviour employed by line 
departments. However, in AJK, as in Pakistan, decision-making is not fully disjointed, due 
to the absence of a number of organised and articulate interest groups. The result has been 
extreme accommodation of the interests of the line departments and also lobbying public 
representatives, at the expense of heavy budgetary overcommitment and no noticeable 
improvement in the quality of project proposals and projects. Five more reasons can be 
identified to account for this: 
1) The departments are treated primarily as technical organisations who know best and 
the variety of their motives for submission of project proposals is insufficiently 
questioned. 
2) Representatives of political parties in power are increasingly appropriating projects 
(and other public goods), while being acknowledged by the administration as 
legitimate stakeholders in the implementation process. 
3) The P&DD itself has mixed stakes, which are the result of its mixed functions as 
funding and monitoring agency. Hard nosed assessment of the failure of so many 
projects is not undertaken due to the P&DD's compromised role as approver of too 
many projects - often badly designed at that. P&DD sees itself as the custodian of 
public investment and wishes to enlarge this as much as possible, yet it also sees itself 
as the watchdog of the line departments. Another reason for mixed stakes is that a 
substantial portion of P&DD's officer staff is 'on deputation' from other departments; 
the positivist assumption that as civil servants they will function as effectively and 
impartially in any department is naive. 
4) The P&DD is in a continuous contest over the control of budget with the Finance 
Department. Although the development programme is to be supervised by the P&DD, 
there are ambiguities regarding the financial management role of the FD; the FD often 
tries to impose independent checks on decisions already taken by P&DD, for instance 
regarding financial releases. Other tactics that FD employs are to be tough on the 
transfer of project staff to the recurrent budget, and to keep O&M budgets of 
departments small, so that major repairs to buildings and roads have to be funded 
through projects in the ADP. The P&DD reacts by not seriously considering the 
impact of projects on the recurrent budget; there is also a tendency to commit FD's 
budget by approving projects which employ staff that later have to be paid from the 
recurrent budget. 
In recent years, a marginalisation of provincial P&DDs in their current arrangement 
vis-a-vis Finance Departments has occurred, due to the effects of the 1991 NFC 
award. This award gradually phased out the earmarked development grants and loans 
from the Federation to the Provinces. From 1997-98 onwards, there are supposed to 
be no more such grants earmarked for public investment and all such funds are to be 
generated by the Finance Departments.2 
5) The P&DD (and the Government at large) is employing the strategy of the camel's 
nose with the Federal Government. It includes extremely expensive projects in the 
ADP and hopes that their national importance will later on persuade the Federal 
2 For AJK, the NFC award has as yet not had serious repercussions (it is not a Province and its ADP continues 
to be based on a federal earmarked grant), but in a province such as that of the North West Frontier, it led to 
a sudden halving of the ADP budgets for 1996-97 and 1997-98. In practice, this meant a suspension of over 
half the ongoing projects. The NWFP P&DD had lost the batde for funds with the Finance Department as 
custodian of the recurrent budget and overall coordinator of resource generation. 
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Government to increase its development grant to AJK, or to take these projects over 
into its own budget (but continue their implementation by line agencies in AJK). (In 
the meantime, federal projects in the provinces and AJK are not sufficiently 
monitored.) Another area of dissent with the Federal Government is the additionality 
of financial aid by donor agencies. AJK claims it should complement the federal 
grant, the Federal Government (often) claims it should not (contrary to the Provinces). 
The resulting tug of war leads to confusion, overcommitment on local counterpart 
funds, and too high expectations of foreign aid. 
In short, P&DD is caught in an organisational environment dominated by relations of mixed 
resource-dependence (it is dependent on the Federal Government for resources, while line 
departments are depending on the P&DD), domain-disputes such as with the Finance 
Department, and diminishing regulation-compliance by line departments due to the 
increasingly maverick role of public representatives in the implementation process and the 
generally diminished moral authority of the P&DD in the 1990s. Only when these 
relationships are clear and stable, and when a number of other major societal interest groups 
can make their influences felt, can the advantages of disjointed incrementalism and mutual 
partisan adjustment compensate for the dysfunctionalities mentioned. 
4. The planning conducted in practice leads to malfunctions at the implementation stage and 
squanders valuable resources. 
Malfunctions are evident not only in the monitoring process (see section 8.2), but also in a 
distribution of government services and projects not corresponding to the most urgent local 
needs. Too few societal stakeholders are invited to participate in the planning process. Other 
malfunctions during the implementation of projects and programmes relate to a lack of 
financial releases when projects need these most, interference from the side of members of 
the legislature and 'party workers', and lack of coordination and cooperation between 
departments. Not all malfunctions can be explained by the attempt at rational comprehensive 
planning as such, but a number of practical difficulties are systematically underestimated at 
the planning stage because of it: a lack of knowledge, lack of technical competence in the 
field offices, opportunistic behaviour by departments, a lack of good contractors and other 
implementers, and corruption. 
The resultant waste of resources was worked out in this study particularly for the 
development programme. It is manifest in the following factors: 
1) Although the average project is scheduled to take less than three years to complete, 
the actual completion period observed is almost ten years. The over-large project 
portfolio under implementation is the most important reason for this: too many 
projects are approved and not enough funds are available to complete each project in 
accordance with its implementation schedule. Because most projects have no returns 
until they are completed, the result of the delay is a serious loss of productivity of the 
capital invested with often too low internal rates of return. 
2) Partly as a result of time overruns and unaccounted for price inflation, 44 percent of 
all projects need an official upward cost revision. Revisions add some 43 percent to 
the cost of the originally approved project portfolio. Given that most of the projects 
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undertaken are of fairly standard nature, such as the building of schools or the 
construction of roads, this is very unfortunate3. 
3) A pro forma calculation leads to the conclusion that there must be also hidden losses 
in terms of project outputs equivalent to over 50 percent of the cost of the project 
portfolio. This is due to wage and price rises in inordinately delayed projects, which 
the implementers can only compensate for by reducing the quality of output: poor 
workmanship and sub-standard materials. Lower than anticipated quality of outputs 
may also lead for certain projects to a slower than anticipated build-up to full 
production, higher than warranted operating and maintenance costs, and lower than 
anticipated benefits. Corruption, in Pakistan endemic, must add further losses in terms 
of the quality of output, but these were not quantified by this study. 
8.2 Conclusions for the role of monitoring 
The problems with monitoring systems were initially divided into four main groups by this 
study, namely political/organisational, managerial, methodological and of focus. A main 
hypothesis in this study was that political and organisational problems were more pertinent 
than the other three (leading to strategic and perspectivistic biases in information). After 
having completed the case study, it seems that such a conclusion cannot be proved in a strict 
sense due to its 'wicked' nature and the lack of comparative data. All four types of problems 
were in evidence in AJK and Pakistan. That the nature of many problems is 
political/organisational and that this is not sufficiently recognised in the structure and 
functioning of monitoring systems in Pakistan, has been amply demonstrated. The following 
conclusions can be presented. 
1. In consonance with the planning system as a whole, the organisation of monitoring systems 
for government development programmes in Pakistan is based on positivist presumptions and 
a Weberian concept of bureaucratic institutions. 
Positivist axioms hold that societal phenomena exist independent of the position of the 
observer (a 'Newtonian' universe) and conform to laws (historical, economic, sociological) 
which can be discovered through empirical observation. The objective in rational 
comprehensive planning is to reduce societal complexity to its essentials, in order to read 
from these and then predict and mould societal progress. In a similar vein, the simplification 
of reality in concise descriptive statements is the rationale for rigid reporting systems for 
public sector development (or investment) programmes. Monitoring is stressed as an 
observation technique yielding data; evaluation would provide their 'valuation'. The summary 
of project progress into a few concise statements is believed to hold specific analytical 
potential and also to lead to greater ease of decision-making. A principle of scientific 
economy, as once put by Ackoff (1967, p.B-149) and in many ways opposite to Ashby's 
Law, is held to apply to all phenomena equally: the better a phenomenon is understood, the 
less variables are required to explain it. Project progress, like any other societal phenomenon, 
is held to be describable in definitive terms. Given the availability of a counterpoint in the 
3 In the Netherlands, project cost overruns also still occur in this day and age, but usually with more innovative 
projects. Budgetary problems in the Western world are frequently severe but are due to entirely different 
reasons: the inherent difficulty with projecting the cost of mandatory welfare entitlements (also called open-
ended arrangements, such as unemployment benefits) - problems not faced by most developing countries because 
these do not grant such entitlements (cf. Wildavsky 1988). 
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project's targets, it is seen as essentially straightforward, and one 'technical' observer / 
rapporteur, as delegated by his department, is held to be sufficient for conveying the project's 
objective status. 
Counterchecking systems for the recording of this progress, although admitted as being 
necessary given unfortunate biases of rapporteurs, challenge this belief in simple truths, as 
well as the norm of a monolithic and instrumental bureaucracy. They therefore lead a 
precarious (token) existence and are not seriously invoked. P&DD's function in AJK in this 
respect was restricted to one or two unsystematically conducted field tours per year, the 
findings of which were not used. Because the influence of other stakeholders in monitoring 
systems was regarded to be similarly distracting and subject-complicating, these were neither 
seriously involved. Such parties were not invited, nor expected, to independently report to 
Review Meetings. The prevailing monitoring systems in Pakistan therefore operate mainly 
through the self-reporting by departments of progress with their own projects to central 
review bodies, organised by planning agencies which control the funding of these projects. 
2. Central Review meetings as headed by the PM or CM are the focus of the monitoring 
process in AJK and Pakistan, but do not fulfil all coordinating, checking, and corrective 
functions assigned to them. 
Central political control of implementation, correcting the straying line departments, does not 
materialise in practice. The central Review Meetings are supposed to be held quarterly. 
However, half of all planned meetings were not held, whilst there was insufficient time to 
address issues directly concerned with the implementation of particular projects. Snap 
decisions occurred frequently, which were later not implemented. The general follow-up was 
very weak. The nature of the meetings was such that the briefing of the Prime Minister took 
precedence and all attention was focused on him. A serious involvement of important 
stakeholders such as the Auditor General was not possible; other stakeholders such as District 
Council Chairmen and Deputy Commissioners, were often not invited and therefore lacked 
experience with the Reviews. District-based Review Meetings, which would by their nature 
focus more on district-based participants in the development process, were not held either, 
with a few exceptions which were argued to be held for reasons of political advocacy. 
Meanwhile, the central Review Meetings that were held, carried such ominous weight that 
potentially controversial information was often not reported to them by the line departments. 
Project Management Units or Steering Committees with wide representation including 
beneficiary groups and/or local government representatives, to manage and review projects, 
were in evidence only for the large foreign aided projects. The large government funded 
projects often did not have a similar management and review mechanism ; in the few cases 
that they did, they did not seriously include the aforementioned representatives. 
3. The reporting system for ADP Review Meetings in AJK as functioning upto the year 1990-
91 contained very little information, was very one-sided, and was not indicative of the 
problems with the implementation of projects. It was hardly used in Review Meetings. As 
such, there was much waste of effort as well as misinformation within this system. 
An analysis of the internally evolved progress reporting system in AJK showed serious 
deficiencies in the quality of financial reporting, reporting of physical progress, and of 
problems. Financial information was by no means as hard as often assumed, whereas, 
contrary to common beliefs, it could neither be held to be a good indicator of physical 
progress. It was even doubted whether it could serve as a basis for financial reappropriations 
amongst departments. Physical progress reporting was completely unsystematic and often 
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incomprehensible or meaningless. Problem reporting was almost absent in spite of the major 
problems, both systemic and contingent, that most projects were experiencing. 
This study advanced both technical and strategic reasons for these deficiencies, technical 
because of lack of capacity of the recording systems and personnel, and strategic because 
most department do not wish to use the progress report instrument to reveal or fight out their 
problems. Rather, they use the reports to convey the impression that they (1) continue to be 
dispassionate servants of governments and (2) have certain legitimate problems or demands. 
The technical and strategic reasons are to a large extent interrelated. It was argued that the 
P&DD has yielded to this use of the reporting system as a ritual, because of the mixed stakes 
already mentioned. For instance, there is a concentration on an exceedingly small time slice 
in the reporting process, to avoid being confronted with the huge time and cost overruns 
which are the result of the approval of too many projects. As mentioned, the use of project 
reports as a basis for Review meetings is rejected by politicians such as the Prime Minister, 
probably instinctively. 
4. Monitoring systems exclusively based on self-reporting of only one of the major 
stakeholders present biased information which, in the absence of parallel and counter-
checking systems, are not an effective tool for planning. The biases relate, amongst other 
things, to the position of the rapporteur within the political context of monitoring, and to his 
interpretation of the use to be made of the information submitted. 
A distinction was made between strategic and perspectivistic biases. The former relate to 
more or less deliberate, opportunistic misrepresentations of reality by organisations and their 
rapporteurs; the latter to inevitably partial representations of reality due to the positions and 
predilections of the rapporteurs, and the purposes of the reports. 
Observations made in a project progress report are determined by at least thirteen different 
factors: 
1) the nature of what is observed (hard or soft fact, complex or simple, 'wicked' or 
'benign') 
2) the state of what is observed (whether the observed phenomenon is in a changeable 
state so that the moment of the observation also counts)4 
3) the context of what is observed (whether the project is a part in a larger programme 
or whether it is more self-contained) 
4) the duration of the time slice observed (annual targets or overall project targets; 
quarterly or overall progress, etc.) 
5) the specificity of the point of reference for the progress report (the extent to which 
the targets have been laid down) 
6) the purpose of the report (e.g. for a Quarterly Review Meeting or for a project 
revision approval meeting) 
7) the audience for which the observation is intended (funding or implementing agency; 
federal or state government) 
8) the stakeholder position of the person performing the observation (project director or 
planning officer or outsider) 
9) the perspective (position) from which the observation is made and the method and the 
duration of the observation (based on hearsay or site visit, etc.) 
4 For instance, many DEOs did not want to report on buildings under construction by the PWD because they 
could not visit all these buildings on the last day of the reporting period. 
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10) the method of reporting of the observation (the report format; open or closed 
questions; number of details asked) 
11) the idiosyncrasies of the person reporting his/her observation (expertise, experience, 
grade, intelligence, pet subjects, etc.) 
12) the strength of the organisational esprit de corps and the particular need of the 
organisation to present a certain image to the outside world 
13) the culture of the rapporteur and his society (power-distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism, masculinity, etc. Particularly important in cases of reporting between 
donors and counterparts). 
Other factors adding dimensions to the reporting process, such as the social desirability 
(optimism) effect, or a habituation effect, have also been pointed out by the study. 
Monitoring takes place in a curved and multidimensional universe ruled by relativity and 
quantum mechanics. The actual objects 'out there' themselves provide just a few of their sides 
to the picture observed and conveyed (factors 1 to 3), and the importance of the other factors 
may vary. When the format of a report changes, or its purpose, or when the audience for a 
report changes, the observations also change. It was shown in chapter 2 that Pakistan's 
bureaucratic universe is as unlikely to be devoid of strategic motivations and perspectivistic 
biases as any other; some writers were referred to who argued that they are even more in 
evidence than in the Western world. The author of this study would agree to such an opinion, 
but would emphasise that budgetary and political uncertainties as much as cultural factors per 
se, may lead to the predominance of protective and evasive behaviour. This would then lead 
to more strategic biases in reporting than prevalent in the 'West'. However, such a hypothesis 
could not be tested. What is sure is that perspectivistic and strategic biases also affect Western 
monitoring systems in the social domain (Kelly 1987; Waller et at. 1976). 
5. Technical improvements such as in terms of format of report forms, definition of indicators 
and data processing will have only limited effect on the quality or usefulness of information, 
if the politics of monitoring is not addressed. 
Technical improvements, forcing the rapporteurs to present a fuller picture of the progress 
by asking more (specific) questions, were found to generally change the strategic and 
perspectivistic biases in reports but not eliminate them. The 'closing' of the format (through 
multiple choice questions) such as achieved in the new reporting system introduced in the 
P&DD of AJK, led to more frequent reporting of (systemic) problems than in the open 
system used before. The fear for repercussions on not marking listed problems that were 
clearly besetting projects, was considered to be the main reason for this. 
If the purpose of the progress reporting system was to enable a comparison of typical 
problems in departments, types of projects and districts, a clever design of the reporting 
system was found to lessen strategic biases and improve the reports' information content for 
purposes of aggregated analysis. However, organisational esprit de corps (or censorship), as 
well as in some cases idiosyncrasies of some rapporteurs were still found to put distinct 
colours on the information, which then needed to be somehow 'discounted'. Due to the fact 
that the new monitoring system did not integrate information flows from more sources, this 
was difficult to achieve. It was evident from a study of the enforcement and use made of the 
new reporting system, that the mixed stakes of the principal senders and receivers prevented 
the realisation of its full potential. Analysis of the information and follow-up by P&DD was 
weak and the system as a whole was allowed to slip. 
It can be surmised that P&DD's decreasing role and prestige in the 1990s have contributed 
to the diminished domain-consensus with line departments and smaller regulation-compliance 
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that were already referred to. The existing reporting system was affected by these 
developments. What happened to projects was perceived by line departments as less and less 
the business of the P&DD, and regulation by it less and less solicited and complied with. 
Other types of 'regulation', for instance through political representatives and involvement of 
the PM, were more relied on. That the establishment of a new reporting system for Reviews 
could not reverse this trend, is not surprising in this context. 
6. Problems of focus of the monitoring system are difficult to avoid as long as the bifurcation 
between development and recurrent budgets persists - one monitoring system focusing on 
'development' will not work if the budgets are controlled by different departments. 
The focus of the ADP monitoring system was identified as the implementation process rather 
than its supposed product: development. This was regarded as to a large extent due to the 
separation of the government budget into two accounts managed by two different 
departments. This led the P&DD to concentrate on the implementation of investment projects 
and the Finance Department to focus on recurrent budgets. 
A monitoring and review system for issues of service delivery parallel to that for the 
annual development programme was not found to exist. It was also observed that what is 
presented as the development programme is, in fact, focusing on capital investment. 
However, it was observed that not all capital investment is in the development programme, 
and that not all investment made in this programme has a clear association with 
'development'. Important effects on development can also be expected from expenditure made 
through the recurrent budget (for instance in education where teaching staff is financed 
through this budget). Therefore, monitoring of the ADP offers a very hazy window on the 
issues connected with capital investment as well as 'development' in a wider sense. Currently, 
monitoring for the Review Meetings does not include such crucial issues as whether new 
schools built under projects are quickly utilised by the Education Department. 
The separation of the budgets and their ownership by two different funding departments 
adds organismic constraints to the integrated assessment of development issues. Amongst the 
examples of missed chances are for instance the lack of utilisation of the project completion 
report and post-completion report; these planning forms were suspected to be of little real 
interest to the P&DD because they relate largely to recurrent budget issues which are viewed 
as not the P&DD's responsibility. They are, however, neither of much interest to the Finance 
departments, because they speak of the project targets and results, which were not their 
responsibility. They were only of importance for those projects which needed staffing 
arrangements to be made, financed through the recurrent budget. 
7. There is an inherent problem with all project monitoring systems, in that it is hard to 
summarise progress and problems with projects, even if strict guidelines are given. 
Projects in the ADP were found to be very disparate entities; they may constitute the 
electrification of AJK to the construction of a bridge, upto the raising of awareness regarding 
birth control. They may refer to indisputably straightforward objects, up to undeniably elusive 
phenomena. Their observation may be heavily disputed or hardly disputable. On the other 
side of the epistemological divide, narrative description brings it own limitations: there are 
vague and clear concepts. Yet the very fact of the juxtaposition of all these concepts in multi-
sectoral reporting systems, gives the impression that all projects can be captured in narrative 
description equally. This levelling process, in turn, produces the illusion that all projects are 
of similar nature and pose the same demands in terms of their management. However, it was 
argued that projects may need varying detail for their satisfactory description even from the 
273 
perspective of a single observer / rapporteur and holding constant the determinants given 
under point 3 above. 
In addition, any problem reported will have entailed a subjective or organisational decision 
to go public, rendering it more difficult to compare problems of different projects in different 
departments. Problems are also usually part of a tree-like hierarchy of problems which may 
lead to arbitrary decisions as to which problem is to be highlighted. Systemic problems may 
be underreported in reporting systems, while contingent problems may be overreported. The 
reverse may be true with a different format. Even the simplest projects on paper turned out 
to be complex problem-ridden universes, where 'thick description' (Lincoln & Guba 1985) 
would lead to higher chances of fair representation than a few statements of high abstraction. 
But this would defeat the management function of monitoring. 
In conclusion, the standardisation and concision process necessary for project monitoring 
systems is problematic, in the sense that it is difficult to achieve correspondence with reality. 
This is notwithstanding the availability of project targets as points of reference. These are the 
fundamental limitations to the monitoring process. 
8.3 Other perspectives on the role of progress information in bureaucracies 
The question needs to be addressed why project reporting for central review meetings 
continues to be the focus of monitoring systems when even after computerisation and 
technical improvements it remains so clearly inefficient and all parties continue to show such 
evasive behaviour. Shorter but yet more analytical reports, summarising departmental 
progress and not based on project listings, could have served the purpose of supplying the 
Review Meetings with the information that is required at that level. It must be assumed that 
there are some specific reasons to continue with bulky project progress reports for review 
meetings. First, the encyclopedia function of such reports can be deemed to be important; a 
few figures and facts will always be utilised out of the great mass of project data. The 
preventive force of accountability may be a second reason: without any progress reporting 
requirement, there is no formal mechanism to fix responsibilities for non-reporting by projects 
if something has gone wrong (although this author has never seen such a check being 
applied). A third reason may be the continued hope and formal expectation that the 
bureaucracy will one day start to function like it should: with impartial and open 
communication through the appropriate channels, copious consumption of information, and 
harmonious coordination. These may be sufficient reasons for the whole system getting the 
benefit of the doubt and motioning on. 
In organisation and evaluation theories, a few explanations of a different nature have been 
advanced to account for the excessive generation of information by organisations, which, it 
is argued here, may have led in monitoring practices to the reliance on progress reports rather 
than other forms of monitoring. These will be summarised below. 
Wrong assumptions 
The systems theorist and planner Ackoff (1967, p. B147-152) has drawn attention to the 
importance of plain misconceptions regarding supposedly rational behaviour. He elaborated 
on five in his view erroneous assumptions underlying many management (misinformation 
systems: 
1) It is assumed that managers operate under a lack of relevant information, whereas in 
actual fact, managers suffer more from an over abundance of it. 
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2) It is assumed that managers need the information that they want. This is wrong: 
managers who do not understand the phenomena that they are supposed to control, play it 
'safe' and, with respect to information, want 'everything'. 
3) It is assumed that if a manager is given the information that he needs, that then his 
decision-making will improve. This is too simple a view. 
4) It is assumed that more information means better performance. Ackoff gives an example 
where the opposite is the case and a too free flow of information between parts of an 
organisations, or between organisations, has counterproductive effects. 
5) It is also assumed that a manager does not have to understand how an information 
system works, only how to use it. Ackoff shows that lack of understanding usually leads to 
lack of use. One is reminded here also of the situation in AJK, where lack of involvement 
by Section Chiefs kept the quality of information submitted below standards. 
On closer examination, the assumptions relate to management information systems which 
have been assigned too many functions. In other words, the purpose of the management 
information system (read: the department) is not understood; the department is thought to 
have too many functions, too vague goals. 
The organisation theorist Mintzberg (1973) similarly questioned the assumption that 
information on paper or in computers is the most important basis for decision-making by 
managers. Mintzberg investigated the use of information by managers in (Western) 
organisations and concluded that managers do not rely on formal management information 
systems to the extent that they professed: they rather rely on personal observations and 
experiences, meetings and telephone conversations. Management is perhaps even less rational 
than the information systems surrounding it but it could also be surmised that personal 
observations and contacts make sense. 
The symbol function of information in organisations 
Organisation theorists Feldman & March (1981) see the production and consumption of large 
quantities of information in organisations mainly as a symbol for good management. They 
note that organisations systematically gather more information than they actually use, yet 
continue to ask for more5. They first draw attention to three conspicuous features affecting 
the instrumental use of information in organisations. First, ordinary organisational procedures 
provide positive incentives for underestimating the costs of information relative to its benefits: 
"it is better from the decision-maker's point of view to have information that is not needed 
than not to have information that might be needed" (ibid., p.415-6). Second, much of the 
information is gathered in a surveillance mode rather than in a decision mode: "we can see 
an organization as monitoring its environment for surprises (or for reassurances that there are 
none " (ibid., p. 416). Third, most of the information used in organisational life is subject 
to strategic misrepresentation: "Information is gathered and communicated in a context of 
conflict of interest and with consciousness of potential decision consequences." They argue 
5 Six observations are made about the gathering and use of information in organisations (Feldman and March 
1981, p.414): (1) Much of the information that is gathered and communicated by individuals and organisations 
has little decision relevance. (2) Much of the information that is used to justify a decision is collected and 
interpreted after the decision has been made, or substantially made. (3) Much of the information gathered in 
response to requests for information is not considered in the making of decisions for which it was requested. 
(4) Regardless of the information available at the time a decision is first considered, more information is 
requested. (5) Complaints that an organization does not have enough information to make a decision occur while 
available information is ignored. (6) The relevance of the information provided to the decision being made is 
less conspicuous than is die insistence on information. 
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that strategic misrepresentation stimulates the oversupply of information. "Competition among 
contending liars turns persuasion into a contest in (mostly unreliable) information. " On the 
other hand: "decision makers discount much of the information that is generated. Not all 
information is ignored, however, and inferences are made" (ibid., pp.416-7). 
But Feldman & March conclude that these explanations are less important than a more 
profound linkage between decision behaviour and the normative context within which it 
occurs: information is a symbol and a signal. Information is seen as the symbol of 
competence. 
"Because the acts of seeking and using information in decisions have important symbolic value to the 
actors and to the society, individuals will consistendy gather more information than can be justified 
in conventional decision making theory terms. Decisions are orchestrated so as to ensure that decision-
makers and observers come to believe that the decisions are reasonable - or even intelligent. Using 
information, asking for information and justifying decisions in terms of information have all come to 
be significant ways in which we symbolize that the process is legitimate, that we are good decision-
makers, and that our organisations are well managed" (op.cit., p.419) (see also Floden & Weiner 
1978). 
In the same way, progress reporting (rather than for instance counterchecking site visiting) 
can be seen as the symbol of the rational planning process as supervised by the proper 
technical organisation: the P&DD. This study argues that this symbol function should be 
counteracted through the conscious promotion of rivalling monitoring systems attacking the 
principle of universal rationality in the case of projects, to replace it with perspective based 
rationalities. 
8.4 Implications for monitoring and evaluation theory 
Implications for the paradigm dialogue 
This study has taken the stance that positivist attitudes to planning, monitoring and evaluation 
contribute to malfunctions and waste; a post-positivist attitude would guarantee better 
protection against these. Post-modernist attitudes to monitoring and evaluation were 
meanwhile rejected, as was argued in chapter 1. The results of the study give further 
arguments for this rejection. They indicate that there is a continuum between contested and 
relatively uncontested knowledge / observations. If the more and less contested indicators are 
separated first, a general monitoring system could be agreed upon which would focus on the 
more consensual objects and observations. It has to be granted, however, that there are few 
indicators on which all stakeholders may agree in the arena of projects and programmes. This 
study has demonstrated that even financial indicators are riddled with problems. The 
operationalisation of the more 'wicked' indicators should be dealt with by monitoring systems 
of specific stakeholder groups. The safest option remains to go for more monitoring systems, 
rather than one unifying. 
A second point to be made is that the adoption of the stance in this study does not imply 
the shedding of the ideal of rationality. Rationality continues to be norm, albeit on the 
premise that there are many rationalities possible; stakeholder-based rationalities. Rationality 
can only be applied from inevitably partial perspectives. A search for agreement on targets, 
indicators and their operationalisation is basic to the approach propagated for the monitoring 
process. Competition for the adoption of viewpoints will take place, and usually, 
compromises will have to be made. It has to be accepted that stakeholders may agree to have 
to some extent different objectives in projects and programmes. With Lindblom, this study 
276 
argues that, as long as a wide range of stakeholders are represented, explicitly partisan 
analysis (and monitoring) from the side of articulate and professionalised stakeholders may 
give the best guarantee for adequate decision-making. 
Implications for the debate on the distinctions between monitoring and evaluation 
This study has argued that the objectivity ideal with which project monitoring is associated 
is as far away as in its twin technique of project evaluation. All the problems associated with 
project evaluation can also be connected with project monitoring. Project monitoring, 
although ostensibly concerned with facts, is as much concerned with values and perspectives. 
Project monitoring may be even more strategically distorted than evaluations, due to the 
nature of the information solicited, which is usually at a level which allows a direct 
relationship to be established with the functioning of personnel or organisations. Concerned 
with the preservation of their jobs, promotions or reputation, staff will often hide or bias 
information. The same may be true for organisations as a whole, when inter-organisational 
reporting is concerned. Heavy organisational fdters may be invoked. Although some forms 
of monitoring may be confined to relatively uncontested subjects and perspectives, and would 
therefore appear to be less problematic than evaluations, this advantage is often offset by the 
requirement of conciseness in reporting, which in the social realm frequently implies more 
incomplete, fragmentary observations. 
Monitoring meanwhile continues to carry the aura of objectivity. This has the same 
disadvantages that some main associated techniques also run, such as Logical Framework 
Analysis and Objective Oriented Project Planning workshops: technification of often political 
views and choices. LFA and OOPP, often employed by donor organisations to reach 
consensus, may divert attention away from the essentially contested nature of planning and 
monitoring. That each stakeholder in a certain project may have a different logical framework 
and different objectives, and therefore different conceptions of the progress made, is not 
integrated in the models. If anything is mentioned about it at all, then a consensus between 
the major stakeholders, such as donors and government counterparts is seen as possible 
because of the supposed universality of reason. Logical Frameworks are particularly rigid 
monitoring instruments in case of programmatic projects with less fixed outputs and effects6. 
8.S Preconditions for a new planning approach for Pakistan 
In section 8.1 under point 2, the main societal conditions currently holding back effective 
planning and implementation in Pakistan have been highlighted, and some suggestions 
regarding their conversion have been sketched, including the establishment of an alternative 
planning paradigm. Obviously, many such conditions are hard to change overnight, even 
though the government seems to be favourable to many aspects of the New Public 
Management, such as privatisation and deregulation. In addition to what has already been 
said, some further issues are raised which are considered by the author to provide clues to 
the way forward. 
6 In fact, this is the reason why an organisation such as the ODA (now DFID) "has never adopted LFA in its 
full rigour" (ODA 1984, p.25), whereas evaluations of other donors such as CIDA have recorded that 
mandatory Logical Framework techniques often proved unimportant to the setup of organisations (IOV 1993, 
p.80). Rebien (1996, p.51) sees a trend away from logical framework approaches because of the trend away 
from project based assistance. For recent critiques on OOPP see Caspar (1997) and Chambers (1997, p.42 ff). 
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First of all, there is reason to believe that an amalgamation of development and recurrent 
budgets would be beneficial, and under the administrative control of the Finance Department. 
Functions should then be delineated fresh for a new type of Planning Department. 
The assignment of funding responsibilities to the Finance Department exclusively, would 
allow a more integrated analysis and monitoring of development related expenditure, and 
reduce organismic biases. Investment choices can be assumed to be more seriously considered 
in the light of O&M requirements and other possible policy instruments than capital 
investment. 
Divested of the 'executive' power to approve, fund, and micro-manage projects, the old 
P&DD could convert itself into a more independent advisor to the Government regarding 
budgetary (project) proposals stemming from the line departments. Continuing to be 
represented in the project/budget approval fora but without executive prerogative, such a new 
planning department would be impeded much less by mixed stakes. A monitoring function 
for the department based on site visits would then have to be mandated in more detail, and 
could be carried out with less inhibitions. Other functions that P&DD could usefully 
concentrate on are liaison with foreign aid donors and assistance to line departments in terms 
of expertise on foreign exchange and customs procedures. 
If such changes would be effected, the P&DD could gradually develop into a regional 
planning office, focusing on land use planning and structure planning. If also the local 
government and administration tier would be strengthened, the new planning department 
could start focusing on the setting, enforcement, and monitoring of planning standards, rules 
and regulations, such as is the case with provincial planning departments in most Western 
countries.7 
The risk of marginalisation of the new planning department as a result of organismic 
behaviour by other departments (such as for instance happened in the past with the Sind 
Regional Plan Organisation, which did not directly control funds), should be countered 
through the enactment of strong legislative mandates. 
Secondly, the creation of a serious tier of local government would benefit planning, as well 
as an administration responsible to it. 
The reinforcement would have to consist of (a) regular elections for local government, (b) 
no political dissolutions during their tenures, (c) the refrainment from the increasing 
appointment of local councillors by central government, (d) a better local government act with 
revised functional mandates and responsibilities not overruled by other agencies with rival 
mandates, (e) much larger budgets to be spent at the local governments' discretion, and (f) 
the appointment of more, higher qualified, and higher ranked administrative staff. Municipal 
management and service delivery should be the focus, as well as the monitoring of central 
7 It merits noting that in most Western countries, the distinction into public investment budgets and recurrent 
budgets is not as dominant and has not led to the management of these budgets by two different departments. 
The Finance Ministries in these countries, as was for instance noted by Premchand (1990) and UNDTCD (1991) 
do not conduct central, PM-chaired reviews of public investment (or recurrent expenditure), such as in Pakistan. 
There is less pretence of central control; ministries and line departments are granted more independence and 
discretion. At the same time, cross-checking mechanisms are pervasive: ministries are monitored closely through 
comprehensive and automated financial systems and performance measurement. Central government decision-
making is furthermore checked through the pervasive influence of (1) local and provincial governments and (2) 
the working of a civic society. 
8 See also Cheema & Rondinelli (1983, pp. 101-104) for recommendations on decentralisation. Rondinelli et al. 
(1984) have stressed that experiences with decentralisation have not often been very positive but that attempts 
should not be abandoned, and should be combined with other measures. 
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government policies and activities of importance to the municipality. Municipal land use plans 
should be legally mandated. The initial emphasis should be on local / municipal councils 
rather than district councils. 
In this context it merits some consideration what to do with the over-representation of 
government staff at middle and lower ranks of the administration. Structural adjustment 
policy requires many such staff to be laid off, but this may not be politically feasible. The 
question can be asked: can some of these staff, currently improductive and unattended to in 
the colossal bureaucracies at provincial and federal level, be reassigned to local governments 
and to more communal/productive duties? 
Thirdly, mechanisms should be found to increase the political control and supervision of 
government departments and to decrease political interference in areas where the 
administration is legally in charge. 
Cabinet Ministers should become more involved in the daily management of their 
departments. This would improve the political responsibility for administrative action. Certain 
decision-making committees such as the Departmental Working Party in the P&DD which 
approves the projects, should be headed by a Minister rather than a Secretary. In the absence 
of the PM, other ministers should head the Review Meetings. 
Meanwhile, the practice of appropriation of public goods through projects (and selection 
of new government staff) by scheming members of the legislature as well as defeated 
candidates of ruling parties who have to be rewarded, is detrimental and should be stopped. 
The creation of project management committee structures with broad representation may be 
one way to avoid the underhand deals now so frequently seen between politicians and 
members of the bureaucracy, or between politicians and companies or contractors. 
Fourthly, a different organisation of projects might improve their implementation in the 
context of resource scarcity and budgetary uncertainty. 
The current strategic management by many line departments, shifting funds round from 
project to project across the year, makes project management and monitoring an exercise in 
futility in many cases. Although this was not specifically investigated in the study, there are 
indications that larger, programme-like projects, covering an area the size of a district, and 
of subsectoral nature (rather than sectoral or multisectoral nature, as SAP demonstrated), 
would straddle investment, operation, and maintenance issues. They would also allow project 
directors of higher grade to be appointed, and generally enable greater flexibility in 
management. This would have to be accompanied by (1) more budgetary discretion, and (2) 
more diverse monitoring systems all addressed to programme management committees 
representing the major stakeholders including programme beneficiaries. The development and 
application of key performance measurement indicators on which there is some agreement 
within these committees (in addition to implementation progress indicators), would also be 
an important requirement. Constructive involvement of beneficiaries and political 
representatives in these committees might lead to greater responsiveness to local needs, and 
improve political responsibility for administrative action. Due to the (injvisibility of 
programme effects within electoral constituencies (and the controls usually operating within 
committee structures), rent seeking behaviour would hopefully be reduced. 
Fifthly, better and more transparent financial management systems are needed. 
This is perhaps a cliche and has been heavily promoted by World Bank and also IMF in the 
context of structural adjustment conditionalities, which may make the recommendation here 
slightiy suspect. But this study has corroborated once more how important good financial 
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Systems are to monitoring and management. These include accounting systems based on 
greater speed in consolidation and reporting, double entry, greater rigour in classification, 
accommodation (next to cash basis) of commitments and the accruals in some areas, as well 
as performance budgeting in a few selected areas where this is possible. The expansion of the 
Auditor General Offices with performance auditing functions and field offices would be 
required (beyond the current 'token' positions), next to the expansion of functions in this 
sense of a (new) planning department. Better budgeting systems are also required. This means 
a greater reliance on rolling expenditure planning (three years), debt profile calculations, 
prioritisation of projects, and greater attention for recurrent cost implications of public 
investment. The problems in terms of government financial management are not unique to 
Pakistan; for further suggestions as to solutions see e.g. Premchand (1990) and UNDTCD 
(1991). 
8.6 Implications of this study for monitoring practice in Pakistan 
The main implication will by now be evident to the reader: there is a need for the 
employment of multiple monitoring systems all geared to specific components and 
stakeholders, and which may be partially competing and complementary. The principal 
reasons are the multidimensionality and varying 'hardness' of reality which is unlikely to be 
captured by single systems and their rapporteurs, and the strategic and perspectivistic biases 
acting on observations. It is the job of the decision-making fora to bring together and 
'triangulate' the results of all these information sources and take the best decisions. The 
inevitable loss of simplicity and increasing appearance of disorder is to be compensated for 
by increased participation by stakeholders in decision-making and by improved quality of 
information all round. 
Complementary and competing systems run by different actors can also be justified with 
reference to the inherent conflict between the standardisation of observation typical of 
monitoring systems and the need for a wide scan of (unexpected, unforeseen) social 
developments which are so important to the success of projects and programmes. Such a 
conflict would also call for the reliance on different ways of information collection and 
valuation, such as is possible through rapid/participatory appraisals, surveys, scanning, formal 
evaluations, meetings etc. 
This study has stressed the limitations of systems relying on self-reporting by departments: 
no one likes to report on his own failure. However, to abolish self-reporting would be to 
throw away the baby with the bath water. Self-reporting by line departments on their own 
functioning must always remain an important component in the overall monitoring process. 
To be sure, in spite of strategic motivations which may distort information, the technical 
departments also have unique access to experiences and information, from which a wide range 
of other interest groups can benefit. These departments may have important perspectives to 
bear on the decision-making process. But these perspectives may be best articulated when 
other departments, such as the planning department and some other organisations would 
complement them by developing and implementing their own 'systems' or monitoring 
practices. In this way, there are chances that the quality of self-reporting improves in the 
longer run. 
A number of technical recommendations in terms of formats for self-reporting by line 
departments have been made at the end of chapter 5. They relate first of all to the need for 
improvements in target formulations reflected in project documents. Secondly they relate to 
the choice of reporting format, whether 'open' or 'closed'. Open formats lead to line 
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departments having the upper hand in reporting and broaching or concealing issues. Closed 
formats give more supervisory powers to the P&DD. As was found by this study, closed 
report formats can improve the analytical potential of information, and can, if not reduce, at 
least clarify and systematise strategic and perspectivistic biases. Such biases can then be 
'discounted' better. Enforcement on the one hand, and counterchecking systems on the other, 
remain the keys, however. 
'Managerial' recommendations include attention for institutional arrangements for 
processing of information within both line departments and P&DD, the institutionalisation of 
diagnostic studies (cf. Casley and Lury) to resolve contingent problems, and the need for 
more regular and better conducted review meetings. Of particular relevance is Peck & 
Rubin's (1983) advice: monitoring and evaluation offices should have independence from 
programme offices. If such offices do not have a clear legislative mandate within an 
organisation, nor a clear external reference group (such as recognised evaluation society), the 
interests of the organisation will always prevail. Appearance rather than content will be 
stressed, and professional standards will be sacrificed. 
The need for shifting of focus in existing monitoring systems 
The current emphasis on implementation monitoring was judged, however, too exclusive by 
this study. When conducted in isolation from other types of monitoring, the result is a 
diversion from many important issues in development, such as service delivery, human 
resources development, and the operation and maintenance of infrastructure and productive 
capacity. In conjunction with the new responsibilities of Planning and Finance departments, 
a new system of Reviews should be started. As mentioned above, project-by-project 
monitoring by supervising departments in the context of wide-ranging investment programmes 
may be too fragmented. From current departmental behaviour and problems with their 
management, there is reason to surmise that this approach should give way to programme 
monitoring. Most of the problems in projects are systemic anyway and nothing much is 
gained from studying these in the context of single projects. 
The integration of budgets and the conversion to more regularised programme management 
would imply a greater role for information gained through monitoring and scanning devices 
as a source for day-to-day management. Such information would have to include service 
delivery by the public and private sector as a major new focus. If other stakeholders in the 
current configuration in Pakistan are insufficiently organised or articulate and cannot be 
effectively involved in programme management in the short run, surveys or evaluations would 
have to make special efforts to include them. It is thought here of local councils, labour 
unions, employers unions, professional organisations (e.g. the Council of Engineers), and 
grassroots based organisations. The new Planning Department, divested of its funding powers, 
might consider including an evaluation wing to conduct programme evaluations of a much 
wider scope than currentiy is the case9. The evaluations should be addressed directly to the 
9 The Inspection Development Cooperation of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs could be an example 
in this respect. Having started in the 1970s as a unit with a large measure of independence, it initially 
concentrated on project evaluations. Dissatisfied with the lack of follow-up to these evaluations, it gradually 
turned to conducting programme evaluations. For each such evaluation, at least a year is taken, and apart from 
the unit's own 'inspectors', relevant professional organisations such as universities, research institutes and 
specialised consultancy agencies are involved. The programme evaluations are directly offered to the Permanent 
Committee on Development Cooperation in the Parliament. They are also published in book form as a matter 
of policy, and disseminated to a wide audience. 
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legislature. Perhaps the Public Accounts Committee could add this function to its current 
mandate. 
It has to be kept in mind that there are always limitations to project progress reporting: 
longer reports will do more justice to reality and the constructed realities of stakeholders. But 
they will require more time for their consumption by decision-makers. General solutions 
cannot be given for this dilemma. 
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ANNEXURES 
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ANNEX 1. SOURCES OF INFORMATION USED 
This study relies on a variety of information sources. Next to published literature on Pakistan 
and the social sciences, the following sources were relied upon: 
Unpublished reports but available in some libraries, such as the UNDP, World Bank, 
and Federal Planning Commission libraries in Islamabad, the Public Library 
Muzaffarabad, and the AJK Government Secretariat library in Muzaffarabad. In as far 
as these have been quoted they are included in the literature list on Pakistan/South 
Asia. 
AJK and Pakistan Government publications with limited distribution, such as Five 
Year Plans, ADPs, Annual Plans, Statistical Yearbooks, budget books, white papers 
and some brochures and leaflets. These are available with P&DD and the Government 
Printing Press. 
Mimeographed report outputs of the UNDP/DTCD project 'Development Planning 
in AJK' in which the author participated. A list of these is included in Table A1.2; 
most are available with the P&DD in AJK and with the UNDP library in Islamabad. 
As per UNDTCD's Manual for Chief Technical Advisers (1983, p. 173), technical 
reports become de-restricted after six months. 
A few mimeographed reports published in the context of the Social Action 
Programme, Pakistan. Their references are included in the literature list; they are 
available with the World Bank library in Islamabad and with the MSU. 
Files and dossiers kept by the AJK Planning and Development Department, regarding 
(principally) projects, approval meetings, review meetings, revisions, and budgets. 
These are not public but findings were generally earlier presented in technical reports 
of the UNDP/DTCD's projects, which have become derestricted. 
Computer databases built up in the course of the implementation of the UNDP/DTCD 
project mentioned above. These databases concern all ADP projects, and include 
information regarding approvals, annual plans of operations, and project progress. 
Interviews with government staff, politicians, contractors, district chairmen, NGO 
staff, and others of interest to the subject of the study. 
Participant observation, through the author's involvement as M&E Advisor in the 
implementation of the project mentioned above, over the period June 1990 through 
August 1994, and from the more distant perspective of Peshawar from October 1994 
through May 1997. Participant observation in AJK concerned the development and 
implementation of a management information system, development of databases in 
preparation of the AJK Statistical Yearbooks, regional plan preparation, (re-) 
organisation of the department, site visiting, collaboration with line departments, and 
the like. In Peshawar, the focus of observation was the Social Action Programme in 
that Province. The perspective was the SAP Cell in the NWFP Planning, Environment 
and Development Department. The author was also in position to closely follow the 
monitoring process as conducted by the P&DD through his affiliation with a 
Netherlands funded project, which had as one major purpose to improve the 
monitoring system. 
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Computer databases and files 
Regarding the use of computer databases and fdes and dossiers, the following remarks can 
be added. Computer databases created in the course of the UNDP/DTCD project were utilised 
for the financial years 1992-93 and 1993-94; much of this data had been analysed earlier in 
UNDTCD technical reports or was reflected in published ADPs and Annual Plans. Project-
related quantitative information pertaining to the period after 1993-94 was utilised by the 
author while drawing on Government publications such as the ADPs and Annual Plans. 
Approval for the use of such data and project report outputs for the present study was 
obtained in writing from the AJK P&D Department, dd 21-12-1997, ref. 
P&DD/ADMIN/4930/97. 
Project file study 
The file study referred to in this study (chapters 3 and 4) was published as a project report 
output earlier (Henderson & Kolkma 1992). In the present study, its information is used 
mainly for the discussion of administrative procedures and processes, and for the analysis of 
cost and time overruns. 
The file study was undertaken as part of a general review of the functioning of the 
Planning & Development Department of AJK and with a view to presenting ideas and 
suggestions for improved efficiency and more effective monitoring. It concerned the analysis 
of a sample of the files of that department concentrating on those projects which were 
ongoing in the Annual Development Programme (ADP) of 1990/91 and which were the 
subject of PC-Is in the period up to July 1991. 
Initially 105 project files were obtained from the P&D department and every piece of 
correspondence contained therein was read and any important items relevant to the objective 
of the study were noted. Comparisons were made with data from other sources such as the 
Five Year Plan and expenditure statements from the Accountant General. Particular attention 
was given to the actual PC-1 form and detailed notes were made using a questionnaire of all 
the information contained in the original PC-1 and subsequent revisions. Annual Plans of 
Operations were also studied, as well as minutes of approval/revision meetings and site visit 
reports (if available). Then there followed two distinct but related activities. First, a detailed 
quantitative analysis was made of the information extracted from the files. This information 
was computerised and analysed through a statistical package (SPSS). Secondly, individual 
projects from each of the sectors were used as case studies, in part to glean useful 
information about the administrative process but also to reinforce the conclusions which could 
be drawn from the statistical analysis. A third source of information was contained in a small 
number of files used for the various Review Meetings held and supposed to be held in 1990-
91. These files contained quarterly monitoring reports for all ongoing projects in the ADP. 
All reports submitted were computerised and analysed. There were, however, no systematic 
visits to the projects in the sample so this source of information was discarded in much of the 
analysis. 
Sampling for the project file study 
The composition of the sample of project files was a product of the following ideas and 
assumptions. Firstiy, the ADP of 1990-1991 was taken as the sample frame making it 
possible to study projects which were ongoing and which would also be required to send 
progress reports. Secondly, it was considered necessary to achieve a minimum level of 
representation in each sector and line department. Given the very different quantity of 
projects in the sectors, ranging from 8 in the Power sector to 163 in the Transport sector, a 
stratified sample was required, ensuring a statistically significant number of files for each 
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sponsoring department. In those sectors or departments which had a portfolio of less than 10 
ongoing projects (excluding feasibility studies or PCII projects), all projects were studied1. 
This decision was also taken in view of the fact that the smaller the sector, the greater was 
the internal variation between the projects2. In sectors with up to 20 projects, 10 projects 
were studied; in the sectors with between 20 and 80 projects, 15; and in the Transport & 
Communications sector with 163 ongoing projects, 20 projects. A sample based on random 
numbers was taken from the portfolio of the Industries, Health, and Education departments, 
and in the Physical Planning and Housing sector and T&C sector of the Public Works 
Department. For purposes of aggregation, the relatively small samples in these departments 
and sectors have subsequently been given extra weights in the statistical analysis. For 
example, in the Education Sector where plus or minus a 20% sample of projects was selected, 
each project has been given a weight of 5. Similarly, in the Health sector, where 
approximately one third of all projects were studied, the projects selected were given a weight 
of 3, i.e. they were multiplied by that figure. 
Unfortunately, due to time constraints and practical difficulties in obtaining the files, the 
sample targets could not be fully achieved and in practice the actual sample size achieved 
varied slightly from the overall sample target. A summary of the sample of projects has been 
entered in Table Al . l . The size of the stratified sample allows a statistically significant 
analysis both on the level of the total ADP and of the various departments/sectors. This was 
borne out by a few simple tests performed on the data, as discussed below. 
In all, 105 project files out of a total of 377 ongoing PC-1 based ADP projects were 
studied. This constitutes a 27 percent sample overall, but since the sample was stratified this 
figure in itself is not of great significance as, in many sectors, an 80 to 100 percent sample 
was achieved. Perhaps a more useful comparison is that the sample covered a total of Rs 
3837 million approved expenditure which is around 60 percent of the total cost of the on-
going ADP project portfolio in 1990-91 (excluding SDP and PC-II projects [i.e. feasibility 
study projects]), reflecting the influence of major projects sampled in sectors with few 
projects. 
A simple test demonstrates the level of representation of the resulting sample. For 1990/91, 
the weighted findings, using the average financial cost of a project in the sample, compared 
with the average for the whole of the ADP gives a total cost of all on-going projects 
(excluding SDP and PC-IIs but including foreign aid and self financing schemes) of 
Rs 21.682m as opposed to Rs 21.916m, a discrepancy of only 1.1%. The sample can be 
therefore be held to represent the ADP in financial terms with at least a 95% confidence 
level. 
1 Initially a larger stratified sample size was proposed which would have resulted in an overall sample size of 
143 projects for the file study. This proved an overambitious target in terms of the manpower and time available 
and the number had to be reduced to 105 files. The following decisions were taken: (1) the 17 projects of the 
Special Development Programme were left out of the sample, (they did not form part of the normal ADP in 
1990-91); (2) the 10 sectoral block provisions for the Local Government and Rural Development Programme 
were left out of the sample (they were not based on PC-Is and are managed in a different way from the other 
projects); and (3) feasibility study projects (projects based on PC-II forms) were left out of the sample as, for 
reasons of uniformity, only PC-1 based projects were included. 
2 For instance, in the Forestry subsector, the 7 ongoing projects are very different in nature, whereas in the 
T&C sector there are many very similar projects for both roads and bridges. 
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Table Al.l Some basic data concerning the sample of projects selected from AJK's ADP of 1990-91. 
SHORTENED TITLE OF PROJECT SECTOR NO. PR0DÏÏR Farm Mechanisation Organis. AK AGR 1 36 
Cereal crops imp & prod progr AGR 2 60 
Proc suppl agr inputs(fert/se) AGR 3 60 Prod diseasefree h potato seed AGR 5 36 Managem. Fruit Plant Nurseris AGR 6 24 Constr of input godowns in AK AGR 7 60 
Est. of vegetable growth point AGR 8 24 
Int. Hill Farming Dev. Project AGR 12 60 Expilmp Govt Poultry Complexes AGR 13 36 
Dpgrad. vet.disp opening f aid AGR 14 36 Imp Cattle Breed Art insem MPK AGR 15 36 Strength. Exist Poultry Servic AGR 16 36 
Establ Growth Points Milk&Meat AGR 17 60 Educ.s Tr. Facil. Nominees ANH AGR 18 36 Reforestation of Blanks AK PhV AGR 23 60 Forest nurseries in AK AGR 24 60 
HFP Ass. Integr. Land Managem AGR 25 36 
Devnt Pasture Lands in AK (II) AGR 26 24 Suketar Hatershed Management P AGR 27 60 
Cold Hater Fish Culture in AK AGR 29 60 Promotion of tourism in AK AGR 33 16 Upgradation tourist facilities AGR 34 24 
Establ. of Tourist Vil. Sharda AGR 35 24 Constr Tourist Rest Houses AK AGR 36 24 
Acq. of plant protect.material AGR 904 24 
Promotion Poultry Prod. Pr.Sec AGR 906 48 Primary Education Dev Exp AJK BDÏÏ 1 30 Prov addl acc and acq 1 47 MSB EDU 8 60 Prov. addl acc 73 Boys M/S Muz EDD 13 36 Prov. addl acc 103 Boys MS Poo EDD 15 48 
Prov addl. acc 38girls MS Kotl EDD 20 36 Prov. furniture 225 Middle Sch EDD 21 24 Cons, addl acc land equi 15 IS EDD 29 48 
Acq.landiconst add roomslOsPoo EDD 35 60 Acq land cons add r 454 HS Kot EDD 37 48 Promotion Sports in MH Schools EDD 39 3 
Constr compound wall 57 HS AJK EDD 42 37 
Constr. addl acc acq land 34HS EDD 48 36 Prov. Students Hostel, Lab Afz EDD 68 25 Cons. Imp. ph fac. 6 Inter Col EDD 901 36 
Opening of 19 disp. in Dist Mu HEA 1 60 
Constr 11 M iChild Hea Centres HEA 5 48 Estab. 12 BHDs in Muzaffar Dis HEA 7 36 Const. 5 RHCs in Distr. Poonch HEA 11 48 Establ. 2+1 RHCs in dist Muz HEA 16 48 Establ.3 new RHC in Kotli Dist HEA 17 48 Imp/Dpgrad.ex.hosp/disp Mirpur HEA 901 48 
Imp. Renov. TB Sanatorium Hill HEA 30 24 Ext. of T.B. Sanatorium Hill HEA 31 24 Dpgrad. exist, hosp/disp Muzaf HEA 910 48 
Health Education Programme AJK HEA 911 60 Establ. industr. estate Kotli INS 4 48 
YR LASTYR DDRMONTH INAPRCOS LASTCOST RE7I BE GHT 
86 95 108 29.313 39.890 1 .13 87 95 96 7.659 7.659 0 .13 89 97 96 43.051 49.508 0 L.13 89 93 48 2.000 2.043 0 .13 90 92 24 2.098 2.098 0 L.13 79 92 156 11.926 16.472 1 .13 91 92 12 0.985 0.985 0 L.13 84 92 96 358.642 471.893 1 
86 92 72 9.808 11.279 0 L.17 88 93 60 30.878 34.113 0 .17 87 92 60 2.767 3.920 1 L.17 
89 93 48 4.119 4.119 0 .17 90 95 60 3.540 3.540 0 L.17 
91 93 24 0.174 0.174 0 .17 
89 98 108 123.516 237.790 1 L.00 88 97 108 46.378 46.378 0 .00 
88 94 72 52.380 52.380 0 L.00 89 93 48 5.548 5.935 0 L.00 88 94 72 22.863 28.971 1 L.00 90 97 24 9.327 9.327 0 L.00 83 92 108 3.100 3.541 0 L.00 87 92 60 4.420 5.078 0 L.00 
88 99 132 4.700 4.700 0 L.00 88 99 132 10.240 19.110 1 L.00 
86 92 72 3.450 3.450 0 L.13 83 92 108 8.084 8.084 0 L.00 88 98 120 108.873 161.797 1 ¡.14 
83 99 192 13.630 15.660 0 ¡.14 86 99 156 19.380 29.200 1 ¡.14 
86 99 156 28.010 35.114 1 ¡.14 86 97 132 10.330 14.044 1 ¡.14 89 92 36 3.710 3.879 0 ¡.14 80 99 228 7.675 10.990 1 ¡.14 86 99 156 11.000 14.650 1 ¡.14 86 99 156 5.137 8.557 1 ¡.14 87 93 72 0.358 0.358 0 ¡.14 
88 99 132 15.740 15.748 0 3.14 90 99 108 46.940 46.940 0 ¡.14 88 96 96 7.650 8.798 0 5.14 83 92 108 15.394 15.394 0 ¡.14 
76 93 204 4.026 12.974 1 ¡.36 82 93 132 4.499 11.000 1 ¡.36 84 98 168 6.375 16.719 1 ¡.36 79 99 240 9.799 19.950 1 ¡.36 87 96 108 6.009 9.640 1 3.36 
84 96 144 7.251 21.846 1 i.36 79 92 156 7.859 14.165 1 ¡.36 88 93 60 3.205 3.025 ¡.36 83 99 192 6.885 19.659 1 J.36 80 92 144 9.660 27.618 1 J.36 81 92 132 1.134 2.613 1 3.36 82 93 132 2.538 12.381 1 ¡.10 
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Conversion ind. training centr IND 6 12 
Setting up of Tr/Devnt Centre IND 901 48 Prod, S Plant. 50 lac Mulberry IND 902 108 Establ. of Vocat. Inst. Kotli IND 14 60 Silk Seed Production with FPI IND 903 36 
Devnt. new industr.area Mirpur IND 17 36 
Establ. Display Centre S Eenov IND 19 15 
Exp & Mod exist, govt pr press IND 21 24 
Moaerniz. Mineral Testing Lab IND 31 36 Integr Hater S Sanit. Progr. LRD 11 36 Electrification Rural Areas II POH 1 36 Electrific rural areas AJK III POH 2 60 Install snail hydel stat Leepa POH 3 12 
Installation snail hydelst Kel POH 4 21 Diesel generators Dudnial Shar POH 5 10 
Estab.2000KH Eydel Rundal Shah POH 6 24 Establ 3x1000 kw lydel Battar POH 7 24 Estab 1.6 mw hydel st Kathai M POH 8 24 Greater Hater Supply Sch Muz'd PPH 1 60 
Augm. Ext. water supply Kotli PPH 3 60 Extension water supply Bhimber PPH 8 24 Const. 72 Dnion Council Offics PPH 901 36 Constr. Seer Complex CD 4 Muzd PPH 15 24 
Const. PM block Kashmir E Islb PPH 18 18 Constr. District Jail Kotli PPH 903 12 Constr. A-Type Bunga.Jalalabad PPH 32 24 
Const. House III s IV hostel PPH 37 36 Eeplanning distr court Rawalak PPH 45 18 
Housing Scheme Rawalakot PPH 57 36 Renov ex water supply netw Mir PPH 904 24 Renov/rehab ex. sewerage Mirpr PPH 65 24 
Area devnt scheme Sect D4 Mirp PPH 66 24 Const. 3 Room Flats D.St.Kotli PPH 902 18 Imp/Met Abbaspur Kahutta Road n c 24 48 Imp/Met Doongi Joona Road 0-9m n c 29 24 Imp/Met Khuiratta Barote Ga rd TSC 30' 24 Reconditioning Kerote Gulpur r TSC 319 24 
Imp/Met Hauseri Panjkot Rd Muz TSC 59 36 Met. Patikka Bheri Road Muzaff TSC 65 18 ImpsMet of Chotagalla rd Poonc TSC 91 24 
Imp/Met Singola Rd Dist.Poonch TSC 92 24 Imp/Met Dheri Shaibzadian ..rd TSC 111 24 Imp/Met Chaksawari Panyana Rd TSC 124 36 
Imp/Met Amb Chinar Thub Beh.Rd TSC 127 36 Imp/Met Jandi Ghoutra Baba..Rd TSC 131 12 Constr of Bridges Khaori Rajpa TSC 146 24 
Constr. prestressed bridge Kam TSC 149 18 
Constr. RCC bridge Neelum Muzd TSC 154 36 Constr R Bridge Sulla Ban Kotl TSC 162 24 Imp/Met Kotli Pallandri Rd Tah TSC 913 36 Imp/Met of Chokoti Khaland rd TSC 61 18 Imp/Met Dhani Kanoor Road Muzd TSC 69 18 Kheri irrigation scheme Mirpur HAT 1 24 
85 93 96 1.651 5.523 1 2.10 
79 92 156 2.861 7.578 1 2.10 82 92 120 15.827 15.827 2.10 87 97 120 3.721 5.582 1 2.10 88 92 48 9.112 9.112 2.10 
88 99 132 53.158 81.933 1 2.10 90 95 60 1.070 1.700 1 2.10 88 94 72 5.454 5.710 0 2.10 88 93 60 1.350 0.150 0 2.10 
91 94 36 55.536 44.666 0 2.94 86 95 108 696.437 800.900 0 1.00 
91 99 96 717.444 1139.432 1 1.00 87 92 60 1.339 2.880 1 1.00 84 93 108 3.494 3.896 0 1.00 
90 97 84 3.104 3.560 0 1.00 
86 99 156 30.000 85.597 1 1.00 87 99 144 28.739 320.493 1 1.00 87 99 144 30.000 62.417 1 1.00 
79 94 180 63.334 143.256 1 2.94 78 95 204 1.562 29.307 1 2.94 89 95 72 2.359 2.712 0 2.94 87 92 60 8.290 8.290 0 2.94 84 94 120 8.175 14.776 1 2.94 
86 95 108 7.874 14.257 1 2.94 82 92 120 3.000 13.809 1 2.94 87 94 84 4.592 4.266 0 2.94 
89 97 96 22.618 21.052 0 2.94 91 95 48 3.850 3.885 0 2.94 80 93 156 11.000 18.422 1 2.94 87 92 60 26.265 26.265 0 2.94 87 95 96 15.090 17.354 0 2,94 
90 93 36 206.090 206.090 0 2.94 87 92 60 2.158 2.158 0 2.94 84 92 96 15.751 18.326 0 8.58 
91 99 96 14.567 14.567 0 8.58 88 99 132 6.017 6.017 0 8.58 89 96 84 23.416 23.416 0 8.58 89 99 120 11.073 11.073 0 8.58 90 93 36 3.847 4.424 0 8.58 89 99 120 6.795 8.200 1 8.58 89 96 84 7.439 7.439 0 8.58 
89 99 120 5.560 5.560 0 8.58 87 99 144 8.274 10.546 1 8.58 
89 98 108 11.529 11.529 0 8.58 89 93 48 2.050 2.050 0 8.58 74 93 228 1.949 5.235 1 8.58 89 99 120 2.858 3.018 0 8.58 90 99 108 15.000 40.000 1 8.58 86 99 156 11.288 37.226 1 8.58 84 92 96 17.300 17.300 0 8.58 
90 99 108 4.600 8.056 1 8.58 90 96 72 4.435 4.435 0 8.58 81 99 216 18.000 96.154 1 1.00 
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NOTE: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS SECTOR Main sector of the Annual Development Programme: AGR= Agriculture, EDD= Education, IND= Industries, HEA= Health, LRD= Local Government and Rural Development, P0H= Power, PPH= Physical Planning and Housing, TiC= Transport and Communication, HAT= Irrigation 
PRODDR Original intended project duration in months 1STYR First year of inclusion in the ADP LASTYR Last year of inclusion in the ADP (updated upto FY 1997-98) 
DDRMONTH Total actual project duration in months INAPRCOS Initially approved cost of project LASTCOST Final (last revised) approved cost of project REVI Revision status of project (l=revised, 0 = not revised) HEIGHT Height attached to the project in the sample 
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Table Al.2 Major report outputs produced by UNDP/DTCD project "Development 
Planning in AJK". 
(June 1990): Output 1.1 [P&D's existing management procedures with respect to ADP and 
monitoring and evaluation system] 
(May 1991): Output 1.1.1 - Development Decision-making Efficiency 
(Febr. 1991): Output 1.1.2 - A Review of Information Sources for Policy Evaluation in AJK 
(Oct. 1990): Output 1.2 [Existing and proposed organisation and responsibilities of P&D 
department] 
Workshop report (Feb. 1991): Project Monitoring and Evaluation by P&D Departments in 
Pakistan; report of 3 inter-provincial workshops 
(April 1992): Report of the Seminar on Planning Needs in AJK, 1st and 2nd March, 1992 
(June 1991): Project Monitoring Systems in Planning and Development Department 
(March 1991): Output 2.2 - Management of the Development Programme by Line Agencies 
in AJK 
(November 1991): Towards a New Approach to the Preparation of the Five Year Plan of the 
Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir 
(January 1992a): Regional Planning Consultancy Report Vol. 1 "Regional Planning and 
Strategy formulation" (Initial report) 
(January 1992b): Regional Planning Consultancy Report Vol. 2 "Regional Planning and 
Strategy formulation" (Training materials) 
(January 1992c): Donors Assisted Projects in AJ&K P&D Department. 
(April 1992): Report of the Seminar on Development Planning Needs in AJ&K. 
(May 1992a): Final [Consultant's] Report on the Project Monitoring System for P&D, AJK 
(May 1992b): Technical Note on Annual Plan of Operation / Quarterly Monitoring 
(July 1992): Position Papers on selected issues in the implementation of infrastructure 
projects: 
1. Land acquisition practice and procedure. 
2. Contracts and contractors in AJK 
3. PCI preparation. 
4. The use and availability of heavy plant in AJK. 
5. The P. & D. Dept. and its performance relative to the line agencies. 
(November 1992a): A study of Project Preparation and Implementation in AJK. Based on a 
Sample of Project Files in P&D Department 
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(November 1992b): Report of two Inter-Provincial Workshops held in 1992. 
(December 1992): System Documentation Programme/Project Management Information 
System for P&DD, AJK. Volume 1 - Introduction 
(February 1993): System Documentation Programme/Project Management Information 
System for P&DD, AJK. Volume 2 - User Guides 
(March 1993a): A possible approach for the 8th Five Year Plan 
(March 1993b): PC-1 Manual for the P&DD Department and the Nation-Building 
Departments in AJ&K 
(November 1993a): Technical Note on the Inputs re AG codes and input progress analysis 
(November 1993b): Technical Note on the Revision of Projects 
(December 1993): Computer Training Manual 
(July 1994): Programme/Project Management Information System for P&DD, AJK. Volume 
3 - Technical Documentation. 
Contributions were made by the project to: preparation Annual Development Programmes, 
Annual Plans, Annual Plans of Operations, Quarterly Monitoring Reports, working papers, 
Statistical Yearbooks and Azad Kashmir at a Glance. 
Further project report outputs consisted of: project documents, workplans, Project 
Performance Evaluation Reports, Terminal Report of Project and terminal reports of project 
staff. 
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ANNEX 2: ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES IN PROBLEM REPORTING IN THREE 
REPORTING SYSTEMS 
The differences in the quantity and quality of problem reporting between the AJK Quarterly 
Review Report (QRR), PC-III (a federal government progress report format), and the AJK 
Quarterly Monitoring Report (QMR), are subjected to a review in this annex. 
To this end the samples of projects are initially limited to those sectors for which reports 
in all three categories were received. This means that the sample is limited to the 86 projects 
for which a PC-III was received. Because of the inclusion of the Health sector in the PC-III 
returns there are relatively many problems in the sample of the old QRRs. Much of the 
information on which the review is based is summarised in Table A2.1. 
The differences between the old and the two other systems are striking. In the old system, 
only around 25 percent of the projects reported observations that could be interpreted as 
problems. The federal system reported many more problems: in 77 percent of the reports one 
or more bottlenecks were mentioned. Was this a consequence of a particularly problematic 
quarter? Not likely; there were no major contractors' strikes; the amount released by the 
Finance Department was not smaller than in other years, and neither did a major calamity 
bias the figures, such as with the torrential rains in September 1992. If the reports are 
scrutinised in detail, then it appears that of all projects, only 21 percent reported something 
different in the third quarter from what it had reported in the first. But almost 55 percent of 
the projects reported something else in the second quarter, while half of the projects in the 
third quarter reported something different from the second. When the reporting of problems 
in the first quarter is correlated with that in the second, then there is even no correlation (R 
=0.0399 at P=0.358). The correlation between the reporting of problems in the second and 
third quarter is significant at P = 0.018 and a strength of Pearson's R = 0.2266, but much 
more strong is the correlation between the reporting of problems in the first and the third 
quarter at R = 0.4515 and a significance level of P = 0.000.3 The conclusion is that 
although the situation is more likely to have changed between the first and third quarter than 
between the first and the second or the second and third, the QRRs report almost the same 
situation: an effect which must be due to the format rather than to similarities in actuality. 
Differences in the nature of problems 
When the nature of the problems reported in the three quarters is taken into account, then 
the extent to which the observations in the second quarter through the PC-III are at variance 
with those made in the first and the third quarter through the QRRs, is further underscored. 
This can be observed from the table below. 
3 It has to be mentioned that most of the correlation is due to the high number of projects reporting no problem 
in both the first and the third quarter. On the other hand, the proportion of projects reporting problems in both 
the first and the third quarter is 41 percent, whereas those in the first and second does not surpass 24 percent 
and those in the second and the third 31 percent, in spite of the very high number of problems ticked in the 
second quarter, which makes it easier to match these with problem statements in the other quarters. 
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Table A2.1 Registration of problems in QRRs and PC-IIIs of 1990-91. and OMRs 
of 1992-93 and 1993-94, in terminology of PC-III. N=86 (AJK) 
Qu.l Qu.2 Qu.3 Av. 1992-4 
QRR PC-III QRR in QMRs 
Delayed release of funds 1.22 37.12 - 6.92 
Inadequate release of funds - 15.12 - 5.12 
No foreign exchange - 1.22 - n.a. 
Admin, d i f f icul t ies - 3.52 - 2.42 
Foreign experts absent - 1.22 - 0.42 
Workers s t r ikes - 10.42 - 0.22 
Site not selected - 9.32 - n.a. 
Delay land acquisition 2.32 19.82 10.32 6.72 
Delay in design or detailed estimate - 16.42 - n.a. 
Tenders not received - 9.82 
Approval tenders delayed - 2.32 - 6 , B 
Contractor problems - 43.82 3.72 14.72 
Diff. procurement materials - 4.62 
Machinery not available/delayed - 2.32 
Weather delays - 9.32 
Interdepartmental delays 1.92 18.62 10.12 n.a. 
Problem with i n s t a l l , u t i l i t i e s - 2.32 - 0.62 
Lack of comm. participation - 5.82 - 1.02 
Lack of local funds - - - 1.02 
Other problems 19.62 - 5.42 3.52 
Note: other problems were coded in QRRs those where works were mentioned not yet to have started and or to have stopped. If works had not been started by e.g. PHD, then this was coded as interdepartmental delays. For the comparison with problems mentioned in QMRs, only those problems were selected that were identical or almost identical those in the PC-III. This meant that some of the QMRs 1 indicators had to be amalgamated. 
Source: Project file study 1992, 
7.68 
.52 
Particularly there are differences between the two kinds of reports in the registration of 
releases, estimates, contractors, land and interdepartmental delays as problems. Since releases 
point back to the Finance Department and partly the P&DD, whereas estimates point to the 
design offices in the own departments, contractors to some extent to the functioning of the 
PWD, land to the Revenue Department, and interdepartmental delays also to other 
departments, these affairs are underreported in the QRR, and heavily reported in the PC-III 
which has a much less compromised audience. If the categories of problems reported in the -
new - QMR are compared with the PC-III, then the latter still reports more problems, 
although the differences have now become smaller. This means that the closed character of 
the new report format must have had a distinct influence. Although the 2nd quarter of the FY 
1990-91, as reported by the PC-III, could theoretically have been an exceptional quarter, it 
is unlikely given the further circumstantial evidence. Especially it is unlikely that the 
perpetual land problems and contractor problems will have been much worse than in the other 
years; if anything the years of 1992-93 with their calamities and worsening overcommitments 
and budgetary crunch should have given rise to more problems. 
293 
High frequency of problem reporting in the PC-Ill 
It is very plausible that the high incidence of problem reporting through the PC-III is related 
to factors other than a particularly difficult situation in the second quarter. First of all, the 
format of the PC-III with its list of selected bottlenecks led many respondents to volunteer 
problems that might not have been raised without a specific question and that might not have 
been intended for discussion in a review. The ticking of these problems was done most likely 
to ward off the (remote) risk of a criticism in a case where problems were obviously besetting 
the project and nothing had been ticked. In the second place, the perception that the Federal 
Government was further removed from project management must have played an important 
role, as was already discussed. By 1991, most departments had the experience with a Federal 
Government not intervening at the project level after its scrutiny of the PC-III - usually, 
nothing was heard anymore after its submission. More frank reporting of problems would 
then not lead to repercussions such as feared for by the AJK Government or to open warfare 
with other departments in review meetings. This was also corroborated by the relatively high 
proportion of projects daring to tick "inter-departmental delays" as a bottleneck in the PC-III: 
18.6 percent. This made it the fourth most frequently reported problem, after contractors, 
releases and land. Although in the new system this very important factor was unfortunately 
not included in the list of problems, it was also hardly ever reported as "other problem". Few 
rapporteurs volunteered it, although it was always among the first discussed in discussions 
with the author. At the most it was reported under a different guise. For instance, in one 
quarter, a rapporteur for the education sector had ticked this problem for many construction 
projects, executed by other departments than his own. Obviously, what he really meant was 
that the Public Works Department was not coming up to the mark. 
The lack of involvement of the Federal Government would explain the unlikely 
combination of high incidence of problem reporting for those agencies which returned a PC-
III on the one hand, and the complete non-response given by other agencies on the other4. 
Problems reported through the OMR 
The new system relied on listings of selected problems, headed "reasons for low fund 
utilization" and "reasons for delays in inputs". Comparing the incidence of problems reported 
through the new system with that of the old system and the PC-III, the new system occupies 
a middle position. In the third quarter of 1991-92, the old system's QRR was dispatched 
together with the new system's forms (QMR). Although not all departments returned QMRs 
and the sample was therefore biased, they can be compared with the QRRs sent by those 
same departments. It appears that 67.3 percent of the projects reported problems in the QMR, 
but only 15.4 percent in the QRR. The difference must be attributed directly to the format 
since it cannot be attributed to a different audience, a different purpose of the exercise or a 
different reporting period. The QMR had a closed format as far as the problems were 
concerned, whereas the QRR had an open format, which led to less frequent reporting of 
problems. If the problems reported through the QRR are compared with those reported 
through the QMR, the same discrepancies are noted as were already evident from the case 
of the PC-III and the QRRs in the year before. Table A2.2, which is based on a sample of 
* The departmental composition of the returns did not exercise an influence over the high number of PC-IIIs 
reporting problem. It could be imagined that the special problems of the Health Department, an important part 
of the PC-HI sample, would have pushed up the proportion of problem ridden projects. But this is not borne 
out by statistical analysis: without the Health department, the proportion of projects reporting problems in the 
PC-HIs would rise even to 82 percent! Whereas the presence of Health Department did push up the average for 
the QRRs, it did not do so for the PC-HIs. 
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64 cases which had submitted both a QRR and a QMR, shows how far apart the reporting 
is through the two systems. Of the 70 problems which were reported in total, only 8 were 
of the same nature, or 11.4 percent. Even when a very lenient view is taken, and the 
problems of "difficulties with contract(or)" of the QMR are equalised with the "work 
stopped" of the QRR, then only 28.6 percent of the problems were the same. 
Table A2.2 Frequencies of matching problem-reporting by QMR and QRR, 3rd 
quarter 1991-92, N=64 (AJK). 
Variable name Not ment- mentioned mentioned mentioned in 
ioned only in QMR only in QRR QMR and QRR 
1. Delay in funds releases 98.42 0.02 1.62 0.02 
2. Delay in project inputs 100.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
3. Weather 68.82 28.12 0.02 3.12 
4. Lack of access to proj . 90.62 6.32 3.12 0.02 
5. Difficulties with contr. 76.62 21.92 0.02 1.62 
6. Internal project probl. 93.82 4.72 1.62 0.02 
7. Difficulties with land 87.52 7.82 3.12 1.62 
8. "Work stopped" 90.62 0.02 9.42 0.02 
9. Problem with tendering 96.92 3.12 0.02 0.02 
10.No public participation 93.82 6.32 0.02 0.02 
Overall frequency: 90.62 7.12 1.72 0.62 
Note: Basic data i s presented in Table A2.3 
Source: AJK P&DD computer databases 
If the selection of projects is further adjusted to reflect only those that also returned a PC-III 
the year before, then there was still a significant difference between the PC-III and the two 
other systems, a corroboration of the influence of the differing audiences of the systems. 
Whereas 76.7 percent of the PC-IIIs indicated one or more problems with a project, the 
respective figures for QRRs and QMRs were 27.9 percent and 36.7 percent in 1991-925. In 
none of the six quarters for which a QMR was submitted by the same departments, did the 
proportion rise to 77 percent (see tables A2.5 and A2.6). And this was in spite of a calamity 
in 1992-93 and a relatively severe problem with releases in the first quarter of 1993-94. The 
average proportion of projects registering problems in the QMR was 40 percent, which is 
only slighdy more than half the proportion of the projects registering problems in the PC-III. 
It can be inferred that the nature of the format and the intended audience of the system are 
both very important determinants of the incidence of problem reporting. 
5 Again, the departmental composition of the sample, in which the Health Department weighed heavily, is 
responsible for the relatively small difference between the incidence of problem reporting in the QMR and QRR. 
If the Health Department, which was wont to play out its problem with PWD also in the QRR, would be 
excluded, then this difference would have been much bigger. 
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Table A2.3: Problem reported by 64 projects with both Quarterly Horttoring Reports i Quarterly Review Reports, 3rd Quarter, 
AJK1991-92 
CODS Abbreviated title of Project Fund Heather Access (Mr-Contr- Inter- Land Hork Tender Public Other release act actor nal acq. stopped partic. problem 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
ACS l Farm mech.organisation (under rev.) AGR 2 Cereal crops impr. i prod. progr.On P 
AGR 3 Proc. & Distr.Agric. Inputs(fert/s) AGR 4 Strength. Agrie. Tr. Inst. Garhi D. AGR 5 Prod. Diseasefree Potato Seed in AK - QRR P AGR 7 Construction of Input Godowns in AK 
AGR 13 Exp. & Impr. Govt.Poultry Complexes AGR 14 Dpgradation of Vetern. Dispensaries AGR 15 Impr. of Cattle Breed by A.I (Rev) AGR 16 Strengthening Poultry Centres 5 Dst QRR AGR 17 S/up Growth Point Milk i Meat Pot.A AGR 18 Education S Training Fac. to AK Norn AGR 23 Reforestation of Blanks in Azad Kas AGR 24 Forest Nurseries in Azad Kashmir 
AGR 25 Integrated Land Management in A.K AGR 27 Sukatter Watershed Management in AK HEA 1 Opening 19 Dispensaries in M'abad D - QJBUQHR - P - - P HBA 3 Opening 20 Dispensaries in Poonch D QRR OMR - p - - QRR HEA 5 Constr. of 11 M.C.H. Centres in AJK P QRR - P HEA 7 Estab. 12 Basic Health Units M'abad - P+P -HEA 9 Estab.14 Basic Health units Kotli D - - - -HEA 10 Establishment of dental clinics in - - - -HEA 12 Const. 5 Rural H.C. Poonch/Bagh Dst - - - -HEA 14 Estab.3 new Rural Health Centre Mrp - - - -HEA 15 Estab.6 New R.H.C Poonch/Bagh Distr - OMR QMR -
HEA 16 Estab. 2 New R.H.C i 1 B.H.ü. Mabad - - P HEA 17 Bstab.3 new Rural Health Centre Ktl - - -HEA 18 Estab.Dist.Head Qtr. Hospital Kotli - - - QMR HEA 19 Imp.Op-grd.of exist.Hosp/Disp.Mirpu - - - -HEA 22 imp/Dp-grd.Mst.Hosp/Disp.Pon/Bagh -
HEA 26 Establ.Improv.Tehsil Hospitals Mirp - - - -HEA 28 Establ.Impr.Tehsil Hospitals M'abad - QRR HEA 29 Establ. Imp. Tehsil Hospitals Kotli -HEA 30 Improv/Renovation TB Senitorium Hil - - - -HEA 31 Extension TB Sanitarium Hill (D.Rv) -HEA 33 Imp.Renovation Disp.Constd by L.Gov -HEA 34 Expanded Program of Immunization AK - - - -IND 29 Mineral Explor.S Evaluation in A M -IND 31 Mod. Mineral Test. Lab. M'abad(rev) -IND 30 Reg.Geol. Map 5 Ore Poten.Assmt.N.V -POH 6 Estb.2000 KB Hydel Station Kundalsh - - - -P0» 7 Establ.3000 KB Hydel Station Battar -POB 8 Establ.1600 KB Hydel Station Kathai -PPH 1 Greater Hat.Sup.Sch.Mzd.(Rev)5500 C - QMR PPH 29 Const.Gov.Off.Judicial i Rev.DepIt -PPH 37 Const.House Cat-Ill(3) House Cat-IV - - - -PPH 58 Housing Scheme Kotli 290 Plots(S.Fi -
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SDP 4 Const .Haltoy alon River Neelum Hzd SDP S Beaut.Inf.Soad New Secr.Chella Band SDP 6 Const.R.Bank PropJalucni Brdg Bala TSC 1 Imp/Met.Kohala-M'abad Rd H u e 15-20 TSC 26 Imp/Ket.Kotli Pallandri Road Poonch TSC 57 Imp/Het.of Link Road Dangaii M'abad TSC 59 Imp/Met.Nuseri Panjkot Road H'abad TSC 62 Imp/Met.C-arhi Dup.Pachund Lawasi Rd TSC 65 Het.Pattika Behri Rd. (5 Miles) fed TSC 69 Iup/Het.Danni Kanoor Road (3M)Mabad TSC 82 Imp/Met.Khaigala All Sojal Rd.Poonc TSC 91 Imp/Het.Husain Shaneed Cnotagala Rd TSC 92 Imp/Met.Rawalakot Singóla Rd.(4M)Po TsQOi lap. S Met. of Mong Bazar to Yadgar TSC146 Const.Bridges M o r i Rajpian Rd.Mzd TSC149 Const.Prest.Bridge Kamsar Nallah Mz TSC154 Const.RCC Bridge River Seelum at Mz 
Note: QRR refers to a problem mentioned in tie Quarterly Review Report, QMR refers to a problem mentioned in the Quarterly Monitoring Report. Problem category 2: Project inputs, was not indicated to be a problem in any of the reports, and formatting reasons. 
has therefore been deleted, for 
Source: database Computer Centre, PSDD, M K . 
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Table A2.4 Basic findings on projects. APOs and Quarterly Monitoring Reports 
in 1992-93 and 1993-94 (AJK). 
S.No 1992-93 1993-94 
1 No. of projects 684 573 
2 ongoing projects: 541 515 
3 Rows 2/1 79.12 89.92 
4 with allocation > 0 465 482 
5 Rows 4/2 86.02 93.62 
6 with expenditures^ 358 349 
7 Rows 6/4 77.02 72.42 
8 with expenditures=0 107 133 
9 Rows 8/4 23.02 27.62 
10 with allocation = 0 76 33 
11 Rows 10/2 14.02 6.42 
12 with expenditures>0 3 1 
13 Rows 12/10 3.92 3.02 
14 with expenditures=0 73 32 
15 Rows 14/10 96.12 97.02 
16 with APO > 0 432 442 
17 Rows 16/2 79.92 85.82 
18 with APO=0 109 72 
19 Rows 18/2 20.12 14.02 
20 new projects: 143 58 
21 Rows 20/1 20.92 10.12 
22 with allocation > 0 126 55 
23 Rows 22/20 88.12 94.82 
24 with expenditures>0 15 16 
25 Rows 24/20 10.52 27.62 
26 with expenditures^) 111 39 
27 Rows 26/20 77.62 67.22 
28 with allocation = 0 17 3 
29 Rows 28/20 11.92 5.22 
30 with expenditures>0 2 0 
31 Rows 30/28 11.82 0.02 
32 with expenditures=0 15 3 
33 Rows 32/28 88.22 100.02 
34 with APO > 0 121 42 
35 Rows 34/20 84.62 72.42 
36 with APO=0 13 16 
37 Rows 36/20 9.12 27.62 
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Table A2.5 Summary of data on progress in AJK 1992-93 and 1993-94, as reported through the OMR. 
Ql Q2 Q3 Ql Q2 Q3 Average 92-93 92-93 92-93 93-94 93-94 93-94 1992-94 Ho. of Quarterly Mon. Reports 390 486 455 423 443 486 447 
BUDGET Av. Ho. of budget inputs 12.54 12.23 12.19 10.71 11.11 11.17 11.66 
OUTPUTS Av. Ho of project output targets 6.73 6.54 6.61 5.88 5.84 5.8 6.23 
STATUS MARKINGS 
Projects with input status markings 342 224 191 174 149 134 202 
perc. inputs not marked 27.2% 73.0% 77.5% 71.9% 76.3% 75.7% 66.9% perc. inputs on schedule 52.8% 16.7% 16.3% 12.6% 18.5% 22.4% 23.2% perc. inputs delayed 20.1% 10.3% 6.3% 15.5% 5.3% 2.0% 9.9% 
Projects with output status markings 279 237 182 235 111 131 196 perc. outputs not marked 52.2% 68.9% 80.4% 69.3% 87.8% 87.7% 74.4% perc. outputs continuing 40.8% 26.5% 15.3% 29.0% 9.6% 10.8% 22.0% 
perc. outputs completed 6.1% 4.2% 3.2% 1.5% 0.5% 8.2% 4.0% perc. outputs canceled 1.0% 0.4% 1.2% 0.2% 2.1% 0.8% 0.9% 
PROBLEMS % projects with problems 46.1% 52.5% 43.7% 57.9% 43.3% 35.6% 46.1% 
Reasons for low fund utilisation: l delayed release of funds by AG 3.6% 0.2% 0.7% 22.0% 6.1% 1.2% 5.6% 2 delayed project inputs 3.9% 3.7% 1.8% 7.8% 5.2% 7.4% 5.0% 
3 weather 24.1% 16.2% 19.6% 9.9% 8.6% 2.9% 13.5% 4 area access 2.3% 2.7% 3.1% 0.9% 1.1% 0.2% 1.7% 5 contract difficulties 4.7% 2.9% 3.3% 3.3% 2.3% 3.5% 3.3% 6 contractor difficulties 8.5% 14.1% 10.5% 12.3% 13.1% 8.0% 11.1% 7 internal project problems 5.7% 8.7% 4.6% 12.1% 9.0% 9.1% 8.2% 
8 land problems 9.3% 13.3% 6.8% 4.5% 8.1% 4.3% 7.7% 9 other problems 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 1.1% 0.2% 0.3% 
Reasons for delays in inputs: l tendering procedure 0.3% 0.8% 0.2% 1.2% 0.9% 1.4% 0.8% 
2 delays in staff recruitment 0.5% 0.8% 0.7% 1.2% 1.1% 1.6% 1.0% 3 appropr. material unavailable 1.6% 1.2% 0.4% 0.7% 0.9% 1.4% 1.0% 4 appropr. mach/eq. unavailable 0.5% 2.9% 0.7% 0.7% 1.4% 1.0% 1.2% 
5 power cuts 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.7% 0.4% 0.2% 6 delay in land acquisition 7.3% 17.4% 8.8% 2.8% 6.1% 4.9% 7.9% 
7 strikes of staff 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 8 tendering not completed 0.8% 3.5% 3.5% 4.7% 5.4% 2.3% 3.4% 
9 costs exceed planning 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 1.7% 1.4% 0.4% 0.8% .0 admin, diffic. shortage staff 0.5% 0.2% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.6% 0.7% 
.1 changes in senior management 1.6% 0.6% 1.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.7% 0.2% ,2 foreign experts not assigned 0.5% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% .3 problems with contractors 7.0% 2.7% 8.4% 7.1% 8.4% 5.6% 6.5% .4 weather or accessibility 10.9% 21.2% 16.7% 8.0% 7.0% 5.3% 11.5% 
.5 problems with public utilities 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.7% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% .6 lack of public participation 2.1% 6.0% 2.4% 0.9% 0.7% 0.6% 2.1% .7 lack of local funds 0.5% 0.4% 0.0% 4.5% 0.0% 2.1% 1.2% .8 other problems (1) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% .9 other problems (2] 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 
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Table A2.6 Comparison of progress in 1992-93 s 1993-94 in AJK, as reported through the QHS, by sample 
Qi 92-93 
Quarterly Mon.. Reports 390 
Quarterly Mon. Reports (2nd Sample) (68) 
BUDGET 
Av. Ho. of budget inputs 12.5 
Av. Ho. of budget inputs (2nd Sample) (15.4) 
OUTPUTS 
Av. Ho of project output targets 6.7 
Av. Ho of pr. output targets (2nd Sample) (8.7) 
PROBLEMS (RECODED) 
I projects with problems 46.11 
Perc. of projects with : 
approval/revision problem 2.61 delayed release of funds by AG 3.8% land acq. problem 13.31 tender problem i.o% staffing problem 3.61 inputs/equipm. problem 5.61 strikes of staff / power cuts 0.31 internal project problems 5.6% current costs exceed planning 0.8% weather or access problem 25.6% contract(or) problem 12.3% problem with install, utilities 0.0% public participation problem 2.3% other (unlisted) problem 1.3% 
(2KD SAMPLE) 
% projects with problems (55.9%) 
Perc. of projects with : 
approval/revision problem 2.9% delayed release of funds by AG 7.4% land acq. problem 8.8% tender problem 4.4% staffing problem 13.2% inputs/equipm. problem 4.4% strikes of staff / power cuts 0.0% internal project problems 5.9% current costs exceed planning 0.0% weather or access problem 27.9% contract(or) problem 20.6% problem with install, utilities 0.0% public participation problem 4.4% other (unlisted) problem 4.4% 
Q2 Q3 Ql Q2 Q3 Average 92-93 92-93 93-94 93-94 93-94 1992-94 
486 455 423 443 486 447 (72) (94) (75) (88) (93) (491) 
12.2 12.2 10.7 11.1 11.2 11.7 15.4) (14.7) (16.5) (18.0) (18.3) 16.4 
6.5 6.6 5.9 5.8 5.8 6.2 (8.7) (8.3) (10.2) (10.0) (9.9) (9.3) 
52.5% 43.7% 57.9% 43.3% 35.6% 46.5% 
0.8% 0.4% 0.5% 1.1% 3.1% 1.4% 0.2% 0.7% 22.5% 6.1% 1.2% 5.5% 
20.4% 11.0% 5.2% 9.0% 7.0% 11.1% 3.9% 3.7% 5.4% 5.6% 3.1% 3.9% 1.6% 2.4% 1.9% 2.5% 2.5% 2.4% 7.2% 2.6% 8.7% 7.4% 9.1% 6.8% 
0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.9% 0.6% 0.4% 8.6% 4.6% 12.1% 9.0% 9.1% 8.2% 0.4% 0.4% 1.7% 1.4% 0.4% 0.8% 
25.1% 23.5% 14.2% 11.1% 6.4% 17.5% 
15.8% 13.4% 15.1% 14.7% 11.1% 13.8% 0.2% 0.4% 0.7% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 
6.0% 2.4% 5.4% 0.7% 2.7% 3.3% 1.7% 1.3% 1.7% 2.0% 0.6% 1.4% 
33.3%) (21.1%) (64.0%) (41.0%) ¡33.3%) (41.4%) 
2.8% 2.1% 1.3% 0.0% 1.1% 1.6% 1.9% 1.1% 26.7% 6.8% 1.1% 6.9% 
12.5% 6.4% 8.0% 3.4% 3.2% 6.7% 2.8% 3.2% 10.7% 6.8% 9.7% 6.5% 5.6% 4.3% 6.7% 4.6% 8.6% 6.9% 
5.6% 2.1% 14.7% 9.1% 9.7% 7.5% 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 2.3% 1.1% 0.8% 2.8% 2.1% 12.0% 4.6% 7.5% 5.7% 2.8% 2.1% 2,7% 1.1% 1.1% 1.6% 6.9% 6.4% 4.0% 2.3% 2.2% 7.5% 13.9% 11.7% 10.7% 15.9% 15.1% 14.7% 0.0% 0.0% 2.7% 0.0% 1.1% 0.6% 1.4% 1.1% 1.3% 0.0% 2.2% 1.6% 6.9% 4.3% 4.0% 1.1% 1.1% 3.4% 
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ANNEX 3. EVIDENCE OF IDIOSYNCRASIES OF INDIVIDUAL RAPPORTEURS 
The databases created by the new monitoring system provide an opportunity to check the 
influence of individual rapporteurs on the information supplied. Most of the Quarterly 
Monitoring Reports (QMRs) were signed and the names and designations of the rapporteurs 
were entered in the computer. The focus in this annex is on two aspects: the level of detail 
(as indicated by the number of budget inputs and project outputs listed) and the problems 
reported. In order to reduce the chance that differences measured between rapporteurs are due 
tif differences between types of projects, the sample is limited to only road construction 
projects. This is the single subsector in the ADP with a large enough number of reports and 
rapporteurs to allow statistical analysis with some measure of significance. 
In 1992-93 there were 255 road projects in the ADP (Transport and Communication sector) 
aid in total 567 reports over three quarters; in 1993-94 there were 237 projects and 605 
reports submitted. Road construction projects have the added analytical advantage that they 
are fairly standard in terms of their structure, with most of them being so-called link roads 
(82 percent)6. If there are differences, then it can be safely assumed that these will be 
averaged out in the sample of each of the rapporteurs. Of the 19 rapporteurs registered in the 
roads sector, 10 had submitted 15 or more Quarterly Monitoring Reports each (over three 
quarters), and these were selected for comparison. Unfortunately, most of them reported only 
about their own division or district, so that the differences in reporting found might in theory 
have to be partly attributed to differences in area's rather than peculiarities of the rapporteurs, 
especially in the case of problems. Nevertheless, an attempt shall be made to distinguish 
between the two effects. 
Budgetary inputs and project outputs 
The variation in the level of detail reached as to budgetary inputs and project outputs 
described in the QMRs can be gauged from Figure A3.1. In this figure, the rapporteurs are 
represented by their initials. In the case of inputs and outputs, the influence of the district on 
variation found is not considered of possible influence, and therefore it is not indicated. 
Ik broad terms, the variety amongst rapporteurs with respect to average number of inputs (or 
idget lines) recorded ranged from 9.2 to 27.9, and outputs from 4.3 to 15.5. Thus the 
ipporteur on one side of the spectrum reported three times the number of inputs of the 
pporteur on the other side, and even three and a half times the number of outputs. Whilst 
e figure shows that most of the ten rapporteurs have similar averages (around 15 inputs and 
| outputs), there are two notable exceptions on either side of the range with either much more 
Or much less inputs or outputs. For instance rapporteurs RJR and MUH recorded on average 
2J0 or more budget inputs, whereas MJA and NMB, with the same kind of projects, less than 
10. Rapporteur MUH reported on average 15.5 outputs, whereas MAQ only 4.3. The 
influence of exceptional rapporteurs within one and the same department and within a fairly 
homogeneous group of projects is thereby illustrated. 
The differences meanwhile appear to be related to the total number of reports that each 
rapporteur had to prepare: those who prepared fewer reports seemed to list more inputs and 
outputs. The four rapporteurs on the right side of the figure all had to prepare relatively 
6 Link road projects connect (mountain) villages to the main road network in the valleys by replacing earlier 
existing unpaved roads with asphalt roads. The differences between link roads and other road categories were 
tested in terms of problems and input/output registrations. There were no significant differences. 
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less reports. This would indicate that if there is more time available per report, the level of 
detail will benefit. This argument should not be taken too far, since the figure shows at least 
one case where the number of reports prepared by a rapporteur (JAW) is not high, but the 
number of outputs is yet low. 
Budget Inputs and project outputs In QMRs 
Roads projects In AJK 1992-1994. by main rapporteurs 
p r o j e c t o u t p u t s d e s c r i b e d I n QMR 
OMR o Q u a r t e r l y M o n i t o r i n g Report 
S o u r c e : D a t a b a s e e P&DD. AJK 
Figure A5.1 
Problem reporting 
Also regarding problem reporting, idiosyncrasies are a distinct possibility. What could be 
more prone to subjectivity than the identification of a problem? The author is reminded of 
a few striking cases, whereby for instance one particular rapporteur in the roads division of 
the PWD frequentiy used to report a lack of public participation. Since public participation 
is not required for the construction of metalled roads - these are in AJK built by contractors 
without village labour or any other contribution, this problem seemed out of place. Upon 
checking it turned out that the man had been keen to point out that in his view there was 
insufficient understanding by the public for what the PWD was doing. He had been angered 
by the frequent complaints about the slow speed of works controlled by the PWD. If the 
public would be more actively involved somehow, surely it would better understand the 
difficulties encountered by PWD, was his explanation. Another rapporteur always used to 
report weather problems in a district; others would have a more sunny character. 
First of all, it may be a temperamental affair whether a rapporteur reports a problem at all. 
Some people always complain, others never. Some officers may be 'of the old school', 
imbued with the old bureaucratic ideology of not acknowledging a problem that might 
embarrass the department, or be of a low rank and not daring to take responsibility to 
formally declare something to be a problem. Figure A3.2 shows the main rapporteurs in the 
road sector, this time with an indication of the district in which they worked. 
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R o a d p r o j e c t s r e p o r t i n g p r o b l e m s I n AJK., 1 9 9 2 - 9 3 a n d 1 9 9 3 - 9 4 
by d i s t r i c t a n d m a i n r a p p o r t e u r 
90« 
• F i n a n c i a l Y e a r 1 9 9 2 - 9 3 
Source : d a t a b a s e s P&OD, AJK 
F i n a n c i a l Y e a r 1 9 9 3 - 9 4 
F i g u r e 5.2 
It appears that the proportion of reports for which a problem was reported, varies gready 
between rapporteurs. ILY in Mirpur reported problems for only around ten percent of his 
projects, whereas MJA reported for 65-80 percent of his projects a problem. As said, this 
might be due to specific characteristics of the districts. Indeed, Mirpur district is special on 
at least three counts: it is less mountainous than the other district, has more land available for 
road construction, and has a less extreme winter season. However, the difference with other 
districts is so large that the individual touch of ILY must also have played a role. This 
becomes clear also when the reporting of problems for road projects is compared with that 
of other construction projects and of projects not related to construction. Figure A3.3 shows 
that Mirpur district reports many more problems for other projects, although yet usually less 
than other districts. 
Figure A3.3 meanwhile shows that there is only slight difference in problems reported by 
the rapporteurs in different years. Only in the case of Kotli district, where there was more 
than one rapporteur with a production of over 15 reports, there is a significant difference: 
RJR reports problems for more than 60 percent of the projects in 1992-93, whereas NMB less 
than 40 percent in 1993-94. That this cannot be due to influences of the climate is clear from 
the fact that TUF, which submitted reports in both years, did not decrease the frequency of 
his problem statements significandy. 
Different rapporteurs in Kotli district 
The case of Kodi is interesting since it is the only district where there was more than one 
rapporteur with a submission of over 15 QMRs concerning roads projects. There were in fact 
four rapporteurs active, over a period of 2 years, and this makes it possible to check to some 
extent whether their reporting of problems differed. The relevant data is projected in Table 
A3.1. 
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R o a d p r o j e c t s a n d o t h e r p r o j e c t s r e p o r t i n g p r o b l e m s I n A J K 
b y d i s t r i c t , 1 9 9 2 - 9 3 u n t i l 1 9 9 3 - 9 4 
Muzaff Bagh 
D l s t r i c t s 
S t a t e w r d e 
I R o a d c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o j e c t s 
I O t h e r p r o j e c t s 
S t a t e w i d e : p r o j e c t s c o v e r i n g more t h a n o n e d i s t r i c t o r i 
S o u r c e : d a t a b a s e s Computer C e n t r e , P&DD, AJK 
O t h e r c o n s t r u c t T o n p r o j e c t s 
d I s t r I c t s 
F i g u r e 5.3 
The conclusion from the table is that the overall differences in problem reporting are not 
so large between the rapporteurs, but for certain exceptions which may have to do with 
idiosyncrasies. Certain rapporteurs are much less concerned about the weather than others. 
Although inputs or machinery problems should be similar for all projects, TUF reports these 
much more than others. Contractor problems are also much more frequent for TUF than for 
others. 
As can be seen from the number of cases reported in each quarter, the number of projects 
reported was generally below 10 and therefore, the evidence presented above does not meet 
with the requirements of tests of significance. The patterns must remain hypotheses, 
therefore. 
Reporting by rapporteurs in two subsequent quarters 
Another test that can be performed on the data is to check whether for those projects which 
in any year had two rapporteurs, each reporting in a different quarter, the differences in 
problem reporting are smaller when the rapporteur in quarter x is the same as in quarter y, 
than when the rapporteurs in quarter x and y are different. All these projects in the databases 
of 1992-93 and 1993-94 were selected on the basis of this criterion, and 143 projects were 
found that had submitted reports in all three quarters, but with two different rapporteurs. 
There were nine low utilisation of funds problem categories and 19 delays in inputs problem 
categories, in total 28 variable scores that were compared with those of another quarter. 
Matching and non-matching scores were counted. If the two rapporteurs for each project are 
called A and B respectively, then there can be three basic patterns for the three quarters: 
AAB, BAA, and ABA. From this it is also clear that the number of times that A can be 
compared with B in another quarter is double that of A and A (4 versus 2 times). The 
findings as to the problem reporting of A and B are presented in Table A3.2 on the next 
page. 
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Table A3.1 Problem reporting as to roads projects, by different rapporteurs 
1n Kotli Dis t r ic t , AJK, 1992-93 and 1993-94. 
Kotli 1992-93 and 1993-94 
In i t i a l s of rapporteurs: 
No. of reports: 
Quarter 1: 
Quarter 2: 
Quarter 3: 
PROBLEMS : 
approval or revision problem 
delay in fund release by AG 
land problem 
tender problem 
staffing problem 
inputs/eq./machinery problem 
str ikes of staff/power cuts problem 
internal project problems 
current costs exceed planned costs 
weather or access problem 
contract(or) problem 
problems of i n s t a l l , u t i l i t i e s 
public participation problem 
other problem(s) mentioned 
Average no. of problems/project 
Freq. of problems reported: 
0 problems reported 
1 problem reported 
2 or more problems reported 
92-93 92-93 92-93 93-94 93-94 
AHU RJR TUF TUF NMB 
17 32 39 15 60 
6 10 15 5 7 
5 9 14 8 18 
6 13 10 2 35 
3.3% 
5.9% 3.1% 13.3% 6.7% 
6.3% 5.1% 
2.6% 
6.3% 15.4% 3.3% 
5.9% 1.7% 
41.2% 21.9% 33.3% 60.0% 30.0% 
41.2% 46.9% 51.3% 60.0% 38.3% 
2.6% 6.7% 
3.1% 2.6% 
0.94 0.84 1.08 1.33 0.80 
47.1% 37.5% 33.3% 33.3% 51.7% 
17.6% 40.6% 33.3% 13.3% 20.0% 
35.3% 21.9% 33.4% 53.4% 28.3% 
Table A3.2 Comparison of problems reported in different quarters by different 
and by the same rapporteurs, in 143 projects of ADP 1992-93 and 1993-94 (AJK). 
Comparison between Total problems Problem in 1 Same problem in 
rapporteurs reported of 2 quarters both quarters 
Rapporteur A with A 264 142 122 
Rapporteur A with B (1) 310 224 86 
Rapporteur B with A (2) 302 210 92 
876 576 300 
The table shows that the number of problems that were reported also in another quarter was 
much higher when the rapporteur was the same, than when the rapporteurs in the two quarters 
were different. When the rapporteur was the same in the two quarters, then 46 percent of all 
problems reported were also the same, but when the rapporteur was different, only around 
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29 percent of the problems were reported as the same. In other words, when the rapporteurs 
between two quarters were different, more than 70 percent of all problems were also 
different; in the case of the rapporteur remaining the same, this was only around half. 
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ANNEX 4. COPY OF ONE OF THE ELEVEN PC-1 FORMS 
PC-I FORM 
GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN 
PLANNING COMMISSION 
PROFORMA FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
(Education, Training & Manpower) 
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Code Number for Project. 
"(To be filled in 
by Planning Commission) 
PART ' A ' 
PROJECT DIGEST 
1. Name of Project : 
2. Authorities responsible for : 
(0 Sponsoring 
(ff) Execution 
(/«) Operation and maintenance. 
3. Time required for completion ofproject.—{in months). 
4. (a) Plan provision : 
(0 If the Project is included in the current Five-Year Plan, specify actual allocation. 
(II) If not included in the current Plan, how is it now proposed to be accommodated (Inter/ 
Intra-Sectoral adjustments in allocation or other resources may be indicated). 
(///) If the project is proposed to be financed out of blosk provision for a programms 
indicate : 
Tqtal Block Provision Amount already Amount proposed Balance available 
committed for this project 
(6) IfprojectisnotinthePlan, what warrants its inclusion in the Plan. 
5. Relationship of the project with the objectives of the sector.—Indicate the Contribution.of the 
project, quantified if possible, to the targets in the Five Year Plan, and the names of other 
projects (whether sanctioned or under preparation) which would form part of an integrated 
programme within the sector. 
6. Capital Cost of Project: 
(ƒ« thousand Rupees) 
Local costs: 
Foreign Exchange costs : 
Total . . . 
7. Annual recurring expenditure after completion : 
Local 
F.E. 
Total 
8. Objectivesjof the Project preferably in quantitative terms: 
Prepared by 
Checked by 
A p p r o v e by 
{In thousand Rupees) 
(Name and Designation) 
(Name and Designation) 
(Name and Designation) 
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2 
; Give breakdown oi capital cost, year-wise covering the whole of the investment period, as 
indicated below:— 
Item 
Total 
at official rate 
of exchange 
I Year 
at official rate 
of exchange 
II Year 
at official rate 
of exchange 
Local FEC Import Total 
Duties 
Local FEC Total Local FEC total 
14. Basis of cost estimates.—(give full details). 
15. Estimates of annual recurring expenditure after comph Hon each phase of a project:—Also indi-
cate source of financing recuning expenditure. 
Local Cost F.E. Cost Total 
Salaries of staff: 
(a) Service staff. 
(6) Ancillary staff (e.g.) para-medical. 
(c) Supervisory and administrative staff, 
(rf) Consumable Stores and Supplies (Please specify), 
(e) Bcokstind Journals. 
(ƒ) Contingent staff. 
(g) Other Contingencies e.g., electricity, water, nostagc etc. 
(A) Kent and rates. 
(/) Cther expenditure e.g., sports and worxsliop supplies. 
16. Unit to;', ior each category of set vice o, „ut,>m e.g.. for educational institutions, the cost per 
student and how il coiiipares with cost in other inJiluli™*. 
17. In ess. of proj. els for prednct.on ej gardi aif.l services c.;;.. production of textbooks, givfi ex-
ptetti. in.n-M ..! .1 i,. at Unfit ami Los:. ccet.vt.ts; Jit tu. . K I W I or until normal capacity is re-
ached—R«.'u U licprct'slioii iiiiu salvdcc viJue c> property shou'd be given. 
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PART ' B ' 
PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND FINANCINO 
!>. Locaticn ofProject : fAttach map) : ' 
(a) Give name of place and administrative district in which the service centre will be located. 
(b) Indicate total area which will be served. 
10. Existing facilities : 
Give information about public and private sector institutions in the area, their staff and equip-
ment, actual enrolment in various classes and capacity enrolment of the institution. The infor-
mation about public and private sectors institutions should be given both for the level of the educa-
tional programme proposed by the Project as well as for the lower level institutions which «fil! serve 
as feeder institutions for the Project. 
11. Description of the Project : 
(a) Give brief history, proposed facilities and justification of Project. 
(b) Give population of the area to be served, age groups and income levels. 
(c) Relationship with other programmes in the same sector and in. other sectors.—Indicate 
whether coordination with other sectors has been ensured. 
(d) Give studenMeacher ratio for the project and the national average fir the proposed level 
of education.—Give also the extent of tibraiy and laboratories facilities per student and 
how it compares with the national average. 
(e) The employment prospects of the persons to be trained in terms of the present and future 
demand. 
(0 Give details of the type of training or education to be imparted.—The syllabus and the 
subjects in which emphasis will be placed. Indicate availability of teaching staff, 
(gj Give details of administrative structure for implementing the project. 
12. Give date wtten capital expenditure estimates were prepared :-^-lf prepared iqore than one year 
ago, confirm if they are stilt valid. 
13. .Capital Cost : 
18. Annual phasing of physical work andfinancial requirements for the project.—Attached PERT 
or Bar diagrams if prepared ). 
Physical work Financial requirements 
Item % Local F.E.C. Total 
Already completed : 
1st year (id 
2nd Year (19 
3rd Year (19 
4th Year (19 
5th Year (19 
19. Foreign Exchange Expenditure : 
Year Material Consultants Others Total 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4 
5. 
20. (a) Likely sources and amount of foreign exchange cost of the Project 
(b) Present position regarding availability, commitment or negotiations. 
21. Indicate sources and amount of rupee component of Project : 
Amount for Amount for 
Sources capital Recurring 
Expenditure expenditure 
(a) Government sources : 
(0 Grant 
(/Ï) Loan. 
(iii) Investment 
(<>) Direct Govt Expenditure. 
(b) Sponsoring Agency's own fund. 
(c) Private Investment. 
(d) Local body resources, if any. 
(e) Non-Government borrowing. 
(f) Other sources (e.g., Recoveries). 
22. Results of the Project : 
(0 Direct benefits Number of persons served. 
(il) Indirect and other benefits. Contribution toward specific targets/social 
objectives. 
23. (a) Approximate number and categories of job opportunities likely to be created indirectly 
as a result of— 
(0 Implementation. 
(8) Operation of Project, 
(b) Economic life of components of project (Buildings, equipment etc). 
P A R T ' C * 
PROJECT REQUIREMENTS 
24. (a) Manpower : 
F O R E X E C U T I O N F O R O P E R A T I O N 
man month Number 
(1) Professional and technical. 
(2) Administrative, Executive and managerial. 
(3) Clerical. 
(4) Service. 
(5) Skilled. 
(6) Unskilled. 
(7) Others 
(b) Likely shortage of manpower by occupation. 
(c) Steps to be taken to assure availability of manpower. 
(d) Approximate number of persons required to be trained per year (locally and abroad) and 
the kind of skills to be learnt 
(e) Give total capital outlay, give the capital cost of mobilizing one worker for one shift 
25. Physical and other facilities required for Project: 
To be provided To be provided 
Items Total from the project from the public 
itself utility 
(a) Housing by type. 
(b) Power supply. 
(c) Water and other utilities. 
(d) Others. 
26. Materials, Supplies and Equipment requirement: 
A. /. Minimum total requirements for execution : 
To be completed only for major items costing more than 10% of the total cost. 
Already avail-
Local Foreign able with agency 
Items Unit — 
Quantity Rate Cost per Quantity Rate Cost per 
unit unit 
1. Materials. 
(a) 
Cb 
(c 
2. Supplies and spares. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c 
W) 
(e) 
(0 
fe) 
5 
Unit 
Local Foreign 
Quantity Rate Cost per Quantity Rate Cost per 
unit unit 
1. Material, 
(a) 
2. Supplies and Spares. 
(a) CO 
27. In the case of imported material and equipment for execution, indicate : 
(a) justification for imports. 
(b) Proposed source/sources of supply. 
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Equipment and machinery, 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
A. II. Materials, Spares and Supplies and equipment for operation of Project. 
Annesore to P C-L 
(This part should be filled up only for revised scheme). 
1. Comparative cost estimate of the last sanctioned and revised schemes : 
Last sanctioned Project Revised Project 
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total 
Exchange Exchange 
1 i 
0) 
Give reasons for the revision in cost estimate. 
Items Reasons for the revision 
8 
(d) 
(e) 
(0 
2. Total expenditure incurred so far : 
Expenditure 
Local Foreign Total 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
3. Progress of work : 
(a) (b) (c) 
As per schedule last Actual Reasons for 
sanctioned achievement delay 
4. Project History : 
Cost Planned Reasons for 
Date period of revision 
Local F.E. Total Comple-
tion in 
months 
Original sanction 
1st Revision 
2nd Revision 
3rd Revision 
PCPPI—41 /Planning Division—20-1 -1987—300. 
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SUMMARY IN DUTCH 
NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
"WERK IN UITVOERING"; De Verborgen Dimensies van de Voortgangscontrole en 
Planning bij de Overheid in Pakistan 
Monitoring wordt in deze studie gedefinieerd als een gestandaardiseerde en met regelmatige 
tussenpozen plaatsvindende verzameling van beknopte informatie en de eventueel daarop-
volgende bewerkingen ter voorbereiding van routinematige besluitvorming met betrekking tot 
vooraf vastgestelde doeleinden en activiteiten. Evaluatie, dat in deze studie wordt afgezet 
tegen monitoring, wordt gedefinieerd als de niet gestandaardiseerde en niet of minder 
regelmatige verzameling alsmede expliciete beoordeling van gewoonlijk al bewerkte 
informatie, ten behoeve van besluitvorming met betrekking tot speciaal voor de gelegenheid 
gedefinieerde doelen en/of activiteiten. 
Monitoring systemen voor ontwikkelingsprogramma's in Derde Wereldlanden mogen zich in 
de tachtiger en negentiger jaren verheugen in een groeiende belangstelling. De ervaringen met 
dergelijke systemen zijn echter tot dusverre niet erg positief geweest. Dit boek stelt in de 
eerste plaats de vraag wat de redenen daarvoor zijn, en in de tweede, hoe en onder welke 
omstandigheden monitoring systemen effectieve instrumenten kunnen worden voor het beheer 
van ontwikkelingsprogramma's. Specifieke informatie en ervaringen opgedaan door de auteur 
tijdens zijn werk bij de overheid in Pakistan gedurende de jaren 1990 tot 1997 worden 
aangewend ter beantwoording. 
Aangezien monitoring systemen over het algemeen deel uitmaken van een geheel van 
plannings- en implementatieactiviteiten is het van belang ze in hun samenhang daarmee te 
bestuderen. In veel ontwikkelingslanden is het bestuur ingebed in een rationeel-centralistisch 
plannings- en implementatieparadigma. Dit paradigma stoelt op de positivistische idee dat de 
sociale werkelijkheid net als de fysieke werkelijkheid eenduidig kan worden gekend en 
daarmee tot op grote hoogte voorspeld en gestuurd. Ideeën dat de overheid een leidende rol 
heeft in de ontwikkeling van het land, dat technische experts binnen het ambtenarenapparaat 
de belangrijkste inbreng dienen te hebben in de politieke besluitvorming, en dat investeringen 
in nieuwe kapitaalgoederen/infrastructuur de kern van het ontwikkelingsbeleid vormen, zijn 
ook belangrijk. Er wordt van uitgegaan dat overheidsorganisaties die op een Weberiaanse 
manier zijn opgezet (dat wil zeggen hiërarchisch gestructureerd en functioneel gespeciali-
seerd), rationeel en gemakkelijk in het algemene belang kunnen werken. In monitoring 
systemen uit de positivistische inslag zich in de nadruk op 1) vertrouwen op slechts één 
hoofdbron van informatie (de projectuitvoerders zelf), 2) financiële gegevens als gemeen-
schappelijke noemer van voortgang, en 3) de gerichtheid op centrale sturing en relatieve 
veronachtzaming van rapportage van problemen omdat die afleiden. 
Het rationeel-centralistische planningsparadigma wordt in deze studie op logisch gronden, 
maar ook op basis van een aantal decennia van slechte ervaringen afgewezen, en tegenover 
een zogenaamd "disjointed incrementalist policy-making paradigm" geplaatst (decentrale 
increméntele beleidsvorming). Bij dit model worden de doelen niet meer noodzakelijkerwijs 
centraal voorgeschreven, maar komen stapsgewijs voort uit het continue overleg tussen de 
diverse maatschappelijke aktoren op alle niveaus. Essentieel voor het paradigma is de idee 
dat de sociale wereld multidimensionaal is en niet definitief gekend kan worden. Om hieraan 
zoveel mogelijk recht te doen zouden in een dergelijk planningsmodel monitoring systemen 
meer uitdrukkelijk moeten steunen op diverse informatiebronnen, diverse verzamelings-
methoden, en diverse soorten informatie. Recente opvattingen in de organisatiekunde 
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ondersteunen daarnaast de idee dat contacten tussen organisaties (dus ook rapportage en 
monitoring) vaak organismische trekken hebben, en plaatsvinden in een machtscontinuüm. 
Door middel van triangulatie van informatiebronnen kan daarmee echter rekening gehouden 
worden. In de evaluatiediscipline is men intussen voor een groot deel afgestapt van de 
veronderstelling dat evaluatie objectief kan zijn en bijvoorbeeld tot de conclusie gekomen dat 
het doen van meerdere evaluaties van verschijnselen, ieder door een andere categorie belang-
hebbenden, beter recht doet aan de werkelijkheid. Dergelijke opvattingen zijn echter nog niet 
echt tot handboeken over monitoring doorgedrongen. 
De basishypothese van deze studie is dat de ook bij donoren nog vaak veronderstelde 
waardevrijheid in de project- en programmamonitoring een fictie is. Projectmonitoring is geen 
clean 'data' verzamelingsinstrument - het levert ook heel veel sterk door belangen gekleurde 
gegevens op. Vervolgens worden als hypothesen opgevoerd dat een rationeel-centralistisch 
planningsparadigma tot problemen leidt, bij zowel planning als uitvoering, en dat ook vele 
problemen met monitoring tot dit paradigma kunnen worden herleid. Tenslotte wordt als 
hypothese geponeerd dat de problemen met de monitoring nog andere, vaak onderschatte, 
oorzaken hebben. De twee belangrijkste daarvan zijn (1) de politiek-organisationele context 
die tot strategisch/opportunistisch beïnvloede rapportage leidt, en (2) de eis van beknoptheid 
die juist in voortgangsrapportagesystemen een zo belangrijke rol speelt, en die met name bij 
de beschrijving van de sociale wereld tot vertekeningen leidt. Uit de aard van de hypothesen 
kan worden afgeleid dat deze niet vatbaar zijn voor strenge toetsing, maar slechts meer of 
minder aannemelijk kunnen worden gemaakt. In de detailstudie van situaties in Pakistan 
zullen ze vooral aan de hand van illustraties worden geadstrueerd. 
Hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 4 behandelen de planningscontext in Pakistan, die ook de 
randvoorwaarden stelt waaronder monitoring systemen moeten functioneren. 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt Pakistan geïntroduceerd. Er wordt vastgesteld dat tot eind tachtiger 
jaren een rationeel-centralistisch beleidsideaal heeft bestaan bij zowel politieke leiding als 
bestuurlijk apparaat, en dat slechts in de laatste tien jaar van grotere democratie aan invloed 
heeft ingeboet. Er wordt geargumenteerd dat het land te divers en instabiel is om een goed 
uitgangspunt te hebben kunnen bieden voor de gepraktiseerde rationeel-centralistische 
planning. Het is vermoedelijk meer geschikt voor meer decentrale incrementalistische 
planning, al zijn ook aan dit model beperkingen verbonden gezien dat het land vermoedelijk 
te weinig pluralistisch is. Factoren als het gebrek aan een solide wettelijk kader, geringe en 
onzekere financiële armslag, en het lage opleidingsniveau van een groot deel van de bevolking 
spelen het land eveneens parten. 
Aangezien de bureaucratie haar macht legitimeert op grond van haar veronderstelde 
technische expertise tracht zij de fictie van rationeel-centralistische planning en bestuur in 
stand te houden en worden de plannings- en monitoringsprocedures gehandhaafd. Zelfs in de 
laatste tien jaar, nu deze vorm van planning voor althans de meeste politici heeft afgedaan, 
zijn haar axioma's nog terug te vinden in bijvoorbeeld het uitsluiten van lokale overheden en 
andere groepen van de politieke en bestuurlijke besluitvorming. Die compliceren het 
besluitvormingsproces te veel. 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK) geïntroduceerd, het administratieve 
gebied in Pakistan waar de hoofdmoot van het basismateriaal van deze studie vandaan komt. 
Ook in AJK spelen er een aantal zaken die beperkingen opleggen aan de effectiviteit van het 
model van centrale planning. Deze gelden bijvoorbeeld een instabiele politieke omgeving, 
feilen in de bureaucratie, geringe projectbeheercapaciteiten, een gebrek aan informatie, en een 
te klein Planning & Development Departement om effectieve sturing te kunnen geven aan het 
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beoogde ontwikkelingsproces. De bureaucratie strijdt in veel gevallen tegen een al te 
gemakkelijk de portemonnee trekkende politiek, maar blijkt zelf intern verdeeld over de 
bestedingen. De vele departementale budgettaire strategieën werken in de richting van 
budgettaire overcommittering. De meer opportunistische rationaliteit van politieke en 
departementale aktoren heeft vaak een grotere invloed dan de rationaliteit van het algemene 
belang. 
In hoofdstuk 4 worden de instrumenten van het Planning & Development Departement 
(P&DD) in AJK beoordeeld op hun vermogen het voorgestane ontwikkelingsproces te sturen. 
De belangrijkste daarvan zijn het vijfjarenplan, het project-goedkeuringsproces, het 
jaarbudget, de projectwerkplannen, en het monitoring- en evaluatiesysteem. Ondanks de 
pretentie van centrale planning en controle worden de instrumenten door het P&DD in feite 
onvoldoende benut voor echte centrale planning. Het vijfjarenplan wordt in de praktijk niet 
gevolgd. Het projectbeoordelingsproces is niet voldoende kritisch en heeft daarenboven te 
maken met gelobby van de vele gekozen vertegenwoordigers. Veel te veel projectvoorstellen 
worden goedgekeurd en als nieuwe projecten toegevoegd aan het ontwikkelingsprogramma. 
Het gevolg is dat de meeste projecten veel te weinig financiën toegeschoven krijgen om 
volgens schema uitgevoerd te kunnen worden. Ook van de mogelijkheid van het Plannings-
departement om op de door lijndepartementen opgestelde projectjaarplannen te reageren, 
wordt geen gebruik gemaakt. Dit is des te meer opvallend aangezien de departementen in de 
loop van het jaar de meeste jaarplannen wijzigen. Het blijkt dat departementen fondsen 
schuiven van het ene naar het andere project en meer aan programmabeheer dan projectbeheer 
doen. Wat betreft monitoring en evaluatie, tenslotte, zijn de volgende instrumenten 
voorhanden: voortgangsrapporten van projecten door uitvoerende departementen geschreven, 
projectbezoek door sectiehoofden van het P&DD, inspecties van de inspecteurs van de Prime 
Minister, het opvoeren van voor M&E geoormerkte fondsen in projectbudgetten, en surveys 
en evaluatierondes ter voorbereiding van het vijfjarenplan of de eindevaluatie van dat plan. 
Van al deze instrumenten wordt alleen het eerste met enige ernst aangewend. 
Geconstateerd wordt dat het departement een aantal gemengde belangen heeft die het 
moeilijk maken de beschikbare instrumenten ook echt toe te passen. De rollen van P&DD als 
enerzijds goedkeurder van projecten en fondsbeheerder en aan de andere kant voortgangs-
controleur staan elkaar in de weg - kritische controle zou tot de conclusie moeten leiden dat 
er veel schort aan projectvoorbereiding en dat P&DD dus zelf fouten maakt bij de 
goedkeuring. De feitelijk prioriteit ligt bij de goedkeuring van projecten; voortgangscontrole 
door P&DD zelf in het veld blijkt nauwelijks plaats te vinden. Daarnaast staat het P&DD 
ambivalent tegenover zowel de politiek als de andere departementen: enerzijds wil men de 
politiek (en andere actoren) zoveel mogelijk buiten de besluitvorming over bestedingen 
houden, aan de andere kant heeft men politieke steun nodig om de strijd om de fondsen 
binnen de bureaucratie te kunnen beslechten. 
Tenslotte worden de effecten van het bestaande plannings- en implementatiesysteem in 
Azad Kashmir beschreven. Ten eerste leidt de mede door P&DD veroorzaakte overcommit-
tering tot grote vertraging bij de uitvoering van projecten. Gemiddelde zou een project binnen 
drie jaar moeten zijn uitgevoerd, maar in de praktijk duurt dit bijna tien jaar. Gedurende al 
deze tijd kunnen de (bouw)projecten niet productief worden aangewend en daalt het 
rendement van de investering sterk; zo sterk dat de meeste niet meer op grond van kosten-
batenanalyses gelegitimeerd kunnen worden. Bovendien leiden de vertragingen en de andere 
problemen tot een formele herziening van bijna de helft van alle projectdocumenten, hetgeen 
nog weer extra administratieve rompslomp met zich meebrengt, en voorts zo'n 43 procent 
kostenverhoging. Deze kostenverhoging is echter nog altijd niet voldoende om alle niet in het 
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oorspronkelijke projectbudget verdisconteerde geldontwaarding (inflatiecorrectie) te kunnen 
compenseren. De studie toont aan dat er vermoedelijk ook nog eens met een vermindering 
van de kwaliteit van het door het project geleverde produkt moet worden gerekend, ter 
waarde van meer dan 50 procent van het projectbudget. 
Dit is nog afgezien van de kwaliteitsverminderende effecten van de corruptie die bij veel 
projectuitvoeringen speelt, maar die voor deze studie niet werden gekwantificeerd. 
Hoofdstukken 5 tot en met 7 concentreren zich op de schriftelijke projectvoortgangsrapportage 
als het in de Pakistaanse bureaucratie belangrijkste bestanddeel van de voortgangscontrole. 
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt het tot 1992 in AJK vigerende projectvoortgangsrapportagesysteem 
onder de loep genomen. Dit systeem was intern in de bureaucratie ontwikkeld en werd later 
vervangen als gevolg van een door UNDTCD uitgevoerd project in de monitoring. Er wordt 
vastgesteld dat dit systeem wel erg aan de magere kant was, met een formulier van maar zes 
kolommen, waarop de voortgang van de projecten diende te worden gerapporteerd. De zes 
kolommen stelden de lezer niet in staat een goed beeld op te bouwen van het project. 
Financiële informatie was nog het belangrijkste bestanddeel van de rapportage, maar er 
bleken bij nader inzien zoveel bezwaren aan te kleven dat zij in elk geval niet kon gelden als 
indicator van fysieke voortgang (hetgeen vaak wordt aangenomen). Zelfs voor financiële 
besluitvorming inzake het schuiven van fondsen tussen projecten en departementen was het 
rapportagesysteem eigenlijk ongeschikt. Fysieke voortgang werd zeer fragmentarisch en 
onsystematisch gerapporteerd. Problemen, ten slotte, werden in het oude systeem nauwelijks 
gerapporteerd door de departementen. Slechts een enkel departement ondernam een serieuze 
poging om problemen aan het papier toe te vertrouwen. Bij nadere bestudering bleek dat dit 
departement in een strijd was gewikkeld met een ander departement, dat voor de bouw van 
diens gebouwen zorg droeg. Door het uitgebreid rapporteren van bouwproblemen probeerde 
het superviserende departement van de regering gedaan te krijgen dat zij zelf een bouween-
heid mocht opzetten. 
Het gebruik dat van de projectrapportage wordt gemaakt was minimaal. De centrale 
voortgangsbijeenkomsten die onder het voorzitterschap van de premier van AJK worden 
gehouden, werden in beslag genomen door een heel aantal andere, veelal willekeurige maar 
niettemin belangrijke zaken. Waarschijnlijk instinctief werden de rapporten door de premier 
als informatiebron afgewezen: te 'gekleurd' om te kunnen worden geloofd. Ook door de 
slechte voorbereiding van de vergaderingen werd niet het maximum gehaald uit de 
projectrapportage. 
Hoofdstuk 6 let bij de bespreking van een aantal andere systemen van projectvoortgangs-
rapportage speciaal op strategische en perspectivistische vertekeningen. Strategische 
vertekeningen verdraaien de werkelijkheid bewust, om organisaties of personen in een 
gunstiger daglicht te laten treden. Perspectivistische vertekeningen vloeien voort uit het 
noodzakelijk partiële perspectief dat een persoon of organisatie heeft op de waarneming van 
een verschijnsel. Uit de ervaringen met de introductie van een nieuw projectrapportage-
systeem in AJK na 1992, blijkt dat technische verbeteringen weliswaar hebben geleid tot een 
grotere hoeveelheid informatie, maar dat strategische en perspectivistische aspecten die 
informatie vaak toch moeilijk interpreteerbaar houden. Veelal blijven de betere en meer 
gedetailleerde vragen zelfs onbeantwoord. Doordat bepaalde vooral perspectivistische 
vertekeningen een systematisch patroon hebben, kan bijvoorbeeld aan de hand van tijdreeksen 
toch nog wel enige computeranalyse plaatsvinden op de gegevens. Vertekeningen treden 
speciaal aan de dag indien het doel van de rapportage verandert flbijv. kwartaalrapportage of 
een projectherziening), of indien de instantie aan wie de rapportage is gericht verandert (AJK 
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of federale overheid). Dat heeft dan onmiddellijk gevolgen voor de manier waarop problemen 
worden gerapporteerd. Voorts blijkt de persoon van de rapporteur van belang. Sommige 
rapporteurs hebben stokpaardjes. Wel werden aanwijzingen gevonden voor een in het 
algemeen sterke aansluiting van rapporteurs bij de (zeer gekleurde) visie van het departement 
waartoe ze behoorden. 
Aan de hand van een survey over het Pakistaanse Social Action Programme werd tenslotte 
aangetoond hoe sterk de waarneming van aspecten van dat programma was gerelateerd aan 
de categorie van waarnemers. Zo kijken dorpelingen heel anders aan tegen schoolvoor-
zieningen dan hoofdmeesters of districtsambtenaren van het departement van onderwijs; en 
hoofdmeesters kijken weer heel anders dan districtsambtenaren, dit ondanks dat ze tot 
hetzelfde departement behoren. Dit geldt zelfs voor de meest simpele zaken zoals de 
aanwezigheid van schoolboeken in scholen. Als men naar de status van onderwijsvoor-
zieningen informeert, dan is het dus verstandig die vraag te stellen aan meerdere categorieën 
belanghebbenden. Ook in 'technische', 'objectieve' monitoring systemen. 
Hoofdstuk 7 abstraheert van de strategische en perspectivistische oriëntaties van informatie, 
en richt zich op twee andere aspecten van projectvoortgangsrapportage. Het eerste heeft te 
maken met het fundamentele probleem van monitoring, namelijk het reduceren van de 
weergave van de projectvoortgang tot een paar essentiële waarnemingen. Er wordt betoogd 
dat dit vooral moeilijk is voor institutionele en sociale projecten. Dit komt omdat deze 
projecten zich met maatschappelijke verschijnselen bezighouden die zich moeilijk sluitend 
laten definiëren. Deze verschijnselen worden in sommige literatuur 'wicked' of 'messy' 
genoemd, dwz. ongrijpbaar. Ze hebben hun weerslag op de definiëring van zowel 
projectdoelstellingen, projectvoortgang, en problemen. Er wordt betoogd dat het laatste geval 
zelfs voor alle projecten moet gelden, ook technische. Problemen kunnen bijna altijd in een 
boomstructuur worden uitgezet, en de keuze voor het verkiezen van het aangeven van het ene 
probleem boven het andere, verwante probleem op een ander niveau, is vaak subjectief. In 
de context van AJK is het daarbij nog zo dat de problemen van projecten veelal systeem-
gerelateerd zijn (bijv. het tekort aan fondsen). Dat maakt het voor veel rapporteurs erg 
moeilijk - en daarmee willekeurig - te besluiten een probleem te rapporteren zonder daarbij 
de indruk te wekken dat de situatie veel ernstiger is dan bij andere projecten. 
Daarnaast blijkt Asbhy's Wet van de Benodigde Variëteit relevant voor projectvoortgangs-
beschrijving. Vrij vertaald: hoe minder aspecten van voortgang in een rapportagesysteem 
worden doorgegeven, des te groter is de kans dat er een vertekend beeld ontstaat van die 
voortgang. De effecten van deze wetmatigheid hebben met name relevantie voor op 
schriftelijke rapportage steunende monitoring systemen, aangezien die als essentiële 
randvoorwaarde beknoptheid hebben. De kwaliteit van de waarneming heeft dus snel te lijden 
onder al te summiere rapportage. 
Het tweede aspect van de voortgangsrapportage geldt meer specifiek voor Pakistan en houdt 
in dat het onderwerp van de monitoring - de uitvoering van projecten - slechts een 
gedeeltelijk beeld oplevert van waar het Pakistaanse ontwikkelingsprogramma in naam op uit 
is, namelijk de ontwikkeling van het land. Daar zijn verschillende oorzaken voor. Ten eerste 
bestaat het ontwikkelingsprogramma voornamelijk uit kapitaalinvesteringsprojecten, terwijl 
voor ontwikkeling veel meer nodig is. Ten tweede vindt niet alle kapitaalinvestering plaats 
door middel van het ontwikkelingsbudget, zodat het argument dat de monitoring dan toch in 
ieder geval alle kapitaalinvesteringen volgt, ook niet opgaat. Ten derde levert niet alle 
kapitaalinvestering gedaan in het ontwikkelingsbudget nieuwe capaciteit op: er wordt ook veel 
vervangen of gerepareerd. Ten vierde is niet alles wat in het ontwikkelingsbudget zit 
kapitaalinvestering. Ten vijfde kan veel van wat in het normale budget zit ook leiden tot 
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(economische) ontwikkeling van het land. Bijvoorbeeld (en vooral) investeringen in onderwijs 
door middel van het aantrekken van onderwijzers of het verhogen van hun salaris. Daarnaast 
zijn fondsen besteed aan zaken die in het algemeen niet met economische ontwikkeling 
worden geassocieerd soms ook heel belangrijk. Zo is volgens de New Institutional Economics 
bijvoorbeeld een adekwaat functionerende rechterlijke macht heel belangrijk voor de stabiliteit 
van het raamwerk waarbinnen economische activiteit moet plaatsvinden. Tenslotte is de 
monitoring gericht op de uitvoering van projecten en niet op de resultaten daarna. Deze 
blikvernauwing wordt nog in de hand gewerkt door het feit dat het P&DD alleen fondsen 
beheert voor projectuitvoering, en de fondsen voor de noodzakelijke bestedingen daarna door 
het Departement van Financiën worden beheerd. Monitoring systemen voor bijvoorbeeld 
openbare dienstverlening zijn in Pakistan veel minder goed ontwikkeld. 
Met andere woorden, monitoring systemen die in Pakistan alleen het ontwikkelings-
programma volgen leveren maar een zeer partieel beeld op van de voortgang met de door de 
overheid gestimuleerde ontwikkeling in het land. 
In hoofdstuk 8 worden de conclusies getrokken en een aantal implicaties uitgewerkt voor 
zowel verdere theorievorming als de plannings- en monitoringpraktijk in Pakistan. Na de 
constatering dat het overheidsmonitoring systeem niet goed functioneert, zelfs niet nadat 
daarin een aantal technische verbeteringen waren aangebracht, wordt de vraag gesteld waarom 
er toch mee wordt doorgegaan. Als mogelijk antwoord wordt gesuggereerd dat er ten eerste 
misvattingen leven bij organisaties en besluitvormers: bijv. hoe meer informatie er 
beschikbaar is, hoe beter de besluiten zullen worden. Ten tweede kunnen er psychologische 
factoren in het spel zijn: informatie heeft in bureaucratieën een symboolfunctie. Informatie 
legitimeert besluiten; projectvoortgangsrapportage is een van de rituelen die de technische 
superioriteit van de bureaucratie moet verbeelden. 
De bevindingen van de detailstudie ondersteunen dat een post-positivistische benadering van 
monitoring en evaluatie zinvol is. Voorts blijkt de problematiek van project en programma 
monitoring in veel opzichten identiek te zijn aan die van project/programma evaluatie. 
Met betrekking tot de planningspraktijk worden een aantal precondities geschetst, die voor 
verbetering zouden kunnen zorgen. De belangrijkste daarvan zijn het onderbrengen van alle 
fondsenverlenende functies van de centrale overheid bij het Finance Department; een nieuwe 
rol voor het planningsdepartement; het vergroten van de politieke controle op het werk van 
overheidsdepartementen; het verbeteren van financiële controlesystemen; en het scheppen / 
versterken van de lokale overheid als tegenwicht voor de centrale overheid. 
Voor de monitoringspraktijk wordt aangeraden af te stappen van de idee van centrale 
monitoring door middel van één systeem, gewoonlijk gebaseerd op het rapporteren van 
voortgang door de departementen die ook de uitvoering verzorgen. Het opzetten van meerdere 
concurrerende en aanvullende systemen wordt aanbevolen, waarin alle belanghebbenden in 
projecten en programma's deelnemen. Door middel van triangulatie van de resultaten van al 
die systemen en informatie moeten besluitvormers dan tot de beste besluiten komen. Het 
mandateren van momtoringfuncties bij (secties van) departementen is daarnaast een essentiële 
voorwaarde om problemen als gevolg van gemengde belangen van organisaties te helpen 
voorkomen. 
Tenslotte worden systemen aanbevolen die ook andere voor ontwikkeling van het land van 
belang zijnde aspecten volgen, zoals de openbare dienstverlening door de overheid. 
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